上市公司董事会特征与审计质量的实证分析——以山东省济南市上市公司为例

济南市上市公司董事会特征与审计质量存在一定程度的相关性,如董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事薪酬与审计质量显著正相关等;董事长与总经理兼任情况与审计质量呈显著负相关;董事会会议次数、四委会设立比例与审计质量有不显著正相关关系。本文在实证分析的基础上,提出建议措施,对提高济南市上市公司的审计质量有一定使用价值。     

上市公司董事会特征与审计质量的实证分析—以山东省济南市上市公司为例

济南市上市公司董事会特征与审计质量存在一定程度的相关性,如董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事薪酬与审计质量显著正相关等;董事长与总经理兼任情况与审计质量呈显著负相关;董事会会议次数、四委会设立比例与审计质量有不显著正相关关系。本文在实证分析的基础上。提出建议措施,对提高济南市上市公司的审计质量有一定使用价值。     

董事会特征与财务舞弊——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文以2003～2007年间我国上市公司为研究对象,系统考察了董事会特征对财务舞弊的影响,结果表明:董事会规模与财务舞弊呈"U"型关系;董事会持股比例与财务舞弊显著正相关;公司领导权结构和董事会稳定性与财务舞弊负相关;董事会会议频度对财务舞弊的抑制作用在逐步加强;独立董事比例和审计委员会与财务舞弊不存在相关性。据此提出了政策建议。     

公司治理结构与多元化投资——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

对2008年我国上市公司公司治理结构对多元化投资的影响进行实证研究后发现:股权集中度与多元化程度显著负相关;国有股比例和法人股比例与多元化程度负相关,但不显著。董事会规模、独立董事人数和两职合一状态与多元化投资不具有显著的相关性;董事会会议次数与多元化程度显著正相关;高级管理层持股比例与多元化程度相关性不显著;资产负债率与多元化程度正相关,但不显著。     

流通服务业上市公司的董事会治理对公司价值影响的实证研究

本文研究发现:流通服务业上市公司的董事规模和董事变更幅度与公司价值存在显著的负相关关系;董事持股比例和董事会会议次数与公司价值存在显著的正相关关系;独立董事比例、董事会领导权结构、董事薪酬、董事教育水平对公司价值的影响不显著。这对于提升流通服务业上市公司的价值,促进流通业的又好又快发展具有重要理论与现实意义。     

我国上市公司内部控制缺陷的影响因素研究

本文以2009年深圳股市445家上市公司为研究样本,利用Logit模型对我国上市公司内部控制缺陷的影响因素进行了实证研究.研究发现:资产规模、盈利能力与内部控制实质性漏洞显著负相关;重大重组与内部控制实质性漏洞显著正相关.审计委员会会议次数与内部控制实质性漏洞显著负相关,审计委员会规模、审计委员会中独立董事比例与内部控制实质性漏洞相关性不显著.     

我国董事会结构及其治理绩效的实证研究——基于公司规模的对比

本文选取A股沪深主板的400家上市公司作为研究样本,以净资产回报率作为公司经营绩效的衡量指标,使用多元回归分析方法对董事会结构与公司经营绩效之间的关系进行实证研究,结果表明:规模小的公司董事会规模与公司经营绩效正相关,规模大的公司董事会规模与公司经营绩效负相关;规模小的公司独立董事占比与公司经营绩效正相关,规模大的公司独立董事占比与公司经营绩效负相关;两职分离有利于规模小的公司经营绩效的提升,两职分离对规模大的公司经营绩效存在负面影响;董事会持股对规模小的公司经营绩效有着较为显著的正面影响,对于规模大的公司而言董事会持股与公司经营绩效之间不存在显著的相关性。     

公司治理结构对总经理长期激励的影响分析

本文研究了上市公司董事会特征和股权结构对总经理长期激励程度的影响.发现,董事会规模与总经理长期激励程度无显著相关关系;独立董事比例、内部董事比例、总经理与董事长年龄都与总经理的长期激励程度显著正相关;国有股比例对总经理的长期激励的影响呈现倒U型关系.     

我国民营上市公司董事会特征与现金持有水平关系的实证研究

董事会作为公司治理的核心,是影响企业现金持有水平的重要因素之一。文章以2008-2011年间民营上市公司为研究对象,对董事会特征与现金持有水平之间的关系进行了实证研究。结果发现:董事会规模、独立董事比例与现金持有水平存在不显著显著的负相关关系;董事会会议频次与现金持有水平存在显著负相关关系;两职合一、董事长持股比例、董事薪酬与现金持有水平存在不显著正相关关系。     

董事责任保险、董事会规模与诉讼风险

本文以2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司的数据为样本,运用门槛效应模型实证分析了董事责任保险、董事会规模与诉讼风险的关系。研究发现,董事会规模的扩大对于上市公司的诉讼风险具有一定的抑制作用。进一步研究表明,董事责任保险对公司的机会主义效应存在基于董事会规模的"单一门槛效应"。在董事会规模较大的上市公司中,董事责任保险与诉讼风险显著正相关;在董事会规模较小的上市公司中,董事责任保险与诉讼风险的正相关关系较弱。最后,根据实证结果进行总结并提出相关建议。     

Homophily versus monitoring: Do all female board directors drive the gender assignment of audit partners?

