政府部门预算支出管理制度的选择——基于新制度经济学的视角

环境管制旨在应对因资源环境消费而产生的外部性问题,它通过三种不同类型政策工具的运用得以实施,即:命令与控制型、基于市场型与自愿型。对政府而言,这意味着三种具有不同交易成本发生和负担机制的管制手段选择。环境管制的发展包含了一种政府在管制过程中不断减少交易成本的尝试,这种努力使得在最新的环境管制形态———自愿环境协议中,企业、非政府组织等多元社会主体共同形成决策并参与管制的实施,分担改善环境质量的社会责任与成本投入,环境管制因而实现了从管理到治理的转变。     

我国环境管制发展的新趋势

一、环境管制政策工具的类型(一)环境管制政策工具的纵向描述。根据环境管制政策工具的特征和演变历程,环境政策类型有两分法和三分法。两分法将环境政策工具划分为传统的或“命令—控制”型环境管制工具和市场化环境管制工具(或基于市场的环境管制)。三分法将环境政策工具划分为三种类型:第一代工具———传统的“命令与控制”型管制;第二代工具———市场化工具或基于市场的政策工具(MBI,Market-Based Instrument);第三代工具———自愿环境管制。这两种分法没有本质的区别,前者是将自愿环境管制纳入到市场化工具之中,而后者则是将自愿…     

我国自愿环境协议的第三方主体选择及其职能安排刍议

自愿环境协议在环境管制的实务中得以流畅运用,政府与企业以外的第三方主体对企业环境绩效所进行的评估功不可没。在我国,可由政府对从事环境服务业的法人实体开展资质认证,依此判断这些组织机构是否具备为协助政府与企业实施自愿环境协议所必要的环境审计能力,并根据所获得的结论建立第三方协议参与者官方认证资源库。通过认证的第三方在自愿环境协议中负责对企业进行环境审计、环境目标执行计划书评审和履约绩效监督,企业购买此类环境服务的费用享受公共财政的支持。     

产权结构与制度环境降低交易成本的机理研究*

产权能否降低交易成本与产权可分性下的不同产权结构与制度环境的适应性水平密切相关。以此为基本思路，本文以产权的可分性为切入点，对产权结构和制度环境进行了类型划分，并深入探究了产权结构、制度环境、交易成本间适应性下运行的一般机理。由此说明，产权结构、制度环境的优化均可降低交易成本，产权结构与制度环境的匹配度越高，交易成本降低越多。政府失灵型等六种产权结构类型与负国家环境水平指数型等六种制度环境类型的具体匹配，可以更好地探究出产权结构与制度环境深度匹配降低交易成本的路径。     

自愿性环境协议中企业行为及在中国的应用

随着社会的不断进步,环境的不断恶化,环境问题日益突出.政府传统的环境管制手段中出现管制俘虏现象,使社会资源浪费严重.自愿性环境管制作为第三大管制工具的出现为政府解决环境问题提供新的思路.本文首先介绍了自愿性环境协议的发展历程,然后分析了企业参与环境协议的动机以及在中国的实践情况,并针对中国实施自愿性环境协议提出相应建议.     

会计信息披露的适度管制

根据代理成本理论和信号传递理论,上市公司存在自愿性披露的动因,但是,这两种理论都是忽略契约成本的,如果加上契约成本,非管制状态下的自愿披露将导致更高的市场交易成本。因此,出于相互识别和降低交易成本的目的,适度的会计信息披露管制是会计信息供给者和会计信息需求者共同的需求,它既是证券交易者签订契约的基础,又是其契约实施的保障。但是,会计信息披露管制是一个公共物品,只能通过政治程序——公共选择来供给,因此,会计信息披露的适度管制必须充分考虑会计信息供给者与会计信息需求者寻求管制的激励,寻找均衡二者利益的最佳披露点。     

服务型政府建构中的制度均衡

在管制型政府形态的制度供给模式下，由于不能满足市场和社会主体对制度的需求，出现制度实际供给与需求意愿不一致的制度失衡。通过实现从管制型制度向服务型制度变迁，达到制度均衡，是构建服务型政府的制度机制。服务型政府的制度均衡路径有三种：价值观念对公民权的重视、服务型制度本身的均衡以及服务型制度与管制型制度的均衡。     

中国环境管制的现状、问题及其对策

随着我国经济的高速发展,环境形势日益严峻,而环境管制作为解决环境问题的有效途径,在我国取得了一定成就,同时也面临着一些问题。基于此现状,本文主要从环境法律法规体系、环境管制机构设置以及相关的管制政策三个方面来研究我国的环境管制现状,并从政府治理的角度分析我国环境管制存在的问题。我国需进一步完善环境管制的法律体系,相应调整管制机构体系,以限制地方政府对环境管制的不正当干预,从而保证环境管制政策的有效实施。     

转基因食品标签管制方式的经济学分析

目前各国对转基因食品采取了“不加贴标签”、“自愿加贴标签”以及“强制性加贴柝签”等三种标签管制方式。本文应用消费者拟线性效用函数模型,对强制性加贴标签管制方式对消费者福利的影响进行了深入探讨。在此基础上通过对现有三种标签管制方式的比较分析,确定了各种标签管制方式实施的条件与影响,并认为在我国现有条件下,只要检测成本不高到难以承受的地步,对转基因食品应采取强制加贴标签管制方式。     

美国社会养老保险基金投资运营的政府管制经验及对我国的启示

我国社会保险基金投资运营处于起步阶段,为规范投资行为,防范投资风险,可借鉴美国社会养老保险基金投资运营模式中的有益做法。美国社会养老保险基金投资运营的政府管制设计主要体现在政府管制职能、基金投资管制模式、财务管制模式等方面,有效保障了社会保险资金投资运营的保值增值。我国可借鉴美国联邦政府实施社会养老保险基金投资运营的政府管制经验,通过实施基金投资运营管制的政府主导化;严格遵循第三方运营原则;注重技术分析,加强风险控制;稳健提高社会养老保险基金收益率;扩大养老领域证券基金和产业基金的比例等措施,加强对社会养老保险资金投资运营的有效监管。     

Factors that influence transaction costs in development offsets: Who bears what and why?

Environmental policy instruments generate transaction costs to public and private parties. There is a growing literature reporting on the size of transaction costs produced by environmental policy instruments. This paper extends that literature through an analysis of the factors that influence transaction costs in environmental policy and how this influence occurs. The theory based factors that influence transaction costs are categorised as: 1) transaction characteristics; 2) transactor characteristics; 3) nature of the institutional environment; and 4) nature of the institutional arrangements. We examined how these factors influenced transaction costs through the analysis of two Australian-based development offset schemes with different policy designs. We found evidence of all four theory-based categories of influence in the policy case studies. The degree of influence and how each factor influenced transaction costs varies across the two policies and between parties. Policy design as a component of the institutional environment had a particularly large bearing on transaction costs of offset buyers and the policy administrator. An important contribution to transaction cost theory assumes the institutional environment as given.     

Transaction costs and environmental policy design

This article synthesizes the growing empirical literature on transaction costs to identify pragmatic design recommendations for environmental and natural resource policies. The New Institutional Economics literature recognizes that appropriate policy choice and design will be a function of the specific characteristics of the problem. The physical and institutional determinants of both transaction costs and abatement costs should be considered in the policy design process due to potential interactions between them. Analysts also need to incorporate the extent to which the technologies, institutional environment, governance structures, or policy designs can be changed; some factors can only be adjusted to or “designed around” while others can be designed differently. This framework highlights the importance of property rights since transaction costs will be incurred to obtain or retain property rights and since the rights assignment may affect both the magnitudes and distribution of costs. Another implication is that education and extension programs or use of behavioral economics concepts to affect choices can be cost-effective in some circumstances. Policy design should take advantage of economies of scale and foster technical change. Appropriate sequencing of policy instruments may decrease transaction costs, particularly if there is potential for technical change.     

Improving environmental decisions: A transaction-costs story

A multidisciplinary team of researchers made efforts to influence the design and implementation of environmental policy in Australia. A focus of these efforts was the development of the Investment Framework for Environmental Resources (INFFER). In addition, the team undertook a range of communication activities, training, user support, and participation in committees and enquiries. Transaction costs were relevant to these efforts in a variety of ways. Environmental managers perceived INFFER to involve relatively high transaction costs. A balance was struck between the system having simplicity (and low transaction costs) and delivering environmental benefits. Transaction costs were factored into the planning and prioritisation processes developed. For example, public and private transaction costs are accounted for in the calculation of benefit:cost ratios and in the choice of policy mechanisms. There are diverse roles that transaction costs play in the processes of developing, implementing and influencing environmental policy programmes. A key observation is that appropriate strategic investment in transaction costs can improve decisions and increase net benefits from an environmental programme. A well-designed decision process can involve incurring transaction costs at one stage in order to save transaction costs at a later stage.     

Transaction cost measurement for evaluating environmental policies

Policy choice and policy design need to take account of transaction costs in order to increase the efficiency and sustainability of policies. However, transaction costs must first be measured to be included in the evaluation of alternative environmental or natural resource policies. While a number of studies measure transaction costs, there has been no systematic treatment of the fundamental issues involved. This article examines the issues involved in transaction cost measurement and makes recommendations regarding a typology of costs as well as the measurement methodologies themselves. In particular, methods used for nonmarket valuation of environmental goods may have potential for the measurement of transaction costs.     

The Economic Efficiency of Policy Reform and Partial Market Liberalization under Transaction Costs

The article presents an integrated analysis of the effects of domestic and trade policy reform on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. It develops a general multiagent, multicommodity model, where transaction costs are the costs of resources used in the exchange process. The influence of domestic and trade policy (including both price and quantity instruments) on distorted market equilibrium is analysed. Alternative concepts of distorted equilibrium are presented and investigated. They provide a basis for evaluating the effects of multilateral partial market liberalization on resource allocation and welfare under transaction costs. New conditions are derived under which multilateral policy reforms generate Pareto improvements.     

Business incentives for sustainability: a property rights approach

Public and private demands for sustainable development put pressure on firms to develop strategies that include environmental concerns. Environmental effects from products often appear as externalities, outside the legal boundary of the producing company. These companies often possess the best competence to optimise the total life cycle environmental performance of its products. They are, however, neither obliged nor stimulated enough by policy incentives to do so from a sustainable development perspective. The policy instruments used today are mostly of a control-and-demand type, i.e. they do not create sufficient incentives to go further than hedging over set requirements. Environmental concerns and tightened environmental policy parameters have mostly been associated with the notion of additional costs and thus a restriction on economic performance. However, since the mid 1990s, several papers have called for corporate win–win situations as well as instruments giving up-stream incentives for change, but not enough abatement of environmental impacts has emerged in reality. Perhaps this is due to the lack of proper connection between economic theory on the one hand, and incentive advocating articles and instruments on the other. We propose a concept for trading of product life cycle (PLC) emission rights, based on property rights and transaction cost theories considering the problem with asymmetric information over the value chain. The initial financial impacts from such PLC instruments are shown to be significant for the system provider, since emissions—and resource use—become production costs. This provides economic incentives to take an increased responsibility for information flow as well as initiatives for product innovations.     

环境规制科技政策对科技进步与经济增长的影响

基于事件系统理论构建系统性、多层次性和综合性的政策量化分析框架，从政策属性、政策目标和政策工具3个维度对我国1985—2015年制定的198条环境规制科技政策进行量化研究。基于政策评估中的工具理性和价值理性两个层面，从环保科技进步效果和经济增长效应两个维度对环境规制科技政策有效性进行评估。研究发现，我国环境规制科技政策工具及政策工具协同对环保科技进步和经济增长的影响存在显著方向性差异。为此，进一步讨论了我国环境规制科技政策工具及工具协同的政策有效性评估结果，可为我国环境规制科技政策的完善和有效实施提供决策依据。     

Talk is cheap,or is it? The cost of consulting about uncertain reallocation of water in the Murray–Darling Basin,Australia

In this paper we reflect on the challenge of reallocating water resources from agricultural interests to environmental uses. The area of interest is the Murray–Darling Basin, Australia, although the evidence presented provides salient lessons for a range of settings. We draw on the transaction cost literature where the tasks of re-designing and using institutions can help conceptualise the costs associated with policy change. A framework for improving ex ante assessment of transaction costs and its relationship to transformation or abatement costs is elaborated, especially as it relates to community consultation exercises. Against the background of the water reforms of the past three decades we conclude that policy makers and administrators could limit increases in transformation costs and contain transaction costs by giving greater attention to the form of community consultation, by taking account of the sources of uncertainty that attend policy choices and recognising the potential for consultation fatigue.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments in the Presence of Imperfect Compliance – A Case Study

In this paper, we aim to include rule making, implementation, monitoring and enforcement costs into the cost comparison of policy instruments. We use a simple partial equilibrium model and apply it to the textile industry. The model includes discrete abatement functions and costly monitoring and enforcement. The case study uses individual firm data to simulate the differences in abatement costs and compliance decisions between firms. We compare combinations of regulatory instruments (emission taxes, emission standards and technology standards) and enforcement instruments (criminal fines, civil fines and transaction offers). We show that the inclusion of information, monitoring and enforcement costs indeed alters the relative cost efficiency of the different instruments.