Executive succession: The importance of social capital in CEO appointments

Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions.     

That special someone: When the board views its chair as a resource

Research summary: Many boards view their chairs as valuable resources. We predict that whether a board adopts such a view depends on the board chair's human and social capital. Data from S&P 500 firms suggest that while a board chair's human capital increases the probability that the board views him or her as a resource, social capital has no overall effect. In a post‐hoc investigation, however, we find the board chair's independence to be an important boundary condition for the effect of social capital. With this exploratory research, we aim to spur research devoted specifically to board chairs. Such research will become increasingly important over time as firms continue to separate their CEO and board chair positions. Managerial summary: The purpose of this research was to determine the factors that lead a board of directors to view its chair as a valuable resource. We expected that board chairs with high human and social capital would be more likely to be viewed as a resource by their colleagues. Surprisingly, only human capital exhibited such an effect overall. Social capital increases the likelihood a chair is viewed as a resource when the chair is independent, but actually decreases the likelihood a chair is viewed as a resource when the chair is either the current or former CEO. These results suggest that boards generally value human capital in their chairs, but view social capital through a somewhat more complex lens. We explore the possible implications of these findings in the article. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of board human and social capital on investor reactions to new CEO selection

This study extends work on independent directors to examine the influence of their human capital and social capital on investor reactions to the board's CEO selection decision. We predict that human capital, as represented by the board's CEO experience and industry experience, and social capital, as represented by directors' co‐working experience on the board and external directorship ties to other corporate boards, will influence the stock market reactions to new CEO appointments. In a sample of 208 new CEO appointment events in U.S. manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2003, we found that the stock market reacted favorably to the appointments made by boards with higher levels of human and social capital. We also found that the effect of internal social capital was stronger when the new CEO was an insider rather than an outsider. The implications of the results for director selection and CEO succession are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board social capital and excess CEO returns

Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressures—corporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards conform to such normative pressures for controlling excess CEO returns is affected by their external and internal social capital. Further, we substantiate our arguments by showing that powerful CEOs and institutional investors may facilitate or constrain the normative pressures existing in the social network and alter the effects of board social capital on excess CEO returns. Data from a sample of U.S. corporations listed on the Standard and Poor's 1,500 index from 1999 to 2010 largely support our framework. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Upper‐echelon executive human capital and compensation: Generalist vs specialist skills

This study extends current knowledge of upper echelon executive compensation beyond the CEO, specifically CFO compensation, based on whether they possess generalist or specialist skills. We find that “strategic” CFOs with an elite MBA (generalist) consistently command a compensation premium, while “accounting” CFOs (specialist) and CFOs with a non‐MBA master's degree, even from an elite institution, do not. Further, scarce “strategic” CFOs are awarded both higher salaries and higher equity‐based compensation. Our findings support the view that unique complementarities between scarce CFOs and firms increase these executives' bargaining power leading to pay premium. Our results are robust to post‐hiring years, firm sizes, board characteristics, and CFO's insider/outsider status. We contribute at the confluence of upper‐echelon compensation, executive human capital, resource‐based view, and assortative matching literatures. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Settling up in CEO compensation: The impact of divestiture intensity and contextual factors in refocusing firms

We examine the relationship between strategic change and CEO compensation by studying how a firm's refocusing program influences CEO compensation after completing the change. We contribute to the ‘settling up’ literature by arguing that strategic change is often uncertain for both the CEO and the board of directors responsible for executive compensation. As such the firm is likely to settle up with the CEO by paying for compensation risk and effort undertaken during refocusing after the extent and impact of strategic change are better known. We find that refocusing intensity is positively related to post‐refocusing CEO total compensation, suggesting that ‘settling up’ through post hoc compensation is an important factor in strategic change. We also find that prior firm performance, governance structure and industry dynamism are important moderators of this relationship. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does board social capital influence chief executive officers' investment decisions in research and development?

The findings of the chief executive officer (CEO) characteristics–research and development (R&D) investment relationship remain incomplete if previous unexamined contingencies are not considered. Very few studies in this area have invariably focused on the constraints from the external environment and overlooked the important influence of board social capital on such relationship. This study uses insights from resource dependence theory to examine how the effects of CEO characteristics on R&D investment are contingent on board social capital. The results show that board social capital mitigates/enhances the negative/positive effect of CEO tenure/CEO educational level on R&D investment, supporting the view that board social capital, as an important conduit to link firms to critical information and essential resources in the environment, may offer better counsel to CEOs and enhance their decision‐making capabilities in moving toward R&D. One important implication is that firms wishing to encourage innovation through R&D spending should consider nominating directors with rich social capital to the board because they may assist CEOs in coping with R&D complexities and acquiring requisite resources, leading to a better planning of R&D.     

