TAX REVENUE-FINANCED PUBLIC ABATEMENT AND WELFARE: A CONSUMPTION TAX CASE

This paper develops a model of public abatement financed either by a pollution tax or by a consumption tax. It shows that consumption tax revenue-financed public abatement raises welfare more than pollution tax revenue-financed public abatement does when the pollution tax rate rises. This result is worthwhile for environmental protection policy makers when they are determining the revenue source of public abatement.     

TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper discusses public abatement financed by pollution tax revenue or tariff revenue and investigates the welfare consequences of a tariff. The main result of this paper is that under certain conditions a tariff reduction results in an improvement in welfare through an increase in public abatement and a decrease in pollution. This result may guide policy for countries that wish to harmonize trade liberalization and the environmental protection demonstrated by both the private and the public sectors.     

A NOTE ON TRADE LIBERALIZATION, PUBLIC ABATEMENT, AND WELFARE

This paper extends Haibara (2006) in order to focus on the welfare consequences of a pollution tax and foreign aid financed for public abatement. The main finding is that environmental protection as a result of increasing a pollution tax by the aid recipient increases the optimal value of foreign aid chosen by the donor and reduces that of a tariff chosen by the recipient. This implies that international environmental cooperation is possible between the donor and the recipient.     

How should heavy-duty trucks be taxed?

This paper develops and implements an analytical framework for estimating optimal taxes on the fuel use and mileage of heavy-duty trucks in the United States, accounting for external costs from congestion, accidents, pavement damage, noise, energy security, and local and global pollution. The analysis allows for endogenous fuel economy, increased auto travel in response to reduced truck congestion, and distinguishes driving by truck type and region. We estimate the optimal (second-best) diesel fuel tax at $1.12 per gallon and implementing it increases welfare by $1.34 billion per annum. Optimizing over both fuel and mileage taxes, and differentiating mileage taxes by vehicle type and region, yields progressively higher welfare gains. The most efficient tax structure involves a diesel fuel tax of 69 cents per gallon and charges on trucks that vary between 7 and 33 cents per mile; implementing this tax structure yields estimated welfare gains of $2.06 billion.     

财税政策影响产业升级的理论机制分析——基于地方政府竞争视角

财税政策通过促进关键生产要素流入可促进产业升级。通过构建动态模型分析地方政府财税竞争对要素流动、社会福利及产业升级的影响。研究发现，提高生产要素的税率不仅会导致该生产要素外流，还会导致其他生产要素外流；在税率变化冲击下，要素存量调整至新的均衡状态与生产函数凹性和调整成本函数凸性有关；对发达地区落后产业实行高综合税率以及新兴产业实行低综合税率会促进地区产业升级，对落后地区实行低综合税率会促进地区经济发展和产业升级；政府的财税协调有利于地区间实现产业升级和提高社会福利水平；地区居民对企业的持股份额会影响地区福利水平。     

环境税收:解决城市环境问题的有效途径

伴随着工业化、城市化过程而产生的城市环境污染 ,已经越来越成为经济发展的限制性因素 ,探索解决城市环境问题的有效途径显得尤为迫切。环境经济学界普遍认为造成环境污染的经济学原因是外部不经济 ,而课征环境税收可以使外部性成本内部化 ,通过实证分析 ,这种基于市场的方法对治理我国城市环境污染也是有效的     

Inflation tax in the lab: a theoretical and experimental study of competitive search equilibrium with inflation

In this paper we measure the effect of the inflation tax on economic activity and welfare within a controlled setting. To do so, we develop a model of price posting and monetary exchange with inflation and finite populations. The model, which provides a game–theoretic foundation to Rocheteau and Wright (2005)׳s competitive search monetary equilibrium, is used to derive theoretical propositions regarding the effects of inflation in this environment, which we test with a laboratory experiment that closely implements the theoretical framework. We find that the inflation tax is harmful – with cash holdings, production and welfare all falling as inflation rises – and that its effect is relatively larger at low inflation rates than at higher rates. For instance, for inflation rates between 0% and 5%, welfare in the two markets we consider (2[seller]×2[buyer] and 3×2) falls by roughly 1 percent for each percentage–point rise in inflation, compared with 0.4 percent over the range from 5% to 30%. Our findings lead us to conclude that the impact of the inflation tax should not be underestimated, even under low inflation.     

Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly

Beladi and Chao (2006) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2006) considered the role of environmental policy on the decision whether to privatize a public firm in different market structures. This paper re-examines whether privatization improves (or deteriorates) the environment in a mixed duopolistic framework with differentiated product and pollution abatement. It is shown that, due to privatization, less attention is paid to pollution abatement by all the firms coupled with less environment taxes levied by the government in a differentiated duopoly, and the environment is more (less) damaged when the product is less (more) substitutable. When the product is highly substitutable, industry profits increase because this softens the intensity of the product market, but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with the path of privatization because the loss of consumer surplus and tax revenue exceeds the increases in profits, even if the environment is less damaged.     

中国横向税收竞争如何影响雾霾污染——基于环保支出中介效应的研究

分税制改革以来，省级政府间税收竞争激化带来的环境污染问题正在逐步凸现。在此背景下，首先从理论层面分析了税收竞争、环保支出及雾霾污染的关系，并提出假说；其次建立空间杜宾模型测度了税收竞争对雾霾污染的直接效应、间接效应和总效应，并利用中介效应方法实证检验了税收竞争通过环保支出对雾霾污染的作用路径。研究结果表明，税收竞争显著加剧了本地区雾霾污染，但是其间接效应和总效应并不显著；此外，环保支出是税收竞争影响雾霾污染的一个主要中介变量。     

Abatement R&D,market imperfections,and environmental policy in an endogenous growth model

We develop an endogenous growth model featuring environmental externalities, abatement R&D, and market imperfections. We compare the economic performances under three distinct regimes that encompass public abatement, private abatement without tax recycling, and private abatement with tax recycling. It is found that the benefit arising from private abatement will be larger if the degree of the firms’ monopoly power is greater. With a reasonably high degree of monopoly power, a mixed abatement policy by which the government recycles environmental tax revenues to subsidize the private abatement R&D is a plausible way of reaching the highest growth rate and welfare.     

Demand for durable and nondurable goods,environmental policy and consumer welfare

If a tax on energy affects the demand for a nondurable good, the stock of a durable good, and the proportion of the energy consumption per unit of service of the durable good, an integrated approach for investigating consumer demand for durables and nondurables is required. The purpose of this paper is to employ the concept of a variable expenditure function with quasi-fixed durable goods as arguments in order to derive a demand system for nondurable goods in prices of the nondurables, in the stocks of durables, and in variable expenditure. From the envelope condition desired stocks of durables can be calculated and investment demand for durables can be determined. For an application we choose a variable expenditure function based on the almost ideal demand specification, and evaluate alternative environmental policy measures using the equivalent variation for comparing the welfare effects.     

上海市税收增长与环境污染关系的实证研究:1985-2010

以1985年-2010年度上海市税收收入为税收增长指标,以工业固体废弃物产生量、工业废水排放量和工业废气排放量为环境污染指标,通过建立VAR模型,得出了上海税收增长与环境污染水平之间的长期均衡关系和动态影响机制。实证结果表明,上海税收增长依赖工业固体废弃物产生量和工业废气排放量的增加,并推动了工业固体废弃物产生量的增加,同时,税收增长与工业废水排放量之间存在良性互动。     

Pareto-improving income redistribution: expanding consumer access to the vaccines market

Economic theory has proved that income redistribution in imperfectly competitive markets can increase social welfare and lead to Pareto-improving situations. This paper shows that, under certain assumptions, self-financing tax subsidy schemes can have Pareto-improving effects also in a competitive framework. This result is achieved by exploiting external economies of scale, resulting in a decrease in price along with an increase in output. The case of the vaccines industry and World Health Organization initiatives are examined to illustrate the theoretical analysis.     

A NOTE ON THE EFFECT OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION VIA OPTIMAL POLLUTION TAX

This paper reexamines the environmental consequences of trade liberalization in a general equilibrium model of a small open economy facing trade and environmental distortions. I show that, under certain conditions, trade liberalization achieved by reducing trade barriers increases the amount of pollution through change in the optimal pollution tax. This result is worthy of consideration in regard to countries that pursue trade liberalization, and the subsequent environmental cleanup.     

