Depoliticization and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from the mandated resignation of directors in China

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.     

Bank risk-taking and corporate investment: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009

In this paper, we explore the relation between the banking sector's risk-taking and a firm's investment (“corporate investment”). Specifically, we ask whether firms' cash holdings moderate the effect of the banking sector's risk-taking on corporate investment. Based on a panel sample of publicly listed non-financial firms in 15 EU countries during the period 1990–2015, we document several key findings. First, both cash holdings and the banking sector's risk-taking are positively associated with corporate investment. Second, bank loan growth, which roughly captures the supply of bank credit, is not related to corporate investment. Third, firms with smaller cash holdings disproportionately invest more than do firms with larger cash holdings during periods of higher risk-taking by the banking sector.     

IRS Private Letter Rulings: Initial Evidence on Determinants and Consequences

This study examines the determinants of firms' requests for Private Letter Rulings (PLRs) from the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and their impact on firms' cash holdings. Our results show that PLR requests tend to be made by firms with more active tax planning, more acquisitions, higher analyst following, higher leverage, and less in-house tax expertise. We also show that firms with IRS audit red flags are less likely to request a PLR. We use a difference-in-difference approach to assess changes in cash holdings following PLR requests and report a decrease in cash holdings for PLR firms, consistent with the notion that PLRs act to reduce tax uncertainty. Our study provides the first empirical evidence about the determinants of PLR requests and complements prior work on tax uncertainty and cash holdings (Hanlon, Maydew and Saavedra, 2017).     

The determinants of corporate cash management policies: Evidence from around the world

We examine the determinants of corporate cash management policies across a broad sample of international firms. We document that firms in countries with strong legal protection of minority investors are more likely to decrease their cash holdings in response to an increase in cash flow than are firms in countries with weak legal protection. This relationship is most pronounced for firms that are financially constrained and those with high hedging needs. More importantly, we do not find evidence that financial development plays an incremental impact on the cash flow sensitivity of cash, after controlling for the effect of legal protection. Therefore, we argue that the legal protection of investors (rather than financial development) represents the first-order effect in influencing international firms' cash management policies. The results are robust to alternative specifications. In general, our findings reinforce the importance of country-level legal protection of investors in mitigating the effects of firm-level financial constraints and hedging needs on corporate cash management policies.     

Green credit policy and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from China

In 2012, China implemented a green credit policy (GCP) that restricts bank credits to heavily polluting firms. Using a difference-in-differences research design, we find that polluting firms increased their cash reserves by 9.5% after the GCP's issuance relative to non-polluting firms. We also document that the GCP significantly reduces firms' access to bank finance but increases the value of cash. Cross-sectional analysis shows that the increase in cash holdings is more significant for firms with greater financial constraints, firms with more investment opportunities, and high-tech companies. Overall, our findings are consistent with a constraint explanation: when external financing is restricted, firms retain more cash to meet future investment needs.     

How do firms learn? Evidence from corporate cash holdings during the COVID-19 pandemic

We examine the impact of COVID-19 on US corporate cash holdings. Our findings suggest that greater pandemic exposure is associated with higher corporate cash holdings and that firms learn from prior experiences as they manage their cash policies. More specifically, the level of cash holdings in firms that experienced severe financial constraints during the 2008 credit crisis and firms with prior severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and H1N1 exposure is significantly lower than that of firms with no prior epidemic or financial constraints experience. Overall, our findings support the learning behaviour of cash and contribute to corporate cash holdings literature by providing insights on the extent to which firms learn from prior experiences to manage their liquidity.     

Employee protection shocks and corporate cash holdings

We examine the relation between employee protection legislation and corporate cash holdings. Our rationale rests on the notion that higher labor adjustment costs increase a firm's operating leverage making firms to adjust their liquidity management by increasing precautionary savings. Consistent with this, we show that the staggered passage of legal exceptions to the “at-will” employment doctrine in various U.S. states led to an average increase in cash holdings by 7.2%. Cash increases are higher when unionization rates and industry concentration are lower, and when industry discharge rates and volatility is higher. Consistent with the financial flexibility argument of tighter employment protection increasing corporate cash needs, the value of cash increases after the passage of pro-labor regulations. Moreover, we find that the increase in the value of cash is especially pronounced for financially constrained firms.     

