Flexible spectrum management for mobile broadband services: How does it vary across advanced and emerging markets?

Demand for wireless data and Internet services are expected to grow exponentially, both in advanced and emerging markets in the near future. While advanced countries have often used centralized planning and coordination methodology to forecast and allocate the associated spectrum blocks to wireless operators for meeting the demand, it is often ad-hoc in emerging markets dictated by market forces. In this paper, Finland and India are taken to represent advanced and emerging markets, respectively. Different policy options and the policy environment in these two countries for spectrum management are explored. A causal model is constructed to represent the different variables that affect spectrum management practices and possible paths forward in these two extreme cases are highlighted. Using the causal model structure, it is hypothesized that (i) the matured markets such as Finland that practice centralized and harmonized spectrum planning are likely to continue their ex-ante policies and opt for the release of digital dividend spectrum and use of spectrally efficient technologies; (ii) the emerging market in India that is characterized by a market oriented ex-poste regulation is a good candidate to introduce secondary markets including flexible opportunistic spectrum access as exemplified by the wide spread adoption of multi-SIM handsets and the practice of national roaming by 3G service providers. Introductions of policies and regulations in these markets to break away from the extant paths are also highlighted.     

Cognitive radio systems specific for IMT systems: Operator’s view and perspectives

Cognitive radio (CR) is still an emerging and disruptive communication technology which is expected to improve the overall efficiency of the spectrum use. It is envisaged that cognitive radio systems (CRS) could impact many aspects of communications and in particular could facilitate accommodation of the increasing amount of services and applications in wireless networks. Intensive research on CR aims at maximising the utilisation of the limited radio spectrum resource. There have been many advances in CR regarding the technology development aspects; however supplementary research on regulation, policy and market structure reforms in relation with application specific deployment is still required before any CR-based spectrum access could be implemented for specific broadband mobile applications. Indeed, mobile community is still at an early stage of understanding and development of CR capabilities and it is premature to envisage wide deployment of CRS without careful consideration of regulatory and business issues. Therefore, this paper gives a classification of CR-based network and application scenarios, and investigates the feasibility of them from a regulatory perspective at a global level (ITU-R). Main part of this paper presents the wireless network operator’s approach to CRS specific for International Mobile Telecommunications (IMT) systems and proposes the radio environment map (REM) concept as a cognitive tool that increases environmental awareness in wireless network operator’s networks. Studies, which the authors performed internally and within the framework of a collaborative European project as well as within ITU-R yield the conclusion that, at shorter term, only intra-operator based CRS maximises the possibility for CR capabilities to be implemented.     

The evolving 5G case study in United States unilateral spectrum planning and policy

This paper tracks increasingly aggressive initiatives by the United States government to reallocate spectrum on an expedited and unilateral basis well before conclusion of inter-governmental coordination. Rather than embrace the customary commitment to achieve consensus on global spectrum allocations at the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has auctioned off large blocks of frequencies for the next generation (“5G”) of wireless services.The FCC might have framed its first 5G auction, reassigning Ultra High Frequency (“UHF”) spectrum, as a one-time deviation from compliance with long standing, intergovernmental coordination procedures. These frequencies have ideal signal propagation characteristics and the Commission could use financial incentives—unavailable in most nations—to expedite “repacking” by incumbent broadcasters willing to move, share or abandon spectrum in exchange for ample financial compensation. However, the FCC has continued to auction off 5G spectrum on grounds that it must find ways to abate an acute shortage of wireless bandwidth and doing so will regain or maintain global leadership in wireless technologies. This paper offers a critical rebuke to unilateral spectrum management, because the short-term benefits expected by the U. S. government likely will be offset by countervailing harms to 5G manufacturers, carriers and consumers. The paper tracks fractious preparation for the ITU's 2019 World Radio Conference by the U.S. delegation and the mixed record achieved there. Additionally, the paper explains how injecting trade, industrial policy and national security issues at the ITU can trigger more delays and disputes, including possible retaliation by nations displeased with U.S. efforts to subvert traditional technology optimization goals.A worst case scenario has the ITU deadlocked and unable to reach closure on “mission critical” spectrum planning issues at World Radio Conferences, convened every four years. The paper concludes that costs and likely challenges to the efficacy and legitimacy of the ITU will reduce the benefits accruing from the FCC's unilateral, spectrum planning campaign.     

