Time Inconsistency and the Exchange Rate Channel of Monetary Policy

This paper analyses time–inconsistency problems related to the exchange rate channel of monetary policy. Within a simple open–economy macroeconomic model, where the exchange rate is the only forward–looking variable, we show that a difference emerges between optimal policy under discretion and under commitment. Moreover, the nature of the time–inconsistency problem resembles that resulting from standard New Keynesian models: when cost–push shocks occur, the exchange rate channel gives rise to excessive output stabilisation and insufficient inertia in monetary policy under a discretionary policy.
JEL classification : E 42; E 52; E 61     

Optimal fiscal and monetary policies in the face of rare disasters

This paper studies optimal fiscal and monetary policies in an economy exposed to large adverse shocks (rare disasters). We contrast optimal policies under commitment and discretion and identify several striking differences between these institutional environments. A government that can commit to its policy plans relies heavily on debt to smooth the adverse effects of large shocks over time. Lack of commitment seriously limits the government's ability to use debt as a shock absorber. Under discretion, an increase in debt leads to an increase in inflation expectations and therefore higher nominal interest rate distortions. Hence, the discretionary government keeps debt in close vicinity of its steady-state level, and the response of taxes, inflation, and interest rates to shocks is much more pronounced under discretion than under commitment. This is particularly relevant for large shocks and when the initial stock of government debt is already high at the time the shock occurs. We also argue that the adverse welfare effects of disasters are larger under discretion than under commitment, but these welfare differentials can be significantly reduced by making the discretionary government inflation averse.     

Capital inflows, fiscal discretion, and exchange rate policy

Many writers have argued for the benefits of a credible fixed exchange rate (a hard peg) as a commitment device in an open economy. But historically, fixed exchange rates have often been associated with large current account deficits and episodes of ‘over-borrowing’. This paper develops a model of capital inflows that are linked to the exchange rate regime because of endogenous fiscal policy. The key message of the paper is that a hard peg is undesirable in the absence of commitment in fiscal policy. In face of a credible fixed exchange rate, the fiscal authority subsidizes capital inflows. The economy will engage in inefficiently high international borrowing, and in welfare terms may end up worse off than under capital market autarky. To eliminate the incentive to subsidize borrowing, the monetary authority must follow a flexible exchange rate rule in which capital inflows lead to exchange rate appreciation. If fiscal policy must be financed by money creation rather than direct taxation, then a fixed exchange rate rule may cause both over-borrowing and a subsequent exchange rate crisis.     

How large are the gains to commitment policy and optimal delegation for New Zealand?

This paper measures the benefits of commitment-based monetary policy over discretion for a small open economy inflation targeting country—New Zealand. Significant gains accrue from commitment policy. If commitment-based policy is unavailable, the government can recoup much of the gains to commitment through optimal delegation, asking the Reserve Bank of New Zealand to care more about inflation stabilisation. The 1999 PTA, the core of the policy contract between the New Zealand government and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, placed an increased emphasis on stabilisation of output, interest rates and the exchange rate. This is inconsistent with a shift to optimal delegation behaviour and must stem from a changed perception of the welfare costs of macroeconomic stabilization on the part of the Government. This is shown to be true when the definition of inflation is extended to a medium term measure.     

Committing to transparency to resist corruption

This paper studies firms' incentives to commit to transparent behavior in a competitive procedure modeled as an asymmetric information beauty contest managed by a corrupt agent. In his evaluation of firms' offers for a public contract the agent has some discretion to favor a firm in exchange for a bribe. While unilateral commitment to transparency is never incentive compatible, under some circumstances a voluntary but conditional commitment mechanism can eliminate corruption. A low quality firm may prefer not to commit only when the agent's discretion is strong and the market's profitability is small. In that situation, the high quality firms commit when commitment decisions are kept secret, but some conditions on firms' beliefs are required when commitment decisions are publicly announced. A mechanism combining both conditionality and a reward (a transparent selection advantage that needs not be large) allows complete elimination of corruption.     

Growth,Distribution, and External Constraints: A Post-Kaleckian Model Applied to Brazil

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to analyze whether the Brazilian economy behaved under a wage-led or profit-led regime between 1960 and 2011, considering a Post-Kaleckian model in a context of external constraints. The time span is limited by data availability (i.e., 2011). To answer the question of whether the Brazilian economy works under a wage-led or profit-led regime, we propose a simple Post-Kaleckian model. The model suggests that a profit-led regime is more probable for Brazil. Moreover, a wage-led regime occurs when a balance of payments constrained growth model is taken into consideration. Likewise, the real exchange rate has a positive impact on economic growth through the export channel. This result is a novelty in the recent literature about the relationship between real exchange rate and economic growth within a Post-Kaleckian model. The Brazilian economy was chosen as it is one of the biggest economies in Latin America.     

Unveiling the objectives of central banks: Tales of four Latin American countries

We estimate the stabilization objectives of four Latin American countries that have implemented a flexible inflation targeting regime recently: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. In doing so, we develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model for these economies and estimate their structural parameters through Bayesian methods. To infer the stabilization objectives in each country, we assume that central banks set monetary policy optimally. Our main results highlight that the central banks in these four countries have a high preference for stabilizing inflation, but do not have the systematic objective of stabilizing the exchange rate. This result is robust to assuming either commitment or discretion in the optimal policy. Also, in contrast to the case of commitment, assuming discretion in the optimal monetary policy increases the preference for interest rate smoothing, making it comparable to a preference for inflation stabilization. Finally, except for the case of Peru, the monetary policy under discretion has a better empirical fit in these countries than the one under commitment.     

Capital Flows Adjustment Policy in Slovenia: Assessment of Design and Efficiency

During the last decade many Central and East European (CEE) countries experienced strong foreign capital inflows. Slovenia was one of them. Sources of inflows in Slovenia changed radically, even though privatisation-driven inflows were absent, in contrast to other CEE countries. Since such inflows could have significant adverse effects on the performance of the economy, some policy measures were taken. This article presents an empirically tested assessment of policy for adjustment to surges in capital flows during the last decade. Speculative reversals, a decline in external competitiveness, exchange rate appreciation, loss of control over the monetary base and inflation are just some of the detrimental effects that can be provoked by surges in capital flows if the economy suffers from fundamental sectoral deficiencies. Empirical results indicated that Slovenia quite successfully mitigated the listed effects of excessive foreign exchange inflows. Efficient combination of direct and indirect adjustment methods succeeded in preventing the still vulnerable economy from suffering a major financial crisis and nominal currency appreciation (which was not the case in some other CEE countries) although there was some real appreciation.     

Evaluating inflation targeting as a monetary policy objective for India

This study formulates a small open economy model for India with exchange rate as a prominent channel of monetary policy. The model is estimated using the Instrumental Variable-Generalized Methods of Moments (IV-GMM) estimator and evaluated through simulations. This study compares different cases of domestic and CPI inflation targeting, strict and flexible inflation targeting, and simple Taylor type rules. The analysis highlights the unsuitability of simple Taylor-type monetary rules in stabilizing the Indian economy and suggests that discretionary optimization works better in stabilizing this economy. There seems to be a trade-off between output gap stabilization and exchange rate stabilization in flexible domestic inflation targeting and CPI inflation targeting respectively. However, flexible domestic inflation targeting seems a better alternative from an overall macro stabilization perspective in India where financial markets are still not sufficiently integrated to ensure quick transmission of interest rate impulses and existence of rigidities in the economy.     

Currency internationalization and valuation effects: based on the threshold model

ABSTRACT

Based on the three functions of currency internationalization, including exchange medium, pricing currency and foreign reserve, this paper explores how the degree of currency internationalization affects the impact of the exchange rate and the asset price on valuation effects. Using samples of 161 countries or regions from 2001 to 2016 and the threshold regression method, we find that, firstly, there is a threshold effect of the exchange rate on valuation effects due to currency internationalization. The higher the comprehensive level of currency internationalization is, the greater the positive impact of the exchange rate on valuation effects will be. Secondly, the threshold effect of the asset price on valuation effects due to currency internationalization is not significant because of the high stickiness of asset price. Besides, compared with developed countries, currency internationalization is more important to increase valuation effects through exchange rate channel and asset price channel in developing countries or regions. Finally, there are some differences in the three types of currency internationalization functions. The promotion of exchange medium function will lead to a greater positive impact of the exchange rate on valuation effects, as well as pricing currency function. However, the foreign reserve function has no such effect.     

