The Relevance of Stock and Flow-Based Reporting Information In Assessing the Likelihood of Emergence from Corporate Financial Distress

A number of recent studies have shown that earnings information is less useful and value relevant when firms are financially troubled. This finding has given rise to the consideration of alternatives. In this paper, we examine the contributions of book value-based proxies (normal earnings and abandonment value) and flow-based proxies (earnings and operating accruals) to the assessment of the likelihood of emergence from financial distress. Our prior reasoning is that while book value-based proxies may provide information about potential future cash resources, flow-based proxies, because they capture the progress of reorganization efforts underway, as opposed to mere potential, should be relatively more useful in assessing the likelihood of emergence from distress. Our findings are consistent with this explanation. We document that the primary predictors of emergence are flow-based proxies—in particular, cash from operations, net of earnings.     

A Note on Selecting a Response Measure for Financial Distress

Since 1966, researchers have examined financial distress prediction models to determine the usefulness of accounting information to lenders. These researchers primarily used legal bankruptcy as the response variable for economic financial distress, or included legal bankruptcy with other events in dichotomous prediction models. However, theoretical models of financial distress normally define financial distress as an economic event, the inability to pay debts when due (insolvency). This study uses a loan default/accommodation response variable as a proxy for the inability to pay debts when due. The purpose of this note is to empirically test whether or not using the inability of a firm to pay debts when due, loan default/accommodation, as a response measure produces different results than using legal bankruptcy as the response measure. The study's empirical results show that legal bankruptcy and loan default/accommodation financial distress prediction models produce different statistical results, thus suggesting that the responses measure different constructs. A loan default/accommodation model also fits the data better than a bankrupt model. Our results suggest that a loan default/accommodation response may be a more appropriate measure to determine which accounting information is most useful to lenders in evaluating a firm's credit risk.     

Employee Relations and the Likelihood of Occurrence of Corporate Financial Distress

Abstract:   In this paper, we investigate the association of employee relations with the occurrence of onset of financial distress. We argue that if adverse economic conditions arise, firms that have maintained good employee relations will be more effective in obtaining temporary labor concessions. As a result, firms with good employee relations, to the extent they are dependent on labor in the conduct of business operations, should be more likely to avoid the onset of future financial distress. The empirical findings we document support this prior.     

The Relationship between Changes in Fixed Plant Investment and the Likelihood of Emergence from Corporate Financial Distress

Companies experiencing financial distress can attempt to mitigate financial distress through changing the investment in the fixed asset base. Management may choose to expand the asset base in hopes of increasing sales. Alternatively, management may choose to contract the asset base in order to eliminate and/or reduce investment in unprofitable or risky ventures, improve liquidity, reduce earnings volatility, and reduce the need for operating capital.In this study, we examined how observed changes in the investment base affect the likelihood of emergence from a financially distressed condition. We find that, when management chooses to contract the investment in property, plant, and equipment, the likelihood of emergence from financial distress is significantly improved. On the other hand, when management chooses to expand property, plant, and equipment in the face of distress, the distress is only intensified. Our explanation is that companies that choose to contract their fixed asset base in times of trouble are taking steps that will most likely improve their financial condition—they are less likely to need working capital, and can better tolerate increased levels of long-term debt. Conversely, increasing the fixed asset base amplifies the need for working capital, and borrowing money to facilitate the expansion simply increases the necessary uses of that working capital because the debt must be serviced. As a result, companies descend even deeper into financial distress and decrease the likelihood that they will emerge therefrom.     

An Analysis of the Underreported Magnitude of the Total Indirect Costs of Financial Distress

In this paper we examine 1,041 ongoing firms over the time period 1982–92. Using quarterly data for the detection and measurement of the magnitude of the indirect costs of financial distress, we find three important explanatory factors: (a) the distinctiveness of the pattern of increasing financial distress over time, (b) the degree of leverage in the capital structure and (c) the size of the firm. For those firms with a distinctive pattern of increasing financial distress over time, the average annual losses as a percentage of market value is –10.3%. The maximum loss is –76%. Even if the firm never fails, its market value can be severely impacted by the presence of the indirect costs of bankruptcy over time. This study finds a significantly positive relationship between Altman's Z-score and the firm capital investment growth rate. This relation holds after controlling for other variables such as leverage, firm size and market/book ratio. This implies that lost investment opportunities may be also an important part of the total indirect costs of financial distress, which appear now to be much larger than previously recorded.     

