INNOVATION,COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION OF THE INTEL CASE

Microprocessor‐maker Intel has been subjected to the highest fine in the history of EU competition policy. Intel operates in a market with one other main supplier, a fact that seemed to provide grounds to those accusing it of abusing a dominant position. The authors argue that, in spite of the limited number of players, the microprocessor market showed the distinctive marks of dynamic competition: ever‐lower prices and ever‐growing innovation. Political considerations more than sound economic reasoning seem to be behind the EU antitrust decision.     

Organizational Structure and Product Market Competition

This paper explores the link between delegation of authority and product market competition. It considers a firm that is contemplating entering a market served by an incumbent. The firm can adopt either a decentralized or a centralized authority structure. In the former, authority is delegated to an agent, while in the latter, it is retained by the principal. We address the questions of how the toughness of future product market competition affects the delegation decision, and how this decision in turn affects product market competition. The delegation decision is determined by a trade‐off between inducing the agent to take greater initiative and accepting lower operating profits from a less efficient decision taken by the agent.     

Collusive Networks in Market‐Sharing Agreements in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority

This paper examines how the presence of an antitrust authority (AA) affects market‐sharing agreements made by firms. These agreements prevent firms from entering each other’s markets. The set of agreements defines a collusive network, which is pursued by antitrust authorities. This paper shows that in the absence of an AA, a network is stable if its alliances are large enough, and in the presence of an AA, more competitive structures can be sustained through bilateral agreements. Antitrust laws may have a procompetitive effect, as they give firms in large alliances more incentives to cut their agreements at once.     

Platform economics and antitrust enforcement: A little knowledge is a dangerous thing

Although the economics of multisided platforms has developed important insights for antitrust policy, there are critical respects in which the body of academic knowledge falls short of providing useful advice to enforcement agencies and the courts. Indeed, there is a substantial risk that recent scholarship will be misapplied to the detriment of sound antitrust policy, as evidenced by the US Supreme Court's recent decision in American Express. In this note, I identify several areas in which economics research could potentially make significant contributions to the practical antitrust treatment of platforms.     

The CAB'S Struggle to Establish Price and Route Rivalry in World Air Transport

A bstract . Almost from the beginning of international air transport , this industry, while regulated by the U.S. Government, has enjoyed exemption from prosecution under the antitrust laws. In 1946 leading airlines of Western Europe, Canada and the United States organized the International Air Transportation Association , which the Civil Aeronautics Board later charged was a cartel regulating prices, schedules and routes in the interest of the profits of the carriers. In 1978 the board began trying to establish price and route competition in the industry's foreign operations, as well as in the domestic services. The board's efforts to deregulate the industry to make it responsive to market forces continued through the Ford, Carter and Reagan presidencies and the evidence so far available suggests that they have achieved a substantial degree of success.     

Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets

Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.     

Exercising Market Power in Proprietary Aftermarkets

Over 20 recent antitrust cases have turned on whether competition in complex durable-equipment markets prevents manufacturers from exercising market power over proprietary aftermarket products and services. We show that the price in the aftermarket will exceed marginal cost despite competition in the equipment market. Absent perfectly contingent long-term contracts, firms will balance the advantages of marginal-cost pricing to future generations of consumers against the payoff from monopoly pricing for current, locked-in equipment owners. The result holds for undifferentiated Bertrand competition, differentiated duopoly, and monopoly equipment markets. We also examine the effects of market growth and equipment durability.     

Beyond antitrust populism: Towards robust antitrust

The populist use of competition policies is on the rise again, associated with the growth of big-tech companies in the era of digital platforms. This article sees antitrust populism as a re-emerging force in the United States and Europe via greater politicisation of competition law enforcement. It addresses the basic tenets of antitrust populism in order to expose the fundamental problems that populist use of competition law entails. I argue for a rethink of antitrust policy on the intellectual foundations laid down by what Mark Pennington describes as ‘robust political economy’. We need greater regulatory humility and antitrust enforcement which takes both innovation and welfare seriously.     

The ARCO decision: Inroads into the per se rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act

In this study, the author analyzes the 1990 U.S. Supreme Court decision inAtlantic Richfield Company vs. USA Petroleum Company approving Atlantic Richfield’s maximum pricing plan improsed on its distributors (despite the Court’s recognition that theper se rule forbade such schemes). Theper se rule had been one of the last substantial measures of effective antitrust policy administered by enforcement authorities and the courts, perhaps even more fundamental than scrutiny of proposed mergers and predatory practices. That principle has been weakened by the ARCO decision. The author addresses some of the likely consequences of the ascendancy of the Chicago School and the NeoClassical theory generally in antitrust interpretation.     

Input Market Competition and the Make-or-Buy Decision

Recent theories of vertical integration based on incomplete contracts assume perfect competition on at least one side of the market. As a result, the make-or-buy choice has no redistributive effect and will reflect efficiency considerations only. This paper introduces imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of a vertical relationship with noncontractable specific investments. We assume that there are a finite number of potential input suppliers with private information about their costs. We first show that a monopoly buyer of such inputs will often prefer to own the seller's assets even though it would be more efficient for the seller's assets not to be so owned. We then show that an increase in the number of potential partners on either side of the market reduces this inclination towards vertical integration. With perfect competition on either side of the market, the make-buy decision will reflect only efficiency considerations.     

Potential competition and quality disclosure

This study presents a model of quality disclosure in which an incumbent, through its quality and disclosure choices, influences the potential that a new entrant enters the market. In this regard, we consider a sequential framework in which the incumbent chooses its quality and decides whether to disclose it to the market; subsequently, the entrant makes the same decisions, if it enters the market. We show that the potential competition can create strategic incentives for the incumbent to choose nondisclosure, because the availability of information about the incumbent's quality promotes entry by enhancing the entrant's expected profit from the market. In addition, an analysis of the effects of mandatory disclosure laws suggests that they can be effective in encouraging new market entrants and in improving the product quality of established firms.     

Direct Marketing in Oligopoly

We consider a game in which symmetric manufacturers decide whether to set up sites (e.g., web sites) where consumers can buy their products directly. Following this decision, the manufacturers choose quantities to sell to the retailers, and then the manufacturers with direct‐sales sites and retailers choose quantities to sell to the consumers. We show that since an increase in the number of retailers may drive the direct‐selling manufacturers from the retail market, it may raise the retailers’ profit and reduce social welfare. Finally, we discuss two cases: an oligopolistic wholesale market and a market with price competition and differentiated products.     

Exclusionary practices in two‐sided markets: The effect of radius clauses on competition between shopping centers

We analyze exclusionary conduct of platforms in 2‐sided markets. Motivated by recent antitrust cases, we provide a discussion of the likely positive and normative effects of exclusivity clauses, which prevent tenants from opening outlets in other shopping centers covered by the clause. In a standard 2‐sided market model, we show that exclusivity agreements are especially profitable for the incumbent and detrimental to social welfare if competition is intense between the 2 shopping centers. We argue that the focus of courts on market definition is misplaced in markets determined by competitive bottlenecks.     

Innovation Strategy and Entry Deterrence

We model an incumbent’s decision to pursue radical or incremental innovation when facing a rival entrant. The radical innovation may yield lucrative financial returns but entails significant technological and market‐related uncertainties. It is also particularly attractive to the rival entrant: if the market for it pans out, such an innovation obsoletes the existing technology and any incremental improvements to it. Each firm has its own assessment of the market potential for the radical innovation, and the reliability of these market forecasts can differ. We show that when the entrant’s market‐assessment capability is weak, the incumbent will pursue incremental innovation and postpone its plans to develop radical innovation even when it thinks highly of the market potential for the radical innovation. The incumbent does so to avoid validating the high market potential to the entrant, who may otherwise be encouraged to invest aggressively. The incumbent thus prefers to look “soft” with respect to its innovation strategy in order to discourage entry. Even if its innovation strategy is not observable, we show that an incumbent that assesses the commercial potential for a radical innovation favorably may pursue an incremental path and communicate its plans publicly; this strategy serves to reduce entry by affecting the entrant’s beliefs about the market potential of the innovation. Finally, we extend the model to investigate the entrant’s decision to communicate its innovation intentions. We find that the entrant communicates its plans to aggressively pursue radical innovation only if the incumbent’s market‐assessment capabilities are strong. In doing so, the entrant acts preemptively to discourage the incumbent from pursuing the radical innovation, and is less concerned with validating market potential.     

Market share and market power in merger and monopolization cases

In light of the growing sophistication of the tools of industrial organization economics and reliance on the federal courts to resolve complicated competitive issues, it may be time for the courts to make greater use of economists in analyzing antitrust cases. While the costs of such an endeavor remain unexplored, we argue below that the benefits may be significant. In particular, we assert that the legal precedent requiring the courts to draw inferences about market power based primarily or exclusively on market shares and/or market concentration¹ can often be misleading. However, the only alternative to such judge-made bright-line rules is to utilize modern economic tools to undertake more extensive competitive analyses. The latter choice is essentially the course that the antitrust enforcement agencies are following. This article explores some of the arguments in favor of such an approach.     

Is the Competitor of my Competitor also my Competitor?

This paper presents several results on multimarket competition. First, whenever a firm faces multimarket competitors that sell goods in markets to which the firm itself has no access, the firm gains a strong incentive to expand production in its own market(s). In the capacity choice model, such a firm builds larger than Cournot capacity and pushes its competitors towards other markets. Consumers always benefit from multimarket competition. In asymmetric market structures, some firms may also benefit from multimarket arrangements, but in symmetric ones, all firms are necessarily harmed by it. Second, the intensification of indirect competition is not necessarily bad for the firm. It may be the case that, the more competitors its competitors have, the higher the firm’s profit. Finally, this model also has a multiproduct interpretation which suggests that a merger of single‐product firms may be beneficial or harmful from a social welfare perspective, depending on whether the new entity will compete with several single‐product firms or another multiproduct one.     

Competition and innovation: The tango of the market and technology in the competitive landscape

Technology innovation can be a double‐edged sword in helping a firm to address competitive pressures. We explore the relationships among market competition, technology competition, and firms' advancement to a higher generation of production technology. Though market competition drives technology advancement as firms attempt to escape competition and technology competition also drives technology advancement as firms try to stay in the technology race, concurrent high market and technology competition lead a firm to defer advancement. We find supportive evidence with data on global flat panel display makers. Our findings shed light on how competition interacts with a firm's technology advancement decision and, in general, a firm's technology strategy.     

The Role of Coordination Bias in Platform Competition

This paper considers platform competition in a two‐sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other platform to convince customers that the two sides will coordinate on joining it. We find that the degree of the coordination bias affects the platform's decision regarding the business model (i.e., whether to subsidize buyers or sellers), the access fees, and the size of the platform. A slight increase in the coordination bias may induce the advantaged platform to switch from subsidizing sellers to subsidizing buyers, or induce the disadvantaged platform to switch from subsidizing buyers to subsidizing sellers. Moreover, in such a case the advantaged platform switches from oversupplying to undersupplying sellers, and the disadvantaged platform switches from undersupplying to oversupplying sellers.     

Hospital Mergers and Antitrust: Some Economic and Legal Issues

A bstract The article traces the development of the market for hospital services through evolutionary stages to the present emphasis on merger and consolidation. Examination of the traditional principles of antitrust analysis suggests they are sufficiently flexible to warrant their application in evaluating the competitive impact of hospital mergers.     

A UNIFIED PRESENTATION OF COMPETITION ANALYSIS IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS

The goal of this paper is to present quantitative tools to manage competition policy analysis in two-sided platforms, based on a common framework for transaction and non-transaction platforms. We explore tools for relevant market definition [Critical Loss Analysis and a small but significant non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) test], unilateral effects indicators [Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) and Gross Upward Pricing Pressure Index (GUPPI)] and tests for exclusionary practices. We review dispersed results in the literature and fill the gaps where appropriate. We highlight the required changes from the usual one-sided market framework and tools. While discussions of antitrust tools can be found in specialized forums devoted to advances in competition policy analysis, we organize the material in an integrated framework.