基于高管背景特征的业绩预告自愿披露行为研究

不管是国外的管理层盈余预测,还是我国的业绩预告,都在一定程度上缓解了管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称,成为资本市场上重要的信息来源.深入理解上市公司管理层业绩预告披露行为,对于投资者和监管者来说都十分重要.传统代理理论将管理者视为同质的,忽略了管理者个人对决策的影响.本文突破传统代理理论研究的缺陷,以高阶梯队理论为基础,从高管背景特征角度出发,研究上市公司业绩预告自愿披露行为.     

投资者情绪对上市公司业绩快报自愿披露行为的影响 ——基于盈余管理部分中介效应的研究

基于会计策略的综合运用视角,探寻上市公司盈余管理行为在投资者情绪影响业绩快报披露过程中的中介作用。研究发现：公司年报中正向盈余管理程度越大,披露业绩快报的可能性越大;对于盈利公司而言,高涨的投资者情绪对业绩快报披露的促进作用部分通过盈余管理策略中介,但对于亏损公司而言,高涨的投资者情绪会对业绩快报披露产生直接抑制作用,投资者情绪高涨经由盈余管理策略对业绩快报披露所产生的间接正向影响,会被直接的抑制作用所遮掩。研究结论有助于深入了解上市公司不同信息披露策略之间的交互影响,并进一步理清投资者情绪对公司不同信息披露策略的作用机理。     

非金融企业影子银行化与管理层业绩预告质量

本文以2013—2021年沪深两市A股上市非金融企业为研究样本,实证检验了非金融企业影子银行化对管理层业绩预告质量的影响。研究结果表明,非金融企业影子银行化显著降低了管理层业绩预告质量,具体表现为业绩预告准确性和精确度的下降。机制检验表明,非金融企业影子银行化通过提高企业业绩波动、增强管理层盈余管理动机两种渠道恶化业绩预告质量。异质性分析发现,在未采用“四大”事务所审计、机构投资者持股比例较低的企业以及非国有企业的样本中,两者之间的负相关关系更加显著。本文研究结果为规范管理层业绩预告披露行为、加强监管部门及外部力量对管理层信息披露行为的监督以及引导投资者辩证看待管理层披露的业绩预告信息具有一定的现实意义。     

业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗

本文考察了业绩预告披露的形式、精度等特征对分析师跟踪数量、预测误差和预测分歧度的影响,实证结果发现:相对于定性业绩预告,发布定量业绩预告的公司以及闭区间宽度较小的公司其跟踪的分析师数量较多,预测误差和分歧度也较低。这些结果意味着,作为一个重要的信息来源,上市公司业绩预告的形式和质量显著影响了分析师的预测行为。研究结论不仅有助于监管部门了解业绩预告政策对资本市场参与者的现实影响,而且也为业绩预告是否影响投资者行为的相关研究提供了新的经验证据。     

盈余管理对上市公司年报披露及时性的影响

本文以沪市上市公司为样本,研究了盈余管理对上市公司年报披露及时性的影响。本文研究发现,盈余管理程度与年报披露时间之间存在显著的正相关关系,并进一步研究了盈余管理的方向对年报披露时滞的影响,发现盈余管理的方向对年报披露时间没有显著的影响。为使上市公司年报及时披露,帮助投资者进行有效决策,控制盈余管理将是一个有效的手段。     

中国上市公司自愿业绩预告动机研究

随着业绩预告制度的实施和演进,我国资本市场上逐步出现了越来越多的上市公司自愿业绩预告,这对于缓解管理层与投资者、机构投资者与中小投资者之间的信息不对称具有重要意义。那么,是什么因素激励上市公司管理层自愿披露业绩预告?通过借鉴西方的自愿信息披露理论,并结合我国转轨经济的制度背景,本文提出了我国上市公司自愿业绩预告的三类动机:资本市场交易、管理层股票收益和管理层能力信号传递,并以2001-2008年我国上市公司业绩预告数据为研究样本对此进行了检验。研究结果显示,融资需求高、管理者利益协同程度高、会计业绩好的上市公司更有动机自愿披露业绩预告,并且国有相对于非国有上市公司自愿披露动机更弱。     

商誉减值与公司业绩预告行为

近年来,商誉减值引发的公司业绩“暴雷”风险成为资本市场的热点话题。本文基于中国A股上市公司数据,考察了商誉减值对业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,商誉减值提高了公司自愿披露业绩预告积极性,但降低了业绩预告精确度和准确度。机制检验表明,商誉减值通过增加双重代理成本降低业绩预告精确度和准确度;坏消息、卖空机制下,发生商誉减值的公司通过降低业绩预告精确度和准确度以维稳股价的动机更强。进一步分析表明,商誉减值降低业绩预告精确度、准确度的作用在内部控制质量较低、分析师跟踪较少的公司中更显著,在自愿披露公司与强制披露公司之间不存在显著差异。本文结论对政策制定中防范商誉减值风险、完善上市公司信息披露制度提供了实证证据。     

