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1.
不管是国外的管理层盈余预测,还是我国的业绩预告,都在一定程度上缓解了管理层与投资者之间的信息不对称,成为资本市场上重要的信息来源.深入理解上市公司管理层业绩预告披露行为,对于投资者和监管者来说都十分重要.传统代理理论将管理者视为同质的,忽略了管理者个人对决策的影响.本文突破传统代理理论研究的缺陷,以高阶梯队理论为基础,从高管背景特征角度出发,研究上市公司业绩预告自愿披露行为.  相似文献   

2.
我国证券市场的业绩预告制度是管理层为提高上市公司信息披露透明度而提出的一项重要措施。然而大量的研究发现,上市公司业绩预告披露质量不客乐观,及时性、准确性不高。本文以洛阳玻璃股份有限公司发布的2007年年度业绩预告为典型案例,对上市公司业绩预告变脸现象做一个深入分析,以期为投资者、上市公司、证券监管部门、会计师事务所提供一些有价值的信息。  相似文献   

3.
近年来,商誉减值引发的公司业绩“暴雷”风险成为资本市场的热点话题。本文基于中国A股上市公司数据,考察了商誉减值对业绩预告行为的影响。研究发现,商誉减值提高了公司自愿披露业绩预告积极性,但降低了业绩预告精确度和准确度。机制检验表明,商誉减值通过增加双重代理成本降低业绩预告精确度和准确度;坏消息、卖空机制下,发生商誉减值的公司通过降低业绩预告精确度和准确度以维稳股价的动机更强。进一步分析表明,商誉减值降低业绩预告精确度、准确度的作用在内部控制质量较低、分析师跟踪较少的公司中更显著,在自愿披露公司与强制披露公司之间不存在显著差异。本文结论对政策制定中防范商誉减值风险、完善上市公司信息披露制度提供了实证证据。  相似文献   

4.
本文以2006-2013年我国A股上市公司为样本,以企业总部所在省份的省委书记变更作为政治不确定性的衡量,研究了政治不确定性对于管理层自愿业绩预告和预告精确度的影响。结果发现,在官员变更的当年,管理层会更倾向于自愿发布业绩预告,并且业绩预告的精确度也会提高。进一步研究发现,政治不确定性对业绩预告自愿披露倾向和精确度的影响在民营企业、新任官员为外部调任时、分析师跟踪人数更多的公司中更为显著。最后本文也从资本市场反应的角度进行了补充检验,发现市场在政治不确定性更高时对业绩预告的反应也更强烈。本文的发现对于理解政治不确定性的微观影响及管理层自愿业绩预测的作用都有一定的贡献。  相似文献   

5.
随着国内资本市场的发展,上市公司管理层盈利预测披露引起了会计学界更多的关注。本文主要回顾国外学者对管理者盈利预测自愿披露的经济动机,并针对我国已有学者的研究,基于我国资本市场特殊制度背景提供相应的研究建议。  相似文献   

6.
盈利预测信息有助于投资者做出合理的经济决策,是极为有用的会计信息。本文通过对盈利预测自愿披露的动机进行分析,得出自愿披露有着极大的可行性。但是由于我国资本市场有效性的缺乏以及上市公司股权结构、预测风险的存在等原因,使得我国上市公司盈利预测自愿行为出现了自愿披露的意愿不强、披露质量不高问题。  相似文献   

7.
盈余管理存在的根本原因在于投资者与管理层之间的信息不对称。业绩预告作为上市公司未来经营成果、财务状况与现金流量的预测,在很大程度上会影响投资者对上市公司的评估及其投资决策。从业绩预告披露的特征方面出发,研究业绩预告披露与盈余管理之间的关系,包括业绩预告的性质、预告精确度、预告误差分别与盈余管理程度的关系,结果发现:发布业绩预告的公司,盈余管理水平更高。预告精确度以及预告期间与预测当期盈余管理水平正相关,预测误差与盈余管理水平负相关。当消息类型不同的时候,预测的强制性与否以及"变脸"对盈余管理水平的影响不同。结论支持了上市公司财务报告迎合业绩预告披露的说法。  相似文献   

8.
分行业信息披露是注册制下高质量监管的重要内容。本文基于沪深交易所分批次颁布行业信息披露指引这一准自然实验构建双重差分模型,实证分析了行业信息披露义务是否改变了公司的策略性信息披露行为。研究发现,要求上市公司披露行业经营性信息能够提高管理层业绩预告质量,且信息透明度、分析师关注度、法制环境、业绩预告属性和经营风险在分行业信息披露对业绩预告质量的影响中发挥着调节作用。会计稳健性和会计信息可比性是潜在机制。本研究有助于理解以行业为属性的信息披露政策对上市公司业绩预告披露行为的影响,同时对完善我国业绩预告制度也有一定的启发。  相似文献   

