Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

国外学者在后危机时代关于金融创新“悖论”的综述

20世纪80年代以来的金融创新,所取得的规模是惊人的,对金融市场和金融风险的影响已经超越了人们的想象。2008年金融危机的爆发使得金融创新受到了人们的质疑,部分学者开始讨论其对金融和经济的冲击和影响。本文首先阐述了国外学者关于金融创新在生产力、经济增长、金融风险和交易成本等四个方面最新的观点,论证其悖论的含义及体现。然后,从金融产品、系统风险、金融立法与完善市场等四个方面归纳总结了目前学术界与实务界对金融创新监督管理和合理使用的观点。最后,本文提出了对于化解金融创新"悖论"的观点和建议。     

Building an Efficient Financial System in China: A Need for Stronger Market Discipline

China has built a very comprehensive financial system, but has not let the market mechanism work freely. This unique pattern, rooted in China's dual‐track reform strategy between state and non‐state sectors, did not prevent a strong economic performance in the past, but is now a main cause of economic inefficiency and financial risks. The rapid development of digital finance is a back‐door way of financial liberalization, responding to both old repressive policies and new technologies. To accomplish the mission of building an efficient financial system, the government needs to take at least three further steps in financial reform: creating a level‐playing field; freeing up the market mechanism; and improving regulation. The key test lies in the effective enforcement of market discipline for corporate and financial institutions.     

Inside the Crystal Ball of Finance: Understanding Financial Economists' Attitudes to Market and Society

Market economists are thought to wield tremendous power—not only over financial markets but over governments that stray from the ‘market way’. Still, there is mystery about what economists think, and how they form their judgements. This article reports results from a survey of over 50 financial market economists from leading financial institutions in Australia conducted in December 2003 and January 2004. It provides insight into the opinions of economists who impact on markets and policy, especially through media commentary. The article identifies their economic and social views, comparing them with the Australian public. We then examine how professional views of economists differ from their personal views. Differences in professional and private views—especially over the role of government and labour markets—are an opportunity to ponder how judgements are formed and used. We offer tentative answers to the question: do these professionals—highly paid for their opinions—occasionally self‐censor?     

我国财政宏观调控政策及其转型取向--兼论以农村教育为重点的财政调控

经济周期波动及其政府宏观调节是与市场经济共生的现象.经典理论形成了低谷和顶峰两极时期的财政对策,但忽视转型期的调控政策.我国新一轮增长拐点时期,将过去实施的积极财政政策转型为稳健的财政政策,财政调控的目标、手段、方式都需要发生改变.稳健的财政政策目标应该由单纯追求增长率转变为扩大就业,由类行政的直接调控转变为利用市场对企业施行间接调控,当前财政重点发展农村教育有助于实现经济由短期波动到长期增长的平稳过渡,并由此延长经济增长期.     

管制、竞争与民营银行的发展

金融深化的基础是管制与竞争的均衡。计划体制下，国家对金融业一直采取国有控股或国家垄断，因而产生民营银行压抑现象。市场化改革显化了金融制度与经济制度的摩擦，因而民营银行发展在金融深化中具有现实性，也是金融基础设施建设的重要组成。从竞争的角度看，放松民营银行进入壁垒，有助于金融业适度竞争，同时也是国有银行改革的重要组成部分。当然，金融本身的脆弱性说明银行民营化过程也是管制重建的过程。     

宏观审慎监管：目标、工具与相关制度安排

最近40年的金融危机史表明,随着金融市场的日渐发达和复杂化,金融失衡不仅周期性地发生,而且与宏观经济的失衡彼此强化,这种强化使得经济和金融长期持续、显著地偏离长期标准。在金融体系顺周期性的负面效应日渐明显的情况下,为确保宏观经济和金融体系的稳定,在传统微观审慎监管的基础上全面建立和完善宏观审慎监管已成为大势所趋。强调宏观审慎的监管理念认为,仅凭微观层面的努力难以实现金融体系的整体稳定,监管当局需要从经济活动、金融市场以及金融机构行为之间相互关联的角度,从整体上评估金融体系的风险,并在此基础上健全金融体系的制度设计并作出政策反应     

Eliciting Stock Market Expectations: The Effects of Question Wording on Survey Experience and Response Validity

Expectations about stock market movements are an important factor in models of investments and savings. To better understand consumers' financial behavior, economic surveys such as the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) ask participants to report expectations about the stock market. However, readability statistics suggest that the HRS' stock market expectations questions use relatively complex wording, which may contribute to their relatively high rates of missing responses. Here, the authors build on survey design research to improve the readability of these questions. In 2 experiments using national online panels, they test whether revising stock market expectation questions to reduce their difficulty affects respondents' (1) survey experience, as measured by percent of missing answers and ratings of question clarity and difficulty, and (2) response validity, as assessed by respondents' confidence in their answer and comparisons between expectations and stock market outcomes. In both studies, the authors' revisions improved survey experience. Unfortunately, revisions also decreased the perceived (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) validity of responses. The authors discuss implications of question revisions for the design of economic surveys.     