When the former ceo stays on as board chair: effects on successor discretion,strategic change,and performance

Prior research on CEO succession has omitted consideration of a critical institutional reality: some exiting CEOs do not fully depart the scene but instead remain as board chairs. We posit that predecessor retention restricts a successor's discretion, thus dampening his or her ability to make strategic changes or deliver performance that deviates from pre‐succession levels. In short, a predecessor's continuing presence suppresses a new CEO's influence. Based on analysis of 181 successions in high technology firms, and with extensive controls (for circumstances associated with succession, the firm's need and capacity for change, and for endogeneity), we find substantial support for our hypotheses. In supplementary analyses, we find that retention has a more pronounced effect in preventing a new CEO from making big performance gains than in preventing big drops. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Positive and negative synergies between the CEO's and the corporate board's human and social capital: A study of biotechnology firms

This paper contributes to the corporate governance literature by developing and testing theory regarding positive and negative synergies between the CEO's and the board's human and social capital. Using a sample of 360 biotechnology firms that went public between 1995 and 2010, we demonstrate that accumulated public company board experiences of the CEO and the board have positive synergistic effects on IPO performance whereas the current board appointments have negative effects. While scientific educational backgrounds have positive synergies, industry‐specific experiences produce either positive or counterproductive effects depending on the age and profitability of the firm. Thus, our paper contributes to the corporate governance and human and social capital literatures by describing the costs and benefits of specific types and combinations of CEO and board capital. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Foreign IPO capital market choice: Understanding the institutional fit of corporate governance

While product market choices have been central to strategy formulation for firms in the past, the integration of financial markets makes the choice of capital markets an equally important strategic decision. We advance a comparative institutional perspective to explain capital market choice by firms making an IPO in a foreign market. We find that internal governance characteristics (founder‐CEO, executive incentives, and board independence) and external network characteristics (prestigious underwriters, degree of venture capitalist syndication, and board interlocks) are significant predictors of foreign capital market choice by foreign IPO firms. Our results suggest foreign IPO firms select a host market where the firms' governance characteristics and third party affiliations fit the host market's institutional environment. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chief executive compensation: A study of the intersection of markets and political processes

A model of the determinants of chief executive (CEO) compensation is presented and tested. Based on a sample from the leisure industry, the study finds that CEO pay has complex links to several factors: firm size, complexity, performance, CEO power, board vigilance, and the CEO's human capital. The study includes a separate examination of CEO salary and bonus, as well as a test of pay determination across McEachern's (1975) ownership categories.     

董事会资本、高管薪酬激励与企业R&D投入——基于我国创业板上市公司的经验证据

董事会资本、高管激励契约与研发投入之间的关系一直是国内外学者研究的热点和焦点问题。论文基于资源依赖理论和委托代理理论的双重视角,以创业板上市公司为研究对象,采用两阶段最小二乘法,考察了董事会资本对研发投入的影响,以及高管薪酬激励对二者关系的调节作用。实证研究结果显示：（1）董事会资本宽度对企业的研发投入具有显著的正向影响;（2）董事会资本深度对企业的R&D投入具有显著的正向影响;（3）进一步分析发现,高管薪酬激励对董事会资本和研发投入之间的关系具有正向调节作用。     

Leveraging who you know by what you know: Specialization and returns to relational capital

Research Summary: This paper investigates the interaction effects of specialization and relational capital on performance. We distinguish between upstream and downstream relational capital and theorize that higher levels of specialization will buffer against decreases in upstream relational capital, because of deeper domain expertise and stronger downstream relational capital. Conversely, higher levels of generalization permit greater gains from increases in upstream relational capital, due to leverage across a more diversified downstream portfolio of activities. We test and find support for these hypotheses in the context of the US lobbying industry. Our study contributes to the strategic human capital literature by isolating the dimension of specialization and relational capital embodied within individuals and providing performance implications of the interactions. Managerial Summary: Both “what you know” and “whom you know” impacts performance. Generalists and specialists are different on the “what you know” dimension. On the “who you know” dimension, we distinguish between upstream (supplier) and downstream (client) relationships. We show that specialists are buffered by deeper downstream relations from performance declines when their powerful upstream connections lose power. Generalists benefit from broader networks when their upstream connections gain power. Thus, when the value of their relationships change, specialists and generalists should each assess when they can reap performance benefits, and when they need to bolster against adversities. For firms, our study suggests hiring the right mix of specialists and generalists is important to reduce risks from relational losses while enjoying the performance benefits from relational gains.     

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board.     

