TV white spaces exploitation through a bicameral geo-location database

The exploitation of TV white spaces can meet the increasing demand for spectrum resources and create opportunities for deploying a variety of wireless services in a flexible manner. However, uncertainties from technologies, business models and regulatory policies hinder the take-off of TV white spaces exploitation. This paper proposes a bicameral (or two-chambered) geo-location database, which allows/supports both free and paid access to the TV white spaces: i.e., one chamber supports free access through opportunistic or geo-location database access; and the other chamber supports paid usage through secondary spectrum trading. Consequently, four technological scenarios for the acquisition of TV white spaces emerge, namely: sensing only, joint sensing and geo-location database access, geo-location database access only, and broker based secondary spectrum trading. An analysis of these scenarios is performed based on a theoretical framework for emerging technology evaluation while considering technological, business models and regulatory dimensions. The analyses show that free and paid access to TV white space complement each other; and that despite considerable infrastructure costs, the bicameral geo-location database is positioned to create viable TV white spaces exploitation value chains; hence have the most optimal technological, business and regulatory prospects.     

Emerging issues in white space regulation

The secondary use of vacant television channels (TV white spaces) and the reallocation of the digital dividend to provide wireless broadband services are in the final stages of implementation in some countries. Originally seen as a once in a generation opportunity to better allocate UHF spectrum, further digital dividends are now underway as regulators and industry strive to meet exponential increases in demand for mobile data services. Concurrent developments suggest that TV white spaces may be rapidly exploited by global networks with billions of supported devices. The potential for sub-optimal outcomes is identified if the prospect of further digital dividends is not taken into account as technical and regulatory arrangements are put in place to allow productive use of TV white spaces. The importance of considering the potential interaction between further digital dividends and the use of TV white spaces is discussed and technical and regulatory approaches to support optimal outcomes are identified.     

The value of 1800 MHz and 2100 MHz spectrums in India and implications for auction design

The sequence of events leading up to the upcoming auction of 1800 MHz spectrum in India has led to the auctions acquiring an extraordinary significance for the future of the Indian mobile industry. A key feature of the auction design proposed by the regulator TRAI is the benchmarking of the reserve price of 1800 MHz to the price of 2100 – 3G spectrum revealed in the 2010 auction. In the context of the low number of LTE devices available and the fragmentation in the 1800 MHz band, this paper proposes reducing the duration of spectrum holding to ten years (from the current level of twenty years), and calibrating the reserve price of 1800 MHz with its value with GSM deployment. An economic model is used to compute the value of startup and incremental 1800 MHz spectrum. The estimated values are shown to differ from the value of 2100 MHz spectrum at a pan-India level and also in their distribution across circles. A new set of reserve prices are computed based on the estimation. The estimated values are also shown to be close to the AGR-adjusted price revealed in the 2001 auction. A reserve price based on the 2001 auction is also provided. Concomitant features of the auction are suggested to give coherence to the auction design.     

Evaluation of the opportunity cost of the spectrum: Application to the digital dividend

The transition to digital television transmission (DTT) creates an opportunity for revising the current allocation and use of the spectrum, and for enhancing its efficiency. The fairly large amount of spectrum that will be freed up in the analog TV switch-off is known as the digital dividend. Many EU countries have decided to partially allocate these frequencies, through market mechanisms, to mobile use, but a large fraction of the dividend is supposed to remain in the hands of broadcasters. An efficient management of the spectrum requires that the use of this resource should be supported through appropriate incentive policies. This paper presents a techno-analytical approach to evaluate the opportunity cost of using a spectrum portion within the digital dividends’ bandwidths, for example around 800-900 MHz, for both DVB-T and UMTS services, specifically addressing the extraordinary rise in the use of mobile broadband in the European context. The methodology is then applied to Italy to derive a baseline for administered prices reflecting the cost of spectrum use. Results obtained are then compared with existing evidences from other studies and Countries’ experiences.     