Economic and policy implications of spectrum license fee payment methods

This paper argues that “Do auctions raise consumer prices?” is a misleading question. License fee payment methods, rather than spectrum assignment methods, are key factors that bring forth different market outcomes in the wireless telecommunication industry. This paper analyzes and discusses the effects of three spectrum license fee payment methods—upfront lump-sum fees, royalties, and profit sharing—on economic efficiency, spectrum supply, and government revenue. Royalties create distortions in product and factor markets but can induce the government to increase spectrum supply and encourage firms’ investments. A caveat is that the analyses are based on the model assuming monopoly market and information certainty.     

Evaluation of the opportunity cost of the spectrum: Application to the digital dividend

The transition to digital television transmission (DTT) creates an opportunity for revising the current allocation and use of the spectrum, and for enhancing its efficiency. The fairly large amount of spectrum that will be freed up in the analog TV switch-off is known as the digital dividend. Many EU countries have decided to partially allocate these frequencies, through market mechanisms, to mobile use, but a large fraction of the dividend is supposed to remain in the hands of broadcasters. An efficient management of the spectrum requires that the use of this resource should be supported through appropriate incentive policies. This paper presents a techno-analytical approach to evaluate the opportunity cost of using a spectrum portion within the digital dividends’ bandwidths, for example around 800-900 MHz, for both DVB-T and UMTS services, specifically addressing the extraordinary rise in the use of mobile broadband in the European context. The methodology is then applied to Italy to derive a baseline for administered prices reflecting the cost of spectrum use. Results obtained are then compared with existing evidences from other studies and Countries’ experiences.     

Allocative vs. technical spectrum efficiency

Achieving allocative and technically efficient spectrum management is a key aspect of deregulatory reforms in several OECD countries. However, reform legislation offers few clues as to how these objectives should rank when they conflict with one another. An ‘innocent’ prior acquisition of service-neutral spectrum at an efficiently run auction may prove allocative efficient but fail to be technically efficient if the spectrum is left fallow in the short term. Accountability for the productive usage of a public resource and pressures from short-term political cycles may induce regulators to mandate some minimal level of activity. Two plausible regulatory responses are considered: use it or lose it clauses and spectrum trading incentives. The former favours technical efficiency whilst the latter promotes allocative efficiency. The argument is formalised in a simple economic model buttressing the roles of uncertainty and transaction costs to assert the primacy of allocative efficiency over technical efficiency.     

竞争政策强化及产业政策转型影响市场效率的机理研究——兼论有效市场与有为政府

中国特色社会主义市场经济建设需要有效市场和有为政府更好结合,其中的一个重要途径是强化竞争政策基础地位,推进产业政策从选择性向普惠化、功能性转型。竞争政策强化与产业政策转型具有内在关联性,二者相互配合,共同促进有效市场形成。本文构建了基于竞争成功函数和共容利益假设的政企互动模型,研究发现:竞争政策和功能性产业政策有利于提升市场竞争效率,而选择性产业政策会降低市场竞争效率;功能性产业政策在一定程度上能起到弥补市场失灵的作用,体现了有为政府的积极作用。进一步考虑非对称市场竞争时发现,竞争政策可以同时兼顾提升市场竞争效率和分配效率两项目标,而选择性产业政策在两项目标上相互掣肘、由此强化竞争政策的优势凸显。本文理论模型的结论表明,有为政府应强化竞争政策基础地位,为产业政策转型创造良好的市场环境,加快选择性产业政策向功能性产业政策转型,放宽市场准入,持续推行公平竞争审查制度,维护和促进有效市场。良好的经济运行秩序需要有效市场减轻政府管控压力、有为政府简政放权营造良好市场环境,实现有效市场和有为政府更好结合。     