管理层盈余预告与分析师预测关系的实证研究——基于中国上市公司的经验证据

论文以2006—2010年沪深两市A股上市公司为样本,研究了管理层盈余预告消息性质、盈余预告披露精确性对分析师预测行为的影响。研究结果表明,相对于坏消息,管理层对好消息的预告会得到均衡透明的披露,因此分析师跟踪人数更多,预测更为准确,分歧度更小。另外还发现盈余预告精确性的提高对分析师跟踪人数并无显著影响,但是随着管理层盈余预告精确性的提高,分析师的预测误差和分歧度均有所减小。     

社交媒体上“用嘴投票”对管理层自愿性业绩预告的影响

本文研究了投资者 “股吧”讨论这种“用嘴投票”机制能否发挥治理作用进而促进管理层进行自愿性业绩预告。用上市公司股吧中的发帖量、阅读量和评论量来衡量投资者“用嘴投票”的参与程度,研究发现投资者“用嘴投票”参与度越高,管理层进行盈余预测自愿性披露的概率越大,且更愿意及时披露业绩下滑等坏消息。进一步研究发现,投资者“用嘴投票”是通过对股价产生影响、引发监管层关注和招致媒体报道这三个渠道对管理层产生预警进而发挥治理作用。且这一治理机制在管理层受到互联网信息影响可能性越大、公司中小股东户数越多以及论坛的讨论内容越负面时更为显著。     

社交媒体上“用嘴投票”对管理层自愿性业绩预告的影响

本文研究了投资者 “股吧”讨论这种“用嘴投票”机制能否发挥治理作用进而促进管理层进行自愿性业绩预告。用上市公司股吧中的发帖量、阅读量和评论量来衡量投资者“用嘴投票”的参与程度,研究发现投资者“用嘴投票”参与度越高,管理层进行盈余预测自愿性披露的概率越大,且更愿意及时披露业绩下滑等坏消息。进一步研究发现,投资者“用嘴投票”是通过对股价产生影响、引发监管层关注和招致媒体报道这三个渠道对管理层产生预警进而发挥治理作用。且这一治理机制在管理层受到互联网信息影响可能性越大、公司中小股东户数越多以及论坛的讨论内容越负面时更为显著。     

Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Intraday Stock Price Variability Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

This study investigates the relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcements is positively related to the degree of analysts' predisclosure earnings forecast dispersion. Additionally, firms with high levels of forecast dispersion exhibit significant increases in price variability for longer periods prior to and following earnings announcements than do firms with low levels of forecast dispersion. These results suggest that there is information about the earnings announcement that becomes available to at least a subset of investors prior to the earnings release and that market participants take different amounts of time to process the information conveyed by the earnings announcement.     

The association between qualitative management earnings forecasts and discretionary accounting in the Netherlands

This paper examines whether there is an association between discretionary accounting and the accuracy of long-run forecasts of annual earnings disclosed voluntarily by Dutch companies in the directors’ report. In particular, investigations were made of the consistency in the sign and direction of discretionary accounting techniques and qualitative earnings forecasts. Long-run forecasts are defined, for the purposes of this paper, as forecasts made at least seven months before the year-end. Although not mandatory, qualitative forecasts are released by well over 60% of the listed companies in the Netherlands. Empirical results indicate that there is consistency in the sign and direction of qualitative earnings forecasts and discretionary accounting. After adopting discretionary accounting, the forecast errors are reduced if the company can reach the management earnings forecast (target). In the event that reserves are insufficient to accomplish this goal, managers choose their next best option and take an earnings bath in order to maximize reserves available for future use. By partitioning the sample in various sub-sets it is shown that earnings management and forecast errors occur most in the extreme ranges of financial performance. Overall, the study shows that management engages in discretionary accounting to present results in line with the disclosed qualitative earnings forecasts in their directors’ reports. Whilst discretionary accounting may clearly improve the consistency of companies’ earnings forecasts released via the directors’ reports and the actual earnings, managers’ earnings forecasts are sometimes disclosed in anticipation of planned discretionary accounting actions.     

Abnormal Returns from Predicting Earnings Thresholds

This study examines the performance of a trading strategy based on the prediction of firms concurrently reporting a positive earnings change and meeting analysts’ earnings forecasts. The evidence indicates that a model predicting both earnings thresholds concurrently can yield excess returns that are incremental to predicting only one earnings threshold. Further, I find that the prediction of forecast errors is relatively more important than predicting earnings changes as the incremental benefit from predicting earnings changes concurrently with forecast errors is small relative to a model that predicts only forecast errors. The results hold while controlling for various risk factors and known anomalies.     

公司治理水平、董事高管责任保险与盈余管理

董事高管责任保险在董事和高管遭受民事诉讼时具有“兜底”效应,降低了董事高管的执业风险.选取2002-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,实证检验董事高管责任保险对公司盈余管理的影响,进一步分析在不同公司治理水平下,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的关系是否存在差异.研究结果表明:董事高管责任保险的引入会加剧公司盈余管理行为;随着公司治理水平提高,董事高管责任保险与公司盈余管理的正相关关系减弱.     

