Discount window borrowing,monetary policy,and the post-October 6, 1979 federal reserve operating procedure

A demand schedule for discount window borrowing based on profit-maximizing bank behavior is derived. A feature of non-price rationing at the discount window making longer duration borrowing more costly is shown to make lagged borrowing and expected future spreads between the Federal funds rate and the discount rate relevant to the current borrowing decision. Consequently, both the size of the coefficients in the borrowing functions as well as the form of the function itself depend on expected Fed policy toward the spread. The demand function for discount window borrowing provides the critical link by which non-borrowed reserve control affects short-term interest rates and ultimately the money supply under post-October 6, 1979 reserve targeting. The analysis suggests some reasons why the Fed has experienced difficulty in specifying, estimating, and utilizing a discount window borrowing function in the non-borrowed reserve operating procedure.     

The Federal Reserve’s operating procedure,nonborrowed reserves,borrowed reserves and the liquidity effect

Recently, a number of researchers (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano et al., 1996a,b, 1997; Evans and Marshall, 1998; Strongin, 1995; Pagan and Robertson, 1995; Brunner, 1994) claim to have found evidence of a statistically significant liquidity effect in a recursive structural VAR using nonborrowed reserves (NBR). It is claimed that innovations to NBR reflect the exogenous policy actions of the Fed. This paper argues that the opposite is true. Specifically, I show that the Fed has an incentive to offset bank-initiated discount window borrowing when it implements the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy directive, and that it has done so since the late 1950s. This practice has created a negative contemporaneous covariance between NBR and the funds rate that has been incorrectly attributed to the liquidity effect. By showing that these models capture the endogenous response of the Fed to bank borrowing on NBR, rather than the effect of exogenous policy actions on the funds rate, this paper also resolves the puzzle of the vanishing liquidity effect noted by Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995).     

Operational outages and aggregate uncertainty in the federal funds market

This paper uses operational problems at depository institutions in sending Fedwire payments as a proxy for aggregate uncertainty in end-of-day Fed account positions and then examines funds market behavior on those days. The results suggest that increased uncertainty is associated with a deviation of the federal funds rate from the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target rate; the magnitude depends on the severity of the difficulty, the payment volume of the affected participant, and the time of day. The intraday standard deviation of the federal funds rate is also affected by operational outages. Moreover, extensions to Fedwire are more likely on days with possible outages, and discount window borrowing picks up on these days as well.     

EFFECT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES ON BANK EQUITY RETURNS

We investigate the reaction of bank equity returns to changes in the relevant Federal Reserve (Fed) policy tool, which is the federal funds rate during periods of interest rate targeting and the discount rate during periods of reserves targeting. Three policy periods from 1974 to 1996 are investigated. We find that bank equity returns are inversely related to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool and that the degree of sensitivity of bank equity returns is conditioned on the direction of the change in the Fed policy tool. Also, we find that values of larger commercial banks and low‐capital‐ratio commercial banks are more exposed to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool. JEL classification: G11, G12, G14.     

Near integration,bank reluctance,and discount window borrowing

This study puts forth stationarity considerations in explaining the observed breakdown between aggregate Discount Window borrowing and the spread between the Federal Funds rate and the discount rate during the post-1987 period. Tests with biweekly data indicate stationarity for adjustment borrowing, but cannot reject the unit root for the spread. The Goodfriend–Dutkowsky dynamic implicit cost formulation can accommodate the contrasting stationarity properties. Structural restrictions are compatible with stationary borrowing and a stationary or near integrated spread. While empirical findings from the static model indicate greater bank reluctance to borrow over time, the dynamic model gives considerably less support.     

U.S. monetary policy indicators and international stock returns: 1970-2001

It is documented in the literature that U.S. and many international stock returns series are sensitive to U.S. monetary policy. Using monthly data, this empirical study examines the short-term sensitivity of six international stock indices (the Standard & Poor 500 [S&P] Stock Index, the Morgan Stanley Capital International [MSCI] European Stock Index, the MSCI Pacific Stock Index, and three MSCI country stock indices: Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom) to two major groups of U.S. monetary policy indicators. These two groups, which have been suggested by recent research to influence stock returns, are based on the U.S. discount rate and the federal funds rate. The first group focuses on two binary variables designed to indicate the stance in monetary policy. The second group of monetary indicators involves the federal funds rate and includes the average federal funds rate, the change in the federal funds rate, and the spread of the federal funds rate to 10-year Treasury note yield. Dividing the sample period (1970-2001) into three monetary operating regimes, we find that not all policy indicators influence international stock returns during all U.S. monetary operating periods or regimes. Our results imply that the operating procedure and/or target vehicle used by the Federal Reserve Board (Fed) influences the efficacy of the policy indicator. We suggest caution in using any monetary policy variable to explain and possibly forecast U.S. and international stock returns in all monetary conditions.     