Financial distress,outside directors and corporate tax aggressiveness spanning the global financial crisis: An empirical analysis

We examine financial distress and tax aggressiveness spanning the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2008 and the impact of the interaction between board independence and firm-specific financial distress on tax aggressiveness. Our regression results show that both financial distress and the GFC are positively associated with tax aggressiveness. More importantly, we find that the positive association between financial distress and tax aggressiveness is magnified by the GFC. We also observe that the interaction between board independence and financial distress is positively associated with tax aggressiveness. Our results are robust to multiple measures of financial distress and tax aggressiveness.     

Valuing Debt in a Complex Capital Structure

This article extends previous bond valuation models to account for more realistic assumptions regarding financial distress. Realized value of an individual bond under severe financial distress will reflect the expected outcome of credit-event negotiations and the relative priority listing of the security. We explicitly represent the probability rate of credit-event occurrence as a function of firm value relative to the fixed overall debt obligations of the firm. Risk premiums generated under reasonable parameter value choices fall within the range of observed bond risk premiums. Our model also provides an explanation as to why observed bond risk premia are positive after adjustment for default.     

国有产权、政府干预与财务困境成本

本文以2000～2006年发生财务困境的480个观测数据为样本,检验国有产权与政府干预如何影响财务困境成本。我们以经行业中位数调整后的正常期间资产报酬率与困境期间资产报酬率的差额度量财务困境成本,检验发现:地区政府干预程度越高,公司财务困境成本越低;在政府干预程度较高的地区,国有公司的财务困境成本显著更低;但在政府干预程度较低的地区,国有产权对财务困境成本无显著影响。     

The Determinants of Foreign Currency Hedging: Does Foreign Currency Debt Induce a Bias?

In this paper we use UK data to present strong empirical evidence that explains the mixed results in previous studies with respect to the effect of financial distress on the demand for corporate hedging. We build on recent studies that have identified a strong link between foreign currency (FC) debt use and leverage. Given this relationship, we show that using leverage variables as proxies for financial distress and the failure to distinguish between FC debt users and non‐users causes misleading inference. More specifically, when we partition our sample of FC hedgers into firms that use and do not use foreign debt, we show that leverage variables are significantly related to the FC hedging decision for firms that use FC debt either in isolation or in combination with FC derivatives but not for firms that only use FC derivatives. This suggests that FC debt users are influencing these results. However, we also find that other financial distress cost proxies with no obvious link to FC debt use are significant determinants in the corporate demand for FC hedging, including derivatives use.     

Analysts’ earnings forecasts: coexistence and dynamics of overconfidence and strategic incentives

This paper formulates a two-stage model to capture the decision process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. Our model extends the model of Chen and Jiang [(2005). Analysts’ weighting of private and public information. Review of Financial Studies, 19 (1), 319–355], by allowing for a distortion of forecasts independent of whether an analyst has private information. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we provide empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives. Financial analysts overweight their private information and at the same time strategically inflate their forecast.     

Predicting Corporate Financial Distress: A Time-Series CUSUM Methodology

The ability to predict corporate financial distress can be strengthened using models that account for serial correlation in the data, incorporate information from more than one period and include stationary explanatory variables. This paper develops a stationary financial distress model for AMEX and NYSE manufacturing and retailing firms based on the statistical methodology of time-series Cumulative Sums (CUSUM). The model has the ability to distinguish between changes in the financial variables of a firm that are the result of serial correlation and changes that are the result of permanent shifts in the mean structure of the variables due to financial distress. Tests performed show that the model is robust over time and outperforms similar models based on the popular statistical methods of Linear Discriminant Analysis and Logit.     

Investments,Credit, and Corporate Financial Distress: Evidence from Central and Eastern Europe

Although they are instrumental for economic development, productivity-enhancing corporate investments may increase the financial vulnerability of companies, especially in an economic and financial crisis. We employ an instrumental probit model with the aim of finding evidence for the investment and credit patterns that led companies into financial distress during the global financial crisis 2009–2010. The company-level micro-data for our study on three Central and East European countries—Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and two Baltic countries, Latvia and Lithuania—originates from two independent surveys, the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey conducted in 2008 and the Financial Crisis Survey conducted in 2009/2010. Both were carried out jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank. Our results emphasize a substantial adverse impact from investment intensity and debt financing on company financial soundness during a crisis. On top of that, we discover a strong non-linear pattern in the sensitivity of company distress to its investment-financing nexus.     

