Financial and Capital Account Liberalization,Financial Development and Economic Development: A Review of Some Recent Contributions

Abstract

This article presents a review of some recent contributions on the relation between global finance and economic development in emerging economies. It first, stresses the growing consensus among economists on the financial instability that financial and capital account liberalization can possibly cause in emerging economies. It then outlines and compares two alternative strategies to tame such instability. The comparison is between the “good-institutions need-to-come-first” approach put forward by some mainstream economists, and the request for a deeper reform of the existing monetary system advocated by heterodox economists.     

Stabilizing Endogenous Instability: Proposals for An Institutionalist Reform of Financial Regulation

A major and persistent question behind economic theories and related policies is whether the market can self-regulate without any restrictive exogenous intervention or whether regular and binding public regulation is necessary for ensuring the reproduction of the economic system in a sustainable way over time. This article considers this question with regard to the working of financial markets in a liberalized environment. Drawing upon an institutionalist stance, the article shows why the operation of a financialized capitalist economy usually leads to systemic imbalances and crises. The article then suggests an alternative framework for a consistent financial regulation that could prevent market actors from developing short-sighted strategies and gambling on macro stability.     

Liberalization,Regulatory Delays and Vulnerability to Systemic Banking Crisis

This work aims at contributing to the improvement of the early warning systems of banking crises using a new approach accounting for model uncertainty. We show that a multinomial logit model based on Bayesian model averaging (BMA) is a good strategy to predict banking crisis. To do this, we argue that differences in vulnerability to banking crisis can be largely explained by an asymmetry between financial market evolution and regulation update on a sample of 49 developed and developing countries between 1980 and 2010. When markets are liberalized, competition pushes bankers to take more risks and take advantage of regulatory delays thus increasing crises probabilities. Our empirical evidence supports that crisis probability is higher in country liberalizing their banking system when regulation is not updated. We developed an early warning system for systemic banking crises based on the multinomial logit model. Its main difference to existing prediction models and its contribution to the literature is that it is intended to identify and resolve what is called by Bussiere and Fratzscher [(2006). Towards a new early warning system of financial crises. Journal of International Money and Finance, 25(6), 953–973] as post-crisis bias in binomial models and to develop a new methodology of leading indicators selection based on BMA. Overall, our model predicts all banking crises during our sample period.     

What matters in the finance–growth nexus of advanced economies? Evidence from OECD countries

Over the last decades, a large strand of finance and growth literature has provided ample evidence on the importance of financial deepening for economic development. Yet, recently, the focus of public debate has shifted towards the role of the financial system structure, an area in which empirical research remains relatively sparse and exploratory in nature. With this article, we aim to contribute to that debate by analysing the role the financial system structure plays in economic growth and risk. Focusing on stock markets and studying OECD economies over 1994–2013, we find that, ceteris paribus, financial systems with relatively larger stock markets facilitate economic growth and dampen economic risk. Our findings remain robust under application of instrumental variable and system generalized method of moments estimators, as well as when we use an alternative definition of stock market development, estimate median regressions, examine relatively high-frequency annual data, control for systemic banking crises or apply quadratic specifications. We find no such effect for private bond markets or private credit volume. Overall, our results suggest that financial system structure matters for the economic development of advanced economies and highlight the importance of a debate about the optimal structure of an economy’s financial system.     

The 2014–15 Financial Crisis in Russia and the Foundations of Weak Monetary Power Autonomy in the International Political Economy

ABSTRACT

This article contributes to international political economy debates about the monetary power autonomy (MPA) of emerging market and developing countries (EMDs). The 2014–15 Russian financial crisis is used as a case study to explore why an accumulation of large international reserves does not provide protection against currency crises and macroeconomic adjustments in EMDs. The analysis centres on the interplay between two dimensions of MPA: the Power to Delay and the Power to Deflect adjustment costs. Two structural factors condition Russia’s low MPA. First, the country’s subordinated integration in global financial markets increases its financial vulnerability. The composition of external assets and liabilities, combined with cross-border capital flows, restrict the use of international reserves to delay currency crises. Second, the choice of a particular macroeconomic policy regime embraced the financialisation of the – mainly state-owned – Russian banking sector, thus making it difficult to transform liquidity inflows into credits for enterprises. Russia’s main comparative advantage, hydrocarbon export revenues, is not exploited. The type of economy created due to the post-Communist transition means that provided ‘excessive’ liquidity remains in the financial system and is channelled into currency arbitrage. This factor increases exchange rate vulnerability and undermines Russia’s MPA.     