9.
近几年业绩预告相关问题频发,利用业绩预告误导市场、牟取私利的案件屡见不鲜,引发投资者、债权人对业绩预告质量的担忧,如何有效解决这一问题成为眼下实务界与学术界共同关注的一大热点。在女性高管群体日益壮大、影响力逐步提升的大背景下,本文以我国A股上市公司数据为样本,考察女性高管对管理层业绩预告的影响。研究发现:女性高管有助于提高管理层业绩预告质量,具体包括业绩预告的准确度、业绩预告的精确度以及业绩预告的积极性。进一步,通过异质性分析发现内部寻租动机较强的企业,或外部治理环境较差的企业,或核心岗位高管为女性的企业,女性高管对业绩预告准确度和精确度的提高作用更为明显。本文不仅丰富了女性高管的相关研究,拓展了业绩预告分析的文献,也对提高上市公司质量的监管机制具有重要启示。  相似文献   

10.
业绩预告信息对分析师预测行为有影响吗   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
本文考察了业绩预告披露的形式、精度等特征对分析师跟踪数量、预测误差和预测分歧度的影响,实证结果发现:相对于定性业绩预告,发布定量业绩预告的公司以及闭区间宽度较小的公司其跟踪的分析师数量较多,预测误差和分歧度也较低。这些结果意味着,作为一个重要的信息来源,上市公司业绩预告的形式和质量显著影响了分析师的预测行为。研究结论不仅有助于监管部门了解业绩预告政策对资本市场参与者的现实影响,而且也为业绩预告是否影响投资者行为的相关研究提供了新的经验证据。  相似文献   

11.
Baik et al. (2011) find that high-ability managers in the U.S. are more likely to issue accurate management earnings forecasts. Focusing on Japan, where management earnings forecasts are effectively mandated, we extend the literature by exploring (1) whether the relationship between managerial ability and forecast accuracy is unique to the U.S. disclosure system, where management forecasts are voluntary, and (2) how high-ability managers increase their forecast accuracy. We find that managerial ability is negatively associated with forecast errors based on initial forecasts, suggesting that high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate forecasts at the beginning of the fiscal year. We then show that high-ability managers are less likely to revise their initial earnings forecasts and less likely to use earnings management to improve the accuracy of their earnings forecasts. Our findings show that, while high-ability managers are more likely to issue accurate initial management forecasts, low-ability managers are more likely to revise their forecasts and conduct earnings management to reduce their forecast errors.  相似文献   

12.
This paper considers the level of bias observed in management disclosures of earnings forecasts and historic earnings data in Australian prospectuses. Management forecasts and naïve forecasts derived from managements’ normalised historic data are analysed. A key focus is upon the possible association between such forecast bias and differential audit services performed upon the data. Audit firm size and level of engagement are modelled against bias. The full sample revealed no overestimation bias for any of the forecast models, but underestimation was observed for elements of the management and random walk naïve forecasts. Cross-sectionally, a significant association was observed between forecast bias and audit firm size across all three forecast models. Specifically, the audit firm size variable (Non Big-5/Big-5) was inversely associated with the extent to which forecasted and normalised historic earnings data were upwardly biased. On the other hand, the level of engagement was not a significant discriminator for forecast bias. These outcomes are contrasted against others reported elsewhere in the literature and suggest a risk in generalising across contexts. The findings imply a level of ‘disclosure management’ regarding company IPO forecasts and normalised historic accounting data, with forecast overestimation and error size more extreme when the monitoring expertise and/or reputation of auditors is lower (JEL D80, G14, M41, N27).  相似文献   

13.
王克敏  廉鹏 《会计研究》2012,(3):72-77,95
本文研究盈利预测制度由强制性向自愿性披露的变化对首发上市公司盈余管理的影响。研究发现,在控制其他首发上市制度影响条件下,自愿性盈利预测制度使首发公司披露盈利预测的偏好明显下降,盈利预测高估程度明显降低,且激进会计政策选择偏好明显下降,公司盈余管理水平显著降低。研究表明,市场化信息披露制度改革有助于缓解公司盈余管理行为。  相似文献   

14.
We study whether the relative magnitudes of analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts convey information about the persistence and value relevance of reported earnings. We find that reported earnings are likely to be more (less) persistent and value relevant when analysts forecast relatively moderate (extreme) levels of operating cash flows, relative to earnings. We also find that the market’s response to a given earnings surprise is the strongest for moderate levels of cash flow forecasts relative to earnings. The joint information role of analysts’ cash flow and earnings forecasts persists even after controlling for the absolute accruals in the model.  相似文献   

