战略性贸易政策理论与我国外贸政策的制定

战略性贸易政策理论是在20世纪80年代提出并建立的,该理论改变了在规模经济与不完全竞争条件下自由贸易政策的最优性,论证了政府对外贸干预的合理性,为各国政府发展本国经济和对外贸易提供了指导。文章在分析战略性贸易政策理论的基础上,提出我国应选择重合产业作为目标产业进行扶持和保护,并进一步探讨了该理论对我国制定对外贸易政策的指导作用。     

古诺竞争条件下价格承诺与技术许可

本文建立了两个国家、两个企业的双寡头古诺博弈模型,来讨论反倾销政策——价格承诺是否会促进拥有先进技术厂商进行技术许可行为。通过论证技术许可行为下厂商的利润、本国的福利,我们发现价格承诺的实施,促使高技术厂商通过技术许可的方式来规避这种反倾销措施对其自身收益的影响。但需要注意的是对于拥有重大技术创新的企业,本国在制定贸易政策的同时,也要结合相应的产业竞争政策,禁止国外厂商垄断本国市场。     

碳关税、出口补贴与发展中国家企业国际竞争力——基于Bertrand模型的研究

以发达国家征收碳关税为现实背景,建立一个三阶段博弈模型,重点探讨了当发达国家征收碳关税时,发展中国家出口补贴、技术研发补贴等贸易激励政策的选择及其对本国企业国际竞争力的影响。文章认为,出口补贴能够提高本国出口企业的国际竞争力,而且最优出口补贴率随着发达国家碳关税的增加而增加;当政府对国内垄断厂商研发进行补贴时,国内垄断厂商的最优研发投入、最优产量以及最大化利润等变量都随着政府研发补贴率的变动而同方向变动。     

战略性贸易政策理论及其对发展中国家的启示

战略性贸易政策理论认为:在规模经济和不完全竞争的市场条件下,一国政府可以通过政策干预的方式创造新的竞争优势,从而增强本国产业企业在国际市场上的竞争力,同时提高本国福利水平。本文在对该理论进行述评的基础上,指出在全球化竞争的形势下,战略性贸易政策在一定范围内适用于发展中国家,并提出相应的建议。     

不完全竞争市场上的贸易和产业政策——以合成橡胶行业为例的经验分析

战略性贸易政策理论研究不完全竞争市场的贸易政策和产业政策。本文将该理论作为分析框架，以合成橡胶行业为分析对象，使用2003年的数据对我国在该行业实施贸易政策和产业政策进行经验分析。文章分析比较了4种不同的政策或政策组合，即自由贸易政策、进口关税政策、生产补贴政策、进口关税与生产补贴结合使用。研究发现，相对于自由放任政策，各种干预政策可增加国民福利，但幅度不大；而干预政策对不同行业厂商利润和政府收入的影响则要大得多，并使合成橡胶的数量和价格发生明显变化。最后，笔者考察了进口关税政策在多期的实施效果。研究结果支持传统幼稚工业保护论：贸易保护程度应随时间减弱，并且政策将在多期中不断降低厂商的市场力量。     

战略性贸易政策理论及其发展

战略性贸易政策主张政府应对国际贸易进行积极的干预,使本国战略性产业处于竞争优势地位,具有很强的实用性,自产生以来就倍受关注,它为政府干预贸易提供了理论依据。本文介绍了战略性贸易政策的产生、理论框架和发展过程,并对其缺陷进行了评析。     

浅述国际贸易理论政策的历史沿革

国际贸易理论大致分为自由贸易理论和保护贸易理论,在不同的历史时期和不同的国家,有不同的内涵,其对应的政策实践也有所不同。当国际贸易形势出现新问题,贸易理论也随之改进。实施何种贸易政策的关键在于政府干预能否为本国争取到更多利益。     

战略性贸易政策在我国适用性分析

战略性贸易政策是20世纪80年代新贸易理论的重要成果,它主张在不完全竞争和规模经济的前提下,一国政府可以通过对国际贸易的适当干预而达到提高本国福利的结果。从理论的约束条件和实施的约束条件两个方面对其进行战略性贸易政策的适用性分析并对我国运用战略性贸易政策提出了相应的意见和建议。     

战略性贸易政策述评

以新贸易理论为依托,战略性贸易政策主张通过政府干预贸易来分享外国厂商的垄断租金或获取外部经济利益。它的出现为政府干预经济提供了新的思路．在理论上和实践上都具有积极意义,但是,这种以邻为壑的贸易政策也招致了不确定性过大、过度进入而导致垄断利润和规模经济的消失以及国外报复的威胁等尖锐的批评。     

