Legislative Organization Under Separate Powers

Existing theories of legislative organization attribute thestrong committee system in the U.S. Congress to members' distributive,informational, or partisan needs. But legislators elsewhereshare these same motivations, yet not all have chosen to organizethemselves in a similar fashion. Therefore the strong committeesystem must derive to some extent from the larger constitutionalcontext, including plurality winner elections, bicameralism,and our focus, the system of separate powers. In particularwe argue that committees established in part to oversee executiveagencies will have preferences biased against those of the executive.Thus committees serve as contrary outliers, acting as a counterweightto executive branch policy making. We find support for thisprediction with data drawn from all standing committees fromthe 80th to 102nd Congresses. We also find that each of theseemingly incompatible theories of legislative organizationpredicts well patterns of committee composition in differentissue areas.     

财政不平衡与城乡公共服务均等化：理论分析与实证检验*

本文基于中国分税财政体制下中央和地方财政不平衡这一事实分析了政府间的财政关系，并利用省级面板数据和SYS GMM方法实证研究了财政缺口、财政不平衡对城乡基本公共服务均等化的影响效应。结论表明：在分税财政体制下基层政府财政缺口的存在，并不利于缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化，而转移支付作为弥补财政缺口、均衡中央与地方财政不平衡的主要机制，对缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化产生了显著的激励效应。另外，尽管较高的转移支付筹资水平和专项补助方式有助于提高城乡基本公共服务的供给激励，但在我国中央和地方财政不平衡的分税财政体制框架内，这一供给激励机制将会大打折扣。     

财政不平衡与城乡公共服务均等化：理论分析与实证检验*

本文基于中国分税财政体制下中央和地方财政不平衡这一事实分析了政府间的财政关系，并利用省级面板数据和SYS GMM方法实证研究了财政缺口、财政不平衡对城乡基本公共服务均等化的影响效应。结论表明：在分税财政体制下基层政府财政缺口的存在，并不利于缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化，而转移支付作为弥补财政缺口、均衡中央与地方财政不平衡的主要机制，对缩小城乡基本公共服务均等化产生了显著的激励效应。另外，尽管较高的转移支付筹资水平和专项补助方式有助于提高城乡基本公共服务的供给激励，但在我国中央和地方财政不平衡的分税财政体制框架内，这一供给激励机制将会大打折扣。     

Vertical fiscal imbalance and local fiscal indiscipline: Empirical evidence from China

Based on Chinese city-level panel dataset, this paper examines the effects of vertical fiscal imbalances (VFI) on local fiscal indiscipline in a partial fiscal decentralization setting. We find that higher VFI induces a form of fiscal indiscipline: a reduction of tax collection effort by local governments. In addition, by exploiting the unique Chinese fiscal institution of “extra-budgetary” revenues, we show that in this case higher VFI does not alter local governments’ tax collection effort. Even though local governments also possess full taxing power for “extra-budgetary” revenues, these revenues do not contribute to the determination of central fiscal transfers to local governments, thus creating very different incentives for local governments response to VFI. Our results shed light on the working mechanism of the VFI and provide significant implications for improving the design of fiscal decentralization policy in China and elsewhere.     

统筹区域经济发展的财政政策选择

造成我国区域经济发展不平衡的原因是复杂多样的,其中,国家资金投入、税收优惠政策与政府间财政转移支付资金的安排在地区间的非均衡性对我国区域经济差异扩大有着十分突出的影响,而这又归结为国家在一定时期的财政政策选择.借鉴统筹区域经济发展的国际经验,促进我国区域经济的协调发展,应调整财政投资的区域布局和区域性税收政策,完善财政转移支付制度.     

Democratic Accountability,Regulation and Inward Investment Policy

We examine the effect of domestic political accountability on leaders' strategies for attracting foreign direct investment to less developed countries. We consider two policy areas: the tax burden imposed on firms and the regulatory environment in which they operate. We find that democratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lower tax rates to foreign investors, whereas autocratic governments are more likely to offer relatively lax regulation. This result is driven by the greater elasticity of the political survival function to environmental and labor regulations in more democratic countries. Analyses of firm‐level survey data confirm our main theoretical conclusions.     

The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox

American governments, federal and state, leave a gap in legislative representation: global majorities are practically silent compared with local ones. An executive veto can right the balance. But prevailing procedural designs are fraught with paradox. I offer a simple new design that avoids paradox, can be instituted without constitutional amendment, and enhances both legislative and executive responsibility.     

Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective

Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis ( Brennan and Buchanan 1980 ). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.     

Revisiting the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers: evidence from Taiwan

This paper employs a panel of 23 local governments in Taiwan over 1998–2010 to re-estimate the redistribution effects of intergovernmental fiscal transfers by considering a self-financing resources of local government as the transition variable in panel smooth transition regression models. Empirical results show that the income (or tax revenues) redistribution effects of fiscal transfer policies are nonlinear and vary with time and across local governments. The grants from central government can improve income and tax revenues distribution of local governments; however, the centrally allotted tax revenues have inverse effects and the total fiscal transfers have ambiguous effects. The total fiscal transfer is a proper policy instrument for improving income redistribution, and the grants for improving tax revenues redistribution. However, high self-financing resources ratios are harmful for these redistribution effects.     

The effects of vertical and horizontal incentives on local tax efforts: evidence from China

Tax effort is a measure of a government’s effort to collect taxes. This study explores what impacts both vertical and horizontal incentives have on local governments’ tax efforts in China. For consistency with the literature, we first include typical economic and institutional factors in our analysis. We find that the effects of economic factors on local tax efforts are significant, but the effects of institutional factors tend to be weak. Fiscal decentralization, as a vertical incentive, has a significantly positive effect on tax efforts at the provincial level. Meanwhile, fiscal interaction, as a horizontal incentive, is also taken into account in a spatial specification to explain tax competition among local governments. The results show that local tax effort in China also depends on the horizontal incentive. Hence, to improve local tax effort, the central government should let the locals have more autonomy in collecting taxes and evaluate local tax effort by referring to tax collection in adjacent provinces simultaneously.     

FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVEN FEDERATIONS

Although fiscal policies of central governments sometimes provide modest insurance against regional income shocks, this paper shows that procyclical fiscal policy among provincial governments can easily overwhelm these stabilizing effects. We examine the cyclicality of budget items among provincial governments in seven federations, showing that own-source taxes are generally highly procyclical, and contrary to common wisdom, revenue sharing and discretionary transfers are either acyclical or procyclical. Constituent governments are thus left alone to smooth their own shocks, and we document the extent to which various restraints on borrowing and saving undermine their ability to do so. The resulting procyclicality of provincial fiscal policy is likely to have important implications in a world where demands for countercyclical fiscal policy are increasing but considerable fiscal responsibilities are being devolved to subnational governments.     

Vertical versus horizontal tax externalities: An empirical test

We study taxation externalities in federations of benevolent governments. Where different hierarchical government levels tax the same base, one can observe two types of externalities: a horizontal externality, working among governments of the same level and leading to tax rates that are too low compared to the social optimum; and a vertical externality, working between different levels of government and leading to suboptimally high tax rates. Building on the model of Keen and Kotsogiannis [Keen, Michael J., Kotsogiannis, Christos, 2002. Does federalism lead to excessively high taxes? American Economic Review 92 (1) 363–370], we derive a discriminating hypothesis to distinguish vertical and horizontal tax externalities based on measurable variables. This test is applied to a panel data set on local taxes in a sample of Swiss municipalities that feature direct-democratic fiscal decision making, so as to maximize the correspondence with the “benevolent” governments of the theory. We find that vertical externalities dominate – they are thus an observed empirical phenomenon as well as a notable extension to the theory of tax competition.     

Public investment,taxation, and long-run output in economies with multi-level governments

This paper examines the dynamic effects of taxation and investment on the steady state output level of an economy. A simple neoclassical growth model with different tiers of government is developed. The initial focus is on governments that aim to maximise their citizens' welfare and economic performance by providing consumption goods for private consumption and public capital for private production. It is shown that a long-run per capita output maximising tax rate can be derived and that there also exists an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation. The analysis then extends to the case where governments attempt instead to maximise their own tax revenue to fund expenditures which do not contribute to the utility of their citizens. Three different cases of taxation arrangement are considered: tax competition, tax sharing, and tax coordination. The modeling shows that intensifying tax competition will lead to an increase in the aggregate tax rate as compared to the cases of sharing and coordination amongst governments. These tax rates are both higher than the long-run per capita output maximising rate that was implied under the welfare maximising government scenario.     

