我国商业银行完善“三会”之对策

随着我国国有商业银行的股份制改造,公司治理成为社会的热点问题。而其中内部治理结构也就“是三会(”股东大会、董事会、监事会)的完善也成为焦点问题。本文从具体细节方面阐述了保护中小股东的利益,保证董事会的独立性和确保监事会的监督职能。     

论制衡机制在我国公司治理结构中的完善

当前,我国公司治理中制衡机制的立法存在着严重的股权结构失衡问题,主要表现在董事会独立性较弱,从属地位的监事会监督职能虚化,利益相关者治理机制不够完善,上市公司独立董事与监事会的职权的冲突等方面.完善我国公司治理中的制衡机制,应明确公司各组织机构的职权范围,加强公司中小股东参与股东会的意识,完善股东代表诉讼制度和董事、监事、高级管理人员义务的规定,建立合理的激励与约束机制,从而提高公司的经营效率.     

上市公司治理及其对会计信息质量的影响研究

公司治理机制与会计信息质量两者密不可分、相互影响。公司治理机制能否有效运行取决于会计信息质量的高低,会计信息的有效性保证了公司治理机构的有效运行。会计信息质量被许多因素所牵制,但其根本原因在于公司治理结构存在问题。上市公司应对股权结构进行改革,充分发挥各层股东对公司经营层的监督作用;加强董事会功能,保证董事会的独立性,,增加独立董事在公司的比重,加强董事会的战略管理能力和责任范围;改进股东大会投票表决制度,促进股权改革的多元化,避免大股东全权控制的现象,扩大被选举对象范围,完善实施细则,保障累积投票制度的能够贯彻落实;加强监事会建设,明确监事会的权利义务,将监事会与独立董事的权利范围合理划分。     

如何建立健全公司治理结构

我国公司治理结构在股东大会、董事会及监事会制度等方面尚存在一些缺陷,妨碍了公司的健康发展。应从完善公司治理结构的方案和措施上加大改革力度,进一步降低国有股比例,从立法上明确董事会的性质地位,明确董事会和总经理的权限,发挥好监事会和全体股东的作用。     

完善我国公司治理结构的思考

随着企业竞争的加剧,公司治理结构完善与否是决定企业命运的重要因素。目前我国公司在内部治理和外部治理中仍存在着股权过度集中、董事会独立性欠缺、监事会作用发展不好、激励机制滞后、股票市场不发达、经理市场不太完善、债券市场不成熟、中介机构违纪操作等问题。应从内部合理配置股权、优化董事会的构成及发挥监事会职能上加以改进,促进股票、债券及经理人市场的不断完善,将公司治理结构提向更高层次。     

论新公司法对公司治理结构的完善

公司治理结构中存在多元利益主体,即股东、董事和经理、监事.新公司法对我国公司治理结构中的股东大会、董事会、监事会进行了完善,针对完善过程中出现的新问题展开进一步探讨以更好地贯彻新公司法中相关制度的精髓.     

我国上市公司治理结构存在的问题及其完善的对策

当前,在我国上市公司治理结构中存在的问题主要是上市公司监事会如同虚设,股权结构不合理,股东大会流于形式,董事会与经理管理层的关联性过强等。完善我国上市公司治理结构,应加强上市公司监事会的法律职责并强化其权利,调整公司产权结构;有效规范公司董事会的运作,增加独立董事的人数;赋予经理管理成员独立的地位,从而提高上市公司市场竞争力,使上市公司在激烈的市场竞争中得以生存与发展。     

我国公司治理结构与中小股东权利保护

公司治理结构,是指适应公司的产权结构,以股东与经营者分离、分立和整合为基础,连接并规范股东会、董事会、监事会、经理相互之间权利义务关系的制度安排。公司制度中,股东因向公司出资而享有股权,配置科学、运行有效的公司治理结构,能最大限度地保障股权的行使,充分满足所有股东的利益追求。但现行公司治理结构,犹如一柄“双刃剑”,在维持公司存续的同时,大股东对中小股东权利的侵害始终无法避免。本文试图从完善我国公司治理结构出发,提出加强对中小股东的权利保护措施。     

审计委员会制度若干问题的研究

审计委员会制度在公司治理结构中,能够发挥增强对企业管理当局的监管、构建良好的企业财务关系、协助董事会作出正确决策、提高外部审计独立性的作用。审计委员会制度在我国逐渐得到了认可和发展的同时,也逐渐暴露出了法律法规不健全、独立董事缺乏独立性、审计委员会与监事会方面的职责重叠、上市公司的治理结构存在缺陷等问题。完善我国审计委员会制度的对策是:完善相关法律制度和其他配套措施;改进独立董事的形成机制;处理好审计委员会与监事会的关系。     

公司治理对会计信息披露质量影响因素分析

公司治理是股东、董事会、经理人三方形成的制衡机制,公司通过这套机制保证会计信息质量。而造成会计信息失真的根源在于公司治理的缺陷,股权集中,大股东侵占小股东利益;董事会内部人员控制,独立董事不独立,监事会失效;经理人薪酬与激励机制失衡。     

The Impact of the Dual Board Structure and Board Diversity: Evidence from Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs)

Chinese listed companies have a two-tier (dual) governance structure that comprises a supervisory board/committee (SB) and the board of directors (BoD). However, as there is no hierarchical relationship between them, the two boards are independent. This is different from the governance mechanism in Continental Europe in which the SB appoints the directors of the management board; in this sense, the Chinese two-tier governance structure is unique. We investigate the impact of governance characteristics and ownership structure on gender diversity of both the BoD and the SB for a sample of 892 Chinese Initial Public Offerings floated in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. We find that the average proportion of female directors and female SB members on the BoD and the SB are 10 and 22 %, respectively. Using both static and dynamic panel data methods, we find that there is no significant impact of board structure on gender diversity in China. However, we find a positive and significant relationship between SB size and gender diversity. We also find that the higher the state ownership, the lower the female representation on both boards. Finally, our findings show that there is a bi-directional relationship between financial performance and the proportion of female directors sitting on the BoD.     

Reactivity and Passivity After Enforcement Actions: Better Late Than Never

We examine the dynamics between enforcement actions and the responses from both the board of directors and supervisory boards amid China’s governance reform. Rather than examining determinants of fraudulent activities, we investigate, after enforcement actions are imposed, whether the board of directors and supervisory boards react differently, and whether their different reactions play a role in preventing future occurrences of frauds. We find that both boards react to enforcement actions, but only the responses from the board of directors help us curb future enforcements under certain circumstances. The supervisory board fails to play any role in preventing future enforcements, even though it is one of the two monitoring mechanisms in the listed companies. Policy implications are discussed.     

How Does Corporate Governance Affect Loan Collateral? Evidence from Chinese SOEs and Non‐SOEs

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the collateral requirements for firms' bank loans in China. We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large shareholders face lower collateral requirements, which is more pronounced in non‐state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in SOEs. Regarding board characteristics, we find that smaller board size, more independent directors, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman, and larger supervisory board size can reduce a firm's use of collateral; the effect of all the preceding characteristics is more pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China, corporate governance structures are able to affect bank‐lending decisions in respect of collateral requirements and that the influence depends on the controlling shareholder type and associated agency problems.     

Do Internal Governance Mechanisms Impact on Firm Performance? Empirical Evidence from the Financial Sector in China

The financial sector plays an important intermediary role in the Chinese economy. However, there has been very limited research concerning improvement in corporate governance within this sector. Using an unbalanced data set of 139 firm-year observations covering 1999 to 2009, this study examines the impact of internal governance mechanisms on the performance of Chinese listed financial institutions. Findings suggest that state ownership, legal person ownership, board size, and supervisory board meetings are negatively related to the profitability of these institutions, whereas factors including ownership concentration, foreign ownership, independent directors, board meetings, and supervisory board size have no impacts.     

企业内部会计控制目标初探

本文认为,内部控制的目标不仅是单位管理经济活动、实施内部控制所要达到的标准,也是外部审计人员或社会中介机构评价内部控制系统的重要依据,良好的内部控制必须设有明确的目标。内部会计控制目标分为所有者目标和经营管理者目标,按照公司治理结构层次划分为股东、股东大会、董事会、监事会、经理、财会经理、内部审计;按内容层次划分为内部制度科学合理,查错防弊病及时准确,财产安全完整,业务活动健康运行,风险控制系统有效,会计资料真实完整,会计信息及时有用,管理制度健全完善,管理效率真实高效,国家法规贯彻执行,经济效益不断提高,职业道德完善升华等。     

董事会特征、盈余管理动机与非流动资产处置

本文以沪深两市2007-2014年发生非流动资产处置损益的A股上市公司为样本,分析处置非流动资产的盈余管理动机以及公司董事会特征对真实盈余管理的抑制作用。研究结果表明：上市公司为了实现扭亏的目标,存在利用非流动资产处置收益实施盈余管理的行为;董事会治理机制中,董事长与总经理两职合一、独立董事比例和董事会开会次数与真实盈余管理水平显著负相关;相对于民营上市公司,国有上市公司真实盈余管理动机更强,其董事长与总经理两职合一和独立董事比例抑制盈余管理的功能优于民营上市公司,而民营上市公司的董事会开会次数的监督功能更为有效。     

安徽省上市公司董事会治理与公司绩效关系的实证研究

以安徽省上市公司为研究样本,对董事会治理与公司绩效的关系进行实证分析,结果表明:适当的董事会规模、董事薪酬与董事持股比例对公司绩效有积极作用;独立董事比例、董事会领导权结构与董事变更对公司绩效影响不显著;过多的董事会会议不利于公司绩效的提高。     

我国董事会约束机制现状及其问题——对我国500家上市公司的描述性实证分析

完善的董事会约束机制是确保上市公司董事会有效参与公司决策与监督的关键。由于我国上市公司处于由行政型治理向经济型治理转化的过程中,公司治理的各项外部监督机制如公司控制权市场、产品市场、专业董事市场等对上市公司董事会的约束力较弱。掌握董事会治理的状况,强化对董事会的约束,对提高董事会治理的效率具有一定的指导意义。     

Code of Conduct for Non-Executive and Supervisory Directors

After the corporate scandals at the beginning of the new millennium, corporate governance codes were drafted and implemented in national laws and regulations. Unfortunately, due to an ongoing supply of new financial scandals and societal deceptions, our society increasingly distrusts executive directors, non-executive directors and supervisory board members, as they often appeared to play a significant role in these scandals. Non-executive directors (NEDs) and supervisory directors (SDs) are often accused of having overlooked the important issues in their supervising role or having failed to intervene in company decision making. Previous research has shown that many NEDs and SDs operate on the basis of their own unwritten rules, which may very well be different from those of their colleagues. In this article we examine whether and how a code of conduct or code of ethics might help to further clarify how NEDs/SDs should act. We also investigated the views of NEDs/SDs themselves. It appears that current corporate governance codes are not sufficient to guide directors on behavioral aspects of their supervisory role. This article shows that a code of conduct could provide this guidance to NEDs/SDs on several issues. First, a code of conduct would compel the Supervisory Board to reflect on its own values. Second, it would compel NEDs/SDs to verbalize their unwritten rules. The results may be applied internationally and could have relevance to the experience of executive directors in addition. This article may serve as a discussion document for other jurisdictions in addition.