Delegation and the regulation of U.S. financial markets

We analyze the institutional determinants of U.S. financial market regulation with a general model of the policy-making process in which legislators delegate authority to regulate financial risk at both the firm and systemic levels. The model explains changes in U.S. financial regulation leading up to the financial crisis. We test the predictions of the general model with a novel, comprehensive data set of financial regulatory laws enacted specifically between 1950 and 2009. The theoretical and empirical analysis finds that economic and political factors impact Congress’ decision to delegate regulatory authority to executive agencies, which in turn impacts the stringency of financial market regulation, and our estimation results indicate that political factors may have been stronger and resulted in inefficiencies.     

Collective Action and the Institutionalist Approach to Financial Regulation

Drawing on the institutionalist approach to a capitalist economy as a money economy, I regard financial regulation and supervision as a collective action problem. I argue that, given the basic characteristics of such an economy, a financial system may be considered as a public utility and financial stability as a public good. I then maintain that the provision of the latter could not rely on private market mechanisms, such as self-regulation and price-directed incentives. As capitalism develops through more financialized forms, new institutions and regulatory rules must be designed to reframe the market’s boundaries in order to consolidate systemic stability, which is a basic condition for continuous and sustainable economic relations in society. I then suggest a precautionary-principle-based macro-prudential approach to financial regulation in order to ensure a sustainable provision of finance and financial stability that is consistent with the characteristics of a money economy.     

The impact of product market competition on GDP per capita growth in the EU countries: does the model of capitalism matter?

This article assesses whether the intensity of product market competition is a factor affecting economic growth (measured by the growth rate of real GDP per capita) and whether this impact depends on the model of capitalism. The study covers the 1997–2015 period and all EU28 countries. Product market competition is measured by two types of variables: product market regulation indicators and the number of enterprises. New elements in the analysis include, among others, nonlinear impact and overlapping observations. The regression equations are estimated on the basis of Blundell and Bond’s GMM system estimator. The results generally indicate that stronger product market regulations (and theoretically lower product market competition) are linked with faster growth of output. However, the impact of product market competition on economic growth depends on the type of capitalism. For post-socialist countries, unlike the Western European model of capitalism, more regulation tends to reduce the rate of economic growth.     

Financial systems and economic growth in South Africa: a dynamic complementarity test

This study examines the relationship between banks, stock markets and economic growth in South Africa. The study attempts to answer one critical question: are stock markets and banks complementary to one another in the process of enhancing economic growth? The complementarity between the stock markets and banks is examined by including a set of interactive terms in a standard growth model, alongside bank development and stock market development proxies. In order to test the robustness of the results, three proxies of stock market development have been used, namely stock market capitalization, stock market traded value and stock market turnover – against the ratio of bank credit to the private sector, a proxy for bank-based financial development. The economic growth is, however, proxied by real GDP per capita. Using the ARDL-Bounds testing procedure, the study finds that the complementarity between stock market development and bank-based financial development is weak and sensitive to the proxy used to measure stock market development.     

Do Survey Probabilities Match Financial Market Beliefs?

This article considers whether survey respondents' views regarding the likelihood of stock index returns exceeding specific thresholds are comparable to market views indicated by index options with strikes at analogous thresholds. It is motivated by the observation that the wording used to elicit subjective beliefs in surveys about expected future returns resembles the question a purchaser of a call option might ask. Building on this association, the authors document a similarity between the views of survey respondents and those of financial market participants as measured through call options, although the association is not 1-for-1. They find a closer association for those demonstrating a better understanding of the laws of probability, suggesting that numeracy affects the accuracy of an elicited response.     