Why and How UK Firms Hedge

This paper attempts to differentiate among the theories of hedging by using disclosures in the annual reports of 400 UK companies and data collected via a survey. I find, unlike many previous US studies, strong evidence linking the decision to hedge and the expected costs of financial distress. The tests show that this is mainly because my definition of hedging includes all hedgers and not just derivative users. However, when the tests employ the same hedging definition as previous US studies, financial distress cost factors still appear to be more important for this sample than samples of US firms. Therefore, a secondary explanation for the strong financial distress results might be due to differences in the bankruptcy codes in the two countries, which result in higher expected costs of financial distress for UK firms. The paper also examines the determinants of the choice of hedging method distinguishing between non‐derivative and derivatives hedging. My evidence shows that larger firms, firms with more cash, firms with a greater probability of financial distress, firms with exports or imports and firms with more short‐term debt are more likely to hedge with derivatives. Thus, differences in opportunities, in incentives for reducing risk and in the types of financial price exposure play an important role in how firms hedge their risks.     

Asset Liquidity,Moral Hazard,and Bank Loan Rescheduling

We analyze the bank's decision to reschedule or to foreclose on a loan in default and the borrower's decision to divert lender-financed assets to personal use, i.e., to consume the assets. We show that the debt of borrowers in financial distress that have substantial intangible or highly specialized assets—i.e., illiquid assets—is likely to be rescheduled. Alternatively, banks will likely foreclose on borrowers in distress that have assets that are difficult to monitor. It is the interaction of the asset's liquidity and the borrower moral hazard that helps determine the nature of the equilibrium. When the condition of the borrower upon default is observable, we find that suboptimal foreclosures are possible but reschedulings are always optimal; when the borrower's condition is private information, however, reschedulings may also be suboptimal. Additionally, borrowers whose lenders foreclose are more impaired then those whose debt is rescheduled. Finally, we show that randomization of the rescheduling/foreclosure decision by the bank and the decision to consume by the borrower may be optimal for particular assets.     

Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

Equity issues when in distress

We investigate the role of financial distress in the seasoned equity market. We find that distressed firms comprise about 40% of SEOs and these distressed issuers have worse abnormal announcement returns than non‐distressed issuers. Stock return volatility is an important determinant for announcement returns for non‐distressed SEO issuers but not for distressed SEO issuers. Signals of firm quality are associated with better announcement returns, larger issues, increased investment, improved operating performance, and lower likelihood of delisting for distressed SEO firms as compared to non‐distressed firms. Our findings suggest equity finance is valuable for financially distressed firms with strong growth prospects.     

董事高管责任保险与企业财务困境风险——基于A股上市公司的经验证据

以2006-2015年A股上市公司为样本,检验董事高管责任保险对企业财务困境风险的影响及其作用机制。研究发现：购买董事高管责任保险有助于降低企业的财务困境风险,保险公司的监督作用是企业财务困境风险降低的主要原因;高质量的内部控制或较多的分析师跟踪能减弱董事高管责任保险对企业财务困境风险的治理效用;产权性质则未产生显著的影响。     

基于CFaR模型与Logistic回归的财务困境预警研究

从现金流风险角度出发,对企业财务困境进行预警研究：首先构建一个基于企业内部环境、宏观经济政策、货币政策及财政政策等因素的CFaR模型,识别出期望现金流及风险现金流;然后以这两个指标作为预警变量,构建一个二元Logistic财务困境预警模型;最后选取27家中国证券市场中代表陷入财务困境的ST公司及配对的财务良好的非ST公司作为样本进行实证研究。结果表明,所构建的CFaR模型能较好地度量两类上市公司的现金流状况,且两类公司的期望现金流和风险现金流水平存在显著的差异;二元Logistic预警模型能较好地实现对上市公司财务风险的预警,对两类公司的预警正确率分别达到85.2%和81.5%。     

Excess corporate payouts and financial distress risk

Firms that follow excessive payout policies (over-payers) are higher on the financial distress spectrum and have lower survival rates than under-payers. In addition, over-payers endure lower future sales and asset growth than under-payers and experience negative abnormal returns in the bond and stock markets. Exogenous import tariff reductions and commodity price jumps reduce the likelihood of overpayment. We interpret this as evidence consistent with financial flexibility considerations, rather than risk-shifting, explaining the decision to overpay. We also find that CEO overconfidence and catering incentives affect overpayment.     

Corporate Sell‐offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds,Financial Distress and Long‐run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

This study examines the long‐run return performance following UK corporate sell‐off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell‐off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long‐run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell‐offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth.