学贷险是国家助学贷款的助推器——关于商业保险参与国家助学贷款模式的分析

国家助学贷款政策的实施,对帮助贫困大学生完成学业起到了推进作用。但虽走过了十年,目前助学贷款的进展较为缓慢。因此,针对国家助学贷款政策及发展现状,以及目前国家助贷政策落实的瓶颈问题,和提出在国家助贷体系中引入保险机制,就是用市场化手段解决助贷款瓶颈问题。最后论述了引入保险机制对国家助学贷款产生的深远意义。     

发展高校商业化助学贷款的思考

文章在分析国家助学贷款政策及实际运作效果的基础上,针对教育金融在高等院校助学贷款业务方面的缺失,提出了发展教育金融,开展商业化助学贷款的政策建议.     

发展高校商业化助学贷款的思考

文章在分析国家助学贷款政策及实际运作效果的基础上，针对教育金融在高等院校助学贷款业务方面的缺失，提出了发展教育金融，开展商业化助学贷款的政策建议。     

我国金融生态系统健康状况分析

改革开放以来,我国的金融业得到了快速发展,金融生态得到了极大改善.但我国的金融生态存在着生态链短粗化、金融生态主体缺位及生态环境脆弱等问题,影响着金融支持经济的持续、健康、快速发展.因此,我国的金融生态建设应从金融生态链、生态主体和生态环境几方面进行优化.     

博弈论视角下的高校国家助学贷款成本分析--以“河南模式”为例

国家助学贷款政策于1999年起试行，经过不断调整和完善在我国高等教育事业的发展中正发挥着越来越大的作用。然而，由于国家助学贷款的政府强制性、各利益主体间的信息不对称性及国家征信系统的不健全性等因素的影响，导致国家助学贷款各利益主体在政策的制定及执行过程中相互间不断进行博弈，寻求各自利益最大化。以国家助学贷款“河南模式”为例，从该模式存在的问题入手，例如：目前河南模式的应用仅局限在河南省内，助学贷款需求远未实现；风险补偿金的发放周期较长，教贷中心和高校前期垫付大笔运作成本，高校资金压力增大，以至于出现高校“惜贷”现象；学生经济独立意识淡薄等。对各利益主体从博弈论的角度进行成本分析，提出优化国家助学贷款“河南模式”的对策和建议，进一步推进国家助学贷款机制的良性运作。     

美国的国家助学贷款

回眸已经过去的2004年,这一年,中国的国家助学贷款遭遇了最严重的生存危机。面对国家助学贷款的大面积停贷,如果不是国家紧急调整助学贷款政策,真不知中国高校的贫困生们如何生存。在讨论国家助学贷款生存现状的时候,让我们来看看美国的国家助学贷款,美国实施此种贷款比我们早,     

国家助学贷款面临三大"瓶颈"

为推动我国高等教育的进一步发展,中国人民银行、教育部、财政部于1999年联合颁发了《关于国家助学贷款的管理规定(试行)》,2000年8月又联合制定了《关于助学贷款管理的补充意见》,将贷款的方式扩大到无担保的信用贷款。2003年,教育部又下发了《关于切实做好资助高校经济困难学生工作的紧急通知》,使得助学贷款成为热点。但从国家助学贷款的试行情况来看,形势并不乐观。到2001年5月底,全国53.4万名学生申请国家助学贷款,16.9万名学生获贷,获贷率仅为21.6%。到2002年6月底,全国累计申请贷款的学生为112.5万人,获得贷款的人数累计为35.1万人,…     

国家助学贷款制度完善构想

国家助学贷款制度在实施的五年中，弊端日益显现。要解决这些问题可以从国家、银行、学校、借款人等方面着手，通过建立个人金融信用制度，发行助学贷款彩票或教育彩票为其筹集建立担保基金，同时可通过在借款人的生源地开办助学贷款业务，改变担保方式等方法来降低银行风险，从而使国家助学贷款制度逐步完善。     

国家助学贷款是拉动消费信贷的龙头

在发达国家个人消费信贷占商业银行贷款总额的20—30％,美国的花旗银行个 人消费信贷占贷总额的60％,而我国的个人消费信贷不到贷款总额的1％。本文 从消费信贷的发展趋势和国家助学贷款的现状提出,在全国高等教育学历证书 网上查询系统的基础上建立大学生信用征询系统,来阐述国家助学贷款是利国、 利民,是拉动我国消费信贷的龙头。     

