State ownership and banks’ information rents: Evidence from China

In a lending relationship, a bank with an information advantage regarding its client tends to hold up the borrower and charge higher interest rates. We conjecture that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with worse information asymmetry, are subject to greater information rents. State-owned banks place less emphasis on information production and hence extract lower rents compared to profit-maximizing private banks. We use the decline of loan interest rates around the borrowers’ equity initial public offerings (IPOs) as the proxy of banks’ information rents. We find SOEs in China experience larger declines in loan interest rates around their IPOs; the central government-controlled Big Four banks exhibit smaller declines in rates they charge, and their rate declines concentrate on loans made to SOEs.     

Are Commercial Mortgage Defaults Affected by Tax Considerations?

We study whether tax considerations are an important determinant of commercial mortgage default. We also study whether large lenders are better informed, or better at interpreting information for lending purposes, and hence have lower foreclosure rates; whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, and hence have lower foreclosure rates on larger loans; and whether commercial mortgage defaults are related to debt service coverage and loan-to-values, both initial and contemporaneous. The paper’s main findings are fourfold. First, holding all else equal, there is evidence that tax considerations influence investors’ decisions about when to “put” assets to lenders. The results are consistent with the argument of Constantinides (J Financ Econ 13:65–89, 1984). Second, the evidence suggests that large lenders are especially knowledgeable about commercial mortgage borrowers and commercial property markets, in that they have lower foreclosure rates than smaller lenders. Third, on the question of whether lenders have more information on larger borrowers than smaller borrowers, we find that larger loans have, on average, lower default rates than smaller loans. Fourth, the findings suggest that lower default rates are associated with higher debt service coverage ratios, both initial and contemporaneous.     

Endogenous screening, credit crunches, and competition in laxity

A simple model of lending with endogenous screening predicts that risk-neutral banks tend to adopt tighter lending standards under several conditions commonly seen in recessions: lower interest rates (or spreads), higher default rates, or a smaller fraction of good borrowers. Historical data support these predictions. In addition, better information about borrower types encourages tighter lending standards, and competition in laxity can arise with multiple banks. Within the class of symmetric screening decisions, endogenizing the interest rates disrupts the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies, just as when screening decisions are assumed to be exogenous.     

Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?

How will banks evolve as competition increases from other banks and from the capital market? Will banks become more like capital market underwriters and offer passive transaction loans or return to their roots as relationship lending experts? These are the questions we address. Our key result is that as interbank competition increases, banks make more relationship loans, but each has lower added value for borrowers. Capital market competition reduces relationship lending (and bank lending shrinks), but each relationship loan has greater added value for borrowers. In both cases, welfare increases for some borrowers but not necessarily for all.     

借贷便利创新工具有效影响了商业银行贷款利率吗？

本文基于手工收集的2009—2017年中国银行业数据,利用我国借贷便利工具创新这一准自然实验,以借贷便利工具的运用需要商业银行提供合格担保品这一要求为切入点,考察了借贷便利工具对商业银行贷款利率的影响。研究发现,借贷便利工具创设后,商业银行持有的合格担保品规模越大,其贷款利率越低,且这一效应随着时间推移逐渐增强。进一步的作用机制检验发现,央行的借贷便利操作扩大了商业银行向中央银行借款规模和贷款投放规模,从而有效降低了商业银行贷款利率,也表明借贷便利工具可通过商业银行合格担保品渠道发挥作用。因此,可以通过调整借贷便利操作规模、操作利率以及合格担保品范围的方式有效影响商业银行贷款利率进而发挥对社会融资成本的调控作用。     

Clawbacks and Cronyism: Evidence from China

This paper is the first to examine the long‐term impact on bank lending policy of clawbacks in executive compensation contracts. Using a hand‐gathered database of Chinese business lending, we find evidence of reduced cronyism at the Big Four Chinese banks during the period after the introduction of a clawback program, marking a shift from earlier studies covering earlier time periods that find evidence of widespread cronyism at the Big Four banks. Politically connected borrowers received fewer and smaller loans relative to non‐Big Four banks, consistent with a backlash against cronyism at the Big Four banks. In contrast, we find that cronyism persisted (i.e., politically connected borrowers received more and larger loans) at non‐Big Four Chinese banks where the clawback policy was not effective.     

Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008

This paper shows that new loans to large borrowers fell by 47% during the peak period of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 2008) relative to the prior quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit boom (second quarter of 2007). New lending for real investment (such as working capital and capital expenditures) fell by only 14% in the last quarter of 2008, but contracted nearly as much as new lending for restructuring (LBOs, M&As, share repurchases) relative to the peak of the credit boom. After the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, there was a run by short-term bank creditors, making it difficult for banks to roll over their short term debt. We find that there was a simultaneous run by borrowers who drew down their credit lines, leading to a spike in commercial and industrial loans reported on bank balance sheets. We examine whether these two stresses on bank liquidity led them to cut lending. In particular, we show that banks cut their lending less if they had better access to deposit financing and thus, they were not as reliant on short-term debt. We also show that banks that were more vulnerable to credit-line drawdowns because they co-syndicated more of their credit lines with Lehman Brothers reduced their lending to a greater extent.     

