Model-free jump measures and interest rates: common patterns in US and UK monetary policy around major economic events

We employ model-free jump measures to study monetary policy operations in the UK and USA around major economic events by exploiting the relationship between jumps, interest rates, and macroeconomic news releases related to monetary policy. In our analysis, we explicitly account for the timing of jumps in UK and US interest rates and the correlation across jumps in the same two interest rates and whether these match Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)/Monetary Policy Committee news releases. We find that FOMC news releases lag jumps in US interest rates, but lead jumps in UK Gilt rates. Overall, our analysis suggests that US Treasury Bills react to information in the aforementioned news releases before their announcement while UK Gilt yields react after them and that the Fed and Bank of England react similarly around major economic events.     

货币政策和宏观审慎政策的关联及启示——基于英格兰银行的经验

时至今日,宏观审慎政策在内涵、工具和框架等方面快速发展,不仅政策目标更加清晰,工具类型更加丰富,相关理论基础也在不断完善。作为危机后形成的新政策框架,宏观审慎政策在工具有效性、作用机制、政策框架设计及与货币政策的关系方面都还有待深入研究。特别是在制度框架中,如何考虑宏观审慎政策与货币政策的关联,合理设计政策决策框架均已成为关键。对中国而言,系统风险识别、监测与分析更加复杂、困难,需要对宏观审慎政策开展更加精细、深入研究,尤其应吸收借鉴国际经验,建立、完善适合中国的宏观审慎政策框架。基于此,本文首先对宏观审慎政策的理论基础、政策目标及工具等进行系统综述,而后从两类政策关联中涉及的三个重要问题出发,着重分析宏观审慎政策与货币政策之间关系,并分别从组织架构设计、货币政策框架改革、金融政策框架设计等方面,系统介绍了英格兰银行在货币政策和宏观审慎政策框架改革的经验,重点阐述英格兰银行如何实现理论发展与制度设计的较好融合。最后,给出我国宏观审慎政策发展的若干启示和政策建议。     

Monetary policy and stock returns under the MPC and inflation targeting

We examine the implications of the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) framework for the monetary policy–equity returns relationship in the UK. Using a standard event study methodology, we do not find a significant relationship between market-based policy surprises and equity returns. After controlling for joint response bias using Thornton's (in press) framework, we find that unexpected policy rate changes enter the stock prices discovery process. Moreover, we produce evidence that the impact of MPC policy decisions on equities depends on the MPC members' voting record publication, especially when the last reveals unanimity versus dissent voting.     

Monetary conservatism and fiscal policy

Does an inflation conservative central bank à la Rogoff (1985) remain desirable in a setting with endogenous fiscal policy? To provide an answer we study monetary and fiscal policy games without commitment in a dynamic, stochastic sticky-price economy with monopolistic distortions. Monetary policy determines nominal interest rates and fiscal policy provides public goods generating private utility. We find that lack of fiscal commitment gives rise to excessive public spending. The optimal inflation rate internalizing this distortion is positive, but lack of monetary commitment generates too much inflation. A conservative monetary authority thus remains desirable. When fiscal policy is determined before monetary policy each period, the monetary authority should focus exclusively on stabilizing inflation. Monetary conservatism then eliminates the steady state biases associated with lack of monetary and fiscal commitment and leads to stabilization policy that is close to optimal.     

关于财政政策影响货币运行的实证研究——从我国货币当局资产负债表看财政货币政策的相关性

本文透过我国货币当局资产负债表,深入观察并揭示反映经济发展规律与本质的货币运行特征。以财政政策的四大主要政策工具为主线,采取定量与定性相结合方法,分析财政政策对货币运行特征的影响机理与程度,以便我们能够全面系统地了解、观察和把握财政政策与货币政策协调空间和互动架构。     

货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调

本文在梳理学术文献和国际经验基础上,讨论了货币政策与宏观审慎政策之间的潜在冲突和协调机制。国际文献的初步结论是,为了同时实现价格稳定和金融稳定目标,大部分情况下需要货币政策与宏观审慎政策反向操作(由于政策的替代性),但有时也需要两者同向操作(由于政策的互补性),最优政策组合取决于宏观冲击的类别和风险的来源。本文认为,选择最优组合是一个复杂的理论和实证问题,除了冲击类别和风险来源外,不同的金融体制和经济周期阶段也会影响选择结果。因此,货币政策当局与宏观审慎当局之间需要建立有效的协调机制,并加强对货币政策和宏观审慎政策“溢出效应”的分析能力。基于上述理论,针对我国“双支柱”决策的现状和问题提出如下改革建议:一是从法律上明确中央银行的金融稳定职责。二是建立在同一框架内分析货币政策与宏观审慎政策的方法和工具。三是将金融监管部门的主要宏观审慎政策决策权集中至中央银行。四是建立货币政策与宏观审慎政策的协调流程与机制。     

