Strategic Delegation in a Multiproduct Mixed Industry

We examine strategic delegation in a multiproduct mixed duopoly with nonprofit organization (NPO) and for‐profit organization (FPO). We will demonstrate that the nonprofitable mission service can reduce both the interest conflicts between the NPO and FPO owners and those between the NPO owner and self‐benefited manager. The profit orientation in the compensation schemes will vary with different relative costs. Although the NPO owner may have a different objective from the FPO owner, they all end up having their managers raise their prices and reducing competition in the profitable market. Moreover, as the regulated price of mission service increases, both firms will charge more for their profitable services, but the owner of NPO could still overcompensate her or his manager, when the indirect impact on increasing the conflict of interest is higher than the direct impact on price. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Imitation and price competition in a differentiated market

We study the stable market outcome that evolves in a spatially differentiated market when price-competing firms choose actions by imitation of the most profitable firm. We compare and contrast the stable outcomes under two imitation procedures: one, where each firm immediately imitates the most profitable firm, and the other when a firm imitates another firm only if it is more profitable while being “sufficiently similar” (in context of the market segment it operates in) or “sufficiently close”. In either case, the symmetric pure strategy Nash equilibrium is always a stable outcome. However, when imitation of the most profitable firm is immediate and market differentiation is ‘moderate’, states with prices lower than the Nash equilibrium are also stable. In contrast, when imitation of the most profitable firm is more gradual and market differentiation is below a threshold, states with prices above the Nash equilibrium are also stable. Thus, while competitive evolutionary pressure in this imitation based model does result in the Nash equilibrium always being stable, other outcomes may be stable as well. Interestingly, the states that are stable under gradual imitation give the firms a higher profit than the stable states under immediate imitation.     

On pure-strategy Nash equilibria in price–quantity games

This paper examines the existence and characteristics of pure-strategy Nash equilibria in oligopoly models in which firms simultaneously set prices and quantities. Existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium is proved for a class of price–quantity games. If the demand function is continuous, then the equilibrium outcome is similar to that of a price-only model. With discontinuous demand and limited spillover, there are rationing equilibria in which combined production falls short of market demand. Moreover, there might again be an equilibrium reflecting the outcome of a price game. Competition in price and quantity thus yields Bertrand outcomes under a variety of market conditions.     

Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer

When a manufacturer and its retailers and consumers are spatially separated, the retailers’ market size may be limited by the manufacturer who provides consumers with an option to purchase goods directly from them. The manufacturer uses this tactic to increase profit when a few retailers dominate the market. The mill price of a manufacturer, that is, the price of the good at delivery from a manufacturer’s factory, is critical under these circumstances.If the manufacturer charges a franchise fee, thus absorbing the retailer’s profit, this fee is a function of the mill price. Mill price policy can be used to maximize profit on the sale of goods and collection of the franchise fee. The resulting retail market structure becomes preferable for the manufacturer and consumers since the manufacturer’s profit is larger, as is the quantity purchased, compared with a competitive equilibrium in which every firm entering the market area is assumed to move its location instantly without cost.     

Intermediated surge pricing

Although Uber and Lyft are known for their flexible “surge pricing,” they are surprisingly rigid in another way: each firm takes a constant percentage of passenger fare whether or not there is a surge. In this paper, I investigate the possible reasons for, and the impact of, this rigidity. I study a market in which a profit‐maximizing intermediary facilitates trade between buyers and sellers. The intermediary sets prices for buyers and sellers, and keeps the difference as her fee. Optimal prices increase when demand increases, that is, shifts right. If a demand increase is due to an increase in the number of ex ante symmetric buyers, then the intermediary's optimal percent fee decreases. If, instead, a demand increase is due to a reduction in the elasticity of demand, then the intermediary's optimal percent fee increases. In either case, if the intermediary keeps a constant percent fee regardless of shifts in demand, as is the case with Uber and Lyft, then surge pricing (i.e., the ratio of price during high demand to price during low demand) is amplified on one side of the market and diminished on the other side.     

Profit maximization and marketing strategies: Demand rotation and social influences

Microeconomic texts discuss alterations in industry demand curves as movements to higher or lower levels. Consider, instead, the implications for a monopolist's profit of rotating its (linear) demand curve. Where this can be done without cost by pivoting at the current price it will be profitable to continue to pivot the curve until it is horizontal or vertical. The possibility of rotating the demand curve of a ‘new’ product on an arbitrarily selected price allows us to consider the optimality of different advertising strategies (‘bandwagon’ or 'snob').     

