团队合作中的利益分配机制及其调整过程探讨

本文主要探讨团队合作这种新兴工作机制的利益分配机制,首先提出了两种方法:其一,权的最小平方法,建立在专家评分基础之上,具有一定的主观性;其二,在合作博弈框架之上运用Shapley定理确定分配方案,具有较好的客观性、公正性。本文后一部分主要讨论在使用Shapley定理确定分配方案之后的团队博弈,即一旦团队由合作博弈进入非合作博弈后,团队利益分配是如何进行调整的,以及调整过程中博弈双方的策略变化和这种调整产生的内在机理。     

由博弈论对我国会计诚信建设的思考

博弈论是研究决策主体行为发生直接相互作用时候的决策以及这种决策的均衡问题,参与博弈的双方既可以是合作的,也可以是非合作的,但通过博弈过程可以达到纳什均衡,即实现一组符合博弈方行为并使双方满足的最好策略。会计诚信建设必然涉及到两个主体:会计信息的供给者和使用者。会计诚信建设就是以供给者诚信为基础,实现会计信息的真正价值,为使用者提供决策支持,使二者利益均达到最大化。会计信息供给者向使用者提供的会计信息质量的高低显然会影响使用者的决策,即使用者权衡其风险的大小,对供给者所提供的会计信息会采取相信或不相信的策略…     

区域经济一体化中的地方政府间竞争——基于不完全信息博弈模型分析

在我国区域经济一体化进程中,地方政府日益成为具有独立利益和决策权利的经济主体,地方政府之间的关系成为协调区域发展的重要因素和衡量指标之一.本文在经典博弈模型分析基础上,引入不完全信息博弈模型,进一步分析地方政府在对抗竞争和合作竞争中的不同决策和不同收益,探讨地方政府行为中出现的合作博弈和非合作博弈倾向,并对产生博弈行为的原因和影响进行研究,在此基础上提出了地方政府"合作博弈"、谋求共同发展的建议.     

航空公司直销渠道竞合博弈与利益分配研究

各大航空公司纷纷结盟支付宝等第三方支付平台,实现航空公司官网机票直销业务,以期降低分销成本,提高收益;可以预见直销将逐步成为航空公司机票销售的主要渠道。论文首先引入航空公司直销渠道竞争与合作静态一次博弈模型,分析了博弈的结果,从而得到航空公司直销渠道合作与竞争的纳什均衡策略。航空公司之间的博弈是一种长期博弈,因此在静态一次性博弈基础上,建立航空公司直销渠道竞争与合作的动态重复博弈模型,博弈结果是要求航空公司应该采取长期合作策略。最后,分析航空公司之间利益分配问题以及长期合作可能存在的问题和解决建议。     

竞争还是合作——以博弈论的视角对企业战略联盟的分析

企业之间通过长时期的博弈对策,会发现合作博弈得到的利益比不合作的利益大,于是企业最终逐渐会从非合作博弈转向合作博弈.企业战略联盟就是企业长期以来博弈选择的结果.但是由于它本身存在着既竞争又合作的博弈关系,我国企业在利用战略联盟增强自己竞争力的同时,要注意处理好这种既竞争又合作的关系.     

基于网络治理视角的地方政府购买公共服务研究

本研究将合作博弈引入地方政府购买公共服务研究中,分析地方政府、企业及第三部门各自的目标函数和博弈资源,构建地方政府网络治理主体合作博弈模型。研究表明:各治理主体通过合作可以实现资源互补与共享,获得合作收益,各主体基于各自目标函数追求自身利益最大化的冲动引致了博弈,并在博弈的过程中表现出利益二元化的特征,在权衡自身利益、合作收益以及社会公共利益后不断调整策略;为确保良好的治理效果,提出从监督、信任、利益分配、信息披露与共享四个方面规范治理主体的行为。     

企业决策的博弈论解读

企业决策是企业管理者自主制定、选择和实施企业策略的过程。本文从博弈论的视角出发,将企业决策过程视为决策诸要素之间的博弈过程,各决策主体根据对方的策略生成应对策略,贯穿整个企业决策过程的始终。决策主体间的博弈要求企业决策从"硬性"管理向"软性"管理过渡,实现共赢局面。     

主观概率判断的演进

一、问题的提出 人们在现实生活中面临的绝大多数决策形势中存在着带有或多或少不确定性的随机性因素,人们如何处理和理应如何处理这种局势是经济学所要研究的一个重要课题。目前从一般意义上研究人们在各种决策形势中的理性行为的理论主要是决策和对策理论。决策理论考察单个利益主体在客观性条件下的策略选择问题,而对策理论则考察多个利益主体在利益相互影响的局势中的策略选择问题,在这些理论中,针对决策中随机性因素的影响,占据主导地     

基于Shapley值的创业团队决策权分配研究

创业团队成员产业经验和职能背景的差异性是团队有效性的基本要求,团队决策权的合理分配是维系团队生存和促进理性决策的基础。针对创新型创业团队中以股权为基础分配决策权的制度缺陷,以及决策过程中的结盟博弈和非理性行为问题,综合团队成员职能分工和角色重要性,全面考虑群体决策中的各种合作博弈形式和可能结果,提出一个实用的决策权分配方法。方法以AHP进行初始决策权分配,应用Shapley值进行优化和调整,能够有效地消除产生博弈的诱因,促进理性决策,保障团队优势发挥和理性决策目标的实现。应用案例对分配方法进行了验证,案例结果对团队风险决策中的一些现象进行了解释,与实际情况相吻合,对创业团队的组建与管理有着一定的实践启示。     

