Cooperative investments induced by contract law

I revisit the economic analysis of contract law for a setting of cooperative investments. While Che and Chung (1999) have shown that expectation damages perform rather poorly, I argue that this negative result follows from their implicit assumption of unilateral expectation damages. Yet the very nature of cooperative investments gives rise to the possibility that both parties may claim expectation damages. I show that such a regime of bilateral expectation damages provides the incentives for the first‐best solution even in a framework of binary choice where, for selfish investments, the traditional overreliance result would hold.     

税务行政程序证据规则研究

税务行政程序不应建立严格证据排除规则,以侵权或违背程序正义方式取得的非法证据应当排除。税务行政程序证明责任主要由税务机关承担,税务机关依职权调查案件事实和收集证据。行政相对人承担部分证明责任,有提供证据的权利和责任。税务行政程序应采用职能分离规则和案卷排他性原则。     

Corporate socially responsible investments: CEO altruism,reputation, and shareholder interests

Corporate managers often invest in activities that are deemed to be socially responsible. In some instances, these investments enhance shareholder value. However, in other cases, altruistic managers or managers who privately benefit from the positive attention arising from these activities may choose to make socially responsible investments even if they are not value enhancing. Given this backdrop, we investigate the various factors that motivate firm managers to make socially responsible investments. We find that larger firms, firms with greater free cash flow, and higher advertising outlays demonstrate higher levels of corporate social responsibility (CSR). We also find that companies with stronger institutional ownership are less likely to invest in CSR — which casts doubt on the argument that these investments are designed to promote shareholder value. Consistent with the literature that explores how CEO personal attributes influence corporate decision making, we find that female CEOs, younger CEOs, and managers who donate to both Republican and Democratic parties are significantly more likely to invest in CSR. This latter result suggests that CSR investments may not be driven solely for altruistic reasons, but instead may be part of a broader strategy to create goodwill and/or help maintain good political relations. Finally, we find a strong positive connection between the level of media scrutiny surrounding the firm and its CEO, and the level of CSR investment. This finding suggests that media attention helps induce firms to make socially responsible investments.     

The effect of social connections on capital structure in supplier-customer relationships

Suppliers socially connected to major customers with relation-specific investments have higher leverage ratios compared to unconnected suppliers. The presence of connections partially reduces supplier underleverage observed in supplier-customer relationships with relation-specific investments. Consistent with the role of connections in bonding trading parties' commitment, connections to major customers help to increase customer purchases, and supplier leverage increases are primarily observed in firms with high intensity of customer purchases. Additionally, connected suppliers are associated with higher leverage primarily when information asymmetry between parties is high. Overall, connections help strengthening implicit contracts through establishing trust between trading parties.     

Relationship-Specific Investments and the Transfer Pricing Paradox

The revised Treasury Regulations interpreting Internal Revenue Code Section 482 allow the use of profit-based transfer pricing methods, as well as the older methods based on prices from comparable transactions between independent parties. This paper compares the effects of price-based and profit-based transfer pricing methods on the allocation of taxable income in a model in which organization structure affects the level of relationship-specific investments made by vertically integrated groups and comparable independent firms. Analysis of the model shows that the price-based methods systematically allocates more taxable income to foreign subsidiaries and less to domestic parents than does the profit-based method.     

Überlegungen zu einem fairen Risikomanagement-Mix in Versicherungsunternehmen

This article deals with the question of how a ?fair risk management mix“ that does not lead to a wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders can be achieved in a joint-stock insurance company. In our financial model of an insurer, the ?fair“ situation, it is assumed that there is no wealth transfer between shareholders and policyholders when both parties receive a net present value of zero on their investments. Taking the default risk of the insurance company into account, we first model a ?fair“ situation for the insurer’s existing portfolio. Surprisingly, closing a new insurance contract that has been priced on a fair basis and then included in the insurer’s existing portfolio leads to a disequilibrium situation because the net present value for the shareholders is no longer zero. This new net present value can be viewed as the fair price of any risk management measure the insurer must take so as to reestablish an equilibrium for both parties, the shareholders and the policyholders.     

Staged investments in entrepreneurial financing

Venture capitalists deliver investments to entrepreneurs in stages. This paper shows staged financing is efficient. Staging lets investors abandon ventures with low early returns, and thus sorts good projects from bad. The primary implication from staging is that it is efficient to invest more in later rounds. The model yields a number of predictions on how the ratio of early to late round financing varies with uncertainty, the outside options of both parties, the value of the venture, the costs of investment, and project difficulty. We test these predictions against data on venture capital financings and find significant empirical support for the theory.     

Learning Portfolio Management by Experience: University Student Investment Funds

In this age of greater cooperation between academia and industry, it is surprising to find a general lack of awareness by both parties as to the progress being made to closely integrate financial theory with practice. This paper is intended to bring colleagues in universities and business up to date in an area where considerable success has been achieved, namely, investments and portfolio management. Through a survey of universities across the country, a comprehensive list of programs that allow students to manage portfolios of real dollars has been compiled. It is hoped that sharing the results of this survey will encourage further cooperation in establishing new innovative programs in all areas of business.     

Utility deregulation and stranded investments

Electric utilities in the U.S. are moving towards full competition in the electricity market. Many utilities carry stranded investments on their balance sheets and the disposition of stranded investments is a public concern, affecting the competing interests of customers and shareholders. Stranded investments represent past utility investments that may not be recoverable in a competitive environment. Recent federal regulations allow utilities to collect their stranded investments in wholesale rates, which is a benefit to shareholders at the expense of existing customers. We find that investor owned utilities with high stranded investments enjoyed larger security returns on the date regulations that allowed utilities to recover stranded investments was enacted. We also find that firms with stranded investments had larger security returns in the one-year period following passage of legislation. In substance, the regulations delayed the movement of the utility industry toward competition and put the burden of stranded investments on consumers, as opposed to shareholders.     

USING PROJECT FINANCE TO FUND INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS

For much of the past century, there has been an increased tendency for large infrastructure projects to be funded and operated by governments. Since the early 1980s, however, private-sector financing and management of such projects have experienced a dramatic revival. In some cases, this revival has taken the form of the "privatization" of an entire industry. But another, increasingly common, form has been the use of project finance to fund instrastructure investments. Besides being widely used in infrastructure investments like telecommunications and power generation in developing countries, the use of project finance has recently been extended by the U.K.'s Private Finance Initiative to fund public enterprises as diverse as the construction and operation of prisons, hospitals, subway cars, and the National Insurance computer system.
In a project financing, the project is managed by a separate company that is owned by a project sponsor (or sponsors) who usually takes an active role in the management of the project. The project company enters into a complex series of contracts with multiple parties, including the host government, the project's customers and suppliers, and the banks that typically provide most of the debt financing.
This paper argues that the equity investment by the project's operators works together with high debt ratios and the web of contractual arrangements to reduce "agency" problems in the management of large projects. It also shows how the contracts shift the various project risks to those parties best able to appraise and control them. Finally, it discusses why most project financing takes the form of limited recourse bank loans to the project company rather than, say, public bonds with full recourse to the sponsors.     

The effect of discretionary actions on small firms' ability to survive Chapter 11 bankruptcy

This paper analyzes whether judges' actions within Chapter 11 bankruptcy affect debtor firms' ability to reorganize (e.g., debt restructurings and mergers) as opposed to being liquidated in Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Our main finding is that debtor firms' control of the process, e.g., the exclusivity period, affects their ability to restructure debt. A reduction in the exclusivity period decreases the likelihood of reorganization, but increases the likelihood of deviation from absolute priority when plans of reorganization are agreed upon. An extension of the exclusivity period, however, does not increase the likelihood of either reorganization or deviation from absolute priority.     

Political connections,financial constraints,and corporate investment

This study investigates whether firms politically connected to the ruling party can mitigate financial constraints and increase their investments. Data on Taiwan-listed companies from 1991 to 2010 are used to answer the preceding issue. Results indicate that firms connected to the ruling party that transitioned into power can mitigate financial constraints, but results do not hold for firms connected to the opposition party that transitioned out of power. Firms connected to both parties have similar results with those connected to the ruling party, but the diminishing effect is weaker than those connected to the ruling party. Results further indicate that financially constrained firms can increase their investment when they have political connections to the ruling party. Finally, firms with strong connections can reduce financial constraints more effectively.     

The Effects of Inflation and Taxes on Growth Investments and Replacement Policies

This paper investigates the effect of inflation and taxes on the optimal duration of investments. The main conclusion is that inflation does not always increase the duration of investments. For example, in the case of equipment with a short replacement cycle, increased inflation tends to decrease the duration of the cycle. Contrary to the common theoretical analysis, these results imply that inflation may increase some forms of capital investments.     

消费信贷与家庭人力资本投资

已有丰富的文献考察了消费信贷对家庭消费和投资行为的影响，但少有研究关注其对家庭人力资本投资的影响。家庭人力资本投资对于人力资本积累、经济高质量发展至关重要。基于此，本文考察了信用卡使用对家庭人力资本投资的影响及其影响机制，主要发现如下：信用卡使用显著增加了家庭人力资本投资，且这一效应具有长期动态影响并对城市、高收入、高教育程度家庭影响更为显著，这意味着信用卡消费信贷可能会增加人力资本不平等。进一步研究发现，家庭会增加劳动力供给来应对人力资本支出的增加。机制分析表明，信用卡使用主要通过增加家庭消费投资、促进消费升级、缓解家庭预算约束三种途径促进家庭人力资本投资。在风险可控的前提下，引导消费信贷流向有利于实体经济发展的领域，可助力于消费升级与人力资本积累，从而为经济发展提供新动能。     

Emerging technologies in favour of sustainable agriculture

European agricultural systems are going through a modernisation process involving radical structural changes. To tackle these important challenges, technology foresight has been employed as a systematic, participatory, intelligence gathering exercise focusing on future R&D investments in sustainable agricultural systems and green technologies. Because reliable data on emerging technology are scarce, any assessment has to be based to a large extent on qualitative methods and on an operational conception of sustainability using priority indicators. The paper describes the Danish Green Technological Foresight on Environmental Friendly Agriculture (GTFEFA). It treats this as a case study and examines the way in which a group of interested parties arrived at recommendations on the application of a number of emerging agriculture-related technologies. Two questions are then addressed: Can technological foresight simultaneously: (1) systematically describe and evaluate the consequences of employing emerging technologies in order to choose between alternatives, and (2) prioritise investments in emerging technologies so as to favour innovation. The discussion here is intended to help meet the challenge of operationalising the term ‘sustainability’, so that environmental friendly agricultural technology can be assessed against priority indicators. Finally, it is suggested that, provided that clear criteria for assessing the sustainability of emerging technologies are identified and made explicit, technology foresight offers a space for dialogue and exploration in contested territory.     

Liquidity preference under uncertainty: A model of dynamic investment in illiquid opportunities

Whereas frictionless exchange markets provide a high degree of liquidity for financial assets, investments in real assets and productive capacity may be very costly to modify, and thus effectively irreversible in the short-run. This paper addresses the problem of an investor (individual or enterprise) who must allocate a limited resource to productive investments over time. Investment opportunities arrive in a random sequence and are irreversible in the short-run: thus investment decisions are made under uncertainty as to future opportunities (which may have to be foregone). The analysis demonstrates that a rational investor will demand a higher return on long-lasting opportunities than on those which are instantaneously reversible. The liquidity premium increases with the average duration of the non-liquid investments.     

On the global supply of basic research

In a two-country Schumpeterian growth model, we study the incentives for basic research investments by governments in a globalized world. A country׳s basic research investments increase with the country׳s level of human capital and decline with its own market size. This may explain why some smaller countries invest so much in basic research. Compared with the optimal investments achievable when countries coordinate their basic research policies, a single country may over-invest in basic research. However, the total amount of decentralized basic research investments is always below the socially optimal investment level, which justifies policy coordination in this area.     

Corporate governance and the sensitivity of investments to cash flows

We find very strong and consistent evidence that investments in Strong‐Governance firms (managers not entrenched) are strongly sensitive to availability of internal cash flows while such sensitivity is not different from zero for Weak‐Governance firms (entrenched management). We interpret this as evidence in support of Kaplan and Zingales' (1997) contention that sensitivity of investments to cash flows is not an adequate measure of financing constraints. More importantly, our findings are consistent with Kaplan and Zingales’ conjecture that the observed sensitivity of investments to cash flows in firms that do not face financing constraints may be driven by excessive risk aversion of managers.     

Information technology,contextual factors and the volatility of firm performance

This study uses previous theory developed in the IT implementation literature and the information processing view of the firm to empirically investigate the impact of IT investments and several contextual variables on the volatility of future earnings. We use InformationWeek 500 data on IT spending from 1992–1997 to find evidence that IT investments increase the volatility of future earnings but that this impact is highly contingent upon three firm level contextual factors — sales growth, unrelated diversification, and size. These factors can lead to conditions in which IT increases or reduces earnings volatility. Taken together, these results may help explain what has recently been termed the “new productivity paradox,” i.e., the apparent under-investment in information technology despite evidence of highly positive returns for doing so, and suggests settings where managers may be under- or over-discounting returns on IT investments.     

Unobserved investment,endogenous quality,and trade

A seller can make investments that affect a tradable asset’s future returns. The potential buyer of the asset cannot observe the seller’s investment prior to trade, nor does he receive any signal of it, nor can he verify it in any way after trade. Despite this severe moral‐hazard problem, this article shows the seller will invest with positive probability in equilibrium and that trade will occur with positive probability. The outcome of the game is sensitive to the distribution of bargaining power between the parties, with a holdup problem existing if the buyer has the bargaining power. A consequence of the holdup problem is surplus‐reducing distortions in investment level. Perhaps counterintuitively, in many situations, this distortion involves an increase in the expected amount invested vis‐à‐vis the situation without holdup.