Stalling innovation of Cognitive Radio: The case for a dedicated frequency band

After more than a decade of frantic R&D efforts, Cognitive Radio (CR) technology continues to fail to pass the first developmental milestone of a working prototype, suggesting that the CR innovation process may be stalling. This paper analyzes possible reasons for this situation from the perspective of innovation management and economics. The CR innovation process has developed in a complex environment shaped by a combination of technology-push and market-pull forces. This paper shows that this process is being stifled by two barriers emerging from the current reliance of CR technology on opportunistic dynamic spectrum access as the sole means for entry into the wireless market. The technology-push is affected by the barrier of technological complexities linked to the requirement to protect highly sensitive incumbent systems. The market-pull forces are being negated by market lock-in and a strong status quo of well-established wireless players. This paper argues that overcoming these barriers and revitalizing the practical development of CR could be possible with the aid of light-touch governmental intervention. This could take the form of designating a dedicated CR band, which would benefit CR through less strict spectrum access requirements. A vibrant cognitive environment could flourish in this type of band, supporting CR innovation.     

Spectrum auctions: Distortionary input tax or efficient revenue instrument?

Spectrum license auctions are widely recognized by economists as more efficient than lotteries or administrative approaches to allocate exclusive rights to spectrum. But whether spectrum auctions are the most efficient spectrum policy still generates debate, in part because the answer may vary depending on exactly what is being optimized, what else is assumed or held constant, and the policies to which one is comparing spectrum auctions. This paper examines the complex confluence of US spectrum policy and fiscal policy. It concludes that economically efficient spectrum policy requires several distinct optimizations, including devolvement of an efficient set spectrum rights and the optimal approach to raising and recycling government revenue in that devolvement process. It also requires allocation policies that take into account possible distortions of the secondary market for spectrum via the capital gains tax. The paper argues that there is no compelling theoretical case or empirical evidence that spectrum auctions are distortionary, and examines cases in which the most efficient policy is to auction spectrum and “recycle” the revenue to offset more distortionary revenue instruments. This paper also examines cases in which it is most efficient to allocate spectrum rights without raising revenue, for example when transactions costs are high or distributional concerns can prevent or delay efficiency-enhancing reforms.     

Expanding mobile wireless capacity: The challenges presented by technology and economics

As demand for mobile broadband services continues to explode, mobile wireless networks must expand greatly their capacities. This paper describes and quantifies the economic and technical challenges associated with deepening wireless networks to meet this growing demand. Methods of capacity expansion divide into three general categories: the deployment of more radio spectrum; more intensive geographic reuse of spectrum; and increasing the throughput capacity of each MHz of spectrum within a given geographic area. The paper describes these several basic methods to deepen mobile wireless capacity. It goes on to measure the contribution of each of these methods to historical capacity growth within U.S. networks. The paper then describes the capabilities of 4G LTE wireless technology, and further innovations off of it, to further improve network capacity. These capacity expansion capabilities of LTE-Advanced along with traditional spectrum reuse are quantified and compared to forecasts of future demand to evaluate the ability of U.S. networks to match future demand. Without significantly increasing current spectrum allocations by 560 MHz over the 2014–2022 period, the presented model suggests that U.S. wireless capacity expansion will be inadequate to accommodate expected demand growth. This conclusion is in contrast to claims that the U.S. faces no spectrum shortage.     

The spectrum policy reform paving the way to cognitive radio enabled spectrum sharing

The increasing amount of data and video traffic carried by mobile networks has recently risen the demand for enhanced network capacity, more efficient use and more effective management of spectrum. Cognitive radio technologies candidate to respond to these urgent needs by allowing a near simultaneous band sharing. The regulation plays a crucial role in promoting the adoption of these technologies, in order to overcome the traditional paradigms of authorizations for exclusive spectrum usage. The article outlines spectrum management regimes where the implementation of frequency sharing technologies, including cognitive technologies, is foreseeable and brings them back to a comprehensive taxonomy of dynamic spectrum access and sharing models, in the effort to reconcile partially diverging approaches and nomenclatures suggested in literature. Theoretic analysis is supported by a number of illustrations and practical experiments with shared spectrum usage. Based on suggested taxonomy, the research aims at showing the evolutionary path toward the introduction and spreading of cognitive and other spectrum sharing technologies, pointing out relevant trends and instruments made available by the reform of EU Telecom Package, as well as at outlining the status of regulation, policy and standardization in Europe.     

Technology neutrality: Exploring the interaction between International Mobile Telecommunication and national spectrum management policies

This paper reviews ITU-R actions with respect to IMT standardisation, and explores how these actions affect national spectrum management decisions such as those related to technology neutrality. Our analysis, which is based on 52 interviews, demonstrates that the IMT standardisation activities do not explicitly influence the decision of the regulator on the adoption of technology neutrality. They do, however, contain a range of positive (encouraging) and negative (discouraging) perspectives that shape the regulator's views on technology neutrality are two contrasting views on whether there is mutual influence between the IMT definitions within the ITU-R, and 3G and 4G market definitions.Nationally IMT standardisation has largely no influence on the discrimination between mobile technology generations (e.g., 3G, 4G etc.). The IMT spectrum identification has positive influences on selecting technologies from the IMT family.     

小型工业企业运行效率的影响评价研究——以公司注册资本自治为背景

从2014年3月起我国公司注册资本方式改为认缴出资，且注册程序也大大简化了，这意味着我国正逐步放开管制，促使公司资本更有效地参与市场经济。资本出资、验资方式的改变，旨在提高市场经济的运行效率，所以本文选取小型工业企业作为研究对象，因为其对注册资本登记制度的改革最为敏感及受益，通过对其前后运行效率的评价研究来检验市场经济的运行效率和公司注册资本制改革的效果。得出结论：改革前后企业运行效率的主要影响因素是相同的，只是顺序有点变动；山东政策落地效果最好；江苏、广东充分调动社会资本力量的参与；浙江狠抓市场环境优化、扩大企业出口；河南高创业热情带动就业。表明公司注册资本制的改革是有效的，能够改善绝大多数省份企业运行效率。但同时也发现存在资本结构不合理、市场环境不好、市场化水平低等问题，就此提出了相关政策建议。     

Raising Rivals' Costs Strategies via Emission Permits Markets

In the present paper we examine the effect of emissions permit price manipulation within an oligopolistic model. We examine the effect that positioning strategies in permits markets have on the degree of competition in the product market as well as on social welfare. The analysis is based on the concept of raising rivals' cost strategies. We find that competition in the product market can be lessened substantially. The welfare effect is ambiguous. If the leader expands its market share at the expense of a less efficient rival, or if it excludes a less efficient entrant, overall efficiency may increase despite the decrease in the industry's output. When efficiency decreases, or when consumers' protection is a policy priority, the initial distribution of permits can be used to control power in the permits market. Such interventions though, improve efficiency only when policy makers have substantial information on the technological structure of the industry, and thus, should be used with caution. Given the importance of information, sharing of information and coordination of actions between policy makers is very important.     

The technical basis for spectrum rights: Policies to enhance market efficiency

This paper describes a conceptual framework to articulate clear rights of access to radio spectrum in a way that would foster an efficient market-based allocation of the resource. In this approach, regulators partition spectrum rights across the dimensions of space, time, frequency, and direction of propagation. They devolve each partition, called a licensed electrospace region (LER), to licensees who may buy, sell, aggregate, and subdivide their LERs at will. All signals outside an LER must have a power level of less than a regulated limit with de minimis exceptions. In addition, even within an LER, transmitter power or field strength must fall below a separate regulator-set level for the band. Licensees may deploy any devices and provide any services that do not violate these rules.     

基于Wi-Fi技术的气象装备实训平台设计

为实现对气象装备保障人员的便捷高效培训,运用无线通信技术,设计了基于Wi-Fi技术的气象装备可移动实训平台。系统通过无线通信模块将气象设备的串口协议数据转换成网络协议数据,再使用Wi-Fi无线技术将数据传输到计算机端,最后在计算机端将网络协议数据转换为串口协议数据,通过虚拟串口传送给气象应用软件,以此建立起气象设备与气象应用软件之间的无线透明传输链路,降低了布线复杂程度,提高了扩展的灵活度。实训平台采用移动式、无线通信和气象设备集中设计,解决了气象设备培训中设备种类多、布线复杂的难题,为气象设备技术保障培训提供了标准化培训环境。在对市级技术保障人员的实际培训中,验证了实训平台在实际操作中具有一定的实用性,可有效提高培训效率。此培训平台的设计为气象装备保障人员的培训提供了新的方法。     

Dynamic usage of narrowband spectrum

We examine the potential for expansion of the white space spectrum sharing model in the 400 MHz band. As opposed to UHF broadcast spectrum, which contains unassigned or idle segments known as white spaces, the 400 MHz band is characterised by intensive licence usage. However, productive spectrum usage does not guarantee allocative efficiency, which would require knowledge of the highest value service for each licence. 400 MHz frequencies are not priced on opportunity cost. It is therefore difficult to ascertain the economically efficient mix of services to deploy in the 400 MHz band. Drawing parallels with the high-economic value revealed and generated through the operations of unlicensed white space devices in UHF broadcast spectrum, we identify untapped 400 MHz spectrum capacity, which we refer to as narrowband spaces. Encouraging dynamic spectrum usage of narrowband spaces could, similarly to TV white space usage help realise the efficient allocation of the 400 MHz band. However, the narrowband nature of the 400 MHz licences and high licensing turnover imply a significantly different concept of dynamic spectrum access than that considered for TV Bands. The paper discusses regulatory implications and the type of services suited to exploit narrowband spaces.     

Will 5G lead to more spectrum sharing? Discussing recent developments of the LSA and the CBRS spectrum sharing frameworks

This paper discusses two recent spectrum management frameworks, the Licensed Shared Access (LSA) developed in Europe and the Citizens Broadband Radio Services (CBRS) developed in the United States (US), which build their management approach on spectrum sharing. The importance of these two frameworks, besides their leading normative roles, is that recent debates have shaped them as cases to consider in the adoption of the upcoming fifth generation (5G) of mobile communications technology, in particular in the C-band. A discussion on these two frameworks is organised by following the four-step decision-making guide for spectrum management developed by Pogorel (2007), which requires spectrum authorities to make decisions in four areas of spectrum management: frequency harmonization, technology standardization, type of usage rights and assignment procedures.Notwithstanding the similarities with respect to the four areas of spectrum management considered, the two frameworks differ on their implementation schedules. CBRS leads the way, with a handful of providers receiving government approval to manage spectrum access controllers, and as of mid 2020, scheduled to have allocated spectrum licenses on half of its available spectrum. On the contrary, European countries have shown scarce interest towards implementing the LSA, despite the extensive work carried out by regulatory and standardization bodies.This may suggest that there are external contextual factors which influence the successful implementation of spectrum sharing frameworks. An interesting aspect which deserves further investigation is the institutional context in which decisions related to radio spectrum management are taken. Unlike the US authorities, European institutions do not possess coercive enforcement powers with respect to spectrum sharing. This key difference may contribute to explaining the different speed at which LSA and CBRS are implemented.