论战略性贸易政策在中国的适用性

战略性贸易政策是20世纪80年代国际贸易理论的重大突破，它主张一国政府在不完全竞争和规模经济条件下，可以采取战略性措施对国际贸易进行适当地干预，以提高本国福利。对于发展中国家，战略性贸易政策的运用尽管受到严格的约束，但是在局部领域存在实施战略性贸易政策的可能性。中国应该综合考虑自己的国情及国际市场经济法律环境，恰当应用战略性贸易政策提升本国企业的国际竞争力，实现由贸易大国向贸易强国的转变。     

论开放经济中的战略性贸易政策:一个基于国际租金耗散的分析框架

传统的战略性贸易政策理论是建立在封闭经济基础上的。本文力图把开放经济中的国际租金耗散问题纳入到分析框架之中,通过研究表明此时战略性贸易政策严格弱。同时由于利润转移政策的外溢效应,两国政府有进行串谋的激励。     

Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure

With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).     

Strategic trade and delegated competition

Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities.     

Information and disclosure in strategic trade policy

We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the governments in the Brander–Spencer setting. With quantity competition, we find firms disclosing both demand and cost information, thereby justifying the literature's omniscient-government assumption. With price competition, however, firms have no incentives to disclose demand or cost information, so governments remain uninformed. Further, with quantity competition and unknown demand, governments are caught in an informational prisoner's dilemma.     

我国战略性贸易政策实践

本文对改革开放以来我国的战略性贸易政策实践进行了分析。虽然我国政府从未明确提出要实行战略性贸易政策,但是通过和日本经济高速增长时期的战略性贸易政策相比较,可以发现,在我国广泛推行的产业政策中,战略性贸易政策早就存在。只是由于产业组织政策失效所导致的市场竞争程度低下,使得我国战略性贸易政策的实施效果很不理想。因此,协调产业政策和竞争政策,打破地方保护,建立国内统一大市场就成为我国今后战略性贸易政策成功的关键。     

Public policy influences on the formation of international joint ventures

The literature on international joint ventures (IJVs) devotes little attention to the influence of public policy on the formation of such alliances. This paper examines the influence on the recent growth in IJVs of U.S. and foreign governments’ antitrust, trade, and technology policies. Little evidence supports the claim that U.S. antitrust policy is a critical influence on the decisions of U.S. firms to collaborate with foreign enterprises. IJVs are rarely substitutes for the collaboration among U.S. firms that might develop in the absence of antitrust restrictions. The recent interest by governments in “strategic technology policy” and the growing importance of “managed trade” in some high-technology industries both have created new incentives for the formation of IJVs. There are some important parallels between recent international joint ventures and the international cartel agreements of the interwar period, but modern IJVs do not yet appear to have reproduced the cartelization associated with the international patent-sharing agreements of the interwar period. Nevertheless, the influence of these market-distorting government interventions on the incentives to form IJVs means that the effects of these alliances on economic welfare may be mixed and should be monitored carefully.     

战略性贸易政策对我国的影响分析

在经济全球化过程中 ,战略性贸易政策已经成为各国争取最大利益的新的理论基点。对我国这样一个发展中国家而言 ,战略性贸易政策是一把双刃剑。研究战略性贸易政策有助于我们对某些贸易政策干预的理解 ,并可适当运用某些政策提高战略性产业的竞争力 ,发挥其积极作用 ,限制其消极作用。     

战略性贸易政策:发达国家与发展中国家的博弈

作为新贸易理论的主要内容之一,战略性贸易政策实质上是发达国家为自己的保护主义所寻求的借口和托词。它虽然在产业适用性和国家适用性方面设置了诸多限制,但印度软件业的发展是该政策得以在发展中国家成功实施的良好佐证。我国应该在市场培育、制度建设以及贸易政策与产业政策协调配合等方面进行强化,以利用战略性贸易政策来培育我国具有国际竞争力的产业。     

UNIONIZATION AND STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY

This article examines the effect of unionization on welfare and trade policy using a model of duopolists competing in a third market. The traditional result that the presence of a union necessitates a stronger strategic trade policy to reach the optimal level of welfare hinges on the mode of competition. With Bertrand duopolists, a union can be welfare-improving; it can also lead to a weaker trade policy, or even reverse the direction of the optimal policy. Our results highlight the importance for trade policy of understanding the nature of firm behavior and the institutional features of the labor market.     

Strategic Trade Policy and Network Compatibility

We consider strategic trade policy for information and communication technology (ICT) product markets with international rivalry. Usually, ICT products exhibit network externalities and product compatibility (i.e., network compatibility). We demonstrate that the optimal strategic trade policy depends on the degree of network compatibility of ICT products. Furthermore, using an endogenous decision game for strategic variables (i.e., quantity and price), we consider the relationship between the optimal strategic trade policies and the endogenous mode of competition.