Financial Structure,Acquisition Opportunities,and Firm Locations

This paper investigates the relation between firms' locations and their corporate finance decisions. We develop a model where being located within an industry cluster increases opportunities to make acquisitions, and to facilitate those acquisitions, firms within clusters maintain more financial slack. Consistent with our model we find that firms located within industry clusters make more acquisitions, and have lower debt ratios and larger cash balances than their industry peers located outside clusters. We also document that firms in high‐tech cities and growing cities maintain more financial slack. Overall, the evidence suggests that growth opportunities influence firms' financial decisions.     

Comparing acquisitions and divestitures

We study the acquisition and divestiture activity of a sample of 1305 firms from 59 industries during the 1990–1999 period. Consistent with the importance of restructuring activity during the 1990s, we find that half of the sample firms are acquired or engage in a major divestiture. Consistent with the notion that economic change is a source of the observed restructuring activity, we find significant industry clustering in both acquisitions and divestitures. We also study the announcement effects of the two forms of restructuring and find that both acquisitions and divestitures in the 1990s increase shareholder wealth. Moreover, the wealth effects for both acquisitions and divestitures are directly related to the relative size of the event. The symmetric, positive wealth effects for acquisitions and divestitures are consistent with a synergistic explanation for both forms of restructuring and are inconsistent with nonsynergistic models based on entrenchment, empire building and hubris.     

Wealth Destruction on a Massive Scale? A Study of Acquiring‐Firm Returns in the Recent Merger Wave

Acquiring‐firm shareholders lost 12 cents around acquisition announcements per dollar spent on acquisitions for a total loss of $240 billion from 1998 through 2001, whereas they lost $7 billion in all of the 1980s, or 1.6 cents per dollar spent. The 1998 to 2001 aggregate dollar loss of acquiring‐firm shareholders is so large because of a small number of acquisitions with negative synergy gains by firms with extremely high valuations. Without these acquisitions, the wealth of acquiring‐firm shareholders would have increased. Firms that make these acquisitions with large dollar losses perform poorly afterward.     

Acquisitions,Overconfident Managers and Self‐attribution Bias

We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution. Self‐attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. Using two alternative measures of overconfidence (1) high order acquisition deals and (2) insider dealings we find evidence supporting the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realise lower announcement returns than rational bidders and exhibit poor long‐term performance. Second, we find that managerial overconfidence stems from self‐attribution bias. Specifically, we find that high‐order acquisitions (five or more deals within a three‐year period) are associated with lower wealth effects than low‐order acquisitions (first deals). That is, managers tend to credit the initial success to their own ability and therefore become overconfident and engage in more deals. In our analysis we control for endogeneity of the decision to engage in high‐order acquisitions and find evidence that does not support the self‐selection of excessive acquisitive firms. Our analysis is robust to the influence of merger waves, industry shocks, and macroeconomic conditions.     

Private and Public Merger Waves

We document that public firms participate more than private firms as buyers and sellers of assets in merger waves and their participation is affected more by credit spreads and aggregate market valuation. Public firm acquisitions realize higher gains in productivity, particularly for on‐the‐wave acquisitions and when the acquirer's stock is liquid and highly valued. Our results are not driven solely by public firms' better access to capital. Using productivity data from early in the firm's life, we find that better private firms subsequently select to become public. Initial size and productivity predict asset purchases and sales 10 and more years later.     

Corporate Cash Reserves and Acquisitions

Cash-rich firms are more likely than other firms to attempt acquisitions. Stock return evidence shows that acquisitions by cash-rich firms are value decreasing. Cash-rich bidders destroy seven cents in value for every excess dollar of cash reserves held. Cash-rich firms are more likely to make diversifying acquisitions and their targets are less likely to attract other bidders. Consistent with the stock return evidence, mergers in which the bidder is cash-rich are followed by abnormal declines in operating performance. Overall, the evidence supports the agency costs of free cash flow explanation for acquisitions by cash-rich firms.     

How do partial acquisitions affect the wealth of acquiring firms? The case of Japanese firms

This study examines how and why partial acquisitions affect the wealth of acquiring firms in Japan. Few studies have focused on acquiring firms in partial acquisitions, whereas many studies have investigated target firms. The empirical results show that the shareholder wealth of acquiring firms, which can increase through partial acquisitions, is much lower than that of target firms. In addition, acquiring firms and their targets differ in how they enhance their wealth from partial acquisitions—acquiring firms can enhance their wealth by exploiting the wealth of target firms, while target firms can enhance their wealth by obtaining support from acquiring firms.     

