Macroeconomic Seasonality and the January Effect

Many financial markets researchers have sought an explanation for the role of January in stock returns. Any explanation of this phenomenon that is consistent with rational pricing must specify a source of seasonality in expected returns. The pervasive seasonality in the macroeconomy is an appealing possibility. A multifactor model that links macroeconomic risk to expected return is found to show substantial seasonality in expected returns. This model accounts for the seasonality in average returns, while the capital asset pricing model cannot.     

Volatile capital flows and economic growth: The role of banking supervision

In this paper, we examine the links among banking supervision, the volatility of financial flows, and economic growth. In particular, we explore whether banking regulation mitigates the adverse effects of capital flows volatility on economic growth. Using cross-country data over four decades, we find that banking supervision promotes economic growth by dampening the negative impact of volatile capital flows. The findings hold for both aggregate capital flows and its various components, and for both its net and gross counterparts, while they are also robust for various indicators of regulatory policies. The results support the argument that bank regulatory policy rules designed to ensure financial stability are beneficial to long-run economic growth.     

Debt-overhang banking crises: Detecting and preventing systemic risk

This paper shows how the debt-overhang distortion on bank lending can generate a self-fulfilling-expectations banking crisis accompanied by a plunge in the value of banks’ assets and a contraction of bank lending and economic activity. Moral hazard in banking adds an additional channel that can generate multiple equilibria, worsen the debt-overhang distortion, and deepen the crisis. Some signals of systemic risk include: high volatility and the presence of two modes in the probability distribution functions of the returns on bank-issued bonds and on portfolios of bank-issued bonds and equities; and high correlation between the returns on bank-issued bonds. Macroprudential regulation should discourage the exposure of banks to the economic and financial cycle by raising the capital requirements for banks with more cyclical assets.     

中国国有商业银行激励机制:一个新的非线性激励契约

我国传统的银行管理人激励方法是根据银行最终实现的收益决定对管理人的奖励,一般是线性的。本文通过对这种线性激励契约的剖析,发现由于银行管理人的有限责任以及企业软约束的存在,银行的预期收益与风险水平呈倒U字的二次关系,因此线性激励契约只会使管理人过度冒险,而无益于银行的预期收益。因此,本文构建了修正的资本资产定价模型,并在此基础上提出了一个新的非线性激励契约:对管理人的奖励计划不再是连续的,而是提供一个有限的奖励范围以避免银行管理人的过度冒险;只有当银行管理人选择的风险水平不超过最优风险水平时,他才可以拿到与其努力水平相等的奖金。     

银行业改革、市场化与信贷资源的配置

鉴于我国资本市场弱法律风险和股权高度集中的基本特征,本文提出了一个分析我国银行信贷业务预期违约风险的基本框架。以此为基础,本文考察了我国的银行业改革以及市场化进程对银行信贷资源配置行为的影响。研究发现,银行配置信贷资源时,会认真考虑贷款企业的历史财务绩效和代理成本。并且,银行业改革和地区市场化进程都成功促进了银行信贷资源配置行为的商业化。本文的研究为评价银行业改革的历史进程提供了经验证据,也为进一步的努力方向提供了一些有益的线索。一方面,银行在配置其信贷资源时不仅要进一步关注贷款企业的财务绩效;另一方面,也应当致力于促使银行在确立必要报酬率时进一步关注贷款企业的代理成本。     

Determinants of risk in the banking sector during the European Financial Crisis

Risk assessment in the banking sector has been a prominent topic in the banking literature and has gained attention especially since the recent financial crises. In particular, the European crisis, which was the first since the formation of the Eurozone, underlined a number of significant problems and increased concerns on the tail or crash risk of banks. In the present study, we seek to examine whether information asymmetry, the importance of banks in the financial system and systemic risk play significant roles in the evolution of stock crashes in the banking sector. Information asymmetry is proxied by opacity, the importance of a bank in a financial network is proxied by network centrality, and systemic risk is proxied by clustering. The research framework considers a number of regulatory, reporting and financial market factors that have also been determined to relate to stock crashes and shows that all of the above factors are related to (idiosyncratic) stock crash risk under specific conditions.     

The impact of opacity on bank valuation during the global financial crisis: A channel analysis

Prior literature suggests that opacity in the banking industry is mainly caused by a lack of informativeness in the assessment of the quality of bank assets. Examining a sample of bank holding companies in the United States, we find that there is a negative relationship between opacity and bank valuation during the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. We further attempt to identify two potential channels through which opacity negatively affects bank valuation during the financial crisis: a cash flow channel and an expected return channel. We show that one channel flows from bank profitability, measured by return on equity and return on assets, confirming a cash flow channel, whereas an expected return channel, proxied by the implied cost of capital, only works for small banks. Overall, this study sheds light on the relationship between in-transparency and bank value discount during a global recession.     

Moral Hazard,Dividends, and Risk in Banks

In non‐financial firms, higher risk taking results in lower dividend payout ratios. In banking, public guarantees may result in a positive relationship between dividend payout ratios and risk taking. I investigate the interplay between dividend payout ratios and bank risk‐taking allowing for the effect of charter values and capital adequacy regulation. I find a positive relationship between bank risk‐taking and dividend payout ratios. Proximity to the required capital ratio and a high charter value reduce the impact of bank risk‐taking on the dividend payout ratio. My results are robust to different proxies for the dividend payout ratio and bank risk‐taking.     

Emerging themes in banking: Recent literature and directions for future research

This paper presents a review of the recent banking literature centred on the core themes of performance, risk and governance of financial institutions. We write this review against the backdrop of the recent financial crisis and the major changes it caused to banking sectors in many countries. Several themes emerge, but the overarching issue relates to the need to better understand bank risk-taking incentives and the implications for systemic stability. Specifically, there is a need for more work on: the role of safety net subsidies and how these relate to systemic risk; financial innovation and the adoption of new products and processes; and how innovative behaviour links to risk-taking, market returns and contagion. Future research could also be directed to provide a better understanding of the inter-connections between competition, capital, profitability, liquidity and risk.     