What to stabilize in the open economy*

We consider the question how “best” to maintain price‐level stability in an open economy, and evaluate three possible policy choices: (a) a constant money growth rate rule; (b) a fixed exchange rate; and (c) a policy of explicit commitment to a price‐level target. In each case we assume that policy is conducted by injecting reserves into or withdrawing reserves from the “banking system.” In evaluating the three regimes, we adopt the criterion that the “best” policy should leave the least scope for indeterminacy and “excessive” economic volatility. In a steady‐state equilibrium, the choice of regime is largely irrelevant; any steady‐state equilibrium under one regime can be duplicated by an appropriate choice of the “control” variable under any other regime. However, we show that the sets of equilibria under the three regimes are dramatically different. When all countries follow the policy of fixing a constant rate of money growth, there are no equilibria displaying endogenously arising volatility and there is no indeterminacy of equilibrium. Under a regime of fixed exchange rates, indeterminacies and endogenously arising fluctuations are impossible if and only if the country with the low “reserve‐to‐deposit” ratio is charged with maintaining the fixed rate. Finally, when one country targets the time path of its price level, under very weak conditions, there will be indeterminacy of equilibrium and endogenously arising volatility driven by expectations.     

Monetary Policy in the Open Economy Revisited: Price Setting and Exchange-Rate Flexibility

This paper develops a welfare-based model of monetary policy in an open economy. We examine the optimal monetary policy under commitment, focusing on the nature of price adjustment in determining policy. We investigate the implications of these policies for exchange-rate flexibility. The traditional approach maintains that exchange-rate flexibility is desirable in the presence of real country-specific shocks that require adjustment in relative prices. However, in the light of empirical evidence on nominal price response to exchange-rate changes—specifically, that there appears to be a large degree of local-currency pricing (LCP) in industrialized countries—the expenditure-switching role played by nominal exchange rates may be exaggerated in the traditional literature. In the presence of LCP, we find that the optimal monetary policy leads to a fixed exchange rate, even in the presence of country-specific shocks. This is true whether monetary policy is chosen cooperatively or non-cooperatively among countries.     

State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

The importance of composition of fiscal policy: evidence from different exchange rate regimes

We study the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policies in an open economy. We emphasize two transmission mechanisms: the cost channel, by which wage government spending and labor taxes raise the real wage firms must pay, and the exchange rate channel, by which the nominal exchange rate shifts induced by fiscal policy have real effects if (some) prices and wages are sticky. The latter channel implies that changes in wage government spending or in labor taxation should have different effects under flexible than under fixed exchange rates. In a 1964–93 panel of OECD countries we find significant evidence for both channels. Moreover, we find that the real product wage and profitability are more responsive than quantities (employment and output) to fiscal policy innovations.     

Even more on monetary policy in a small open economy

It is well known that in a small open economy with full capital mobility and a fixed exchange rate, monetary policy is ineffective in influencing real output (e.g. the works of Fleming [Int. Monetary Fund Staff Pap. 9 (1962) 369.] and Mundell [Can. J. Econ. Polit. Sci. 29 (1963) 475.]). However, Wu [Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 8 (1999) 223.] finds that when the credit channel is added to this model, monetary policy can have real effects under a fixed exchange rate system. This conclusion hinges on the assumption that open market operations have no effect on foreign exchange reserves of the central bank when evaluating how a change in monetary policy affects the loan market. This assumption is incorrect because under a fixed exchange rate regime, the quantity of foreign reserves becomes endogenous in the model. It is shown that when this assumption is relaxed, monetary policy is still ineffective in influencing output under a fixed exchange regime, even with an operative credit channel.     