A Post-Keynesian Model of Accumulation with a Minskyan Financial Structure

Abstract

Minsky's theory of financial instability is a strong alternative to neoclassical theory. Many Post-Keynesian authors use this analysis in order to elaborate models that give rise to crises or business cycles. Nevertheless, none of them has directly linked growth and financial structure. This article proposes a simple macroeconomic model linking the accumulation of capital and the state of the financial structure as defined by Minsky. The analysis shows how a capitalist economy may become financially fragile, and it suggests that instability is apt to be the rule.     

Policy uncertainty and international financial markets: the case of Brexit

ABSTRACT

This study assesses the impact of the Brexit probability on both the UK and on international financial markets, for the first and the second statistical moments. As financial markets are by nature highly interlinked, one might expect that the uncertainty engendered by Brexit also has an impact on financial markets in several other countries. We first estimate the time-varying interactions between UK policy uncertainty, which to a large extent is attributed to uncertainty about Brexit and UK financial market volatilities. Second, we use two other measures of the perceived probability of Brexit before the referendum, namely daily data released by Betfair and results of polls published by Bloomberg. Based on these data sets, and using both panel and single-country SUR estimation methods, we analyse the Brexit effect on levels of stock returns, sovereign CDS, 10-year interest rates in 19 predominantly European countries, and those of the British pound and the euro. We show that Brexit-induced policy uncertainty will continue to cause instability in key financial markets and has the potential to damage the real economy in both the UK and other European countries. The main losers outside the UK are the ‘GIIPS’ economies: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain.     

Does Financial Sector Development Augment Cross-Border Capital Flows?

ABSTRACT

The sharp increase in volatility of capital flows in recent years has resulted in many countries altering the regulations governing the flow of foreign capital only to find such changes having a limited impact. We postulate that one reason for the limited effectiveness of such changes in regulations is the level of financial sector development in the country. As a country enhances its level of financial sector development, it also develops more and more sophisticated financial instruments. The more advanced the domestic financial instruments are, and the deeper is the integration of the domestic financial markets with the world markets, the greater is the likelihood of developing strategies to bypass capital account management measures. In this paper, we use various empirical techniques to identify the impact of financial sector development on capital flows, after accounting for regulatory regime. The empirical results indicate that there is a threshold effect in the financial sector development capital flow relationship. In particular, financial sector development augments greater integration with global capital flows only above a threshold level. Below the threshold level we find financial development reduces the extent of integration with global capital markets.     

Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Bank loan versus financial lease: how do traditional and innovative approaches within the banking sector influence economic growth? A comparative analysis between the US and China

ABSTRACT

The argument over the effects of financial structures on economic growth remains unsettled. This study, therefore, compares the dynamic correlation and lead–lag relationship between the different financial approaches within the banking sector (that is, traditional bank loans versus innovative financial leasing) and economic growth. We employ a continuous wavelet analysis using time-series data from 1982–2017 from the US (the world’s largest developed country) and China (the world’s largest developing country). The empirical results show that (1) episodes of significant correlation usually emerge during periods of reform, crisis or policy implementation; and (2) in China, traditional banking promotes economic growth in the long term, while the real economy only imputes the evolution of banks during critical economic reforms in the short term. Meanwhile, financial leasing could only promote the development of the real economy under suitable regulation; and (3) in the US, before the crises, the irrational growth of the real economy could increase bank assets, while during the crises, the traditional banking approach harms economic growth, and after the crises, financial leases play an important role in recovery. Therefore, we suggest that policymakers should establish adequate policies and regulations to solve the situation.     

The IMF as just One Creditor: Who’s in Charge When a Country Can’t Pay?

ABSTRACT

The international community’s management of the 2010 financial crisis in Greece revealed a major gap in the international financial system. No single institution is any longer unambiguously in charge. Consequently, the path is open for narrow interests to predominate over global interests. An examination of postwar history shows that this problem has been growing gradually since the 1970s and has become much greater since the mid-1990s. To alleviate the problem, the International Monetary Fund needs to develop an effective strategy for reducing the opportunities for creditor countries to intervene in decisions on how crises should be resolved.     

Managing Financial Integration and Capital Mobility—Policy Lessons from the Past Two Decades

Emerging market experience over the past two decades has revealed the tenuous links between external financial integration and faster growth, and the proclivity of such integration to fuel costly crises. Emerging markets learned, converging to the middle ground of the macroeconomic trilemma. Following their crises of 1997–2001, emerging markets added financial stability as a goal, self‐insured by building up international reserves, and adopted a public finance approach to financial integration. The global crisis of 2008–09 illustrated that the advanced economies “overshot” the optimal degree of financial deregulation, while the resilience of the emerging markets validated their public finance approach to financial integration.     