利用拖欠模型分析国家助学贷款的违约行为

国家助学贷款是信用贷款,它无须提供担保、抵押或质押。由于担保的缺位使得违约率和不良贷款率都很高,这严重阻碍国家助学贷款健康发展。加强贷后管理,采取切实措施降低风险,已成为推动国家助学贷款工作必须着力解决的重要问题。利用拖欠模型,可以对国家助学贷款违约行为进行经济分析,讨论各种因素对拖欠水平的影响,由此得出:适当延长还款期限,降低每期还款额将会降低贷款的违约率,从而推动国家助学贷款健康持续发展。     

建立高校助学贷款风险防范机制的构想

高校贫困生助学贷款政策的正确实施,关系到目前我国高校贫困学生的正常学习、教育公平和社会公平大局。国家助学贷款政策推出已经十年,历经调整变化,但仍然存在一些明显的机制缺陷,本文认为要实现高校贫困生助学贷款的可持续发展,建立高校资助贷款的风险防范机制十分必要。主要从以下五个方面着手：一是构建多元化的资助贷款体系,实现资助贷款主体多元化、资助手段多样化、还贷方式的多样化,使资助贷款更加人性化、科学化;二是建立资助贷款风险的顸警机制,建立“双重”环节的顸警机制,加强各参与方的良性互动;三是建立政策性资助贷款担保体系,通过建立政策性担保机构、建立银行、担保机构与政府共担风险机制;四是完善资助贷款的激励一约束机制,强化风险主体的责任意识;五是完善资助贷款的支持体系。     

国家助学贷款风险成因分析与对策研究

国家助学贷款工作是党中央、国务院实施科教兴国战略的一项重大决策,是适应我国教育体制改革和发展的需要。加强国家助学贷款风险管理,是各商业银行面临的急需解决的问题。从国家助学贷款风险的特征出发,分析贷款风险的成因,提出防范国家助学贷款风险的对策建议。     

微小企业融资困境与信贷机制创新

微小企业融资长期被正规金融机构边缘化的原因在于为其提供贷款"成本高、抵押难、风险大".与大银行相比,中小银行在获取"软信息"、降低单位交易成本、防范信用风险等方面更具比较优势,中小银行通过信贷机制?的创新向微小企业提供贷款能按照商业可持续原则实现金融机构、微小企业、政府等主体的共赢.本文基于数理模型简要论证了微小企业融资难,且其融资困境的化解在于信贷机制的创新的问题.在此基础上通过对台州市商业银行小本贷款案例分析得出相应结论,为微小企业融资市场正在不断深化的中国提供一些有益的启示.     

积极的小微企业信贷政策研究

小微企业占我国企业群体的绝大部分,是社会财富的主要创造者,也是吸纳就业的主渠道,在我国国民经济中占有重要地位,但小微企业贷款难问题突出.小微企业贷款难,既有企业自身和商业银行方面的原因,更有存款准备金率政策对小银行存在歧视、资本占用系数的规定缺乏支持小微企业贷款的充分安排、贷款指标没有充分向小微企业倾斜等信贷政策方面的原因.因此,应牢固树立“小微企业贷款≠高风险贷款”的理念,将主营小微企业贷款的小银行当作发展小微企业的战略重点,降低小银行的存款准备金率,降低小企业贷款的风险权重和资本匹配系数,信贷指标分配向小微企业贷款倾斜,实施积极宽松的小微企业信贷政策.     

Determinants of microcredit repayment in Portugal: analysis of borrowers,loans and business projects

Microcredit programs in Portugal represent a unique case for studying the microcredit repayment determinants in a developed country, as it experienced a financial hardship in 2008–2009, with economic and social consequences that led to unemployment crisis. This research examined the determinants of microcredit loan repayment based on a sample of 752 microcredit loans granted in Portugal by the National Association for the Right to Credit, adopting individual lending mechanisms and granting loans through partnerships with several credit institutions. This is the first study to ascertain the influence that a set of factors – grouped into three categories: borrowers’ individual characteristics; loan characteristics; and characteristics of business projects implemented by borrowers – has on the repayment ability of microcredit programs, in a developed country of the Eurozone. Moreover, this is the first study using an ordered logistic regression (OLR) in estimating the determinants of microcredit loan repayment. Similar to previous studies, married borrowers tend to repay loans faster as they tend to be more responsible than single borrowers. Nationality seems to be an issue as foreigners tends to default the repayment loans. Finally, those involved in manufacturing activities perform better than those involved in service activities in repaying their loans. This clearly indicates that in developed countries special attention needs to be provided to minority groups as well as market/supply conditions, which are not normally considered in less favored economic countries.     