Government‐spending multipliers and the zero lower bound in an open economy

This paper assesses the size of the government‐spending multiplier in an open economy when the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate is binding. In a theoretical framework, in a closed economy, other authors have shown that when the nominal interest rate is binding the government‐spending multiplier can be very large (close to four). Their theory helps illuminate the government‐spending multiplier in the ZLB, but it is difficult to match that theory with the data. We argue that, in an open economy, another channel exists for the crowding‐out effect via the real exchange rate. For an open economy, the government‐spending multiplier is not large owing to the appreciation of the real exchange rate, induced by the appreciation of aggregate demand that follows the increases in government spending. To test the robustness of our open economic model, we conduct the same analysis in a corresponding closed economy model. The result from our closed economy model confirms the result obtained in the other work. Our theoretical results are consistent with the results obtained in the empirical literature, which uses the vector autoregressive method and the structural vector autoregressive approach to measure the impact of government‐spending shock on the real gross domestic product and revealed that the government‐spending multiplier tends to be lower in open economy.     

Monetary policy channels in Brazil through the lens of a semi-structural model

We develop and estimate a medium-sized, semi-structural model for the Brazilian economy during the inflation targeting period. The model describes fairly well key features of the economy and allows us to decompose the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In the baseline decomposition, the transmission mechanism is broken down into household interest rate, firm interest rate, and exchange rate channels. In addition, we carry out an alternative decomposition that allows us to evaluate the expectations channel as well. In both procedures, the household interest rate channel is the most important for explaining the response of output to a monetary policy shock. In the baseline decomposition of inflation, both the household interest rate and the exchange rate channels are the main transmission channels. However, in the alternative decomposition, the expectations channel accounts for the bulk of the inflation response.     

Monetary Regime Choice and Optimal Credit Rationing at the Official Rate: The Case of Russia

ABSTRACT

Stabilizing monetary policy in a small open economy is constrained by the open economy trilemma. In this paper, we investigate whether foreign exchange market interventions and the Central Bank’s credit rationing at the official rate (CROR) may soften this constraint and improve the results of monetary policy for different monetary regimes. We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model appropriate for analyzing the forward-looking behavior of households facing non-zero probabilities of losing access to financial market and CROR. We have found significant credit rationing in the quarterly Russian data of 2001:Q1–2014:Q2. The probability of losing access to financial market and the probability of CROR are estimated as 22% and 66%, respectively. Using Russian data of 2001:Q1–2014:Q2 we demonstrate that CROR provoked forward-looking activity in financial market, which led to more Ruble devaluation in the crises of 2008–2009. It improved poor countercyclical performance of two Russian monetary policy rules, whereas made small effect on welfare. Welfare maximization exercises reveal a tradeoff between low-inflation and high-welfare solutions and favor of a floating exchange rate regime. We found the optimal value of the probability of CROR in both exchange rate-based and Taylor rule-based models but resulting improvement in welfare is very small.     

Exchange Rate Volatility and Output Volatility: A Theoretical Approach*

This paper makes an attempt to determine the factors influencing exchange rate and exchange rate uncertainty, as well as output and output variability. In the context of a small open economy under flexible exchange rates regime it is found that the level both of exchange rate and output is affected by monetary and inflationary shocks, as well as shocks in government spending, output, and trade balance. Further, the uncertainty of exchange rate and output is associated positively with the uncertainty of all shocks while the contemporaneous occurrence of selected shocks imposes either a positive or negative impact on exchange rate and output volatility. Finally, it is shown that the effect of the determinants either of exchange rate volatility or output volatility is very sensitive to the parameter values.     

Monetary policy and noise traders: A welfare analysis

This paper studies the choice of monetary policy regime in a small open economy with noise traders in forex markets. We focus on two simple rules: fixed exchange rates and inflation targeting. We contrast the above two rules against optimal policy with commitment under productivity shocks. In general, the presence of noise traders increases the desirability of a fixed exchange rate regime. We also evaluate the welfare impact of Tobin taxes in this milieu. These taxes help unambiguously in the absence of productivity shocks; their welfare impact under productivity shocks depends on the monetary regime in place and trade elasticity between domestic and foreign goods.