When will boards influence strategy? inclination × power = strategic change

While boards of directors are usually recognized as having the potential to affect strategic change in organizations, there is considerable debate as to whether such potential is typically realized. We seek to reconcile the debate on whether boards are typically passive vs. active players in the strategy realm by developing a model that specifies when boards are likely to influence organizational strategy and whether such an influence is likely to impel vs. impede change. Specifically, we develop arguments as to when certain demographic and processual features of boards imply a greater inclination for strategic change, when these features imply a greater preference for the status quo, and how differences in such inclinations will influence strategic change. We then also propose that a board's inclination for strategic change interacts with a board's power to affect change, generating a multiplicative effect on strategic change. These ideas are tested using survey and archival data from a national sample of over 3000 hospitals. The supportive findings suggest that strategic change is significantly affected by board demography and board processes, and that these governance effects manifest themselves most strongly in situations where boards are more powerful. We discuss these findings in terms of their relevance for theories of demography, agency, and power. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do board chairs matter? The influence of board chairs on firm performance

Research summary : We use a variance decomposition methodology to assess the degree to which board chairs may influence their companies' performance. To isolate the board chair effect, we focus on firms in which the CEO and board chair positions are separated. Using a U.S. sample of 6,290 firm‐year observations representing 1,828 board chairs in 308 different industries, our results indicate that the board chair effect is substantial at about nine percent. Drawing on resource dependency theory, we also theorize and show how this board chair effect is contingent on the task environment in which firms operate. Our results add to the literature examining the role and influence of board chairs and the context in which chairs may have a greater impact on performance. Managerial summary : Following institutional and regulatory changes, more firms are separating the CEO and board chair positions. With an increasing number of individuals separate from the CEO serving as board chairs, a critical question becomes: What influence do these separate board chairs have on firm performance? Prior research suggests that separate board chairs can provide important resources—including advice and counsel, legitimacy, information linkages, and preferential access to external commitments and support—to their CEOs, other top managers, and overall firms. In turn, who the board chair is and the individual's ability (or lack thereof) to provide these resources may have a significant impact on firm performance. Offering support for this perspective, we find that separate board chairs explain nine percent of the variance in firm performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The direct and indirect effects of core and peripheral social capital on organizational performance

Research summary : In this paper we adopt a core‐periphery approach to specify the direct and indirect effects of social capital on organizational performance. We suggest that social capital deriving from stable task relationships between organizational members has a direct positive effect on organizational performance. Said effect depends, in both strength and functional form, on whether actors involved in stable dyads are located at the core or at the periphery of the organization. We also argue that core and peripheral social capital affect performance indirectly by moderating the organization's ability to leverage its human capital to improve performance. Results from a 48‐year study of the National Basketball Association support our arguments and bear important implications for strategic human resource practices and organizational performance in competitive settings. Managerial summary : Stable work relationships among employees generate trust, more efficient work routines, common understanding and thus higher organizational performance. These benefits depend on the location of such stable relationships in the organization. Relational stability among core organizational members has an immediate, strong impact on performance, an effect that plateaus as stability grows. Stable relationships between core and peripheral members have instead a weaker, yet linear effect on performance. The location of stable relationships is also critical to leverage the talent of core employees, whose contribution to performance is stronger when relational stability is high in the organizational core, yet hindered by stable relations between core and periphery. Such findings provide relevant implications for strategic human resource management, in particular for choices regarding team composition and managing stars. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

What's all that (strategic) noise? anticipatory impression management in CEO succession

We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by simultaneously releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely when long‐term CEOs have a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well‐regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The presence of a separate COO/president and its impact on strategic change and CEO dismissal

This study focuses on the leadership structure at the very top of a firm. Specifically, it examines how the presence of a COO/president, who is separate from the CEO, affects strategic change and CEO dismissal. With longitudinal data on the tenures of 207 CEOs, results suggest that the presence of a separate COO/president increases the magnitude of strategic change under conditions of low firm performance but it decreases the magnitude of strategic change under conditions of high firm performance. In addition, the presence of a separate COO/president increases the likelihood of CEO dismissal under conditions of low firm performance, and this effect is stronger when the magnitude of strategic change is high; but it has no impact on the likelihood of CEO dismissal under conditions of high firm performance. These results suggest that the impact of the presence of a separate COO/president on strategic change and CEO dismissal varies across different organizational contexts. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do some outside successions fare better than others? The role of outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity

Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post‐succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide support for our theory. This study contributes to upper echelon theory and research by identifying outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity as an important aspect of their background that influences a range of major organizational outcomes, including CEO turnover, director turnover, and firm performance. Managerial summary: It is challenging to be a new CEO who comes from outside of the organization. Our study examines why some new outside CEOs fare better than others. We suggest that a positive relationship with the board of directors is a key factor in a new outside CEO's success. A new outside CEO can better manage the relationship with the board if he or she has prior experience working with other demographically diverse boards. In contrast, when the focal board is more diverse than the other boards on which the new CEO previously served, the new CEO tends to struggle in managing his or her relationship with the board, experiencing a higher likelihood of turnover and delivering worse financial performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.