地方财政体制权责不对称问题研究

地方财政体制权责不对称已经成为分税制后我国地方财政管理体制运行中的一个较为突出的问题。主要表现为：事权划分原则性不强且缺乏法制化基础导致了政府间事权下移，地方政府级次过多与“倒轧账”式的分税模式引起了地方政府间财权上移，转移支付制度不规范造成了地方政府间财力差距日益扩大。为此，我们应选择相应的治理对策来完善我国地方财政体制。     

税收竞争、地区博弈及其增长绩效

中国的财政分权改革激发了地方政府推进本地区经济发展的积极性,但不恰当的分权路径也加剧了地区间的税收竞争。本文运用空间滞后模型,对中国省际间的税收竞争与博弈行为进行检验。研究显示,省际间税收竞争反应函数斜率为负,这说明省际间在税收竞争中采取的是差异化竞争策略;同时也意味着地方政府目前对公共产品的偏好较低。而对省际间税收竞争增长绩效的格兰杰因果检验则显示,公共服务水平对地区经济增长率具有显著的促进作用,并且地方政府的征税努力与其财政充裕状况直接相关。为此,本文提出应加快地区基本公共服务的均等化和转移支付的法制化进程,努力打破数量型增长的政绩观,从制度层面营造地区间协调有序的竞争关系。     

地方财政体制权责不对称问题研究

地方财政体制权责不对称已经成为分税制后我国地方财政管理体制运行十年来的一个较为突出的问题。主要表现为：事权划分原则性不强且缺乏法制化基础导致了政府间事权下移,地方政府级次过多与”倒轧账”式的分税模式引起了地方政府间财权上移,转移支付制度不规范造成了地方政府间财力差距日益扩大。为此,我们应选择相应的治理对策来完善我国地方财政体制。     

弹性分成：分税制的契约与影响

本文从契约角度分析分税制的性质,并用统一的框架解释了分税制的正反两方面作用。研究认为：中国的分税制本质上是一个弹性的分成合同系统。它是中央政府与地方政府关于剩余分配的各种子契约的组合。这些子契约可归为四种基本形式--工资合同、定额合同、分税合同和分成合同,并且它们之间具有很强的互补性,由此构成了一个富有弹性的分成合同系统。在信息不对称的条件下,这个激励系统能够激励地方政府发展经济,但是易扭曲地方政府行为,促使经济重复建设和粗放型增长模式的形成。     

收入分成、竞争与中国的省份内经济差距

中国的地区差距问题已逐渐成为制约经济发展的重要因素，并受到学术界的广泛关注。然而，作为其主要构成部分的省份内经济差距，现有研究却尚未深入。本文立足于省级以下财政分权体制，从地方政府竞争的角度梳理了政府间收入分成作用于省份内经济差距的具体机制，进而运用1995—2014年县级面板数据构建了省份内经济差距和省级以下收入分成指标，并展开实证检验。研究发现：省级以下收入分成比例的提高，扩大了省份内各县有效税率的差异，进而带来了要素在空间上的不均衡分布和省份内经济差距的扩大。同时，这一作用在经济欠发达省份的效果更为明显。这些发现为理解中国财政分权体制下地区经济差距的形成，以及完善当前财政体制以推动国家治理现代化提供了良好启示。     

Optimal fiscal decentralization: Redistribution and welfare implications

The literature has been inconclusive regarding the welfare effects of fiscal decentralization (FD), defined here as the extent to which local governments collect and spend local tax revenues. We present an original model to investigate formally the distributional and welfare implications of FD. In contrast to the standard approach that compares the implications of full FD with that of centralization, we consider that the central government chooses the level of FD to maximize welfare in a heterogeneous country. Noncooperatively, local governments choose their tax collection effort to maximize local utility. We show that an increase in the tax rate leads optimal FD to increase so as to compensate for the welfare loss from decreasing optimal local tax effort. Hence, welfare and income distribution improve in FD at its intermediate, rather than extreme, levels. We coin this result as the decentralization-Laffer curve. As regional spillovers increase, FD is less desirable as it deteriorates welfare and income distribution. This finding provides a novel support for the decentralization theorem and contributes to the fiscal policy debate.     

单一制国家财政联邦制的“中央-地方”财政关系

财政联邦主义是联邦主义政治理念在财政领域的应用。在单一制政治体制下实行财政联邦主义,中央和地方之间的财政关系有其特殊之处。文章通过构建两种异质群的演化博弈模型,采用系统动力学方法研究了中国"中央—地方"财政关系的演化特征。研究发现,当前的固定分权格局使中国的中央财政与地方财政之间处于一种失衡状态,存在"一放即乱,一收即死"的"治乱循环"。