Price premiums,payment delays,and default risk: understanding developing country farmers’ decisions to market through a cooperative or a private trader

Smallholder farmers in developing countries face a competitive disadvantage in modern agricultural supply chains. Joint marketing through cooperatives is a potential tool to mitigate these disadvantages; yet cooperatives’ success in these settings is uneven at best. We develop an analytical model to study a farmer's choice of selling to a private trader who pays cash on delivery but may exercise market power or a cooperative that promises a price premium but delays payment and carries a concomitant risk of default. In the presence of impatient and risk‐averse farmers, we show that these factors can severely limit smallholder patronage of a cooperative, despite a promised price premium. We then construct and parameterize a simulation model to fit a profile of heterogeneous farmers within a prototype developing‐country village, and study the optimal decisions of farmers regarding marketing through a cooperative versus a private trader. Results suggest that modest improvements in either timeliness of payment or probability of default can induce a substantial increase in a cooperative's market share and economic viability. Extending the simulation analysis to a dynamic setting shows how implementing reasonable policies to improve a cooperative's payment timeliness and default probability can markedly improve its growth trajectory.     

Estimating Market Power by Retailers in a Dynamic Framework: the Italian PDO Cheese Market

In this article, we evaluate the role of market power by retailers within the supply chain of Parmigiano Reggiano (PR) and Grana Padano (GP), the two most famous Italian quality cheeses. Market power is analysed in the context of a dynamic imperfect competition model of the supply chain, in which retailers are allowed to exert market power both downstream and upstream. We jointly estimate market‐power parameters together with supply and demand elasticities, by means of a structural system of demand, supply and price‐transmission equations, estimated using the generalised method of moments. We find evidence of downstream market power by retailers (toward final consumers) for PR and GP, but no evidence of upstream market power (toward processors/ripeners). These results may be explained by the structure of the supply chain and by the peculiar characteristics of the two cheeses.     

Residual demand measures of market power of Russian wheat exporters

Traditionally, the international wheat market has been considered a good example of a market with perfect competition. Yet, several articles provide evidence of imperfect competition and price discrimination in the wheat trade. However, these studies focused on traditional high‐quality wheat exporters such as Canada and the United States. In contrast, this article investigates whether Russian wheat exporters exercise market power in eight selected importing countries using the residual demand elasticity (RDE) model. The article makes two major contributions. First, it focuses on a nontraditional exporter, who exports mainly wheat of mediocre quality to low‐ and middle‐income countries. Second, the RDE model is estimated for the first time using a nonlinear estimator, the instrumental variable Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood estimator. This is important because the double logarithmic functional form can provide biased results in the presence of heteroskedasticity. The results indicate that Russian wheat exporters can exercise market power in only a few markets, while they are price takers in the majority of importing countries.     

Does oligopsony power matter in price support policy design? Empirical evidence from the Thai Jasmine rice market

In the oligopsony market, farmers may receive low prices and policy analysis assuming perfect competition can yield serious bias results. In this paper, we estimate oligopsony power between processors and farmers and evaluate the welfare impact of the paddy pledging program (PPP), a generous price support program in the Thai Jasmine rice market, with an imperfect competition model. We develop a model that consists of rice supply equation and derived demand equation. We then simultaneously estimate these equations using system estimation methods to recover oligopsony power parameters. Finally, we use these parameters to assess the welfare impact of the price support program. Using annual panel data running from crop marketing year 2001/2002–2015/2016 and exploiting the institutional feature of the PPP, we find strong evidence of some oligopsony power, a moderate level of oligopsony price distortion, and a negative relationship between price support and oligopsony power. We also find that the PPP is inefficient but effective in income redistribution. Moreover, the program benefits both farmers and consumers. With better policymaking decisions, the PPP can be efficient by setting a suitable support price. Therefore, our results show that in the case of the Thai Jasmine rice market, the generally accepted “wisdom” about agricultural price support policy does not necessarily hold, and price support can be designed to improve the efficiency of the market.     