The loan structure and housing tenure decisions in an equilibrium model of mortgage choice

The objective of this paper is to understand how loan structure affects (i) the borrower's selection of a mortgage contract and (ii) the aggregate economy. We develop a quantitative equilibrium theory of mortgage choice where households can choose from a menu of long-term (nominal) mortgage loans. The model accounts for observed patterns in housing consumption, ownership, and portfolio allocations. We find that the loan structure is a quantitatively significant factor in a household's housing finance decision. The model suggests that the mortgage structure preferred by a household is dependent on age and income and that loan products with low initial payments offer an alternative to mortgages with no downpayment. These effects are more important when inflation is low. The presence of inflation reduces the real value of the mortgage payment and the outstanding loan over time reducing mobility. Changes in the structure of mortgages have implications for risk sharing.     

Market structure and credit procyclicality: Lessons from loan markets in the European Union banking sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the market structure has an impact on procyclicality in the European Union bank loan markets. The cyclical responses of three types of bank loans (residential mortgage loans, consumer loans, and corporate loans) are quantified separately using the interacted panel vector autoregression model at the country level and the single-equation panel regression model at the bank level. Using a sample of 26 European Union countries, we find that the procyclical responses of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans are significantly stronger and prolonged when the banking sector is more concentrated or dominated by foreign banks. However, we find that there are nonlinear relationships between the market structure and credit procyclicality based on bank-level data. We also find some heterogeneities between advanced and transitioning European Union banking sectors. Finally, our findings confirm the leading role of residential mortgages in intensifying credit fluctuations.     

基于信息不对称的中小企业贷款模式创新研究

通过对银企信息不对称情况下的贷款供需情况进行分析,指出由于软信息所反映的企业未来价值是隐性的,因此规模匹配只能在有限程度上解决中小企业贷款难的问题。本文认为:中小企业申请的贷款数额相对于其自身规模及债务清偿能力过大,是其难以从银行获得足够资金支持的原因;分散和转移银行提供超过中小企业债务清偿能力的贷款的风险才是解决中小企业贷款难的有效途径。据此,本文提出两种新型的银行贷款风险分散和转移模式——还贷保险模式和股权激励模式。     

INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE: A LOAN MECHANISM-DESIGN APPROACH

International Financial Institutions (IFIs) tie resource transfers to capital-scarce countries to improvements in their economic policies and institutions. The objective of this assistance is twofold: to augment the recipient's capital base and to improve its allocation of resources. This paper offers a political-economy explanation for the limited success of some of these loan programs. In our model, governments select policies under the influence of interest groups. Their capacity to absorb IFI loans and their reform efforts are both unobservable to the IFI. An optimally designed loan mechanism must create sufficient incentives – in the form of rewards and punishments – to counter the influence of interest groups on economic policy choices. The loan mechanism is, however, constrained in two ways: it cannot punish a country so severely as to threaten its political stability and it must remain affordable to the IFI. Whenever reform incentives are inadequate, a government will accept the loan but cheat on the implementation of reforms. If, on the other hand, the mechanism design is optimal, it might be so costly to the IFI that a well-entrenched interest group can block the reform program. Nonetheless, the availability of properly designed loan mechanisms will push governments to implement partial reforms even if the optimal mechanism is too costly for the IFI.     

Funding self-employment – the role of consumer credit

This article investigates whether self-employed households use consumer loans – in particular, instalment loans and overdrafts – to finance business activities. Controlling for financial and nonfinancial household variables, we show that self-employed households particularly use personal overdrafts significantly more often than employee households. When analysing the correlation between consumer loan take-ups and consumption of self-employed in comparison to employee households, we find first evidence that overdrafts are used by self-employed to finance their business as well. This indicates that intermingling constitutes a financing strategy when regular business loans might not be accessible.