Underpricing,Share Overhang,and Insider Selling in Follow‐on Offerings

Prospect and information‐momentum theories predict that insiders can offer fewer shares in an initial public offering (IPO) to create informational momentum and obtain higher prices in follow‐on offerings. I find that dilution and insider participation in the IPO are negatively related to the number and size of follow‐on offerings, consistent with the prediction. However, insider selling in follow‐on offerings is positively related to IPO selling, contrary to the theories. Returns around follow‐on offering announcements are more negative for newly public firms than older firms, but for newly public firms do not differ by whether the announcement comes before or after the lockup expiration date.     

DIRECT EVIDENCE ON THE MARKET‐DRIVEN ACQUISITION THEORY

We provide direct empirical evidence that share overvaluation is an important motive for firms to make stock acquisitions. We find that more overvalued firms are more likely to acquire with stock, and acquirers are more overvalued in successful stock mergers than in withdrawn mergers. Acquirers' overvaluation, on average, exceeds the targets' premium‐adjusted overvaluation. Shareholders of stock acquirers, whose overvaluation is greater than their targets' premium‐adjusted overvaluation, realize sustained wealth gains from one day before the merger announcement up to three years after the merger completion, as compared with a matching sample of similarly overvalued but nonacquiring firms.     

Firm size and the effectiveness of the market for corporate control

Recent research has shown evidence that larger firms are more likely to destroy shareholder wealth through acquisitions. Those findings suggest that managers of larger firms are less likely to be disciplined by the market for corporate control than managers of smaller firms. With a sample of nearly 8000 acquisitions over the period from 1980–1999, this paper offers evidence to the contrary. The results suggest that larger firms are more likely to be the target of a disciplinary takeover than smaller firms. Further tests indicate that CEOs of larger firms are significantly more likely to be replaced following a series of poor acquisitions than CEOs of smaller firms. In total, managers of the largest firms continue to make the worst acquisitions despite the evidence that they are more likely to be punished for doing so.     

Investor Protection,Investment Efficiency and Value: The Case of Cross‐Listed Firms

We examine the impact of improved investor protection due to cross‐listing on foreign firms’ investment decisions and firm value. While we find that cross‐listing increases firms’ capital expenditures and mergers and acquisitions activities, cross‐listed firms also invest more in research and development, make better acquisition decisions, and have higher profitability compared to non‐cross‐listed firms. Moreover, cross‐listing is associated with better cash utilization by foreign firms for investments. These improvements in investments and cash utilization are more pronounced for firms cross‐listed on US exchanges and for firms from countries with weak investor protection laws.     

The Industry Life Cycle,Acquisitions and Investment: Does Firm Organization Matter?

We examine the effect of industry life‐cycle stages on within‐industry acquisitions and capital expenditures by conglomerates and single‐segment firms controlling for endogeneity of organizational form. We find greater differences in acquisitions than in capital expenditures, which are similar across organizational types. In particular, 36% of the growth recorded by conglomerate segments in growth industries comes from acquisitions, versus 9% for single‐segment firms. In growth industries, the effect of financial dependence on acquisitions and plant openings is mitigated for conglomerate firms. Plants acquired by conglomerate firms increase in productivity. The results suggest that organizational forms' comparative advantages differ across industry conditions.     

CEO age and the riskiness of corporate policies

Prior theoretical work generates conflicting predictions with respect to how CEO age impacts risk-taking behavior. Consistent with the prediction that risk-taking behavior decreases as CEOs become older, I document a negative relation between CEO age and stock return volatility. Further analyses reveal that older CEOs reduce firm risk through less risky investment policies. Specifically, older CEOs invest less in research and development, make more diversifying acquisitions, manage firms with more diversified operations, and maintain lower operating leverage. Further, firm risk and the riskiness of corporate policies are lowest when both the CEO and the next most influential executive are older and highest when both of these managers are younger. Although older CEOs prefer less risky investment policies, I document results suggesting that CEO and firm risk preferences tend to be aligned. Lastly, I find that a trading strategy that goes long in a portfolio of stocks consisting of firms managed by younger CEOs and short in a portfolio of stocks comprised of firms led by older CEOs would generate positive risk-adjusted returns. Overall, my results imply that CEO age can have a significant impact on risk-taking behavior and firm performance.     