Banks’ lending behavior and monetary policy: evidence from Sweden

The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the aggregate data about bank loans which may hide significant information about the monetary transmission mechanism. This study, by disaggregating bank loans data and using the relevant interest rates in Sweden, investigates the behaviour of banks after a monetary policy tightening. By using an unrestricted VAR model and impulse response analysis, our results show that a shock on the policy rate affects the main components of the banks’ loan portfolios differently. Initially, banks do not reduce lending to firms and households and they present a sluggish reaction concerning the relevant interest rates. On the contrary, they reduce lending to mortgage credit institutions significantly since real estate lending can be considered as a risky long-term investment. Moreover mortgage credit institutions reduce lending for housing purposes to non-bank public. This reduction is mainly driven by flexible rate loans and loans secured on tenant owned apartments. Consequently, theses actions have a significant effect on real economic activity, by amplifying the initial shock from the tightening monetary policy. The latter result provides evidence of the bank lending channel in Sweden working via mortgage lending and could be very important for policy makers.     

Bank and Nonbank Lenders and the Commercial Mortgage Market

This paper develops an equilibrium model of the commercial mortgage market that includes the sequence from commitment to origination and allows testing for differences by type of lender. From borrowers, loan demand is based on the income yield, capital gains, and expectations about return distributions. Lenders use prices such as mortgage rates and their distributions, and quantities in underwriting standards. There are separate equilibria in the markets for loan commitments and originations. Bank and nonbank lenders are not restricted to the same lending technology, nor to the weights placed on mortgage rates as opposed to underwriting standards. Empirical results for the United States commercial mortgage market indicate that banks use interest rates in allocating credit while nonbanks rely on underwriting standards, notably the loan-to-value ratio. A consequence is that nonbanks have a clientele incentive towards making low cap rate loans compensated by low loan-to-value ratios.     

Bank lending opportunities and credit standards

This article empirically tests the hypothesis that credit-screening standards can be first increasing and then decreasing in the quality of the bank's pool of potential borrowers, which in turn may vary through the business cycle or across different segments of the lending markets. A key implication is that banks with lending opportunities toward the middle of the quality spectrum can have loan portfolios that perform better than do the portfolios of banks with loan-origination opportunities that are either too weak or too strong. Using banks’ volume of secondary-market loan sales as a proxy for the richness of lending opportunities, I find an inverse U-shaped relation between the performance of banks’ loan portfolios and their activity in the loan sales market. The pattern deserves scrutiny for its policy implications, as many regulators hold the view that countercyclical variation in credit standards may have a destabilizing effect on business cycles.     

Lock‐In Effects in Relationship Lending: Evidence from DIP Loans

Do prior lending relationships result in pass‐through savings (lower interest rates) for borrowers, or do they lock in higher costs for borrowers? Theoretical models suggest that when borrowers experience greater information asymmetry, higher switching costs, and limited access to capital markets, they become locked into higher costs from their existing lenders. Firms in Chapter 11 seeking debtor‐in‐possession (DIP) financing often fit this profile. We investigate the presence of lock‐in effects using a sample of 348 DIP loans. We account for endogeneity using the instrument variable (IV) approach and the Heckman selection model and find consistent evidence that prior lending relationship is associated with higher interest costs and the effect is more severe for stronger existing relationships. Our study provides direct evidence that prior lending relationships do create a lock‐in effect under certain circumstances, such as DIP financing.     

Finance and inequality: The distributional impacts of bank credit rationing

We analyze reductions in bank credit using a natural experiment where unprecedented flooding in Pakistan differentially affected banks that were more exposed to the floods. Using a unique data set that covers the universe of consumer loans in Pakistan and this exogenous shock to bank funding, we find two key results. First, following an increase in their funding costs, banks disproportionately reduce credit to borrowers with little education, little credit history, and seasonal occupations. Second, the credit reduction is not compensated by relatively more lending by less-affected banks. The empirical evidence suggests that a reduction in bank monitoring incentives caused the large relative decreases in lending to these borrowers.     