管理层利用董事会报告可读性配合盈余管理了吗

依据2007-2018年中国上市公司数据,考量管理层是否会利用董事会报告可读性配合盈余管理。结果显示：上市公司存在管理层利用董事会报告可读性配合其盈余管理行为,表现为盈余管理程度较高的公司董事会报告可读性较差,盈余管理程度较低的公司董事会报告可读性较好;且当年董事会报告可读性较差的公司下一年盈余管理程度较高,当年董事会报告可读性较好的公司下一年盈余管理程度较低。此外,国有上市公司管理层利用董事会报告可读性配合其盈余管理的动机会更强。     

Causes and Consequences of Disaggregating Earnings Guidance

Whether managers should provide earnings guidance, especially quarterly guidance, has been a hotly debated policy issue. Influential organizations have urged firms to stop providing earnings guidance to reduce earnings fixation and short‐termism in the capital markets. Little attention has been paid to an alternative proposal: instead of ceasing earnings guidance, companies could provide disaggregated earnings guidance. No archival evidence exists regarding the determinants of disaggregated earnings guidance and its effects on the firm and its information environment. We find that once managers provide guidance, the decision to disaggregate this guidance is primarily driven by demand‐and‐supply factors that exhibit little change from year to year rather than by strategic factors. We find more timely analyst forecast revisions (with no compromise of forecast accuracy), a greater magnitude of revisions, and a larger reduction in analyst disagreement for disaggregating firms than for non‐disaggregating firms. These findings suggest that disaggregation enriches a firm's information environment. We also find that disaggregation helps managers align analyst expectations with their own, but firms are punished by investors for providing multiple performance targets but missing them.     

我国上市公司盈余管理对股价影响的实证分析

盈余管理在西方被称为“市场参与者的游戏”,近年来日益受到我国会计学界的关注。证券市场的迅速发展要求上市公司提供高质量的会计信息,由于盈余管理与会计信息质量关系密切,使得对上市公司盈余管理问题的研究成为投资者、债权人、政府主管部门以及会计准则制定机构关注的重点。另一方面,证券市场经验数据证明,股价的波动也同盈余管理密切相关,而利益相关者很可能利用盈余管理手段来影响股价从而获取利益。因此,加强我国上市公司盈余管理和股价相关性的研究,对提高上市公司会计信息质量和改善证券市场资源优化配置功能有着重要意义。本文运用实证分析方法,选取了竞争性强的家电行业和竞争性弱的石油行业的上市公司,从盈余管理度量着手,研究竞争性不同行业的上市公司盈余管理对股价的影响大小,并对投资者的行为提出相关建议。     

International Variation in Accounting Measurement Rules and Analysts' Earnings Forecast Errors

We theorize that accounting systems affect analysts' forecast accuracy through changes in earnings variability. We argue that the matching and historical cost principles reduce earnings variability, and hence, reduce analysts' earnings forecast errors. We also argue that restricting the choice of accounting methods can result in larger forecast errors. We argue that more informative disclosure environments should reduce forecast errors. We test whether variation in these factors across countries explain variation in analysts' earnings forecast bias and accuracy. Our results indicate that these characteristics of financial accounting systems are complements, and that they affect financial analysts' earnings forecast errors.     

Earnings Surprises in Analysts' Forecasts,Mandatory Disclosure,and Share Repurchases

This paper examines the impact of forecast errors and the mandatory disclosure of repurchase transactions required by 2003 Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations on share repurchases. We define forecast errors as the difference between analysts' forecasted earnings and actual earnings. We argue that firms with positive forecast errors imply greater information asymmetry, which may induce them to signal through share repurchases. We show that both the repurchase target and analysts' forecast revision are positively related to forecast errors. Furthermore, these associations are more pronounced in the low disclosure period (1989–2003) where greater information asymmetry between managers and outside investors is found, while increased transparency in the high disclosure period (2004–2006) leads to more significant improvement in long‐term performances for firms with positive forecast errors. The results are consistent with our expectations that the information asymmetry implied in forecast errors, along with a shock change from the introduction of the 2003 SEC regulation, affect both corporate and analysts' behaviour.     

Earnings manipulation and similarity of annual report disclosure: Evidence from China

The Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) section is an important component of a company's annual report, where the management team provides a textual analysis of the company's performance for investors. Due to the existence of agency problems, management is likely to mask any earnings manipulation in order to maximise their salary, build a corporate empire or obtain more financing, which will reduce the reliability of the company's financial information. Utilising 13,679 Chinese A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2020, this study examines the correlation between management earnings manipulation and annual report MD&A similarity. We find that earnings manipulation leads to increased MD&A similarity in order to reduce the transmission of useful information and thus stymie investors. As such, we recommend that regulatory authorities should monitor the level of similarity and validity of MD&A disclosures in addition to the authenticity of numerical financial information.