15.
This study examines the relative and complementary performance of alternative earnings forecast adjustments using a common set of consensus analysts’ earnings forecasts. We document that a simple adjustment to analysts’ earnings forecasts, based solely on cross-sectional relationships between actual and forecasted earnings in the prior year, performs as well as more complicated adjustment methods, i.e., composite forecasts and persistence adjusted forecasts. A forecast adjustment that is based on prior year earnings and returns, however, provides significant incremental reductions in forecast error and dominates all of the other adjustment methods.  相似文献   

16.
This study investigates managers' motivations to engage in earnings management through purposeful interventions in the setting of discretionary accruals, in the context of initial public offerings (IPOs) in France. Firms issuing forecasts in their prospectuses are expected to differ from nonforecasters in the level of earnings management during the year following the public offering. Within the context of contracting theory, four research questions are addressed. First, are IPO firms issuing forecasts more inclined to manage earnings 1 year after an IPO compared to nonforecasting firms? Second, is a forecasting firm's level of earnings management conditioned by earnings-forecast deviation? Third, is earnings management by IPO forecasting firms affected by contractual and governance environments? Fourth, how do investors see through earnings management following IPO earnings forecasts, i.e., how do stock market participants value earnings components (i.e., nondiscretionary and discretionary accruals)? Our findings document that in the year following an IPO, the magnitude of earnings management is much higher for forecasters than for nonforecasters. Results also show that a firm's accrual behavior is affected by earnings-forecast deviation, but the relationship is moderated by contractual and governance constraints. Finally, it would appear that French investors do not adequately readjust the relationship between reported earnings and a firm's market value for the year in which earnings are subject to manipulations.  相似文献   

17.
We study the effect of disclosure on uncertainty by examining how management earnings forecasts affect stock market volatility. Using implied volatilities from exchange-traded options prices, we find that management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility. This effect is attributable to forecasts that convey bad news, especially when firms release forecasts sporadically rather than on a routine basis. In the longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced, regardless of whether there is a preceding earnings forecast. This decline is mitigated when the firm issues a forecast that conveys negative news, implying that these forecasts are associated with increased uncertainty.  相似文献   

18.
The effect of cash flow forecasts on accrual quality and benchmark beating   总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2  
When analysts provide forecasts of both earnings and operating cash flow, they also implicitly provide a forecast of total operating accruals. We posit that this increases the transparency and the expected costs of accrual manipulations used to manage earnings. As a consequence, we predict and find that accrual quality improves and firms’ propensity to meet or beat earnings benchmarks declines following the provision of cash flow forecasts. We also predict and find that firms turn to other benchmark-beating mechanisms, such as real activities manipulation and earnings guidance in response to the provision of cash flow forecasts.  相似文献   

19.
This study examines whether the Taiwanese regulation requiring disclosure of earnings forecasts in the IPOs resulted in disclosure of more optimistic earnings forecasts and whether the forecast error was reduced more by manipulating the reported earnings rather than revising the earnings forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. The study is based on 759 forecasts issued by the Taiwanese IPO firms from 1994 to 2001, i.e. 8-year period after the regulation was modified to increase the forecast error threshold to 20%. The findings show that the disclosure regulation resulted in more optimistic forecasts than conservative forecasts, especially for firms expecting better performance in the forecast year compared to the previous year. Firms disclosing optimistic earnings forecasts engaged more in manipulation of reported earnings than revision of forecasts to meet the forecast error threshold. These findings thus suggest that the disclosure regulation resulted in earnings manipulation, which reduced the quality of reported earnings. We received valuable comments at the 2003 American Accounting Association and 2004 Euorpean Accounting Association annual meetings. We also thank the participants at the research seminars at Rutgers University, City University of Hong Kong, and Pace University, for their insightful comments. Picheng Lee especially thanks Pace University for 2003 summer research grant.  相似文献   

20.
The 1990s were characterized by substantial increases in the performance of and investor reliance on financial analysts. Because managers possess superior private information and issue forecasts to align investors’ expectations with their own, we predict that managers increased the quality of their earnings forecasts during the 1990s in order to keep pace with the improved forward-looking information provided by financial analysts, upon which investors increasingly relied. Using a sample of 2,437 management earnings forecasts, we document an increase in management earnings forecast precision, management earnings forecast accuracy, and managers’ tendency to explain earnings forecasts in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. Given that these forecast characteristics are linked to greater informativeness and credibility, we also document that the information content of management earnings forecasts, as measured by the strength of share price responses to forecast news, increased in 1993–1996 relative to 1983–1986. As expected, the increased information content of management forecasts primarily occurred for firms covered by financial analysts.
Michael D. KimbroughEmail:
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