Institutional investors and opportunistic seasoned equity offerings in the Korean stock market

This study examines the impact of institutional monitoring on opportunistic seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the Korean stock market. With a firm’s accrual quality as a measurement for the degree of information asymmetry between managers and investors, we hypothesize that the managers of firms with poor accrual quality are likely to engage in opportunistic SEOs, but such opportunistic activity is weak in firms strongly monitored by institutional investors. The empirical findings indicate that opportunistic SEOs tend to be deterred by institutional monitoring.     

Visibility,Institutional Preferences and Agency Considerations

We show that market frictions and agency considerations are important concerns when institutional investors make portfolio allocation decisions. For a sample of widely followed firms, institutional holdings increase with increases in visibility as measured by the number of analysts following the firm. We also report a significant seasonal pattern in institutional holdings consistent with the gamesmanship hypothesis, which asserts that institutions rebalance their portfolios in response to agency considerations. Finally, we find that excess returns are highly seasonal with performance, deteriorating when the following by financial analysts increases. "Followed" firms actually exhibit inferior market performance over the 1981-1996 sample period.     

Family ownership,altruism and agency costs in Australian small- and medium-sized enterprises

Given the continuing uncertainty about whether family firms enjoy lower agency costs, this article hypothesizes that a combination of the effects of family ownership, altruism and self-control is instead at play. To begin with, family ownership can indeed reduce agency costs through better aligning the interests of owners and managers. This is a ‘determining’ effect in that it independently mitigates one source of agency problems. However, altruism combined with self-control problems arising from the highly concentrated ownership often found in family firms can also increase agency costs. This is an ‘embedding’ effect as it is rooted in the personal relationships within the family firm. Using the Business Longitudinal Database compiled by the Australian Bureau of Statistics on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), we find that for larger SMEs (those with 20–200 employees), the gains in lower agency costs arising from family ownership are almost completely offset by the losses from altruism and the lack of self-control.     

Stock market-driven investment: new evidence on information,financing and agency effects

This study provides a theoretical model and empirical analysis to jointly examine the information, financing and agency effects, the three channels through which the stock market can actively influence corporate investment decisions and firm performance. First, stock market affects corporate investments, and such impact varies with different market valuation measures, types of investments and firm characteristics. Second, stock market valuation affects investments through the channel of corporate financing, supporting the financing hypothesis. Third, stock market-driven investments have differential impacts on the future operating performance of firms. Investments driven by market valuation of firm-specific information have a positive effect on future performance. In contrast, investments driven by market-wide sentiment have a negative effect on future performance. Fourth, consistent with the information hypothesis, market-driven investments are value-enhancing for firms with better external monitoring by analysts and institutional investors. Lastly, consistent with the agency hypothesis, market-driven investments are value-destroying when firms lack external monitoring, proper managerial incentives and independent board of directors.     

融资政策与增长速度:来自企业层面的证据

企业的融资政策对企业的增长速度具有决定性作用,恰当的融资方式安排能够减少股东与经理的代理成本、提高企业发展速度;通过降低资产消耗、提高生产水平、调整企业利润分配政策,企业也能够获得较快的增长速度。但对我国上市公司的实证研究表明,我国上市企业的增长速度与融资政策之间存在高度的依赖关系,从而企业持续快速的增长在现实中不太可能实现,股东和经理人对企业的发展速度和可以达到的规模都应该保持一个合理的预期。     

国有企业管理者激励补偿效应——政府的角色

本文突出制度环境,研究了政府干预对国有企业管理者薪酬激励效应的影响。同时,比较了政府这一制度约束与管理者权力这一契约安排之间的制衡关系。通过实证分析发现,政府干预程度越低,管理者盈余管理的空间越有限,薪酬与企业真实绩效的敏感度越强,但这一现象只存在于管理者权力较小的企业。在管理者权力较大的企业,薪酬自定现象明显,政府干预的减少并未弱化管理者的权力,也没有提高薪酬激励效应。本文的结论进一步验证了制度环境对管理者激励契约的重要影响,并对现有相关文献加以扩展,指出了契约安排内的权力取向会削弱制度环境的影响。     

Vertical Integration,Firms’ Entry,Exit, Strategic Shifts,Age, and The Productivity Growth in Korea's Core Growth‐Leading Industries

This study attempts to measure the impact of firms’ entry, exit, strategic shifts, and age on the productivity growth of Korea's three core growth‐leading industries and their vertical integration with capital share (VI) firms and non‐VI (NVI) firms in view of the 2008 global financial crisis and the institutional push by the Korean Government. A stochastic frontier production model was applied to firm‐level panel data from 2006 to 2011 for Korea's automobile, electronics and general machinery industries. The results show that exogenous shocks to the market triggered large‐scale resource reallocations from firms with declining productivity to firms with less declining or rising productivity, and market share reallocation between VI firms and NVI firms. The Korean Government's institutional push led the productivity growth of NVI firms to reach their highest levels in 2010. In a VI structure, a structure comprising VI firms only, the agency problem dominated the synergies of secure supply chains and saving on transaction costs, while NVI firms endeavoured to raise their productivity to step into a VI structure to secure stable supply chains, only to find their R&D initiatives stagnated once they took on the VI structure. Therefore, efficient resource reallocation is hindered by the agency problem within the bounds of vertically integrated industrial structures.     