Why Crisis Continue?——The Endogenous Reason of Financial Crisis and Evolution to the Debt Crisis and the Enlightenment

当前欧债危机越演越烈,需要重新思考金融危机爆发并且演化为主权债务危机的内生性根源.此次金融危机中,资本主义社会的基本矛盾是危机发生的制度性根源.这一矛盾外化为“相对过剩”.经济机制层面,新自由主义影响下的自由市场经济体制放大了市场经济固有的缺陷,为危机的爆发积累了机制性原因.微观市场层面,缺乏金融监管、不当的房地产和货币政策则是诱发危机的直接原因.高赤字和高负债的背景下,一些国内经济和社会矛盾突出的国家发生主权债务危机是金融危机深化的必然结果.处理好自由市场经济和规制市场经济、金融创新和金融监管、实体经济和虚拟经济的关系以及地方债务问题是此次金融和债务危机给我国的最大启示.     

保险监管的经济学动因——保险市场失灵及其表现

政府对保险业实施监督管理有其经济学动因。后危机时代,保险监管呈现出了全球性的特征。从国际宏观角度进行保险监管的微观经济基础的探讨,必将有利于我国保险监管事业的迅速稳固发展。公共利益监管理论认为,政府监管的存在是为了修正低效率或不公正的市场行为。本文根据经济学的框架,探讨了政府与市场的关系,分析了目前我国保险市场上存在的四种市场失灵的表现,即市场支配力、外部性、公共物品和信息不对称问题,从而阐释了保险监管存在的经济学动因,认为合理的政府干预对于维护市场机制正常运行、及时纠正市场缺陷、防范各类风险是十分必要的。     

Financial Development and Economic Growth: The Tunisian Experience

The aim of this paper is to investigate empirically the question of whether financial development leads to economic growth in a small, developing country like Tunisia. The paper focuses on the causal link between finance and economic growth in order to discriminate between several alternative theoretical hypotheses. The results suggest the existence of a stable long-run relationship between the development of the financial sector and the evolution of per capita real output that is consistent with the view that financial development can be an engine of growth in this country.     

金融创新与金融风险的“孪生性”辩证

金融是现代经济的核心。金融创新是金融市场的＂催化剂＂,它＂催生＂了各个子市场的形成和发展,不断推动金融市场的完善与成熟。在当前国际金融危机的大背景下,文章以金融衍生工具为＂链条＂,分析了金融工程学、金融创新和金融风险之间的逻辑关系：金融工程学是＂载体＂,金融创新是表现形式,金融风险是一种另类的潜含结果。同时,详细探讨了金融创新和金融风险之间的辩证关系：三者都是金融市场存在和发展的产物。澄清金融创新与金融风险之间内在的市场联系,对建立与我国经济发展相适应的成熟的金融市场具有重要的指导意义。     

国际石油价格冲击研究综述

国际石油价格剧烈波动对2007年世界金融危机爆发起到了推波助澜的作用,并直接影响当前全球经济复苏进程。本文从石油价格及其形成机制、石油价格冲击对实体经济和金融市场的影响以及应对策略等多个方面对石油价格冲击研究文献进行梳理。已有文献多以发达国家为研究对象,在当前全球经济复苏的背景下,结合当前国际石油市场状况与我国国情,提出有价值的研究方向,这是本文拟达到的目的。     

论民营银行市场准入压抑问题

在经济转轨时期,我国金融领域存在着明显的民营银行市场准入压抑问题。民营银行市场准入压抑的形成机理在于:决策层顾虑发展民营银行会削弱国家对金融资源的控制,降低金融宏观调控效果,影响国有企业改革等。然而,随着经济和金融环境的变化,尤其是民营经济的快速发展,民营银行市场准入压抑催生的金融问题日益凸现。在国家综合经济实力的增强,金融调控和监管机制的不断完善的条件下,逐步解除民营银行市场准入压抑,应成为深化金融体制改革的理性选择。     

Regulatory Institutions And Structures

This article presents a legal perspective on regulatory institutions, procedures and processes. Analysis of legal instruments examines justifications for regulatory interventions, and considers the inadequacies of private law remedies to instances of market failure (such as monopolies, inadequate or asymmetric information, externalities and co–ordination problems). A distinction is drawn between social and economic regulation: the former deals with such matters as health and safety, and environmental and consumer protection; and the latter is needed where there is insufficient competition. Instruments of social regulation include prior approval, mandatory standards and information disclosure. A range of instruments of economic regulation is also assessed, including competition law, public ownership, price and quality regulation, and competitive public franchising. Analysis of regulatory processes focuses on regulatory rule–making, delegated regulation and self–regulation. Particular weight is given to different forms of accountability—financial, procedural and substantive—which draws attention to the significance of the public interest dimension of regulatory systems.