Corporate Governance and Financial Peer Effects

Growing evidence suggests that managers select financial policies partially by mimicking policies of peer firms. We find that these peer effects in capital structure choice are unique to firms operating under weak external corporate governance. Cross-sectional tests suggest that this finding is best explained by a quiet life hypothesis in which managers may be able to avoid the effort required to optimize financial policies and the scrutiny of market participants. Leverage ratios of mimicking firms display less sensitivity to a profitability shock. Finally, mimicking correlates to higher financing costs and lower future profitability, especially if it results in high leverage.     

Corporate Governance and Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Germany

Recent empirical work shows evidence for higher valuation of firms in countries with a better legal environment. We investigate whether differences in the quality of firm‐level corporate governance also help to explain firm performance in a cross‐section of companies within a single jurisdiction. Constructing a broad corporate governance rating (CGR) for German public firms, we document a positive relationship between governance practices and firm valuation. There is also evidence that expected stock returns are negatively correlated with firm‐level corporate governance, if dividend yields are used as proxies for the cost of capital. An investment strategy that bought high‐CGR firms and shorted low‐CGR firms earned abnormal returns of around 12% on an annual basis during the sample period.     

Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics

We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager–shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms’ equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low‐leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.     

The Effects of Public Venture Capital Investments on Corporate Governance: Evidence From IPO Firms in Emerging Markets

This study examines the impact of public venture capital (hereafter PVC) investments on corporate governance of initial public offering (hereafter IPO) firms in emerging markets. Using data collected from Taiwan PVC investments during 1996–2005, we analyse three corporate governance features in IPO firms: earnings management, board characteristics, and excess control by controlling shareholders. We find that PVC‐backed firms use fewer accounting accruals in their IPO financial statements than non‐PVC‐backed firms. This result suggests that PVC‐backed IPO firms engage in less earnings management than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. We also find PVC‐backed firms tend to set up their boards with fewer non‐independent directors and supervisors at IPO. This result indicates that PVC‐backed IPO firms have better board structures than non‐PVC‐backed IPO firms. Finally, we find that controlling shareholders are less likely to exert excess control in PVC‐backed firms than in non‐PVC‐backed firms. Overall, our results indicate that PVC investments add value to new IPO firms not only in financing their capital needs but also in creating better corporate governance structures in emerging markets.     

Shareholder governance, bondholder governance, and managerial risk-taking

We examine the relation between the overall corporate governance structure and managerial risk-taking behavior. We find that the overall governance structure has a significant impact on how managers make decisions on investment policy: strong bondholder governance motivates more low-risk investments such as capital expenditure and lower high-risk investments such as R&D expenditures, whereas weak shareholder governance (entrenched managers) leads to more R&D expenditures. Moreover, we find that the effects of governance on investment policy differ significantly between speculative and investment-grade firms. For speculative firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to more capital expenditures and low R&D investments. For investment-grade firms, strong bondholder or shareholder governance leads to low capital expenditures and an insignificant impact on R&D investments. Furthermore, financing and investment covenants exhibit strong binding power to deter risky investments. Finally, a more dependent (or a less independent) board is associated with low capital expenditures and high R&D investments.     

A Unified Theory of Tobin's q,Corporate Investment,Financing, and Risk Management

We propose a model of dynamic investment, financing, and risk management for financially constrained firms. The model highlights the central importance of the endogenous marginal value of liquidity (cash and credit line) for corporate decisions. Our three main results are: (1) investment depends on the ratio of marginal q to the marginal value of liquidity, and the relation between investment and marginal q changes with the marginal source of funding; (2) optimal external financing and payout are characterized by an endogenous double‐barrier policy for the firm's cash‐capital ratio; and (3) liquidity management and derivatives hedging are complementary risk management tools.     

Family Control and Financing Decisions

This study uses a comprehensive European dataset to investigate the role of family control in corporate financing decisions during the period 1998–2008. We find that family firms have a preference for debt financing, a non‐control‐diluting security, and are more reluctant than non‐family firms to raise capital through equity offerings. We also find that credit markets are prone to provide long‐term debt to family firms, indicating that they view their investment decisions as less risky. In fact, our empirical results demonstrate that family firms invest less than non‐family firms in high‐risk, research and development (R&D) projects, but not in low‐risk, fixed‐asset capital expenditure (CAPEX) projects, suggesting that fear of control loss in family firms deters risk‐taking. Overall, our findings reveal that the external financing (and investment) decisions of family firms are in greater (lesser) conflict with the interests of minority shareholders (bondholders).     

Corporate governance,institutions, markets,and social factors

We use a comprehensive set of country-level social and institutional measures to study the relationship between country-level factors and firm-level governance. We also examine the roles of the country’s financial development status and the firm’s external financing needs in influencing the firm’s governance framework. Using a sample of 43 countries and 3301 firms, we find that country-level factors explain a large part of the variation in firm-level governance across countries. We also find evidence that the relationship between country-level factors and firm-level mechanisms is best represented as a moderating relationship. The results also indicate the presence of a complementary relationship, albeit sometimes insignificant, between firm-level governance and all the country-level variables included in our study. When accounting for the effect of a country’s financial development status and a firm’s external financing needs, we find evidence of a positive relationship between firm-level governance and firm returns and value for firms with high financing needs which operate in countries with high financial development.     

The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage

We study the causal effects of analyst coverage on corporate investment and financing policies. We hypothesize that a decrease in analyst coverage increases information asymmetry and thus increases the cost of capital; as a result, firms decrease their investment and financing. We use broker closures and broker mergers to identify changes in analyst coverage that are exogenous to corporate policies. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach, we find that firms that lose an analyst decrease their investment and financing by 1.9% and 2.0% of total assets, respectively, compared to similar firms that do not lose an analyst.     

Short‐Term Debt as Bridge Financing: Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market

We analyze why firms use nonintermediated short‐term debt by studying the commercial paper (CP) market. Using a comprehensive database of CP issuers and issuance activity, we show that firms use CP to provide start‐up financing for capital investment. Firms’ CP issuance is driven by a desire to minimize transaction costs associated with raising capital for new investment. We show that firms with high rollover risk are less likely to enter the CP market, borrow less CP, and borrow more from bank credit lines. Further, CP is often refinanced with long‐term bond issuance to reduce rollover risk.     

The Real and Financial Implications of Corporate Hedging

We study the implications of hedging for corporate financing and investment. We do so using an extensive, hand‐collected data set on corporate hedging activities. Hedging can lower the odds of negative realizations, thereby reducing the expected costs of financial distress. In theory, this should ease a firm's access to credit. Using a tax‐based instrumental variable approach, we show that hedgers pay lower interest spreads and are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in their loan agreements. These favorable financing terms, in turn, allow hedgers to invest more. Our tests characterize two exact channels—cost of borrowing and investment restrictions—through which hedging affects corporate outcomes. The analysis shows that hedging has a first‐order effect on firm financing and investment, and provides new insights into how hedging affects corporate value. More broadly, our study contributes novel evidence on the real consequences of financial contracting.     

The Real Effects of Financial Sector Interventions during Crises

We assess the importance of supply‐side credit market frictions by studying the impact of bank recapitalization on firm growth in 50 countries during the recent crisis. Our identification strategy exploits the crisis as a shock to credit supply and combines an exogenous measure of firms’ dependence on external financing with policy interventions aimed at restoring bank capital. We find that the growth of financially dependent firms is disproportionately positively affected by bank recapitalization. This effect is quantitatively important and robust to controlling for other policies. These results provide new evidence of the influence of credit market frictions on economic activity.     

The Influence of a Credit Rating Change on Dividend and Investment Policy Interactions

We examine firms’ alterations in dividend and investment activities following credit rating changes. We find that downgraded firms reduce both dividends and investments more than no‐rating‐change firms. However, a silver lining of this doubly negative impact for shareholders is an increase in investment efficiency in firms that are most likely to overinvest. For upgraded firms, investments increase, but dividend outlays do not, compared to firms without rating changes. Our findings of asymmetric dividend stickiness and symmetric investment changes on a credit shock suggest that dividends and investments should not always be considered competing uses of funds.     

Real Estate Risk,Corporate Investment and Financing Choice

This paper empirically examines how real estate risk impacts corporate investment and financing decisions. Using a panel of United States firms from 1985 to 2013, we document that real estate risk is negatively associated with firms’ long-term investments and long-term external financing in equity and debt. The results are robust to different risk measurements and in particular salient during the financial crisis period when the endogeneity between risk and investment is less of a concern. The effect on firm leverage, however, depends on risk measures. Overall, in contrast to previously documented positive effects of the real estate value, real estate risk exposure exhibits mostly the opposite effects on investment, financing and capital structure. This difference is consistent with option value determinants. Findings in this paper shed new lights on the impact of real estate holding on corporate decisions, offer a new explanation for the underperformance of hedge funds’ real estate strategies, and confirm the theoretical predictions in Deng et al. (2015).     