企业与市场:相关关系及其性质——一个基于回归古典的解析框架

通过对科斯替代逻辑的反思 ,重新考察了企业与市场的相关关系。认为交易费用的提出虽然打开了新古典企业的“黑箱” ,但是由此来解释企业的性质 ,其结论与现实相悖。本文提出了一个趋于古典的分析框架 ,发现企业与市场是分别建立在两种不同但有紧密相关性的分工基础上的 ,因而 ,它们各自的性质及其相互关系源于一般分工与个别分工各自的性质及其相关关系———企业是要素所有者为分享“合作剩余”而达成的合约 ,而市场则是商品所有者交换比较优势的制度安排。两者互补而不相互替代。这一结论较好地解释了实体经济中不论是企业规模 ,还是企业数量都在不断扩张 ,同时市场范围随之不断扩展 ,两方面相互促进、正相关推进发展的现实。     

Digital Platforms and the Nature of the Firm

Abstract:

Digital platforms turn traditional approaches of the firm, which relied on the wage relation to explain the major difference between firm and market, upside down and underline the advantages of coordination through organization over coordination through market. This study aims to propose a definition of the firm able to integrate, besides the integrated firm, also hybrid forms such as networks of subcontractor/subcontracting firms as well as atypical forms such as digital platforms. By reactivating the firm-boundary problem, this article suggests putting valorization by labor at the heart of the firm’s decisions concerning integration. It suggests therefore a general definition of the firm as a techno-institutional center of capital valorization, provided that firms make profits by means of the appropriation of labor incorporated into their (productive, structural, intellectual) capital through institutional arrangements. By stressing the relation of production between the owners of the means of production and the direct producers, the approach of the firm supported here should allow to cover the different existing models of the firm, from the classical firm to hybrid models, around which the boundary debate has revolved, to digital platforms.     

代理成本与审计师选择--基于中国IPO公司的研究

西方大量研究表明,公司的代理冲突程度越高,选择大事务所进行审计的动力就越强。文章在对179家IPO公司研究后发现,建立在英美市场经济条件下的代理理论对我国审计师选择行为的解释力并不充分。在公司规模、成长性、财务杠杆、管理层持股比例、董事会独立性等反映公司代理冲突的变量中,仅公司规模与是否选择大事务所进行审计有显著正向关系,管理层持股与是否选择大事务所审计则呈倒U形关系,没有发现成长性、财务杠杆与审计师选择存在显著关系的证据。     

THE DECISION TO HIRE MANAGERS IN MIXED MARKETS UNDER BERTRAND COMPETITION*

This paper analyses the decisions of firms as to whether or not to hire managers when there is a public firm competing with a private firm in the product market. It is shown that under Bertrand competition with heterogeneous goods both firms hire managers. This is in contrast with the result obtained under Cournot competition, where only the private firm hires a manager. Moreover, welfare is lower if both firms hire managers than if neither firm does. In contrast, under Cournot competition welfare is greater if both firms hire managers.     

经理人市场失灵与家族管理转型的制度困境

由家族企业向现代经理式企业演变是企业发展的一般规律,也是家族企业规模扩张的必然要求.但是在我国经理人市场失灵的现实条件下,引入外部经理人将使家族企业面对经理人的选择风险和经理人的道德风险.本文通过一个博弈模型证明,家族化管理因家族成员的高度信任具有情境的合理性.     

资本市场开放与企业真实盈余管理——基于“陆港通”的经验证据

资本市场开放不仅是扩大国际融资、更好地利用国际金融市场的需要,而且对我国资本市场发育和上市公司行为具有多重外部治理效应。本文借助我国内地与香港资本市场互联互通机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放对企业真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)总体上,“陆港通”机制的实施显著降低了标的公司真实盈余管理程度。(2)委托代理问题是企业进行盈余管理的重要原因,而“陆港通”机制开通后,能够缓解标的公司代理矛盾,进而约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。(3)当资本市场信息环境改善、管理层面临较大股票抛售压力以及大股东监督力度较强时,“陆港通”抑制企业真实盈余管理行为的治理效果更强。本文结果表明,资本市场开放有助于提高我国上市公司财务信息披露质量及公司治理水平。     