The relationship between product market competition and unemployment with profit sharing

We investigate the implications of product market imperfections on negotiated wages and equilibrium unemployment under profit sharing. We show that intensified product market competition reduces equilibrium unemployment in a strictly monotonic way when the trade union's bargaining power exceeds the profit share. If the profit share exceeds the trade union's bargaining power, the effect of product market competition is ambiguous: there is a threshold for the benefit–replacement ratio above (below) which intensified product market competition increases (decreases) equilibrium unemployment. The profit share and the union's bargaining power affect the wage mark-up, and thereby equilibrium unemployment, in different directions.     

考虑市场冲击下易变质商品的临时价格折扣模型

文章从零售商的角度出发．考虑当零售商能够预知市场变化并采用价格折扣时所得到的利润收入,同时价格的变化会影响顾客需求的变化。由于采取价格折扣时刻的不同会导致零售商利润收入的不同．文中给出了零售商的最优定价策略,并通过实例对模型进行分析。     

Market competition and pricing strategies in retail supply chains

This study provides a better explanation for the continued prevalence of high–low (Hi–Lo) pricing strategy. We investigate the impact of market competition on adopting two different pricing strategies in the retail industry: everyday low price (EDLP) strategy and Hi–Lo strategy. We developed two analytic models using a game-theoretic modeling approach: the profit maximization model and the sales revenue maximization model. We then conducted an econometric analysis based on retail store-level dataset. The result shows that an EDLP player's equilibrium price depends highly on the cost level rather than competitor's price whereas the Hi–Lo player's equilibrium price depends mainly on the range of promotional basket as well as the cost level.     

Apple's disaster: Linking two‐sided markets and strategic delegation

Asymmetric pricing structure and different intergroup network externalities are characteristics of two‐sided markets not captured in the analysis of one‐sided markets. Focusing on Cournot duopoly where membership decision may be delegated to a manager, several equilibrium regimes are sustained depending on the fixed cost of managerial hiring and strength of the network externality exerted by the side whose demand is more price sensitive. The change from null to full delegation sharpens the asymmetric pricing structure and reduces the price level in two‐sided markets. Contrary to one‐sided markets with direct network effects, the prisoner's dilemma holds for sufficiently strong indirect network externalities. Imperfect interside discrimination of managerial incentives ensures profit maximization and efficient consumers' allocation. Private hiring should occur when the two‐sided market exhibits symmetric pricing structure. An explanation for Apple's unprecedented event is provided. The reduction of revenue and managerial bonus in 2016 may be justified by the dissemination of full delegation in the Chinese information technology industry. Apple's upcoming strategy may consist on reducing both access prices, although the side whose demand is more price sensitive should have a greater price reduction. Alternatively, improving the content quality may constitute Apple's corporate strategy, thereby inducing a skimming pricing strategy on Chinese rivals.     

Why Lever into a Zero-Profit Industry: Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion

This paper considers the incentives of a firm with power in a market for one good to tie in the sale of a complementary good even though the complementary good is produced in a zero profit market. If the zero-profit price of the tied good is greater than the marginal cost (which occurs for example when the technology is characterized by a fixed cost and a constant marginal cost), a firm will fie in order to increase the sales of the complementary good, which at the margin is profitable. We show that such tying will lower the effective prices paid by customers and increase welfare. This incentive exists if the firm with market power is a monopolist or one of several competing oligopolists.     

发展航运金融服务促进上海国际航运中心建设研究

在分析上海现代航运服务业发展现状的基础上,归纳了航运服务业金融服务需求的四个基本特征,并对上海现代航运服务业不同类型企业金融服务需求进行了分析,指出发展航运金融服务促进现代航运服务业快速发展是加快建设上海国际航运中心的重要战略举措。     

中国公路货运价格博弈现象分析

公路货物运输在现代物流业中占据重要地位,但是当前中国公路货物运输业恶性竞争剧烈。从博弈论的角度,运用Bertrand寡占模型对企业间价格行为进行分析,从运输企业提供的服务价格与服务质量关系角度出发,用纯战略均衡方法进行探讨,提出公路货物运输企业应采取提供不同服务质量的差别定价战略。     