The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States

We investigate whether corporate governance affects firms’ credit ratings and whether improvement in corporate governance standards is associated with improvement in investment grade rating. We use the Gov‐score of Brown and Caylor (2006) , the Gomper’s G index and an entrenchment score of Bebchuk et al. (2009) to proxy for corporate governance. Using a sample of US firms, we find that firms characterized by stronger corporate governance have a significantly higher credit rating, and that this association is accentuated for smaller firms relative to larger firms. We find that an improvement in corporate governance is associated with improvement in bond rating.     

Deviations from Expected Stakeholder Management,Firm Value,and Corporate Governance

We propose that high‐quality corporate governance may mitigate agency costs related to value‐destroying investments in stakeholder management (SM). Using an unbalanced panel of 9,051 firm‐year observations for 1,631 firms, we find that deviations from expected stakeholder management (ESM) are increasing in chief executive officer (CEO) portfolio delta. We find, however, that deviations from ESM are negatively related to proxies for effective board monitoring. We also document that the effect of governance mechanisms varies by industry (consumer or industrial orientation) and SM dimension. The results indicate that corporations with good governance pursue shareholder value maximization while constraining unnecessary investment in stakeholders.     

Corporate financing of investment opportunities in a world of institutional cross-ownership

Institutional cross-owners, specifically institutional investors with significant stakes in multiple firms in the same industry, are becoming increasingly common in the United States. In this paper, we investigate and find that the presence of institutional cross-owners facilitates a firm's financing of its investment opportunities, consistent with institutional cross-owners reducing the adverse selection concerns of those who provide capital for the investment opportunities. We then examine the conditions under which the presence of institutional cross-owners is likely to more significantly reduce adverse selection and thereby have even more of a positive effect on the financing of investment opportunities. We document that relative to transient institutional cross-owners, dedicated institutional cross-owners facilitate more financing of investment opportunities. We also find that institutional cross-owners facilitate the financing of investment opportunities even more for firms with greater dependence on external financing, those with an opaque financial reporting environment, and those with more product market competition. Our paper offers novel insight into how a firm can benefit from the presence of institutional cross-owners.     

The Effect of Venture Capital Financing on the Sensitivity to Cash Flow of Firm's Investments

This work studies the effect of venture capital (VC) financing on firms' investments in a longitudinal sample of 379 Italian unlisted new‐technology‐based firms (NTBFs) observed over the 10‐year period from 1994 to 2003. We distinguish the effects of VC financing according to the type of investor: independent VC (IVC) funds and corporate VC (CVC) investors. Previous studies argue that NTBFs are the firms most likely to be financially constrained. The technology‐intensive nature of their activity and their lack of a track record increase adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Moreover, most of their assets are firm‐specific or intangible and hence cannot be pledged as collateral. In accordance with this view, we show that the investment rate of NTBFs is strongly positively correlated with their current cash flows. We also find that after receiving VC financing, NTBFs increase their investment rate independently of the type of VC investor. However, the investments of CVC‐backed firms remain sensitive to shocks in cash flows, whereas IVC‐backed firms exhibit a low and statistically not significant investment–cash flow sensitivity that we interpret as a signal of the removal of financial constraints.     

Law,Stock Markets,and Innovation

We study a broad sample of firms across 32 countries and find that strong shareholder protections and better access to stock market financing lead to substantially higher long‐run rates of R&D investment, particularly in small firms, but are unimportant for fixed capital investment. Credit market development has a modest impact on fixed investment but no impact on R&D. These findings connect law and stock markets with innovative activities key to economic growth, and show that legal rules and financial developments affecting the availability of external equity financing are particularly important for risky, intangible investments not easily financed with debt.     

Investment efficiency of firms outside the business group

Using Korean firms between 1987 and 2010, we show that non-group firms suffer more from investment inefficiency if they operate in industries where group firms belong to larger business groups. We also find that this effect exists mainly during a period characterized by a capital supply shortage and low cash flow pledgeability to investors. Further analyses indicate that the effect is attributable not to human capital constraints, but external financing constraints imposed by business group firms and that causality runs from business group strength to investment inefficiency of non-group firms.