内部审计在人民银行内控制度建设中的作用论析

本文以阐述内部审计与内部控制制度建设的联系为逻辑起点,并结合实际,逐步分析了内部审计在人民银行内部控制制度建设中的作用,最后探讨了内部审计在人民银行内部控制制度建设中的履职方向。     

基于经典审计理论的政府综合财务报告审计制度构建

随着政府会计制度改革深入推进,政府综合财务报告制度日趋完善。从监督管理视角出发,政府会计制度改革的四大任务之一——政府财务报告审计制度的构建迫在眉睫。以经典审计理论为依托,提出构建政府综合财务报告审计制度的理论框架。在此框架中,审计目标是逻辑起点,审计主体是该业务的主要实施者,审计内容即作用对象,审计模式是实施手段,审计报告是最终的业务成果,对成果的有效运用反向助力起点目标的实现,从而形成一个相对完整的框架体系。     

审计理论结构逻辑起点新思考——审计本质目标

审计理论结构逻辑起点是构造审计理论体系的出发点和最基本的理论范畴,对审计理论结构的建立和发展有着决定性的作用,而逻辑起点的选择应符合一定的要求。本文探析了以审计本质目标为审计理论结构逻辑起点的可行性,并由此构建了以审计本质目标为逻辑起点的审计理论结构。     

审计理论体系逻辑起点新探

自20世纪90年代以来,西方的新制度经济学及产权理论、交易费用理论传入我国,与我国的制度演变相结合,引起了我国经济学的革命,也掀起了作为经济学的分支学科——会计学的革命。我们也有必要从新的视角对整个审计理论体系进行审视,这种审视的系统性、深刻性,要求首先对赖以演绎出整个审计理论体系的逻辑起点进行新的审视。逻辑起点具有先导性,是推动学科研究进一步发展成熟的基础;逻辑起点还同时具有终极性,这既意味着它是审计理论中最为基本的范畴,同时也是审计理论体系的出发点和目的。文章全面剖析了审计动因的产权因素,从产权经济学角度审视审计理论体系,确立审计理论体系的逻辑起点——产权动因论。     

审计理论框架新论

信息认证既是审计活动的历史起点,也是审计理论框架构建的逻辑起点.以信息认证为逻辑起点,审计理论框架由信息认证、审计本质、审计目标、审计假设、审计准则等要素组成.审计基本理论框架的深入研究,可以避免审计实践的盲目性、无序性,大大减少注册会计师审计的执业风险和与注册会计师有牵连的会计舞弊案件的发生,维护资本市场的正常秩序,促进社会主义市场经济的健康发展.     

人民银行开展信息系统审计的逻辑起点与路径选择

近年来,人民银行各类信息系统纷纷上线,如何加强和改进人民银行信息系统风险审计已成为当前人民银行内审工作最重要的方面之一.本文在对制约人民银行开展信息系统审计的瓶颈因素进行调查和论述的基础上,认为应结合总行审计转型要求,以风险导向分析为信息系统审计的逻辑起点,并提出了加强和改善人民银行信息系统审计的发展路径.     

信息理论与独立审计制度

当人类文明的脚步刚刚迈入二十一世纪,独立审计师们却遭遇了多事之秋。国内外频繁发生的大公司财务舞弊事件,沉重打击了全世界对独立审计的信心。近代会计审计史表明,证券市场发生的重大危机事件,必然影响甚至改变会计审计的发展进程、发展模式和方向。建立在财产委托代理关系基础上的审计制度正面临着痛苦的选择。本文试图从信息理论角度探讨独立审计制度的改革。一、信息理论1.信息理论。信息论认为,为了使资本市场的资源配置有效,在决策时需要可靠的信息。审计,能使这些信息可靠,即审计     

论审计理论的逻辑起点

审计理论逻辑起点应是审计理论体系中最基本、最概括、最简明的一个理论范畴；它必须能联系审计理论与审计实践，它能推导论证所有其他相关的审计理论范畴。审计理论的逻辑起点可以是多元的，审计环境与审计本质共同决定了审计目标，二者有“汇合点”，因而共同构成审计理论的逻辑起点。     

中英内部审计制度之比较

内部审计是一项独立、客观的保证和咨询活动,其目的在于增加价值和改进组织的经营,它通过系统的方法,评价和改进风险管理、控制和管理过程的效果,帮助组织实现其目标。中英两国有不同的社会政治经济制度,因而在内部审计的业务内容和组织形式等方面各有独特之处。一、英国内部审计制度(一)内部审计的产生与发展现代内部审计是在20世纪40年代以后发展起来的,1948年英国在伦敦成立了国际内部审计师协会的分会,即英国内部审计师协会。该协会的成立大大促进了英国内部审计的发展。(二)内部审计机构英国内部审计的形式有三种:由公司内部设置的审计…     

中国国家审计制度变迁：历史与逻辑勾画

国家审计是国家治理系统的重要组成部分,具有产权保护功能。制度市场的非均衡引致的国家财产权益保护问题决定了国家审计制度变迁具有必然性;国家审计制度变迁的目标是维护国家财产权益和经济安全,变迁路径遵循“诱致性变迁为主、强制性变迁为辅”,并具有很强的历史继承性,未来国家审计制度将实现从“产权为本”到“人权为本”、“政府主导”到“公民主导”的历史性变迁。     

Corporate director liability and monitoring preferences

An important issue in the regulation of corporate behavior is its impact on the monitoring configuration selected by top management. In this article, we provide evidence consistent with the notion that the recent trend toward audit committee formation, and the movement toward Big-Eight auditors, are responses to increased legal exposure of the board of directors, notably stemming from the passage of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. The costs associated with changes in monitoring configurations are also considered. In particular, it is argued that auditor assistance can substantially reduce the cost of audit committee formation. Because external auditors may have differential incentives to support audit committee formation, a hypothesis linking auditor identity and audit committee formation is offered. Recent auditor changes and audit committee formations of American Stock Exchange companies are examined to provide positive evidence for the theory. The data reveal a clear trend to form audit committees, and a movement to Big-Eight auditors. Underscoring the importance of auditor involvement, it is shown that audit committees were more likely to be formed given recent selection of a new Big-Eight auditor.     

事务所战略、行业特征与客户选择

本文试图通过客户选择行为来研究事务所专门化经营战略及其实施的具体策略,以期为事务所从内涵发展方面实现做大做强提供有益的途径。研究发现,事务所的专门化经营战略促使客户偏好于集中选择事务所,而行业内的客户出于竞争驱动偏好于选择不同于竞争对手的事务所,从而促使其分散选择;说明专门化经营战略是有效的竞争战略,且更容易在竞争程度较低的行业内得到发展。这一结论将为我国事务所经营竞争战略和未来发展方向提供经验证据。     

审计师声誉研究:述评与展望

审计师声誉是审计师保持独立性的动机,对审计师声誉的研究在2001年安然事件后逐渐增多并引发了广泛关注。现有文献主要从审计师声誉的形成、作用、毁损与修复机制等方面展开。具体而言,监管、行业专门化、审计质量、媒体及法律等是审计师声誉形成的重要影响因素,审计师声誉的建立有助于审计师保持独立、提高审计质量和收费等,而审计师声誉的毁损将会导致市场反应和溢出效应,同时也催生了相应的声誉修复问题。本文的综述有助于全面了解审计师声誉的现状并可能对其未来发展方向提供建议。     

上市公司董事会特征与审计费用率

本文以披露了2003年年报审计费用的上市公司为样本,借助回归分析方法,研究了审计费用率与董事会特征的相关性。本文发现,审计费用率与独立董事的规模显著负相关,与董事会的独立性、非独立董事规模显著正相关,与董事会会议次数不相关;与审计委员会的设立、独立董事的薪酬相关性不显著。客户规模、子公司个数、应收账款和存货在总资产中的比重、审计任期仍是影响审计费用率的主要因素;审计任期与审计费用率的相关性说明,审计师首次执行审计业务时不仅没有审计折价现象,反而可能存在显著的审计溢价。发现表明,独立董事相对规模较大的董事会支持高质量的审计服务,而绝对规模较大的董事会更可能改善公司内部控制环境。     

Legal systems and auditor independence

This paper examines whether an appropriate legal system, which is a combination of a legal regime and a damage apportionment rule, effectively enhances auditor independence. Economic and psychological hypotheses derived from a one-period game model in which the auditor may commit either a technical audit failure (resulting from the auditor’s inability to detect true output given a lack of audit effort) or an independence audit failure (resulting from the auditor’s intentional misreporting on false output) are tested. Three major findings are documented. First, auditor independence affects firm investment, which in turn affects audit effort. Under this strategic dependence, no single legal system can provoke audit effort, improve auditor independence, and encourage firm investment simultaneously. To enhance auditor independence and motivate investment, a legal system consisting of both a strict regime and a proportionate rule is preferred. Second, the strict regime induces more auditor independence than the negligence regime, while the proportionate rule induces higher audit effort than the joint-and-several rule. Finally, auditors’ moral reasoning and penalty for misreporting are both positively associated with their independence. In addition, the effect of moral reasoning on auditor independence diminishes as the level of penalty increases. These two results hold only when the legal systems that auditors face are considered.     

The influence of auditor narcissism and moral disengagement on risk assessments of a narcissistic client CFO

Global capital markets rely heavily on independent and skeptical auditors as gatekeepers to provide assurance that corporate financial reports are free of material fraud. The rise of narcissism among the ranks of both client and audit professionals challenge this gatekeeper function. In addition, auditor moral disengagement may undermine auditor skepticism, further eroding public confidence in the integrity of financial reporting and the audit process. We conduct a quasi-experiment with 118 auditors from three international audit firms. In a simulated interview with a client CFO, we examine whether auditors underestimate risks of fraudulent financial statements due to the interactive effects of (1) client narcissism (manipulated verbally and nonverbally) and (2) auditor narcissism. We also examine the influence of auditor moral disengagement on client risk assessments. Results indicate that CFO verbal and nonverbal narcissism significantly influenced auditors’ assessment of management-related client risk. Moreover, auditor narcissism was found to interactively influence client risk inferences such that auditors higher in narcissism exhibited narcissistic tolerance (lower risk assessments) when the hypothetical CFO displayed high verbal narcissism. Auditor moral disengagement was negatively associated with client risk assessments. We discuss the implication of these findings on future audit judgment research, audit firm policy and training on maintaining auditor skepticism, and the audit oversight role of standard-setters.     

论民国时期政府审计思想的特点及其启示

民国时期产生了具有近代意义的政府审计思想,本文的目的是归纳它的特点及其启示。通过梳理、分析和归纳相关历史文献,发现民国时期政府审计思想有五大特点:从简单模仿日本审计制度到结合中国国情;注意事前审计;在机构设置、监察权行使方式和报告关系上实行监审合一;政府审计组织独立于行政组织,实行审计人员限制兼职和回避制度,确保人员独立;规定审计会议制度,推进民主审计。这一时期审计思想对当代的启示有:目前政府审计组织的"行政型"模式符合中国国情;由全国人大审计委员会对财政预算进行事前审计,对于预算支出,非经审计核签国库不得支付;合并监察部与审计署为监审部,提高它的地位至副总理级;在审计法规中明确审计会议制度,规定重大审计事项和重要人员调度须经审计会议决定。     

会计师事务所的属性重要性与审计收费——基于中国会计师事务所综合评价前百家信息的证据

审计收费是对事务所的审计师团队努力的回报,而审计师团队有多种不同重要程度的属性,因此有必要把会计事务所作为一个拥有多个属性重要性的系统,具体考察其对于审计收费的影响。本文根据中国注册会计师协会年度会计师事务所综合评价前百家信息,具体考察了会计事务所的属性重要性对审计收费的影响。研究表明,事务所中的CPA的教育结构、CPA的经验(年龄)结构和事务所综合规模对审计收费具有显著正向影响。事务所其他属性与审计收费未发现存在显著相关性。     

The dominant senior manager and the reasonably careful, skilful, and cautious auditor

This paper examines a paradox in corporate audit history that threatens the credibility of the current audit as a means of protecting stakeholders from corrupt senior managers. Using a historical analysis of legal cases of fraudulent reporting and subsequent public accountancy responses, the study reveals the paradox of a corporate auditor denying or limiting responsibility to detect material accounting misstatement (MAM) facilitated by dominant senior managers (DSM), while relying on the honesty of senior managers. The primary finding of the legal case analysis is the persistent presence of a DSM or team of DSM in the context of various contributing features, and the creation by Victorian lawyers of a model of excuses for the corporate auditor. The primary finding from the responses of public accountants is, within the context of the model of excuses and the assumption of managerial honesty, continuous denial, or limitation of auditor responsibility for detecting MAM facilitated by DSM. The consequence of this history is that DSM intent on MAM currently face corporate auditors generally untrained to assess the audit risk of managerial domination facilitating MAM. The paper's single recommendation is that corporate auditors be educated and trained to assess the audit risk associated with DSM facilitating MAM. The paper's contribution to corporate auditing is its use of historical analysis to bring together previously known but relatively disparate matters into a coherent whole that signals a fatal flaw in existing practice.