Beachfront commons

Technology competition between wireless communication technologies can lead to new, more or less disruptive services. A potentially disruptive technology would be to have unlicensed transmission in the lower UHF bands at power levels up to, e.g. 2 W EIRP. This would give citizens a share of the best spectrum for free use. Tools against congestion could be based on mandatory stochastic channel back-off or, if multiple users are present, on adaptive power and bandwidth control. Compared to the FCC TV white space regulation, no back link would be needed as the spectrum would be used exclusively by wireless devices. In an environment of shrinking interest in terrestrial TV broadcasting, such a regulation is expected to create a new market for high-range consumer devices, competing with licensed communication, while also being suitable for offloading traffic from licensed operations. Furthermore, the approach will allow for efficient digitization of equipment for Programme Making and Special Events (PMSE), but could also be made compatible with novel disaster relief services. To enable accurate interference prediction, it is proposed that, instead of only providing transmitter regulation, receivers should also be regulated, such as be required to adhere to a certain minimum selectivity. The proposal should be taken up in the WRC process.     

The business case of a network that serves both public safety and commercial subscribers

Deploying a single nationwide broadband wireless network to serve all public safety users would have great advantages over the existing fragmented public safety systems. A nationwide system could be created to serve both public safety and commercial subscribers, which would allow a provider to exploit important economies but force it to meet the more costly requirements of public safety. This paper analyzes the viability of a public-private partnership that serves public safety and commercial subscribers from a for-profit provider's perspective. A model is presented that estimates the net present value (NPV) of a wireless network by calculating costs based on the number of cell sites required and revenue based on the projected number of subscribers acquired. The model is applied to both a network that serves only commercial subscribers on 10 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum and a public-private partnership that serves commercial subscribers and public safety personnel on 20 MHz of 700 MHz spectrum. It is found that NPV is greater for the public-private partnership than for the commercial-only network for any population density, which shows that the value of 10 MHz of spectrum exceeds the cost of meeting public safety requirements. Furthermore, the paper demonstrates that NPV/cell increases with population density, so urban areas are profitable and rural areas are unprofitable. The paper demonstrates that a partnership covering 94% of the US population breaks even because the most urban 56% of population subsidizes coverage for the next 38%. If initial deployment is subsidized, a financially sustainable public-private partnership can serve much more than 94%. Additionally, it is shown that allowing urban municipalities to opt-out of the partnership can significantly increase the subsidies required.     

Opportunity cost of spectrum for mobile communications: Evaluation of spectrum prices in Bangladesh

The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the choice of the reserve price made by the telecom regulator to explain the under-performance of spectrum auctions in Bangladesh. The overestimation of the reserve prices for several auctions in Bangladesh including the auction of the 3G – 2100 MHz band in 2013, the 2G - 1800 MHz band in 2015, and the 4G – 1800 and 2100 MHz bands in 2018 is established by comparing the reserve prices to the economic value of spectrum, determined by using the engineering valuation and production function approaches. Possible reasons for the inflation of the reserve price are discussed.     

A mixed spectrum management framework for the future wireless service based on techno-economic analysis: The Korean spectrum policy study

The evolution of radio technology and various services has increased the world's dependence on wireless communications. The demand for and value of spectrum resources therefore are also increasing. Spectrum efficiency is the most important factor in managing spectrum scarcity. However, under the current spectrum management approach, it is difficult to adopt innovative technologies that improve spectrum efficiency and flexible usage in the current dynamic wireless market. Recently, there have been several approaches to improve efficient use of spectrum resources, and each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, this research first discusses current issues and analyzes relative social welfare based on the different characteristics of technology and market conditions to compare various attributes of each approach. Based on the techno-economic simulation results, this paper introduces a mixed spectrum management framework for the future wireless service and support policy makers’ decision making. Furthermore, the mixed spectrum policy to spectrum management in Korea is proposed to find a more realistic and efficient spectrum management policy.     

On-line spectrum auctions in TV white spaces for supporting mobile services—A practical manual

This paper considers an approach for dynamic short-term spectrum leasing in TV white spaces (TVWS) using an on-line auction. The secondary spectrum market discussed here is organized by a central entity called the spectrum broker. The auctioned spectrum appears in blocks of available DVB-T channels with some transmit power constraints set-up to protect the primary users (DVB-T receivers). The bidders are institutional spectrum operators (telecommunication companies or service providers), operating in a given area. These players are characterized by heterogeneous demands concerning the spectrum bandwidth, the operation period with temporarily-exclusive rights for using the spectrum and the transmit power needed for successful transmission. Thus, the auctioned objects are non-identical and present different value for different players. Two auction models are proposed. The first one is the simultaneous auction in time domain and combinatorial in frequency and power dimension. The second proposed auction is fully combinatorial. Simulations results are also provided showing effectiveness of the analyzed auctions (high spectrum utilization ratio) and relation between the players’ satisfaction, their spectrum valuation and varying competition. Finally the guidelines concerning the spectrum auctions in TVWS for the policy makers are proposed.     