The Effect of Federal Reserve Accounting Rules on the Equilibrium Level of Overnight Repo Rates

This paper addresses whether Federal Reserve Board accounting requirements are sufficiently pervasive to create regularities in government overnight repurchase agreement (repo) rates. US bank settlement regulations allow overnight government repos as substitutes for Federal (Fed) funds. We find that overnight government repos exhibit rate changes and variance regularities consistent with regularities identified in the Fed funds market, which have been shown to result directly from the Federal Reserve regulations and accounting policies governing the US bank settlement process. Thus, we conclude that the overnight government repo rates are influenced in a similar manner by regulatory rules. However, since the rate changes are not large economically, the influence of regulatory accounting practices does not violate the premise of an efficient market.     

美联储发布利率预测的目的及影响

2012年1月26日,美联储公开市场委员会（FOMC）首次发布对2012年内以及未来较长期间联邦基金利率水平的预测。这是美联储提高货币政策透明度和有效性的最新举措。美联储长期维持超低利率有助于本国经济复苏,但其负面影响不容忽视。     

A Micro Model of the Federal Funds Market

This paper demonstrates that valuable insights into the determination of Federal funds rates can be gained through modeling the micro-decisions of market participants. Fed fund demand functions are derived for different bank valuation functions and several implications are discussed. Specifically, it is: (i) possible to rationalize the observation that large banks are net purchasers and small banks net sellers of Fed funds; (ii) to explain the positive spread of Fed funds rates over other short-term money market rates; and (iii) to link the size of this spread to the Federal Reserve's underlying monetary policy strategy.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

Reserve regulation and recourse as a source of risk premia in the federal funds market

In this paper we demonstrate that there is a pronounced and persistent daily pattern of returns in the federal funds market, centered on Wednesday. We present evidence that explains this phenomenon as a reflection of the optimal behavior of banks operating in an environment in which there are effective reserve requirements and a penalty cost for recourse to discount borrowing. In particular, we report empirical evidence that shows there was a significant upward shift in the amplitude of this pattern of daily returns that resulted from (1) the increase in uncertainty associated with the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures during the 1979–1982 period, and (2) the imposition of a surcharge on discount borrowing instituted by the Federal Reserve. Our results demonstrate that what otherwise might be regarded as anomalous interest-rate behavior is consistent with the optimal response of banks to the regulatory environment within which they operate.     

Stock Returns over the FOMC Cycle

We document that since 1994, the equity premium is earned entirely in weeks 0, 2, 4, and 6 in Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) cycle time, that is, even weeks starting from the last FOMC meeting. We causally tie this fact to the Fed by studying intermeeting target changes, Fed funds futures, and internal Board of Governors meetings. The Fed has affected the stock market via unexpectedly accommodating policy, leading to large reductions in the equity premium. Evidence suggests systematic informal communication of Fed officials with the media and financial sector as a channel through which news about monetary policy has reached the market.     

The banking industry under uncertain monetary policy

The optimal loan decisions of banks are shown to be dependent on the banks' rational forecast of the future federal funds rate which in turn is related to the policy rule used by the Fed. Consequently, a change in the policy of the Fed will alter the reduced form model of the banking industry. This result brings into question the Fed's ability to predict and control the money stock under the procedure adopted by the Fed between October 1979 and September 1982.     

Credit risk dynamics in response to changes in the federal funds target: The implication for firm short-term debt

The recent credit crisis has raised a number of interesting questions regarding the role of the Federal Reserve Bank and the effectiveness of its expected and unexpected interventions in financial markets, especially during the crisis, given its mandate. This paper reviews and evaluates the impact of expected and unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target on credit risk premia. The paper's main innovation is the use of an ACH-VAR (autoregressive conditional hazard VAR) model to generate the Fed's expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks which are then used to determine the effects of a Federal Reserve policy change on counterparty credit risk and more importantly short-term firm debt financing. The findings answer a longstanding question sought by researchers on the effect of policy makers' announcements on firm debt financing. The results clearly show that the Federal Reserve influences short-term debt financing through the credit channel for both expansionary and contractionary monetary policies. In particular, we find that the growth in counterparty risk appears less responsive to anticipated responses in the Fed funds rate that fail to materialize than to an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. Finally, we also document that the results appear to validate the Feds interventions in financial markets to stem counterparty risk and to make liquidity more readily available to firms.     

The Fed and short-term rates: Is it open market operations,open mouth operations or interest rate smoothing?

It is widely believed that the Fed controls the federal funds rate by altering the degree of pressure in the reserve market through open market operations when it changes its target for the funds rate. Recently, however, several analysts have suggested that the Fed need not conduct open market operations to change the funds rate. Rather, they argue it is sufficient that the Fed indicate its desire for the funds rate. This paper notes that there is yet a third alternative, the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis, that suggests that the Fed does not move rates per se but, rather, smooths the transition of rates to the new equilibrium required by economic shocks. This paper tests the open market and open mouth alternatives using a methodology first used by Cook and Hahn [Journal of Monetary Economics (1989a) 331]. Finding no evidence that either open market operations or open mouth operations can account for the close relationship between the funds rate and the funds rate target, a variety of evidence consistent with the interest-rate-smoothing hypothesis is considered. The results suggest that many changes in the Fed’s funds rate target are an endogenous response to economic events and suggest that an alternative way to identify exogenous changes in policy is to identify exogenous changes in the Fed’s funds rate target.     

Asymmetric Effects of Interest Rate Changes on Stock Prices

This study examines the stock price adjustment process around announcements of changes in the federal funds rate target in the 1990s using an asymmetric autoregressive exponential GARCH model (ASAR‐EGARCH). We find that target change announcements convey new information to the stock market. Risk aversion increases before the announcement of a rate change, and especially before the announcement of a joint target and discount rate change. The volatility estimates suggest that such joint rate changes send a clearer signal to the stock market about monetary policy objectives relative to unilateral target changes. Our findings are consistent with overreaction in the wake of bad news (rate hikes), and point to a shift in volatility from before to after the rate change announcement since the adoption of the immediate disclosure policy of the Federal Open Market Committee in February 1994.     

美联储利率承诺的宏观经济效应

作为金融危机后美联储非常规货币政策的重要手段之一,利率承诺对美国宏观经济变化的影响颇受关注。本文选取美国2001年1月至2011年8月的月度数据,以2008年12月为分界点,采用VAR模型实证检验了美联储非常规货币政策实施前后利率承诺政策对金融市场和实体经济的影响。研究结果表明:(1)零利率承诺缩短了金融市场对基准利率变动响应的时滞,但作用持续期明显缩短,其中股票市场和商业房地产市场的响应尤为明显;(2)零利率承诺政策有利于提升消费者信心,并抑制通货紧缩;(3)零利率承诺措施对实体经济的影响要大于对金融市场的影响。     

Controlling Monetary Aggregates: The Discount Window

This paper argues that current discount window policy, coupled with non-borrowed reserve targeting of the Federal Reserve, makes the quantity of high-powered money endogenous. Examination of the advisability of this procedure in a stochastic environment is conducted using a general equilibrium financial model. It is concluded that the current policy reduces the destabilizing effects of shifts between various depository financial assets, but increases the effect of other asset portfolio shifts and aggregate supply disturbances. These results are consistent with the work of Poole inasmuch as the current debate over discount policy is a repackaging of the debate over interest rate or aggregates control for monetary policy.     

The Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and overnight interest rates: Empirical modeling of exit strategies

This paper provides a comprehensive study of the interplay between the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet and overnight interest rates. We model both the supply of and the demand for excess reserves. Treating outright securities holdings of the Federal Reserve as a policy tool, we estimate the effects of unconventional monetary policy on overnight funding rates. Further, we offer the first empirical assessment of the FOMC’s principles of the exit strategy. Assuming a path for removing monetary policy accommodation that is consistent with the FOMC’s exit principles, we project that the federal funds rate increases to 70 basis points by 2016, settling in a corridor bracketed by the discount rate and the interest rate on excess reserves, as excess reserves of depository institutions decline to near zero.     

Discount window borrowing after 2003: The explicit reduction in implicit costs

In 2003, the Federal Reserve introduced primary credit as its main discount window lending program. This program replaced the adjustment credit program, which, subject to a number of restrictions, had generated a stigma associated with borrowing from the Federal Reserve. Lessening the stigma of borrowing was viewed as essential for reducing the reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve. We develop a structural model of daily borrowing. Using this model, we estimate the implicit cost associated with borrowing. Our results suggest that the stigma of borrowing is significantly reduced.