Foreign shareholders,relative foreign policy uncertainty and corporate cash holdings

Studies have shown that foreign investors hedge risks stemming from economic and political uncertainty in the home country through outward investment. This paper studies how foreign investors' home country risk affects their overseas investment and the host country firms' corporate cash holdings. We find that relative foreign EPU, defined as the difference between foreign investors' home country EPU and the host country of investment EPU, negatively impacts the host country firms' cash holdings through their influences on managerial decision-making. This negative relationship arises from firms' precautionary and transaction motives as foreign investors perceive lower corporate risk and better investment opportunities in the host country firms. Good corporate governance is also instrumental in yielding this negative relationship. The reduction in cash holdings due to high relative foreign EPU is more pronounced if foreign investors' home country legal environment is weaker, the two countries are further apart, and there is little trade partnership between them.     

The impact of competition and time-to-finance on corporate cash holdings

This paper empirically documents how the interaction between competition and time frictions in capital markets impacts firms' cash management decisions. Using the introduction of the U.S. Securities Offering Reform in 2005 as a quasi-natural experiment, we show that a shorter time-to-finance leads to a reduction in corporate cash holdings. This effect is significantly stronger for firms that are exposed to preemption risk. Furthermore, patents mitigate the risk of preemption and the effect of a reduction in time-to-finance on cash holdings is strongest for unconstrained firms.     

MANAGING FOR RATINGS: REAL EFFECTS OF A CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA CHANGE

We exploit a criteria change by Standard & Poor's (S&P) to examine the real effects of a credit ratings change. Using a recalibration by S&P, unrelated to firms’ fundamentals, as a quasi-natural experiment we analyze the impact of a ratings upgrade on the issuance activity, investment, cash holdings, and payout policy of companies. Our findings suggest upgraded firms subsequently issue more debt relative to equity, enjoy lower debt yields, and increase their investment rate and share repurchases. We find limited evidence that upgraded firms decrease their cash holdings. Our results support the view that credit ratings have a real effect on corporations.     

How common are credit-less recoveries? Firm-level evidence on the role of financial markets in crisis recovery

We study firm recoveries from systemic sudden stops in developing countries, where firms' cash flows suffer exogenous shocks. Contrary to macro studies suggesting that output recovery precedes that of the financial sector, firm-level data shows that only in less than a third of firms, operating cash flows recover without a recovery in external credit, and even these firms have access to other sources of cash. Specifically, firms with high prior short-term debt exposure do experience a sharp reduction in short-term credit but increase operating cash flows during a crisis. Firms with high prior cash holdings experience negative cash flows and deplete their cash holdings. Thus, firms' financial prepositioning predicts recovery in cash flows and is consistent with trade-off theories of capital structure and with precautionary motives for cash holdings. We find no support for the maturity mismatch hypothesis, which predicts that firms with high short-term debt should have harder recoveries post crisis.     

The tax incentives and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment of an accelerated depreciation tax policy for fixed assets

Based on a quasi-natural experiment of an accelerated depreciation tax policy (ADP) for fixed assets in China, we examine the impact of the ADP on corporate cash holdings. Using a multiperiod difference-in-differences model with a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2008 to 2020, we document that firms subject to the ADP exhibit lower cash holdings compared to firms not affected by the policy. The effect is more pronounced for young firms, profitable firms, and firms with less R&D investment. According to our mechanism analysis, the ADP mitigates a firm's financing constraints and financialization and therefore, a firm does not need as much as cash holdings as they did before the implementation of the ADP. The mechanism test results suggest that the ADP lowers the precautionary and speculative demand for cash. The analysis of economic consequences shows that the reduction of cash holdings significantly enhances firm value. Our research results suggest that the ADP is a good policy for firms.     

Foreign institutional ownership and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from emerging economies

With the increased presence of foreign institutional investors in emerging stock markets, academic interest on the effects of foreign institutions on corporate managerial decisions has notably increased. This paper joins this debate by investigating the effects of foreign institutional ownership on cash holdings, a strategic corporate financing choice. Analysing a sample of firms from 23 emerging economies, the paper shows that, while foreign institutional ownership has a negative effect on cash holdings, it also increases the contribution of cash to firm valuation. These effects are potentially transmitted to cash through mitigation of agency conflicts and alleviation of financing constraints. In all, our findings suggest beneficial effects of foreign institutions on firms' financing structure, as foreign investors contribute to a more efficient and value-enhancing cash policy.     

Internal controls,risk management,and cash holdings

Exploiting a unique setting in China where internal controls are intended to manage risks, we investigate how internal controls shape the cash holding policies. Results show that firms with higher internal control quality (ICQ) are less likely to have abnormal cash holdings, either excess or deficit cash, and this effect is not driven by corporate governance quality. We also find that firms with higher ICQ are more likely to increase dividend payments and are less likely to increase M&A investments, especially when the firms have had a negative experience with prior M&A investments. Furthermore, our tests on the market valuation of cash holdings show that investors place a higher value on cash holdings of firms with higher ICQ. Collectively, our findings suggest that internal controls help companies shape reasonable cash policies that lead to value creation.     

Inflation,operating cycle,and cash holdings

A corporate cash-holding strategy is a trade-off between the costs and benefits of holding cash.At the macrolevel,firms are inclined to adjust and optimize their cash-holding strategies in response to changes in purchasing power due to inflation.At the microlevel,the operating cycle,which indicates the speed and turnover of corporate cash flow,also influences the corporate cash-holding strategy.Firms flexibly adjust their cash-holding strategies in response to changes in the internal and external environment,which is referred to as the cash adjustment strategy.We examine these predicted relationships using a sample of listed firms in China’s stock market over the 1998–2009 period.Consistent with our predictions,the empirical results indicate a significant negative association between cash holdings and the CPI,but the relationship is reversed when the CPI reaches a certain level.There is also a U-shaped relationship between operating cycle and cash holdings,and this relationship is similarly influenced by changes in the inflation level.In examining the macroeconomic environment and microlevel firm-specific characteristics simultaneously,our findings supplement the literature on firms’cash-holding strategies and provide theoretical and practical implications.     

Operating lease obligations and corporate cash management

Our study addresses two issues overlooked in prior research: Does a firm's future operating lease obligations influence its current cash holdings? Does this relationship contribute to the temporal increase in corporate cash holdings? We provide evidence that these future obligations significantly influence a firm's cash holdings and contribute to the temporal increase in U.S. corporate cash holdings. Consequently, our findings are consistent with the options offered by operating leases to young growing firms and the effect of these operating lease obligations on the firm's operating leverage.     

The strategic use of corporate cash holdings in collective bargaining with labor unions

We provide evidence that firms in more unionized industries strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unions and shelter corporate income from their demands. Specifically, we show that corporate cash holdings are negatively related with unionization. We also find that this relation is stronger for firms that are likely to place a higher value on gaining a bargaining advantage over unions and weaker for those firms in which lower cash holdings provide less credible evidence that a firm is unable to concede to union demands. Additionally, we show that for unionized firms increases in cash holdings raise the probability of a strike. Finally, we show that unionization decreases the market value of a dollar of cash holdings. Overall, our findings indicate that firms trade-off the benefits of corporate cash holdings with the costs resulting from a weaker bargaining position with labor.     

Share repurchases of initial public offerings: motives,valuation effects,and the impact of market regulation

This study investigates the motives and valuation effects of share repurchase announcements of German firms during the 1998–2008 period, addressing the question why initial public offering (IPO) firms repurchase shares soon after going public. While our focus is on IPO firms, we also examine the impact of firm size by differentiating between IPO and established DAX/MDAX firms and by analyzing the source of surplus cash holdings, that is, either from equity issuances or from operating cash flows. We further explore the impact of the regulatory environment. Our empirical analysis reveals significant differences between the IPO and DAX/MDAX subsamples regarding their repurchase motives, stock price performance, and explanatory factors. Standard corporate payout theories are essential in explaining the different valuation effects. Our empirical analysis suggests agency costs of free cash flow as the main reason for the observed valuation effects of both IPO and DAX/MDAX firms, yet for different reasons. While DAX/MDAX firms continuously generate high operating cash flows before and after repurchasing shares, IPO firms exhibit low operating cash flows during the entire period but large surplus cash holdings due to the mandatory equity issuance at their public offering. Overall, the repurchase decisions of IPO firms are best explained by the agency costs of cash holdings and the unique rules and regulations of the German stock exchange.     

Excess cash holdings and shareholder value

We examine the determinants of corporate cash holdings in Australia and the impact on shareholder wealth of holding excess cash. Our results show that a trade‐off model best explains the level of a firm’s cash holdings in Australia. We find that ‘transitory’ excess cash firms earn significantly higher risk‐adjusted returns compared to ‘persistent’ excess cash firms, suggesting that the market penalises firms that hoard cash. The marginal value of cash also declines with larger cash balances, and the longer firms hold on to excess cash. The results are consistent with agency costs associated with persistence in excess cash holdings.