基于顾客服务水平的物流网络优化问题

文章利用优化方法讨论了供应链中由零售商向供应商订购货物,同时又要满足顾客的不确定性需求的物流网络设计问题。文中引入了顾客服务水平的概念,通过顾客的服务水平来控制库存,从而影响每次货物的订货量,并讨论了顾客需求的概率在已知和未知两种情况下,如何来确定零售商的订货量和供应商的批发价从而使得共同获利最大。此外,对顾客服务水平和零售价进行了分析,找出两者之间的关系。     

Competition Among Health Plans: A Two‐Sided Market Approach

We set up a two‐sided market framework to model competition between a Prefered Provider Organization (PPO) and a Health Maintenance Organization (HMO). Both health plans compete to attract policyholders on one side and providers on the other. The PPO, which is characterized by a higher diversity of providers, attracts riskier policyholders. Our two‐sided framework allows us to examine the consequences of this risk segmentation on the providers' side, especially in terms of remuneration. The outcome of the competition depends mainly on two effects: a demand effect, influenced by the value put by policyholders on the providers access and an adverse selection effect, captured by the characteristics of the health risk distribution. If the adverse selection effect is too strong, the HMO receives a higher profit in equilibrium. On the contrary, if the demand effect dominates, the PPO profit is higher in spite of the unfavorable risk segmentation. We believe that by highlighting the two‐sided market structure of the health plans' competition, our model provides a new insight to understand the increase in the PPOs' market share as observed in the USA during the last decade.     

需求受定购数量影响的供应链合同设计问题

本文针对一类市场需求受定购影响的问题提出了最佳合同设计问题。现实生活中上网卡或者高档消费品等特殊商品，数量卖的过多，顾客对该商品的评价下降，从而购买量也会相应下降，因此零售商需要考虑如何制定定购数量和合同形式使得自身利益最大。经对目前各种合同形式的研究，发现buy-back合同是最合适的合同形式，它能够达到供应链最佳协调的效果并能实现利润在供应链伙伴间任意分配。     

集装箱班轮公司非价格行为分析

国际金融危机以来,班轮运输市场一直处于不景气状态。2011年各大班轮公司采取了打价格战的价格行为,结果损失惨重。2011年底马士基推出了＂天天马士基＂,希望通过非价格竞争扩大服务差异,提高行业壁垒,抢占市场份额。文中利用产业经济学SPC理论中的市场行为理论以及博弈论对这一非价格行为进行了分析。     

Uncertain availability,spatial location and regulation: An application to the airline industry

This paper presents an analysis of industries characterized by both uncertain availability and spatial location of the product. The analyis is applied to the US airline industry and is used to analyze the differential effect of price regulation on different markets and firms. From this analysis we obtain insights into which firms and markets may have benefited most from the deregulation of the industry in 1978. Previous works on the regulation of the airline industry implicitly assume that markets have the same demand structure. If airline services are of homogeneous quality, men we do not expect the unregulated solution to depend on demand structures. If on the other hand airline services vary in their quality component, then different markets may have different equilibrium price-quality combinations depending on the characteristics of demand. This paper explores the implication of different demand structures on the impact of (de)regulation.     

Information markets, product markets and vertical merger

In many markets, firms have the option of advertising at price comparison sites to broaden their market reach. Such sites are often controlled by profit-maximizing “information gatekeepers” charging advertising fees. This paper considers vertical merger between such a monopoly information gatekeeper and a firm in the product market. We find that: (i) If the integrated firm can act as a price leader before independent firms make advertising and pricing decisions, then the merger is profitable. (ii) If the integrated firm cannot move first, then the merger is unprofitable, or divestiture is optimal in the case where the firm has already created the gatekeeper. As a result, the merged entity has an incentive to invest in technologies to support a price leader.     

Local Hospital Competition in Large Metropolitan Areas

This paper uses origin-destination data to define geographic local hospital markets in large metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). Results support past findings of service rather than price competition, with negative-cost Herfandahl-Hirschman indexes relationships at the market level (and sub-MSA level) and with profit margins negatively related to hospital market competition. The effects of total (direct plus indirect) market competition are unchanged between 1983 and 1988, precisely estimated, robust to estimation techniques, and unaffected by whether the number of direct competitors is included as an explanatory variable.