Asset Pricing with a Bank Risk Factor

This paper studies how the state of the banking sector influences stock returns of nonfinancial firms. We consider a two‐factor pricing model, where the first factor is the traditional market excess return and the second factor is the change in the average distance to default of commercial banks. We find that this bank factor is priced in the cross section of U.S. nonfinancial firms. Controlling for market beta, the expected excess return for a stock in the top quintile of bank risk exposure is on average 2.83% higher than for a stock in the bottom quintile.     

Industry‐Specific Human Capital,Idiosyncratic Risk,and the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns

Human capital is one of the largest assets in the economy and in theory may play an important role for asset pricing. Human capital is heterogeneous across investors. One source of heterogeneity is industry affiliation. I show that the cross‐section of expected stock returns is primarily affected by industry‐level rather than aggregate labor income risk. Furthermore, when human capital is excluded from the asset pricing model, the resulting idiosyncratic risk may appear to be priced. I find that the premium for idiosyncratic risk documented by several empirical studies depends on the covariance between stock and human capital returns.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

Banking industry volatility and economic growth

Utilizing the recent dynamic panel GMM estimation techniques for 36 markets, this research investigates the relationship between banking industry volatility and future economic growth, and provides empirical evidence complementary to Cole et al. (2008) who examine the finance-growth nexus from a unique asset pricing theory perspective and document a positive relationship between bank stock returns and future economic growth that is significantly influenced by a series of country-specific and banking institutional characteristics. We find that the negative link between banking industry volatility and future economic growth is significantly affected by government ownership of banks, the enforcement of the insider trading law, systemic banking crises, and bank accounting disclosure standards, while the impact of financial development is ambiguous. The significant results are primarily driven by the data from emerging markets.     

The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison

This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.     

Financial markets development,business cycles,and bank risk in South America

In this paper, we examine whether banking crises or business cycles affect the influence of financial markets development on bank risk in a sample of 37 publicly listed commercial banks in seven South American countries over a 22-year period between 1991 and 2012. Banking crises in this region offer a natural setting in which the impact of financial markets development on bank risk is examined. We find that financial markets development improves banks’ capitalization ratio and reduces their exposure to non-traditional banking activities, suggesting that financial markets development on average reduces bank risk. In addition, banking crises and business cycles appear to moderate the impact of financial markets development on bank risk. In the aftermath of banking crises, banks appear to concentrate more on their core traditional banking activities.     

Capital flows and the risk-taking channel of monetary policy

Adjustments in bank leverage act as the linchpin in the monetary transmission mechanism that works through fluctuations in risk-taking. In the international context, we find evidence of monetary policy spillovers on cross-border bank capital flows and the US dollar exchange rate through the banking sector. A contractionary shock to US monetary policy leads to a decrease in cross-border banking capital flows and a decline in the leverage of international banks. Such a decrease in bank capital flows is associated with an appreciation of the US dollar.     

The financial distress pricing puzzle in banking firms

This paper examines whether the financial distress pricing puzzle observed for non-financial firms is also observed for financial firms and how this puzzle differs according to the extent of short-sale constraints. By using the eight distress measures developed for financial firms, we find that there is a strong negative relation in the cross-section between financial distress and subsequent bank stock returns, regardless of adjustment for risk. However, this distress pricing puzzle is statistically significant only for high short-sale constrained banks, but not for low short-sale constrained banks. Thus, short-sale constraints are at least one non-risk attribute that causes the distress pricing puzzle for financial firms. We also find that despite its simple form, compared to the other complex distress measures, non-performing loans (NPLs) are the most informative in predicting future bank stock returns as well as bankruptcy and failure.     

Bank Earnings Management and Tail Risk during the Financial Crisis

We show that a pattern of earnings management in bank financial statements has little bearing on downside risk during quiet periods, but seems to have a big impact during a financial crisis. Banks demonstrating more aggressive earnings management prior to 2007 exhibit substantially higher stock market risk once the financial crisis begins as measured by the incidence of large weekly stock price “crashes” as well as by the pattern of full‐year returns. Stock price crashes also predict future deterioration in operating performance. Bank regulators may therefore interpret them as early warning signs of impending problems.     

Diversification of the Banking Firm

Diversification of banks and bank holding companies into nonbank product lines may reduce the risk to banking returns or cash flows provided appropriate portfolio conditions are satisfied. This study of bank and nonbank financial-service firms and nonfinancial corporations over the 1966–1985 period finds evidence consistent with the proposition that individual banking firm risk may be reduced through selected product-line diversification, particularly in the insurance and data processing fields. Moreover, there is evidence of less cash-flow sensitivity of selected nonbank product lines to exogenous economic and financial-market variables compared to banking firms. While public policy continues to insulate banking firms from most nonbank product and service lines, the potential benefits of risk reduction suggest that a careful review of current policy is needed.     

Financial Innovation,Basel Accord III,and Bank Value

I examine how financial innovation and Basel III capital requirements in Taiwan respond differently to banking crises and market competition. My panel data set comprises data from thirty-four banks for 2000-2012. I find a significant negative relationship between derivatives and the value of a bank and significant positive relationships among the capital adequacy ratio, bank-specific variables, and the value of a bank. Larger bank size and operational diversification tend to be positively associated with a bank's value, the holding of a relatively high amount of capital requirements, and nonperforming loans that are large. The latter result may simply reflect the scale of economy and improvement of efficiency in terms of financial innovation in the banking sector.