Optimal Investment in Transportation Infrastructure When Middlemen Have Market Power: A Developing-Country Analysis

Transportation costs and buyer market power reduce prices and income received by farmers in developing countries. Transportation costs directly affect the marketing margin and also exacerbate market power by limiting farmers' access to buyers. This article develops a multistage spatial model to determine optimal investment in transportation improvements, taking account of impacts on marketing costs and competition. The beneficial impact of investments from farmers' perspective is mainly through enhanced competition, meaning significant under-investment may occur if this effect is ignored. However, the optimal investment depends on the relative importance of transportation costs; in some settings, transportation improvements reduce farm prices because buyers rationally over-compensate farmers for these costs.     

IMPERFECT COMPETITION AND THE COBWEB THEOREM: A VEGETABLE CASE

Producer price changes are dependent on final demand, marketed volume and marketing cost, but the less than perfect competition which may determine this last is ignored in formulating the cobweb theorem. Attention to monopsonistic buying of farm products has importance in the choice between stabilisation measures directed at producers and marketing firms, and also as regards the need for integration of the theory of imperfect competition and the analysis of agricultural price cycles. Cyclical instability is a serious problem in the New Zealand vegetable industry. The size and inflexibility of retail margins significantly accentuate producer price fluctuations. Auctions are the main mechanism for price formation, and high retail margins appear to be permitted by the non-competitive elements in this marketing system. The most promising avenues for improvement would be in reform of auction procedures and exploration of alternative marketing channels for vegetables.     

Expectations,supply response,and marketing boards: An example from Kenya

Whether farmers form price expectations adaptively or in a forward-looking manner has implications for supply response analysis and for the implementation of agricultural policy reform. This paper examines the formation of price expectations by Kenyan export-crop farmers who market their produce through a monopsonistic parastatal. The analysis allows for relaxation of the small-country assumption within a rational expectations framework. Production behavior is consistent with expectations of future prices based on indicators of aggregate supply and of the marketing board's purchasing capacity. The finding that price forecasts may be formed using information other than previous price levels implies that marketing reforms that raise prices may not raise the relevant price expectations. To elicit a positive supply response, market reforms should be sensitive to farmers' interpretation of institutional signals as well as previous prices.     

Formation and adaptation of reference prices in grain marketing: an experimental study

This study aimed to explore how producers’ reference prices are formed and adapt over time, and how they affect marketing decisions. Results indicate that producers focus on three major variables to form their reference prices: the current market price, the highest price to date, and their expectation about price behavior. Further, they update their reference prices during the marketing season mainly in response to changes in current market prices, their own expectations about price behavior, and the general price trend. Finally, our findings suggest that producers’ marketing decisions are based on the spread between current market price and reference price, the general market trend and price expectation.     

Determinants of smallholder farmers' participation in banana markets in Central Africa: the role of transaction costs

A bivariate probit model was employed to jointly and separately estimate banana market participation decisions of buying and selling households in Rwanda and Burundi using household survey data. Selectivity bias was corrected for estimating the transacted volumes using Heckman's procedure. The results showed that transaction cost‐related factors such as geographical location of households, market information sources, and travel time to the nearest urban center influence market participation. Non‐price‐related factors such as security of land tenure, labor availability, off‐farm income, gender of the household head, and years of farming experience had a significant influence on the transacted volumes. Output prices had a significant correlation with sales volume, indicating price incentives increased supply by sellers. Generally, the findings suggest that policies aimed at investments in rural road infrastructure, market information systems, collective marketing, and value addition of banana products may provide a potential avenue for mitigating transaction costs and enhancing market participation and production of marketed surplus by rural households.     

Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality

Recent food scares such as the discoveries of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and E. coli -contaminated spinach have heightened interest in food traceability. Here, we show how exogenous increases in food traceability create incentives for farms and marketing firms to supply safer food by increasing liability costs. We model a stylized marketing chain composed of farms, marketers, and consumers. Unsafe food for consumers can be caused by either marketers or farms. We show that food safety declines with the number of farms and marketers and imperfect traceability from consumers to marketers dampens liability incentives to supply safer food by farms.     