Mechanisms to incentivise shared-use of spectrum

A key concern with the Licensed-shared access (LSA) approach currently being developed by European regulators is that leaving incumbents and secondary users to agree to bilateral arrangements may be insufficient to incentivise an optimal level of sharing.We propose an efficient auction mechanism to incentivise incumbent users to offer shared access to the spectrum they use. The mechanism consists of two stages. In the first stage, LSA licences are auctioned. In the second stage, the incumbent is provided with a choice of either granting access under an LSA agreement to the winner of the auction or not. If the incumbent accepts, its existing licence fee is reduced, whereas, if it rejects, its existing licence fee is increased. The change in the licence fee is such that a rational incumbent always opts to share when it is efficient to do so, i.e. when the cost of sharing is below the value to the secondary user.We also explore how this simple mechanism can be extended to situations in which there is more than one incumbent in a band. Our proposed approach involves package (combinatorial) bidding and linear reference prices.     

The spectrum policy reform paving the way to cognitive radio enabled spectrum sharing

The increasing amount of data and video traffic carried by mobile networks has recently risen the demand for enhanced network capacity, more efficient use and more effective management of spectrum. Cognitive radio technologies candidate to respond to these urgent needs by allowing a near simultaneous band sharing. The regulation plays a crucial role in promoting the adoption of these technologies, in order to overcome the traditional paradigms of authorizations for exclusive spectrum usage. The article outlines spectrum management regimes where the implementation of frequency sharing technologies, including cognitive technologies, is foreseeable and brings them back to a comprehensive taxonomy of dynamic spectrum access and sharing models, in the effort to reconcile partially diverging approaches and nomenclatures suggested in literature. Theoretic analysis is supported by a number of illustrations and practical experiments with shared spectrum usage. Based on suggested taxonomy, the research aims at showing the evolutionary path toward the introduction and spreading of cognitive and other spectrum sharing technologies, pointing out relevant trends and instruments made available by the reform of EU Telecom Package, as well as at outlining the status of regulation, policy and standardization in Europe.     

Quantifying the costs of a nationwide public safety wireless network

The existing US public safety wireless infrastructure consists of thousands of disparate systems built by separate local agencies. Problems with interoperability, cost, spectral efficiency, and limited functionality plague these systems but could be significantly reduced through the deployment of a single nationwide network that serves all public safety personnel. Two major efforts towards such a nationwide network are the federal-government-only Integrated Wireless Network (IWN) and an FCC-led effort to create a public-private partnership in the 700 MHz band; the future of both projects is uncertain due in part to concerns surrounding cost. This paper presents a model to estimate cost for two fundamental approaches to a nationwide network: a public-safety-only network and a public–private partnership which serves both public safety and commercial subscribers. We apply this general model to four network scenarios which differ in the amount and band of spectrum allocated as well as the number and type of subscribers (public-safety-only versus commercial and public safety) under three traffic scenarios: voice-only, data-only, and voice and data. We demonstrate that the nation's many small systems could be replaced with a single nationwide network with a small fraction of the tower sites and spectrum. The cost of building this new infrastructure is comparable to what is likely to be spent in just a few years on upgrading and maintaining the existing infrastructure. In addition, we show that these cost estimates are highly dependent on some key system design parameters including the public safety capacity required and signal coverage reliability, which must therefore be well-defined in advance.     

An optimal way to licence the radio spectrum

Radio spectrum licences are generally specified in terms of the power a holder is allowed to transmit. However, if licences become flexible, allowing change of use and technology, then this licensing approach could result in significant interference between users. A new approach is proposed termed “spectrum usage rights” (SURs) which restricts the interference a licence holder is allowed to cause rather than the power they are allowed to transmit. This approach is shown to protect users against interference while providing the maximum flexibility possible and its implementation is discussed.     

The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency

This paper describes a conceptual framework to articulate clear rights of access to radio spectrum in a way that would foster an efficient market-based allocation of the resource. In this approach, regulators partition spectrum rights across the dimensions of space, time, frequency, and direction of propagation. They devolve each partition, called a licensed electrospace region (LER), to licensees who may buy, sell, aggregate, and subdivide their LERs at will. All signals outside an LER must have a power level of less than a regulated limit with de minimis exceptions. In addition, even within an LER, transmitter power or field strength must fall below a separate regulator-set level for the band. Licensees may deploy any devices and provide any services that do not violate these rules.     