资本市场开放与企业真实盈余管理——基于“陆港通”的经验证据

资本市场开放不仅是扩大国际融资、更好地利用国际金融市场的需要,而且对我国资本市场发育和上市公司行为具有多重外部治理效应。本文借助我国内地与香港资本市场互联互通机制这一准自然实验,研究资本市场开放对企业真实盈余管理的影响。研究发现:(1)总体上,“陆港通”机制的实施显著降低了标的公司真实盈余管理程度。(2)委托代理问题是企业进行盈余管理的重要原因,而“陆港通”机制开通后,能够缓解标的公司代理矛盾,进而约束管理层的真实盈余管理行为。(3)当资本市场信息环境改善、管理层面临较大股票抛售压力以及大股东监督力度较强时,“陆港通”抑制企业真实盈余管理行为的治理效果更强。本文结果表明,资本市场开放有助于提高我国上市公司财务信息披露质量及公司治理水平。     

Do concentrated shareholdings mitigate the agency problem of “free cash flow”? some evidence

It is often argued that corporate managers tend to waste “free cash flow”. While the standard Berle-Means approach to corporate agency problems suggests that this behavior should be restricted to firms with atomistic shareholders, it is argued here that the effect of concentrated share ownership on the decision to disgorge “free cash flow” is ambiguous because concentrated ownership can blunt the disciplinary effect of a hostile takeover threat. The decision to pay out free cash flow in a sample of large U.S. corporations is found to be unrelated to the size of managerial, family or institutional blockholdings. This suggests that large shareholders are of no use in resolving the free cash flow problem, or that the importance of free cash flow as a source of agency problems has been greatly exaggerated.     

Dividend policy and investor pressure

The economics of dividend policy has focused on the single tight narrative that dividends keep managers honest, mitigating concerns that they over-invest. This article provides a critique of that agency narrative, arguing that pressure from short-term focused investors, executives and board members pushes the firm into preemptive actions of returning too much cash via dividends. We analyze three channels of influence for investor pressure through 1) threat of takeovers, 2) shareholder value oriented corporate governance, measured by director independence and board equity incentives, and 3) trading and institutional ownership patterns. We find that firms adopt a higher dividend payout to discourage takeover bids. Also, FTSE 100 firms, that are most focused on shareholder value governance in the form of equity-based compensation and a higher share of independent directors, display a higher dividend payout. Frequency of trading and ownership by transient investors seeking current profits also predict increased dividend payout. Traditional agency theory, focused on dividends as a tool for managerial discipline, is not strongly supported by the results, which rather support a narrative of short-term investor pressure on firms irrespective of investment opportunities.     

Leadership and firm value among couples in charge: Evidence from Chinese listed family firms

This study investigates how leadership by married couples affects the firm value of family businesses in the institutional context of the Chinese capital market. Marital leadership is found to significantly decrease firm value compared with other family firms, which is supported by a battery of estimation strategies. Aggravating the principal–principal problem, tunnelling behaviour and financial fraud are confirmed as potential economic mechanisms. Moreover, monitoring from the internal corporate governance and external institution environment helps marital leadership focus on shareholder wealth beyond family interest. Our findings indicate that marital leadership implies more of a collusion effect than a collaboration effect in China.     

Institutional Quality and Economic Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: Can Management Effort and Bribes Compensate for Low-Quality Institutions?

The industrial development in sub-Saharan Africa is perhaps more affected by the quality of institutions than that of other regions. We investigate what alternatives managers may have and what their firms would need to function in case the institutional furniture they encounter is of low quality. We find that, in high quality institutional environments, management spending effort to deal with the authorities and to navigate regulations negates the effect of the institutional environment. Managers do not need to spend such efforts. Perhaps surprisingly, we find that the positive effect of high-quality institutional environments on firm performance is enhanced by making informal payments.     

国有机构投资者持股能提升企业投资效率吗?

具有国资背景的机构投资者,对于资本市场平稳发展具有重要意义。本文基于我国2015—2019年A股上市公司样本,考察持股对企业投资效率的影响。研究发现,持股显著提升了企业投资效率,并且该影响在代理冲突更严重和所处信息环境更不透明的公司中更加显著。机制检验表明,降低企业内外部信息不对称和代理成本是持股提升企业投资效率的重要渠道。进一步研究发现,国有机构投资者持股时间越长,对企业非效率投资的治理效果越好;细分国有机构投资者类型后发现,致力于长期维护资本市场稳定和上市公司长期健康发展的证金公司和汇金公司对企业投资效率的提升作用显著,但没有发现“救市”基金和外管局旗下的投资平台对企业投资效率有提升作用。研究结论从企业投资效率视角为国有机构投资者持股在微观企业日常经营中发挥的治理作用提供了新颖的经验证据,对进一步提高我国上市公司质量具有启示意义。