Asymmetric Margins in Prices and Retail Supply Chain Integration: The Spanish Vegetable Case

Several studies have observed asymmetric behavior between sale prices in the supermarket and the price paid to the farmer. This article presents the consequences derived from a simplified framework considering a scenario in which the retailer wishes to maintain balanced profits due to external pressures or because the retailers' strategy to differentiate themselves from the competition requires greater integration in the supply chain. It is shown that the price-fixing decision of the distributor may depend on the risk, measured by the relationship between demand elasticity and variable costs, as a result of uncertainty in consumer response to price variations. This risk arises from the existence of supply that is highly changeable in the short term and demand that is unpredictable.     

Agricultural trade liberalization and economic development: the role of downstream market power

A model is developed to characterize the vertically linked and concentrated nature of developed‐country food markets. This model is then parameterized and used to simulate the effects of varying food market structures on the benefits to developing‐country exporters of agricultural commodities from trade liberalization by developed countries. Results demonstrate that even relatively modest departures from perfect competition can cause much of the benefits from trade liberalization to flow to marketing firms instead of producers in the developing country. The distributional effects under downstream market power differ significantly from the perfectly competitive case and may result, somewhat paradoxically, in developing countries receiving a lower share of the total value added within the food chain as trade reform occurs.     

Finding optimal price risk management instruments: the case of the Spanish potato sector

This article offers a comprehensive analysis of the problem of choosing between alternative market risk management instruments. We model farmers' behavior to optimize the certainty equivalent, formulated by a mean–variance model, by combining instruments with and without basis risk. Results are expressed as the demands for hedging with futures, forward contracts and insurance. Theoretical results are applied to a selection of Spanish producers of fresh potatoes, a sector that is exposed to significant market risks. Amsterdam's Euronext provides potato futures prices, and the recently launched revenue insurance in Spain provides the example for price insurance. Three conclusions summarize the article's main findings. First, we show that Spanish potato revenue insurance subsidies are a factor that determines the instrument rankings and choice. Second, the efficiency of insurance subsidies is generally low. Finally, the Amsterdam potato futures market does not provide a cost‐effective means to manage price risks for Spanish fresh potato growers.     

Imperfect Price Transmission: Is Market Power Really to Blame?

Several studies in the literature have argued that price transmission in vertically‐related markets is imperfect, i.e. that farm input price changes are not fully passed‐through to the final product price. Market power, notably oligopoly, is presumed to be the principal source of imperfect price transmission. To date, the impact of oligopsony (buyer) power on the degree of price transmission has not been evaluated using a formal theoretical model. Moreover, neither has the combination of oligopoly and oligopsony despite the fact that its influence has been formally acknowledged in both the UK and some European food markets. This paper makes a contribution to the literature by developing a model of price transmission where both oligopoly and oligopsony power co‐exist and where industry technology is assumed to be characterised by variable input proportions. It shows that taking the degree of price transmission in a perfectly competitive market as a benchmark, oligopoly and oligopsony power do not necessarily lead to imperfect price transmission, although they can. Indeed, they may counteract each other's impact on the degree of price transmission. The key to these outcomes is to be found in the functional forms for retail demand and farm supply.     

云南省城镇供水行业市场化改革的适应性分析

针对云南省地处边疆、地形复杂、经济水平发展不高、供水设施不完善等特点,结合供水行业的特性和云南省供水行业市场化改革的进程,分别从基础设施条件、政策法规以及监管保障、水价机制3个方面对云南省城镇供水行业市场改革的适应性进行相关分析,提出云南省城镇供水行业市场化改革需以较为完善的供水设施为基础、以试点探索适合云南省省情的改革模式,增强行业竞争性,积极稳妥地推进市场化改革,逐步形成市场竞争和水价形成机制。     