中国热计量改革参与主体的合作博弈及利益诉求分析

热计量改革是供热体制改革的核心内容和关键环节。本文首先建立热计量改革多参与主体之间的合作博弈模型,并对合作博弈的充要条件进行分析。研究表明,参与主体之间的合作博弈是推动热计量改革的关键,合作博弈的充要条件是主体之间建立的约束协议及合理的利益分配。在改革进程中,要想达成多主体的合作博弈并非易事。在总结博弈模型的基础上,结合中国热计量发展和改革的实际,本文深入分析了不同博弈主体在热计量行业博弈中的利益诉求。     

A noncooperative view on two airport cost sharing rules

In this paper we model cost allocations for airport problems by using cooperative game and noncooperative game approaches. We relate the cost allocations given by the nucleolus and the egalitarian allocation to those given by the Nash outcomes of the noncooperative game.     

Integrating the Nash program into mechanism theory

Abstract. The present paper provides a method by which the Nash Program may be embedded into mechanism theory. It is shown that any result stating the support of any solution of a cooperative game in coalitional form by a Nash equilibrium of some suitable game in strategic form can be used to derive the mechanism theoretic Nash-implementation of that solution. Received: 29 June 1999 / Accepted: 3 April 2002     

投资者关系管理的博弈分析

本文主要从三个角度论述上市公司投资者关系管理的博弈分析,即投资者与上市公司之间的非合作博弈、机构投资者与个人投资者之间的“智猪博弈”以及投资者与上市公司之间的合作博弈。阐明投资者与上市公司非合作博弈的严重后果,机构投资者在促使上市公司实施投资者关系管理方面的作用,以及上市公司实施有效的投资者关系管理后的“双赢”结果。     

Buying cooperation in an asymmetric environmental differential game

We consider a two-player asymmetric differential game of pollution control. One player is non-vulnerable to pollution, or unwilling to consider damages when choosing her production policy in a non-cooperative game. We characterize the feedback-Nash equilibrium and the cooperative solution. We establish conditions under which the vulnerable player can buy the cooperation of the non-vulnerable player to control her emissions. We further use the Nash bargaining solution to allocate the total cooperative dividend between the two players and propose a time-consistent decomposition overtime of the total payoff.     

Core-stable rings in second price auctions with common values

In a common value auction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A., 2002. Dominance solvability of second-prices auctions with differential information. Journal of Mathematical Economics 37, 247–258], describe a cooperative games in characteristic function form, in spite of the underlying strategic externalities. A ring is core-stable if the core of this characteristic function is not empty. Furthermore, every ring can implement its sophisticated equilibrium strategy by means of an incentive compatible mechanism. An example shows that, if the bidders’ information partitions are not connected, rings may no longer be core-stable.     

A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set

We propose an extensive form game to give a noncooperative interpretation of the Mas-Colell bargaining set for transferable utility games. Based on the objection and counterobjection in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, a bilateral negotiation is designed in our model. We show that the equilibrium outcomes of our extensive form game coincide with the Mas-Colell bargaining set in the supperadditive environments.     

非线性需求下两层供应链的定价策略及协调机制研究

对基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的供应链,在非线性需求函数的前提下,应用博弈理论对供应链系统的定价策略进行了分析,分别得出非合作博弈和合作博弈的均衡解,进一步对各种定价策略的效率进行了分析。另外,给出了便于实际操作的协调方法。     

博弈论在逆向供应链系统定价中的应用

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统,应用博弈理论对废旧产品回收的定价策略进行研究。分别得出了非合作博弈的均衡解(Stackelberg均衡)和合作博弈的均衡解(联合定价),并进一步对各种定价策略的效率进行了分析。另外,给出了便于实际操作的协调方法。     

MACROECONOMIC POLICY EVALUATION AND OPTIMAL CONTROL THEORY: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Abstract. This survey addresses the recent literature on the application of optimal control theory and game theory to macroeconomic policy evaluation and design. This literature focuses on strategic interactions between governments and private agents engaged in dynamic non-cooperative games and emphasizes such issues as precommitment, credibility and reputation as important and endemic aspects of optimal policy design. A dominant theme is the problem of dynamic inconsistency and the inferiority of an equilibrium in single-stage full-information games without commitment. This may be alleviated in repeated games involving reputation effects and threat strategies designed to coerce rivals into pursuing particular strategies and to sustain a sequential equilibrium. The type and characteristics of a sequential equilibrium also depend importantly upon the information structure conditioning players'beliefs under uncertainty. Included here are separating and pooling equilibria, involving notions of learning, signalling and information revelation. Additional dimensions exist in stochastic systems which introduce other forms of uncertainty. Optimal control and game theory have also been applied to international macroeconomic policy design, with emphasis on the potential costs and benefits of non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour between countries and problems of international policy coordination.     

A stochastic differential game of capitalism

We develop a stochastic differential game of capitalism to analyze the role of uncertainty. In the deterministic game, the firm’s rent is completely taxed away and the firm stops investing completely. In the stochastic game, the government does not tax the firm’s rent completely. The firm posts a positive rate of investment if the firm’s rent exceeds the labor’s income. Although the cooperative solution is indeterminate, cooperation is always Pareto optimal compared to the non-cooperative Markovian Nash equilibrium. For individual rationality, we apply a payoff distribution procedure based on Yeung and Petrosyan (2006) to derive a subgame-consistent solution.