Stock market liquidity and macro-liquidity shocks: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

We develop an empirical framework that links micro-liquidity, macro-liquidity and stock prices. We provide evidence of a strong link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of UK stock portfolios constructed on the basis of micro-liquidity measures between 1999 and 2012. Specifically, macro-liquidity shocks, which are extracted on the meeting days of the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) relative to market expectations embedded in 3-month LIBOR futures prices, are transmitted in a differential manner to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, with liquid stocks playing the most active role. We also find that there is a significant increase in shares' trading activity and a rather small increase in their trading cost on MPC meeting days. Finally, our results emphatically document that during the recent financial crisis the shocks–returns relationship has reversed its sign. Interest rate cuts during the crisis were perceived by market participants as a signal of deteriorating economic prospects and reinforced “flight to safety” trading.     

What Is the Importance of Monetary and Fiscal Shocks in Explaining U.S. Macroeconomic Fluctuations?

This paper analyzes the importance of monetary and fiscal policy shocks in explaining U.S. macroeconomic fluctuations, and establishes new stylized facts. The novelty of our empirical analysis is that we jointly consider both monetary and fiscal policy, whereas the existing literature only focuses on either one or the other. Our main findings are twofold: fiscal shocks are relatively more important in explaining medium cycle fluctuations whereas monetary policy shocks are relatively more important in explaining business cycle fluctuations, and failing to recognize that both monetary and fiscal policy simultaneously affect macroeconomic variables might incorrectly attribute the fluctuations to the wrong source.     

Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.     

Interaction of Government Tiers and Central Banks in a Federation: An Empirical Test

Fiscal rules are necessary to protect monetary policy from the consequences of unsustainable or active fiscal policy for inflation. Monetary unions, such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), require even stronger fiscal rules to avoid free riding by regional fiscal authorities on the common monetary policy. By contrast, in a fiscal federation, the federal government internalises the effect of active regional policies on the overall price level. Federal fiscal policy contributes to price stability either by enforcing fiscal rules or by adjusting its own stance. Following Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2001), we test whether federal and regional governments in Germany behave in an active or passive way. We find evidence of a spillover effect of unsustainable policies on other regions. The German federal government offsets the effect on the price level by running passive policies. The Bundesbank's prime objective of price stability is therefore endorsed by fiscal policy. The results have implications for the regulation of fiscal policies in the EMU.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

Fiscal and Monetary Policy Coordination,Macroeconomic Stability,and Sovereign Risk Premia

In standard macroeconomic models, equilibrium stability and uniqueness require monetary policy to actively target inflation and fiscal policy to ensure long‐run debt sustainability. We show analytically that these requirements change, and depend on the cyclicality of fiscal policy, when government debt is risky. In that case, budget deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Consequently, countercyclical fiscal policies reduce the parameter space supporting stable and unique equilibria and are feasible only if complemented with more aggressive debt consolidation and/or active monetary policy. Stability is more easily achieved, however, under procyclical fiscal policies.     

Seven Fallacies Concerning Milton Friedman's “The Role of Monetary Policy”

This paper analyzes Milton Friedman's (1968a) article “The Role of Monetary Policy,” via a discussion of seven fallacies concerning the article. These fallacies are as follows: (i) “The Role of Monetary Policy” was Friedman's first public statement of the natural rate hypothesis. (ii) The Friedman–Phelps Phillips curve was already present in Samuelson and Solow's (1960) analysis. (iii) Friedman's specification of the Phillips curve was based on perfect competition and no nominal rigidities. (iv) Friedman's (1968a) account of monetary policy in the Great Depression contradicted the Monetary History’s version. (v) Friedman (1968a) stated that a monetary expansion will keep the unemployment rate and the real interest rate below their natural rates for two decades. (vi) The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates invalidates the natural rate hypothesis. (vii) Friedman's (1968a) treatment of an interest-rate peg was refuted by the rational expectations revolution. The discussion lays out the reasons why each of these seven items is a fallacy and infers key aspects of the framework underlying Friedman's (1968a) analysis.     