The Young and the Restless: A Study of Age and Acquisition Propensity of CEOs of UK Firms

Using a large sample of CEOs of UK firms, we show that CEO age is a key determinant of acquisition activity. We find that younger CEOs are more likely to acquire another firm and spend more on large capital expenditures. We argue that while younger CEOs of both UK and US firms undertake more acquisitions than their older peers, their motivations for acquisitions might differ. We find that the stock market perceives acquisitions by younger CEOs to be of a higher quality. Following previous studies, we use CEO tenure as a proxy for reputation, and find that large acquisitions enhance CEO reputation, especially for younger CEOs. In contrast to the previous findings for CEOs of US firms, we determine that the compensation of CEOs in the UK does not increase after acquisitions. This absence of a compensation incentive for CEOs of UK firms is consistent with the idea that the UK compensation structure is more restrictive and has a smaller equity‐based component. Our evidence is also inconsistent with an overconfidence effect. Overall, our results provide consistent evidence of executive signaling by younger CEOs of UK firms eager to distinguish themselves.     

Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups

We examine whether firms belonging to Korean business groups (chaebols) benefit from acquisitions they make or whether such acquisitions provide a way for controlling shareholders to increase their wealth by increasing the value of other group firms (tunneling). We find that when a chaebol-affiliated firm makes an acquisition, its stock price on average falls. While minority shareholders of a chaebol-affiliated firm making an acquisition lose, the controlling shareholder of that firm on average benefits because the acquisition enhances the value of other firms in the group. This evidence is consistent with the tunneling hypothesis.     

Bidder returns in interstate and intrastate bank acquisitions

Returns to bidders are examined for 108 bank acquisitions over the 1981–1987 period. These returns provide evidence on the conflict-of-interest hypothesis and the hubris hypothesis, both of which predict negative returns to bidders, versus the shareholder wealth maximization model that predicts positive (or at least non-negative) returns. Further evidence on these hypotheses is provided from the returns on 18 defensive acquisitions. Consistent with the conflict-of-interest and hubris hypotheses, announcement period returns are negative and statistically significant both for interstate and intrastate acquisitions. However, bidder returns to interstate bank acquisitions do not differ significantly from intrastate mergers.     

IMPACTS OF RELATIVE SIZE AND INDUSTRIAL RELATEDNESS ON RETURNS TO SHAREHOLDERS OF ACQUIRING FIRMS

The premise of this paper is that in mergers the manageability of acquisitions significantly affects the wealth of shareholders of acquiring firms. Specifically, the relative size of partners as well as the industrial relatedness of the two firms are examined. The test period allows for the determination of announcement, interim, and consummation effects of the mergers on shareholder wealth. It is found that acquisitions of relatively large firms from unrelated industries lead to significant declines in the wealth of shareholders of acquiring firms, and that this result is most pronounced when the period is extended beyond the announcement through the effective dates.     

Corporate Governance,Product Market Competition,and Equity Prices

This paper examines whether firms in noncompetitive industries benefit more from good governance than do firms in competitive industries. We find that weak governance firms have lower equity returns, worse operating performance, and lower firm value, but only in noncompetitive industries. When exploring the causes of the inefficiency, we find that weak governance firms have lower labor productivity and higher input costs, and make more value‐destroying acquisitions, but, again, only in noncompetitive industries. We also find that weak governance firms in noncompetitive industries are more likely to be targeted by activist hedge funds, suggesting that investors take actions to mitigate the inefficiency.     

International acquisitions and shareholder wealth Evidence from the Netherlands

In this article, we test wealth effects of international acquisitions using a sample of foreign acquisitions by Dutch firms during the period 1990–96. We find weak evidence that cross-border acquisitions are wealth-creating corporate activities, especially for acquisitions in the U.S. We observe further that for the West European acquisitions, benefits from internalization are larger for companies having relatively less international exposure and making acquisitions outside of their main activities.     

CEO power,M&A decisions,and market reactions

In this study we examine the relationship between CEO power, corresponding acquisition activities and market reactions to mergers and acquisitions (M&A) announcements with a Canadian M&A dataset (1997–2005). We use CEO excess pay as a proxy for CEO power. Our empirical results show that the market reactions to M&A announcements are not related to CEO power. It implies that powerful CEOs do not necessarily make value destroying acquisitions. Our results further show that CEO power levels are significantly higher for acquiring firms compared to the CEOs of non-acquiring firms. In other words, CEOs with more relative power make more acquisitions. Such acquisitions will increase the size of the firm and will allow CEOs to demand a higher compensation level for managing larger asset pools and to derive higher performance incentives that are also generally tied to firm size.