Managing specific accruals vs. structuring transactions: Evidence from banking industry

This study investigates earnings management through managing specific accruals vs. structuring transactions in the banking industry. This paper explores the circumstances under which banks manipulate loan loss provisions vs. circumstances that lead banks to structure loan sales and securitizations for the purpose of achieving earnings benchmarks. Empirical results show that banks manage earnings through loan loss provisions, before resorting to structuring transactions, to avoid small earnings decreases and or just meet or beat analysts' forecasts. The findings imply that structuring loan sales and securitizations is more likely to be used as a secondary instrument. In addition, I find that the earnings of banks with lower discretionary loan loss provisions and higher discretionary gains from loan sales and securitizations are priced more negatively, suggesting that investors impose incremental penalties on the joint use of loan loss provisions and gains from loan sales and securitization to meet or beat earnings benchmarks.     

The Impact of SFAS No. 114 on the Linear Information Dynamic for Commercial Banks

Increase (decrease) in loan loss provisions would decrease (increases) bank earnings, but increase (decreases) regulatory capital. Previous studies have separately documented earnings and capital management behavior via loan loss provisions by commercial banks. However, it is difficult to isolate a bank's demand for increasing earnings from its demand for regulatory capital because earnings is a source of capital. Based on the objective bank function, this study investigates the impact of SFAS No. 114 on the information content of loan loss provisions in relation to both earnings quality and capital adequacy in a linear information dynamic framework. Test results show that the association between market value with loan loss provisions became significantly stronger for commercial banks in the post- than in the pre-adoption period. As a result, SFAS No. 114 is also found to positively affect the association of market value with both bank earnings and regulatory capital through the clean surplus relation because of the higher value relevance of loan loss provisions. The findings thus provide empirical evidence that SFAS No. 114 has significantly complemented banking regulations in enhancing (reducing) the (dispersion from the) accounting measurement construct of loan loss provisions.     

The procyclicality of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks

From a sample of Islamic banks around the world from 1997 to 2012, this paper examines whether loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks is procyclical. Our empirical findings highlight that loan loss provisioning in Islamic banks remains procyclical, although the ‘expected’ loan loss model (E-LLM) has been implemented for Islamic banks in several countries. A closer investigation further documents that Islamic banks also use loan loss provisions for discretionary managerial actions, especially related to capital management in which loan loss reserves and provisions are inflated when bank capitalization declines. Eventually, this paper highlights that higher capitalization can mitigate the procyclicality of loan loss provisions in Islamic banks. In other words, loan loss provisioning becomes countercyclical for Islamic banks with higher capitalization. This paper therefore casts doubts on the adoption of the E-LLM for Islamic banks to promote countercyclical effects, because the E-LLM may be influenced by managerial discretion, including opportunistic capital management using loan loss provisions that may undermine the importance of maintaining bank capitalization.     

Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings management and signalling by Australian banks

This study examines whether and to what extent Australian banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital, earnings management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs as a result of the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel Accord of 1988, which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐Basel period. Overall, we find a significant understating of LLPs in the post‐Basel period relative to the pre‐Basel period. This indicates that reported earnings might not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors.     

Do Loan Loss Provisions Affect the Credit Fluctuations in China’s Banking System?

ABSTRACT

The global financial crisis of 2008 sparked new ideas on pro-cyclical transmission in the financial system. The accounting treatment method of loan loss provisions differs between the accounting standards that banks use and the supervisory rules of banks. This fundamental difference has attracted wide attention from academics and regulators. This article studies whether bank loan loss provisions affect credit fluctuation in China’s banking system. We divide loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions. We find that non-discretionary loan loss provisions result in greater credit fluctuation, whereas discretionary loan loss provisions have no significant impact on credit fluctuation. Further evidence shows that the relation between non-discretionary loan loss provisions and credit fluctuations does not vary among different types of banks. Overall, our study shows that non-discretionary loan loss provisions can increase credit fluctuation and therefore strengthen banks’ pro-cyclical behavior.     

贷款行为、盈余管理与贷款损失准备的动态调整

本文利用面板VAR模型及2004～2009年9家上市商业银行的数据,研究银行贷款损失准备计提与银行贷款行为、盈余管理策略的动态调整.研究发现,从中国代表性上市商业银行的经验证据来看,贷款损失准备的计提与净利润率之间存在显著的负相关关系;贷款损失准备计提影响了商业银行的贷款能力和商业银行的盈利水平,这证实了盈余管理行为的...     

Economic policy uncertainty and bank earnings opacity

Using a sample of U.S. banks and an index for economic policy uncertainty developed by Baker et al. (2016), we investigate whether economic policy uncertainty is systematically related to bank earnings opacity. When economic policy is relatively uncertain, it is easier for bank managers to distort financial information, as unpredictable economic policy changes make assessing the existence and impact of hidden “adverse news” more difficult for investors and creditors. Economic policy uncertainty also increases the fluctuation in banks’ earnings and cash flows, thus providing additional incentives and opportunities for bank managers to engage in earnings management. Our results show that uncertainty in economic policy is positively related to earnings opacity, proxied by the magnitude of discretionary loan loss provisions and the likelihood of just meeting or beating the prior year’s earnings, and negatively related to the level of accounting conservatism (i.e., the timeliness of recognition of bad news relative to good news). Collectively, our results suggest that economic policy uncertainty leads to greater earnings opacity. We also find that the impact of economic policy uncertainty on financial reporting distortion is less pronounced for stronger banks (i.e., banks with high capital ratios).     

Loan loss accounting and procyclical bank lending: The role of direct regulatory actions

I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regulatory forbearance. This regulatory action mechanism expands on prior research that has focused on the effect of loan loss recognition on regulatory capital adequacy during economic downturns.     

Keeping up with the Joneses? Evidence from Peer Performance in the Banking Industry

This paper traces the reaction of US banks to ROE underperformance on liquidity creation, equity capital, and loan loss provisions. We find that banks change their structures in the subsequent quarter after underperformance by increasing their on-balance and off-balance sheet liquidity creation to increase profitability. Banks tend to increase their equity capital and improve their loan quality by lowering non-discretionary loan loss provisions to become safer. Banks signal their ability to overcome underperformance by increasing their discretionary loan loss provisions. Our results reveal that large banks rely mainly on off-balance sheet liquidity creation as their primary tool to recover from underperformance while medium-size and small banks adjust their equity capital to increase their safety.     

我国商业银行贷款损失准备的效率分析

提取贷款损失准备金是商业银行应对信用风险的措施,无效的贷款损失准备对银行资本与盈利有一定的影响。以往的研究主要集中在银行有意愿操纵贷款损失准备方面,而对其贷款损失准备的决策效率很少涉及。贷款损失准备效率是指银行管理者对银行贷款损失准备决策的有效性,即实际设置的贷款损失准备与其有效边界的偏离程度。本文运用随机前沿模型研究了1998～2004年我国商业银行贷款损失准备的决策效率,实证结果发现,我国商业银行贷款损失准备决策效率具有一定的无效性,没有达到效率边界;股份制商业银行贷款损失准备的决策效率高于国有商业银行。     

Credit unions and earnings management to mitigate political scrutiny over tax-exempt status

In this paper, we examine whether credit unions manage earnings to mitigate political scrutiny. In particular, we study whether credit unions increased loan loss provisions to decrease earnings around a 2005 congressional hearing on the efficacy of credit unions’ tax-exempt status. On average, we find evidence consistent with credit unions managing earnings downward via the loan loss provision in the quarters leading up to and surrounding the congressional hearing. In addition, we find that credit unions with higher earnings before the loan loss provision engaged in more downward earnings management than credit unions with lower earnings before provision. Our findings contribute to the literature examining the use of downward earnings management to avoid political scrutiny and the banking literature. Likewise, our results inform the continued debate as to whether credit unions should be tax-exempt.     

Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions and Systemic Risk in the Banking Industry

This study examines the relation between earnings management through discretionary loan loss provisions (LLPs) and systemic risk in the U. S. banking sector using a large sample of commercial banks from 1996 to 2009. We find that earnings management increases a bank's contribution to systemic crash risk and systemic distress risk, consistent with the notion that earnings management increases information opacity, facilitates bad news hoarding, co‐moves with macroeconomic conditions, and exhibits cross‐sectional correlation and herding in earnings management. However, the effect of earnings management through discretionary LLPs on systemic risk disappears during the crisis period, consistent with weakened earnings management in crisis times. We also find that the same effect strengthens with bank uncertainty and homogenous loans, and weakens in the post‐SOX period, and when banks are audited by Big 4 auditors.     

Former auditors on the audit committee and earnings management: Evidence from African banks

This paper investigates whether former auditors on the audit committee constrain earnings management through loan loss provisions. Based on an analysis of the annual reports of 82 African listed banks over the period 2011–2016, findings show that the presence of former auditors on an audit committee is associated with lower earnings management. This result suggests that audit committee members with auditing expertise and background contribute to effective monitoring of management’s accounting practices. Furthermore, results reveal that the reducing effect on earnings management of former auditors is strongest for directors who are unaffiliated with the bank’s current external auditor.     

Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings Management and Capital Management under IFRS: The Case of EU Commercial Banks

Prior research has shown that loan loss provisions are primarily used as a tool for earnings management and capital management by listed banks. Effective 2005 all listed companies in the European Union (EU) are required to comply with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Adherence to IFRS, it is claimed, should enhance transparency of reporting practices relative to local General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The overall objective of this paper is to examine the impact of the implementation of IFRS on the use of loan loss provisions (LLPs) to manage earnings and capital. We use a sample of 91 EU listed commercial banks covering a period of 10 years (before and after implementation of IFRS). Since early adopters may have different incentives and motivations relative to those who adopt mandatorily, we dichotomize our sample into early and late adopters. Overall, we find that earnings management (using loan loss provisions) for both early and late adopters while significant over the estimation window is significantly reduced after implementation of IFRS. We also find that, for risky banks, earnings management behavior is more pronounced when compared to the less risky banks, but is significantly reduced in the post IFRS period. Capital management behavior by bank managers is not significant in both pre and post IFRS regimes. Overall, we conclude that the implementation of IFRS in the EU appears to have improved earnings quality by mitigating the tendency of bank managers of listed commercial banks to engage in earnings management using loan loss provisions.     

Provisioning over the business cycle: Some insights from the microfinance industry

This paper investigates the drivers of provisioning in MFIs and their provisioning behaviour over the business cycle. Based on an international sample of MFIs extracted from the MIX database over the 2001–2014 period, we uncover a negative relationship between MFIs' provisioning and the business cycle. Our finding corroborates the fact that MFIs do not build their loan loss provisions (LLP) during economic booms when profit and earnings are high. Since they provision more during downturns, they are more likely to suffer from unexpected losses and experience failure. This is in sharp contrast with the current Basel III countercyclical buffer requirement suggesting that financial institutions, especially banks, should build sufficient buffer in booms so that they can avoid costly capital adjustment when the economy contracts. Deeper analyses suggest however that this behaviour mainly concerns profit-oriented and deposit-taking/regulated MFIs, with business model and target close to conventional banking. This suggests that bank-like and regulated MFIs' loan loss provisions follow similar behavioral patterns to those of the conventional banking sector during the boom-and-bust cycles.     

Bank Managers' Heterogeneous Decisions on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions

This study examines bank managers' three major motivations for discretionary behavior with respect to loan loss provisions: signaling, income smoothing, and capital management. To do so, it utilizes a bank-specific time-series regression approach that captures heterogeneity in the banks' priorities and strategies for alternative motives and compares the results to those from alternative model specifications. The statistical tests and results presented in this study lead to three conclusions. First, significant results for the income smoothing hypothesis are robust to the various model specifications. Second, average signaling coefficients estimated from bank-specific regressions are systematically larger than corresponding coefficients from pooled time-series cross-sectional regressions and are statistically significant. Finally, bank managers appear to use loan loss provisions to manage their regulatory capital levels by comparing them with the minimum ratios specified by regulators rather than with a time-series bank-specific ratio or pooled time-series cross-sectional mean ratio.     

The association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary accounting choices

This study examines the association between fair value measurements and banks' discretionary loan loss provisions using regulatory financial data from 2009 to 2016 for a sample of U.S. public bank holding companies. I find that banks recognizing larger proportions of fair value assets and liabilities based on level 2 and level 3 inputs are associated with lower discretionary loan loss provisions. However, there is no significant association between level 1 fair value assets and liabilities and discretionary loan loss provisions. When pre-managed earnings are lower, banks with larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities report smaller discretionary loan loss provisions to inflate earnings. Banks reporting larger proportions of level 2 and level 3 fair value assets and liabilities are more likely to use discretionary loan loss provisions to beat earnings benchmarks and manage tier one capital ratios. Overall, the results support the proposition that fair value assets and liabilities based on level 2 and level 3 inputs are less transparent and are subject to more discretion regarding loan loss provisions.     

Loan loss provision decisions: An empirical analysis of the Spanish depository institutions

Accountants and financial economists have long held concerns that inefficient loan loss accounting may have a material impact on reported capital and earnings, especially in the banking industry. Prior research has examined banks’ incentives to manipulate loan loss provisions (LLPs) and the resulting impact. However, most of this research has focused on management incentives and other determinants of LLP decisions without addressing the relevant factors associated with best-practiced or efficient LLP decision-making. In this paper, we identify a stochastic frontier model that examines the “efficiency” of the LLP decisions of bank managers. Further we explore the relationship between efficient LLP decision-making and relevant factors that could potentially explain any inefficiency. Our evidence indicates that there is considerable inefficiency in loan loss decision-making among the sample institutions. The research is based on data from the Spanish banking industry, which is particularly relevant in light of the recent deregulatory initiatives in Spain. The findings in this study with regard to the existence of inefficiency in loan loss decisions and the causes of such inefficiency have far-reaching implications for regulators throughout Europe.     

Discretion in bank loan loss allowance,risk taking and earnings management

We study whether banks use the allowance for loan losses (ALL) for efficiency or for opportunistic reasons. We find that banks that had higher abnormal ALL during the period prior to the 2007–2009 crisis engaged in less risk taking during the pre‐crisis period and had a lower probability of failure during the crisis period. In testing earnings management to meet or beat earnings benchmarks, we find that abnormal ALL is unrelated to next period's loss avoidance and just meeting or beating the prior year's earnings. Our results suggest that banks use ALL for efficiency and not for opportunistic purposes.     

Banks’ procyclical behavior: Does provisioning matter?

A panel of 186 European banks is used for the period 1992–2004 to determine if banking behaviors, induced by the capital adequacy constraint and the provisioning system, amplify credit fluctuations. We find that poorly capitalized banks are constrained to expand credit. We also find that loan loss provisions (LLP) made in order to cover expected future loan losses (non-discretionary LLP) amplify credit fluctuations. By contrast, LLP used for management objectives (discretionary LLP) do not affect credit fluctuations. The findings of our research are consistent with the call for the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system in Europe.