Alternative Monetary Targets,Instruments and Future Monetary Policy Frameworks

ABSTRACT

This article expands on the debate of whether merely controlling inflation can be considered a good outcome in terms of monetary policy, discussing proposals for adopting alternative monetary targets (e.g., price level, nominal GDP), alternative instruments (e.g., monetary finance, central bank digital currencies), for enlarging central banks' mandates (e.g., incorporating employment, wages, inequality, environmental objectives) and for the design of future monetary policy frameworks.

We argue that in the coming years, central banks should not simply maintain their pre-2008 standards by de-implementing unconventional monetary policies. Instead, they must take advantage of their past and recent experiences in order to improve, under an evolutionary perspective, future monetary policy and financial stability frameworks. Based on this, measures implemented since the 2008 crisis would have three possible treatments in new frameworks: i) be discarded, due to their predominantly adverse effects; ii) not be regularly implemented, but be used as backstop mechanisms if needed; iii) be incorporated as regular measures of monetary policy/financial stability frameworks. Accordingly, monetary and financial stability authorities will increasingly need to evolve and engage in a continuously adaptive and innovative process in order to face challenges posed by financial markets that are becoming more dynamic, innovative, complex, interconnected and globalised.     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

Instability and Crisis in Financial Complex Systems

This paper contrasts the Efficient Markets Hypothesis with Hyman Minsky's Financial Instability Hypothesis (FIH), taking into account the dynamic complexity of financial markets. This approach offers analytical tools that can account for crisis through processes endogenous to contemporary economies. Recent work, notably by J. Barkley Rosser, has suggested that complex dynamics is a strong foundations for Keynesian models and results. Group dynamics enter into the analysis in at least two ways: they provide an independent source of fundamental uncertainty which, as discussed by Keynes himself, can lead to speculative bubbles in asset markets, and they can cause overreactions in both lenders' and borrowers' attitudes toward risk. These aspects can lead to financial fragility and instability following a variety of complex dynamics. I shall argue that a financially complex system is, according to the FIH, inherently flawed and unstable: in the absence of adequate economic policy boom and bust phenomena, in financial markets which are fuelled by credit booms and busts, may generate endogenous instability and systemic crisis, such as the recent sub-prime mortgage crisis.

[O]ur economic leadership does not seem to be aware that the normal functioning of our economy leads to financial trauma and crisis, inflation, currency depreciations, unemployment, and poverty in the midst of what could be virtually universal affluence—in short, that financially complex capitalism is inherently flawed. (Minsky, 1986, p. 287; our emphasis)     

The financial and economic performance of social banks

ABSTRACT

The financial crisis of 2008 provides evidence for the instability of the conventional banking system. Social banks may present a viable alternative for conventional banks. This article analyses the performance of social banks related to the bank business model, economic efficiency, asset quality, and stability by comparing social banks with banks where the difference is likely to be large, namely with the 30 global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) of the Financial Stability Board over the period 2000–2014. We also analyse the relative impact of the global financial crisis on the bank performance. The performance of social banks and G-SIBs is surprisingly similar.     

Foreign Direct Investment,Sectoral Effects and Economic Growth in Africa

Abstract

Many small, frontier equity markets in regions such as Africa and Eastern Europe have opened in recent years. As in other larger emerging markets, important issues for investors are the extent of financial integration with exchanges in other countries and, if some reasonable degree of integration is found, whether such markets still provide diversification opportunities. Here, we will examine a frequently used metric of integration by testing for the existence of common trends, or cointegration, in these frontier markets. While common stochastic trends are found, results show that coefficients on cointegrating vectors are at times negative, and reaction to deviations from the long-run trend are often slow, thus indicating that frontier markets are a good source of diversification opportunities despite a degree of integration.     

金融危机中的衍生工具——基于20世纪80年代以来金融危机视角的思考

本文从20世纪80年代以来金融危机的不同特性对比分析入手,对衍生工具在金融危机中作用的二重性进行了研究。指出衍生工具除了具有引导资金从发达资本市场向发展中经济流动过程中的建构性作用,同时在诱导金融危机的发生和加剧方面还具有助动性作用。从衍生工具的产生和发展,降低了经济运作的透明度、削弱了金融管理当局的监管、威胁到固定汇率体系的稳定性、提高了系统风险和感染风险、进而加速并深化危机等不同角度,对衍生工具在金融危机中的负面作用作了较为具体的论证。     

The future of financial markets: financial crisis avoidance

This article considers the lessons from the global financial crisis for redesigning the financial system and its regulation to make the chance of future such crises lower. It focuses on three areas: improvements to the regulation of individual financial firms; macroprudential analysis and improving the structure of crisis resolution and management. It argues that if the authorities implement a credible crisis management regime where no firm is too big to be resolved, a smarter and more incentive based approach to the regulation of individual financial firms and extensive macroprudential analysis that both makes the structure of financial markets less risky and identifies risks, the risk of future crises will be reduced. But no framework can eliminate the risk altogether.