By examining the extent to which the proportion of female board directors affects the gender assignment of engagement partners, this paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, we investigate the French mandatory joint audit setting, giving rise to a set of concerns with regard to the auditor pair composition. Second, we consider female directors according to their positions on the board in order to determine which of the homophily and monitoring arguments plays the greater part in the auditor selection process. Third, we address the moderating effect of the gender quota law on the link between female directorship and the choice of audit engagement partners. Using appropriate estimation methods, we find that female board members appointed to key monitoring positions (female independent directors and female audit committee members) choose gender-diverse engagement partners. However, counter to the gender similarity (homophily) argument, we find that female inside directors are negatively associated with the selection of gender-diverse engagement partners. The association between gender-diverse boards and gender-diverse audit partners is found to be more pronounced in the period following the enactment of the gender quota law, thereby providing some practical and policy implications with regard to capitalising on the benefits of gender diversity. Supplementary analyses support the preponderance of the monitoring argument over the homophily argument in the auditor selection process.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

Board and Monitoring Committee Independence

This study focuses on the composition of boards of directors and their monitoring committees (audit and compensation) for large Australian companies. For firms whose boards use a committee structure, much of the monitoring responsibility of the board is expected to rest with the independent committee members. We document a positive association between the proportion of independent directors on the full board and its monitoring committees, and a greater proportion of independent directors on both audit and compensation committees than the full board. Our hypotheses tests involve an examination of the impact of other mechanisms used to control agency conflicts on full board and committee independence, and the association between this independence and firm value. We find that full board independence is associated with low management ownership and an absence of substantial shareholders. Audit committee independence is associated with reduced monitoring by debtholders when leverage is low. While we predict a positive relationship between board and monitoring committee independence and firm value, our results do not support this conjecture.     

Corporate Governance and Efficiency: Evidence From U.S. Property–Liability Insurance Industry

This study examines the relation between corporate governance and the efficiency of the U.S. property–liability insurance industry during the period from 2000 to 2007. We find a significant relation between efficiency and corporate governance (board size, proportion of independent directors on the audit committee, proportion of financial experts on the audit committee, director tenure, proportion of block shareholding, average number of directorships, proportion of insiders on the board, and auditor dependence). We also find property–liability insurers have complied with the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) to a large extent. Although SOX achieved the goal of greater auditor independence and might have prevented Enron‐like scandals, it had some unexpected effects. For example, insurers became less efficient when they had more independent auditors because the insurers were unable to recoup the benefits of auditor independence.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.     

Independent director reputation incentives,accruals quality and audit fees

While prior research provides abundant evidence that independent directors are associated with favorable outcomes, researchers have only recently started to investigate the impact of independent director reputation incentives. This study examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors are associated with accruals quality and audit fees. The results reveal a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives and accruals quality. Further, the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives is positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors view lower reputation incentives as increasing risk. We also find that Big 4/5 auditor office size moderates the relationship between independent director reputation incentives and audit fees. Specifically, our results indicate that audit fees increase less in response to lower reputation incentives as office size increases, suggesting that larger offices respond to the risks associated with lower reputation incentives more efficiently than smaller offices.     

Board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure

This study, which examines the association between board monitoring and the level of voluntary disclosure, finds new evidence that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors on the board are associated with higher levels of voluntary disclosure. Although board size and CEO duality are not associated with voluntary disclosure, boards with a majority of independent directors have significantly higher levels of voluntary disclosure than firms with balanced boards. Notably, we find that the presence of an external governance mechanism, the regulatory environment, enhances the strength of the association between the proportion of independent directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. This association is some two to three times greater under a “disclosure-based” regulatory regime than under a “merit-based” regulatory regime.     

Auditor sanction and reputation damage: Evidence from changes in non-client-company directorships

This study examines whether audit partners who have also served on the boards of directors of companies other than the audit firms' clients lose their directorships after they are sanctioned. Using 2002–2015 Taiwanese samples, the empirical results at the company level show that sanctioned audit partners, particularly those with a serious sanction, are less likely to gain or retain their directorships than the non-sanctioned ones following sanctions. Moreover, the results at the individual level show that, among the audit partners already serving as directors, those who have a serious sanction hold fewer directorships and are more likely to exit the director market than the non-sanctioned ones. Among the audit partners not yet holding director positions, those who have been sanctioned, regardless of the sanction severity, are less likely to enter the director market than the non-sanctioned ones. These contrasting results suggest asymmetric reputation penalties for existing partner directors and potential partner directors following auditor sanctions. Overall, sanctions damage auditors’ reputation capital, and the adverse consequences spill over into the director market.     

Corporate board and board committee independence,firm performance,and family ownership concentration: An analysis based on Hong Kong firms

This study examines whether the relationship between corporate board and board committee independence and firm performance is moderated by the concentration of family ownership. Based on a sample of Hong Kong firms, we find no significant association between the independence of corporate boards or board committees and firm performance in family firms, whereas board independence is positively associated with firm performance in non-family firms. Additionally, our findings show that the proportion of independent directors on the corporate boards of family firms is lower than that of non-family firms, but we find no significant difference in the representation of independent directors on the key committees of corporate boards between family and non-family firms. Overall, these results suggest that the “one size fits all” approach required by the regulatory authorities for appointing independent directors on corporate boards may not necessarily enhance firm performance, especially for family firms. Thus, the requirement to appoint independent directors to the corporate boards of family firms needs to be reconsidered.     

Audit committee,board of director characteristics,and earnings management

This study examines whether audit committee and board characteristics are related to earnings management by the firm. A negative relation is found between audit committee independence and abnormal accruals. A negative relation is also found between board independence and abnormal accruals. Reductions in board or audit committee independence are accompanied by large increases in abnormal accruals. The most pronounced effects occur when either the board or the audit committee is comprised of a minority of outside directors. These results suggest that boards structured to be more independent of the CEO are more effective in monitoring the corporate financial accounting process.