Nominal Interest Rates and the News

This paper provides new estimates of the impact of monetary policy actions and macroeconomic news on the term structure of nominal interest rates. The key novelty is to parsimoniously capture the impact of news on all interest rates using a simple no‐arbitrage model. The different types of news are analyzed in a common framework by recognizing their heterogeneity, which allows for a systematic comparison of their effects. This approach leads to novel empirical findings. First, monetary policy causes a substantial amount of volatility in both short‐term and long‐term interest rates. Second, macroeconomic data surprises have small and mostly insignificant effects on the long end of the term structure. Third, the term‐structure response to macroeconomic news is consistent with considerable interest‐rate smoothing by the Federal Reserve. Fourth, monetary policy surprises are multidimensional while macroeconomic surprises are one‐dimensional.     

1998—1999年美国货币政策及其对中国的启示

本文从美国经济的持续增长入手，主要探讨美联储审慎的货币政策在美国“新经济”中的作用。通过分析美联储在１９９８－１９９９年以利率为主线、以其他货币政策工具为补充的货币政策的实施过程，并具体剖析了其主要特点，最后对我国在货币政策的实施过程中就各种货币政策工具提出了一些建议。     

Forecast rationality and monetary policy frameworks: Evidence from UK interest rate forecasts

We find evidence of heterogeneity and irrationality among professional forecasts for three-month inter-bank rates and ten-year gilt yields at both short and long forecast horizons over the period 1989-2006. The majority of biased forecasts overestimate the future spot rate, consistent with slow adjustment to the declining trend in inflation and interest rates. Furthermore, we produce evidence indicating that both monetary policy actions and elements of communication policy have information content regarding the rationality of forecasts. Changes in official bank rates and disagreement among the Monetary Policy Committee influence the rationality of forecasts. The publication of inflation reports has no effect.     

财政政策定义的重构--来自两百年间的文献研究与中国实践的启示

财政政策长期缺乏准确定义,引发两重模糊性:与财政部门的行为相混淆;与货币政策的边界模糊。十九届四中全会提出健全宏观调控体系,要求财政、货币及其他政策协调。本文通过重新构建财政政策的定义,消除模糊性,从而为政策协调提供理论基础。本文首先梳理财政政策的词源与其后两百余年间的文献,论证模糊性的存在,并总结理论渊源;在重构定义之后,本文讨论了一般性和具体政策的典型分类,发现新定义既不与公认分类矛盾,又能消除传统概念的模糊。本文重构的定义明晰了财政政策的学理属性与理论边界,提出的弱财政政策的概念对政策制定如何考虑市场平台与政府参与之间的关系有实践意义,该定义的提出为中国特色财政学理论的构建与完善提供了概念基础。     

Do central banks respond to exchange rate movements? A structural investigation

We estimate a small-scale, structural general equilibrium model of a small open economy using Bayesian methods. Our main focus is the conduct of monetary policy in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the UK. We consider generic Taylor-type rules, where the monetary authority reacts in response to output, inflation, and exchange-rate movements. We perform posterior odds tests to investigate the hypothesis whether central banks do target exchange rates. The main result of this paper is that the central banks of Australia and New Zealand do not, whereas the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England do include the nominal exchange rate in its policy rule. This result is robust for various specification of the policy rule. We also find that terms-of-trade movements do not contribute significantly to domestic business cycles.     

Designing domestic institutions for international monetary policy cooperation: A Utopia?

In a wide variety of international macroeconomic models monetary policy cooperation is optimal, non-cooperative policies are inefficient, but optimal policies can be attained non-cooperatively by optimal design of domestic institutions/contracts. We show that given endogenous institutional design, inefficiencies of non-cooperation cannot and will not be eliminated. We model the delegation stage explicitly and show that subgame perfect, credible contracts (chosen by governments based on individual rationality) are non-zero, but are different from optimal contracts and hence lead to inefficient equilibria. Optimal contracts require cooperation at the delegation stage, which is inconsistent with the advocated non-cooperative nature of the solution. A general solution method for credible contracts and an example from international monetary policy cooperation are considered. Our results feature delegation as an equilibrium phenomenon, explain inefficiencies of existing delegation schemes and hint to a potentially stronger role for supranational authorities in international policy coordination.     

Is monetary policy effective in dampening fiscally induced exchange market pressures? Evidence from Ghana

Episodes of currency crises in Ghana over the recent past were examined. We also address two fundamental questions using VAR framework. First, how does fiscal policy relate to exchange market pressures (EMPs) in Ghana? Second, whether persistent fiscal slippages hinder the effective use of interest rate as monetary policy tool to influence undesirable exchange rate fluctuations? We found sterilization interventions to be more effective than interest rate as a monetary policy tool in moderating tensions in foreign exchange market. Higher recurrent expenditure was generally associated with higher EMP, while capital expenditures tend to assuage EMP. We recommend strong policy coordination between the fiscal and monetary authorities to ensure macroeconomic stability.