The optimal carbon tax mechanism for managing carbon emissions

Along Pigouvian lines, the carbon tax not only exceeds the carbon emission damage imposed on society, but ignores the potential cost from deliberate carbon abatement, which in turn challenges the stability and optimality of the Pigouvian solution. For correcting these distortions, this paper amends the standard Pigouvian version by using piecewise tax functions to approximate the social damage curve of carbon emissions. An optimal carbon tax mechanism is designed, where the tax is endogenously determined from social welfare maximization. With the help of a modification instrument, the carbon tax corrects emitters’ non-optimal individual decision and the social optimum is implemented efficiently. How to put the carbon tax into practice is examined under both the deterministic and stochastic modeling settings. In both cases, we demonstrate the structure and effectiveness of the carbon tax in detail. Moreover, a flexible adjustment tax scheme is proposed, which may produce the double-dividend effect that reduces carbon emissions and relieves financial burden of carbon abatement simultaneously. These may improve the application of market-based carbon-reducing tools in public management and pollution regulation.     

Anticipation,learning and welfare: the case of distortionary taxation

We study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in a Ramsey economy where agents form long-horizon expectations using adaptive learning. We extend the existing framework by introducing distortionary taxes as well as elastic labor supply, which makes agents’ decisions non-predetermined but more realistic. We detect that the dynamic responses to anticipated tax changes under learning have oscillatory behavior that can be interpreted as self-fulfilling waves of optimism and pessimism emerging from systematic forecast errors. Moreover, we demonstrate that these waves can have important implications for the welfare consequences of fiscal reforms.     

环境的外在性和保护策略

一个简单的环境污染模型发展后,环境污染具有外部性,在这个内生增长模型中,考虑了通过税收提供的资本来保护环境的两条途径。在政府不参与环境控制时,经济增长率最高,但污染也最严重,社会福利要比政府采取补贴情形时底。当环境外部性较少时,环境保护采取政府补贴社会福利要比完全由政府控制时的福利要大,而当外部性较大时,则环境保护应当采取完全由政府控制为妙。     

经济增长与环境

在政府不参与环境控制时,经济增长率最高,但污染也最严重,社会福利要比政府采取补贴情形时低.通过建立模型推导出了在放任政策下的经济增长率是最快的,但污染比较严重。     

UNEMPLOYMENT, TRANS-BOUNDARY POLLUTION, AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN A DUALISTIC ECONOMY

This study is intended to examine the effects of environmental policies on employment, the use of polluting goods, and the unemployment rate under a model introducing trans-boundary pollution affecting the productivity of the other productive sectors. That model was designed by Copeland and Taylor (1999) , and transformed into a dualistic economy model constructed by Harris and Todaro (1970) . Results of our analyses show that enforcement of environmental policy through control of emissions taxes does not necessarily worsen urban unemployment. Therefore, we show that it is not usually proper to maintain that some environmental pollution cannot be avoided to establish economic development. Moreover, we analyze the effect of some environmental policies on social welfare and discuss the effectiveness of those policies.     

Resource balance, limited information and public policy

The U.S. Federal Government through its expenditure programs is having a major impact on all forms of pollution abatement. Total expenditures on Federal environmental programs amounted to $3.3 billion in 1972. A program of this magnitude can easily lead to waste and expenditures on conflicting goals unless carefully managed.

In a recent article in the Am. Econ. Rev. William Baumol examined the theoretical justification for and attacks on the Pigouvian tax and subsidy approach to controlling externalities. He concluded that while it is theoretically possible to control externalities through Pigou's procedure, the existence of multiple equilibrium and information requirements make it impractical. He proposes an alternate approach which changes the policy goal from maximization of social welfare to generation of acceptable levels of externalities. His goals differ drastically from those of the resource balance model presented by Kneese, Ayres and D'Arge of maximization of social welfare. This paper will combine the concept of resource balance with the goal of obtaining acceptable level of externalities at minimum cost in the presentation of a theoretical model that can be operationalized.

This paper proposes a general equilibrium method, utilizing the decomposition principle of linear programming, that will permit expenditures and regulations only on non-conflicting goals and includes a feedback mechanism for determining if a program is wasteful in relation to other programs. The model has five advantages over earlier proposals: (1) it is a general equilibrium rather than partial equilibrium model; (2) it is dynamic rather than static; (3) limited information rather than complete information is required for its implementation; (4) the model is heuristic rather than optimizing in the sense that policy decisions always increase the efficiency of pollution control, but because of the existence of uncertainty, they cannot be interpreted as maximizing social welfare; (5) the model incorporates multiple rather than a single policy tool.