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF MARKET EFFICIENCY

Important agricultural marketing policies and decisions are constantly before industry and government. Much market research is being supported. There is a need to “bridge” research with policy. The core of this paper is to develop a conceptual framework that spans the needed analysis of marketing efficiency. The basic point is that marketing policy must focus on both competition and physical operations. The analysis of this paper builds upon Clark's concept of workable competition and Sosnick's extension to the concept of effective competition. Market efficiency is separated into operational efficiency and exchange efficiency components; the determinants of each component are diagnosed and analyzed in terms of costs and pricing. While the agricultural marketing process produces increments of product form, space, and time utility, costs are incurred. Cost analysis is central to the notion of operational efficiency; cost levels depend upon market organization and the feasible set of market logistics. Exchange efficiency refers primarily to price; the effectiveness with which price reflects costs depends upon market structures and the applicable competitive strategies. The conceptual framework developed in this paper integrates the preceding relationships and formalizes an approach for decisions. Trade-offs often exist between operational efficiency and exchange efficiency components of market efficiency. When a trade-off relationship exists, market efficiency is maximized by equalizing the gain in one component with the opportunity-cost loss in the other component. Le gourvernement el I'industrie font continuellemeni face à?importante décisions dans le domaine des marchés el de la politique agricloe. Ces deux groupes subven-tionnenl les recherches dans ce domaine. II y a un besoin de Her la recherche avec la politique. ?essentiel de cet article est de développer un côdre qui comprend ?analyse nécessaire pour ?efficacité du marché, le point important est que le politique du marché doit se concentrer sur le concurrence et les operations. L'analyse de cet article travail sur le théorie de concurrence réalisable de Clark et sur celle Sosnick traitant de ?Extension de la concurrence effective. ?efficacité du marché est diversé en deux éléments: ?exploitation efftcace el ?echange éfficace, les facteurs déterminant de chaque élément sont soumis à un diagnostic et à une analyse en termes du coût et du prix     

Botswana: Poverty amid plenty

This paper uses the technological capabilities framework for examining differences in technological intensities and economic performance between foreign and local food and beverage, and textile and garment firms and metal engineering firms in Kenya. Foreign firms had statistically significant higher labour productivity means than local firms in textile and garment manufacturing. Foreign firms were also more export- and technology-intensive than local firms in textile and garment (process technology and R&D) and metal engineering (HR). Foreign firms had higher and statistically significant skills and overall technology (TI) means than local firms in food and beverages. The econometric exercise showed that foreign ownership had a statistically significant and positive relationship with overall technological and HR intensities. In labour productivity, the coefficient of TI was higher in the foreign firms' sample than in the local firms' sample. Local firms had higher value added in domestic than export markets. Export intensity had a positive relationship in the process technology regressions, but an inverse relationship in the HR regressions in the foreign firms' sample. Overall, the statistically significant results suggest that foreign firms' technology, productivity and export intensity levels in economies with weak institutions tend to be superior to local firms.     

Spatial and Temporal Marketing Considerations under Marketing Loan Programs

Marketing assistance loan (MAL) and loan deficiency payment (LDP) programs differ in their treatment of transportation costs. Marketing decisions are analyzed under these programs when producers are differentiated by location with respect to the terminal market. Under certain conditions, a complete characterization of equilibrium is developed. The proposed model broadly fits several "stylized" facts about producer enrollment in these programs. If LDPs are uniform at all locations, LDP programs do not interfere with marketing decisions. MAL programs distort the optimal marketing pattern by providing incentives to store for producers who should be among the first ones to supply the market.     

Measuring the effect of risk attitude on marketing behavior

Despite extensive study, researchers continue to search for consistent and reliable measures of risk preferences to explain market behavior. We find that a measure, combining experiments rooted in expected utility theory and measures derived from surveys, explains spot and contractual sales, but does not exhibit substantially greater explanatory power than its underlying components. Survey‐based measures are generally more significant indicators of marketing choices, but experimental measures reveal how risk attitudes vary over a range of probable outcomes, which is important in light of increased commodity price volatility. Given recently identified limitations on the applicability of expected utility theory, we suggest that researchers include survey methods to obtain low‐cost supplemental measures.     

Spatial and Seasonal Price Differences for Sorghum and Sesame in Sudan

Spatial and seasonal price differences for sorghum and sesame in the Sudan are investigated. A conceptual model of competitive market behavior in time and space dimensions is adopted to test the spatial and the seasonal price differences as compared to transportation and storage costs, respectively. The large differences in sorghum prices among regions indicate a lack of market integration between producing and consuming regions. Monthly price changes for sorghum and sesame compared to storage costs indicate an opportunity to capture above normal returns to storage. Causes of these large price differences are inadequate transportation and marketing infrastructure and government policy.