Setting licence fees for renewing telecommunication spectrum based on an auction

This paper presents a methodology for setting fees for the renewal or extension of spectrum licences, by using the outcome of an auction for comparable licences but with a different licence period. The methodology is a combination of market and cash flow valuation and consists of two main steps. First, prices for spectrum corresponding to that of the licences to be extended are derived from the auction outcome. Second, the relative value addition of the extension period for the new licensee, compared to the value of the licences auctioned, is derived by using a model for the development of EBITDA for an operator over time. A combination of these two is used to calculate fees that match the opportunity costs of extension. Thus, optimum alignment is achieved with the policy objective of using licence fees only to promote efficient use of spectrum, while avoiding state aid at the same time.     

Allocative vs. technical spectrum efficiency

Achieving allocative and technically efficient spectrum management is a key aspect of deregulatory reforms in several OECD countries. However, reform legislation offers few clues as to how these objectives should rank when they conflict with one another. An ‘innocent’ prior acquisition of service-neutral spectrum at an efficiently run auction may prove allocative efficient but fail to be technically efficient if the spectrum is left fallow in the short term. Accountability for the productive usage of a public resource and pressures from short-term political cycles may induce regulators to mandate some minimal level of activity. Two plausible regulatory responses are considered: use it or lose it clauses and spectrum trading incentives. The former favours technical efficiency whilst the latter promotes allocative efficiency. The argument is formalised in a simple economic model buttressing the roles of uncertainty and transaction costs to assert the primacy of allocative efficiency over technical efficiency.     

Alternative radio licensing arrangements: A case study of the multipoint distribution service

Currently, the FCC assigns radio licences after making a determination of the public interest. Conflicting licence applications are resolved through comparative hearings. This mechanism is cumbersome and unreliable. This article analyses three alternatives: Increasing the available spectrum; an auction; or, lottery of radio licences. The analysis deals specifically with the Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS). The analysis suggests that increasing the spectrum allocation will create more assignments than will be demanded by MDS. Rough calculations suggest that auctions offer a more efficient selection mechanism. Lotteries with resale of the license are better than hearings, but not as good as auctions.     

Expanding mobile wireless capacity: The challenges presented by technology and economics

As demand for mobile broadband services continues to explode, mobile wireless networks must expand greatly their capacities. This paper describes and quantifies the economic and technical challenges associated with deepening wireless networks to meet this growing demand. Methods of capacity expansion divide into three general categories: the deployment of more radio spectrum; more intensive geographic reuse of spectrum; and increasing the throughput capacity of each MHz of spectrum within a given geographic area. The paper describes these several basic methods to deepen mobile wireless capacity. It goes on to measure the contribution of each of these methods to historical capacity growth within U.S. networks. The paper then describes the capabilities of 4G LTE wireless technology, and further innovations off of it, to further improve network capacity. These capacity expansion capabilities of LTE-Advanced along with traditional spectrum reuse are quantified and compared to forecasts of future demand to evaluate the ability of U.S. networks to match future demand. Without significantly increasing current spectrum allocations by 560 MHz over the 2014–2022 period, the presented model suggests that U.S. wireless capacity expansion will be inadequate to accommodate expected demand growth. This conclusion is in contrast to claims that the U.S. faces no spectrum shortage.     

A state space augmentation algorithm for the replenishment cycle inventory policy

In this work we propose an efficient dynamic programming approach for computing replenishment cycle policy parameters under non-stationary stochastic demand and service level constraints. The replenishment cycle policy is a popular inventory control policy typically employed for dampening planning instability. The approach proposed in this work achieves a significant computational efficiency and it can solve any relevant size instance in trivial time. Our method exploits the well known concept of state space relaxation. A filtering procedure and an augmenting procedure for the state space graph are proposed. Starting from a relaxed state space graph our method tries to remove provably suboptimal arcs and states (filtering) and then it tries to efficiently build up (augmenting) a reduced state space graph representing the original problem. Our experimental results show that the filtering procedure and the augmenting procedure often generate a small filtered state space graph, which can be easily processed using dynamic programming in order to produce a solution for the original problem.