The influence of political factors on commercial banks in Central European countries

This study examines the impact of political factors on the behaviour and performance of commercial banks in 11 Central European countries from 1995 to 2008. Using a unique dataset of commercial banks and political factors, we find that state-owned banks report significantly smaller net interest income ratios during the years of parliamentary elections. The proxy cumulative amount of net interest income lost by state-owned banks during the election years equals, on average, 0.38% of each country's GDP. The decrease in the profitability of state-owned banks is caused primarily by the lower interest rates charged on loans. In contrast, we document that the lending growth of state-owned banks is not affected by the political cycle. Hence, to a certain extent, this study supports the view that state-owned banks constitute a tool that serves political goals in Central European countries.     

Bank Loans, Bonds, and Information Monopolies across the Business Cycle

Theory suggests that banks' private information about borrowers lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since hold-up power increases with borrower risk, banks with exploitable information should be able to raise their rates in recessions by more than is justified by borrower risk alone. We test this hypothesis by comparing the pricing of loans for bank-dependent borrowers with the pricing of loans for borrowers with access to public debt markets, controlling for risk factors. Loan spreads rise in recessions, but firms with public debt market access pay lower spreads and their spreads rise significantly less in recessions.     

Banks' option to lend,interest rate sensitivity,and credit availability

Interest rate risk is a major concern for banks because of the nominal nature of their assets and the asset-liability maturity mismatch. This paper proposes a new way to derive a bank's interest rate sensitivity, by examining separately the effects of interest rate changes on existing loans(loans-in-place) and potential loans (loans-in-process). A potential loan is shown to be equivalent to an American option to lend, and is valued using option theory. An increase in interest rates generally has a negative effect on existing loans. However, if both deposit and lending rates rise by the same amount, the value of a potential loan generally increases. Hence a bank's lending slack (or ratio of loans-in-process to loans-in-place) will determine its overall interest rate risk. Empirical evidence indicates that low-slack banks indeed have significantly more interest rate risk than high-slack banks. The model also makes predictions regarding the effect of deposit and lending rate parameters on bank credit availability. Empirical tests with quarterly data are generally supportive of these predictions. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The changing structure of local credit markets: Are small businesses special?

In many countries consolidation in the banking industry has reduced the number of small banks and led to significant shifts in market shares; deregulation has fostered entry in local credit markets and the expansion of branch networks, increasing competition in local markets. Small businesses are believed to be more vulnerable to these changes, since they are more dependent on credit from local banks. In this paper we investigate the consequences of consolidation and entry for these borrowers compared with those for large firms. We employ a data set for Italy, which provides information on volumes of loans and bad loans by size of borrower with a detailed geographical partition. We find that mergers are followed by a temporary reduction in outstanding credit to all sizes of borrowers and by an increase in bad loans, most likely due to the reassessment of banks portfolios. Entry has a relatively persistent negative impact on credit supply to small and medium-sized firms. Our results also show that concentration, branch density and the share of branches of small banks affect the volumes of credit and bad loans of small borrowers.     

What's different about banks?

Negotiable certificates of deposit (CD's) trade in the capital market in competition with other securities like commercial paper and bankers' acceptances. If CD's must pay lenders competitive monetary interest, the reserve tax on CD's is borne by bank borrowers. Viability of the tax means there must be something special about bank loans that makes some borrowers willing to pay higher interest rates than those on other securities of equivalent risk. Moreover, there must be something special about banks that prevents other intermediaries from competing to assure that it never pays to finance loans with CD's.     

The Effect of Private-Debt-Underwriting Reputation on Bank Public-Debt Underwriting

We provide evidence that commercial banks extend their reputationin underwriting syndicated loans and private placements (privatedebt) to their bond-underwriting activities. In the absenceof bond market reputation, private-debt-market reputation enablescommercial banks to win underwriting mandates from their loanclients. Furthermore, it allows them to credibly commit to investorsagainst opportunistically using lending information and therebydeliver superior certification benefits in the form of higherissue prices relative to investment-bank underwriters. Thispricing benefit is not offset by higher underwriting fees andthus results in lower total issuance costs for borrowers.(JELG21, G28, L14, L15)     

Lending Booms and Lending Standards

We examine how the informational structure of loan markets interacts with banks' strategic behavior in determining lending standards, lending volume, and the aggregate allocation of credit. We show that, as banks obtain private information about borrowers and information asymmetries across banks decrease, banks may loosen their lending standards, leading to an equilibrium with deteriorated bank portfolios, lower profits, and expanded aggregate credit. These lower standards are associated with greater aggregate surplus and greater risk of financial instability. We therefore provide an explanation for the sequence of financial liberalization, lending booms, and banking crises observed in many emerging markets.     

Financial Protectionism? First Evidence

We examine large public interventions in the financial sector, such as bank nationalizations and search for “financial protectionism,” a decrease in the quantity and/or an increase in the price of loans that banks from one country make to borrowers resident in another. We use a bank‐level panel data set spanning all U.K.‐resident banks between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced their fraction of British loans by about 11% and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. In contrast, nationalized British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates.