A comparison of machine‐learning classifiers for selecting money managers

Machine‐learning algorithms have performed well on noisy datasets that are typical of financial data. This paper compares the performance of three types of machine‐learning classifier for selecting money managers. Naïve Bayes, neural network and decision tree learners were applied to a dataset of US equity managers. Although other studies have suggested that the performance of classifiers appears to be highly dependent on the nature of the problem and the dataset, the learning algorithms each had similar predictive accuracy and all outperformed by a substantial margin simple manager selection rules that are typical of the ways in which money managers and mutual funds are selected by investors. The results indicate that machine learners can be used as a decision‐support aid to improve the selection of money managers. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Strategic Asset Allocation in Money Management

This paper analyzes the dynamic portfolio choice implications of strategic interaction among money managers who compete for fund flows. We study such interaction between two risk‐averse managers in continuous time, characterizing analytically their unique equilibrium investments. Driven by chasing and contrarian mechanisms when one is well ahead, they gamble in the opposite direction when their performance is close. We also examine multiple and mixed‐strategy equilibria. Equilibrium policy of each manager crucially depends on the opponent's risk attitude. Hence, client investors concerned about how a strategic manager may trade on their behalf should also learn competitors' characteristics.     

The performance of long-serving fund managers

Apparently “there is no substitute for experience”. This and similar phrases are often heard in the worlds of politics, business, sport and others. It is the sort of proposition that makes sense to people. However, while the performance of actively managed funds has attracted a great deal of attention in the past, the performance of managers with long track records has attracted relatively little. In this paper we focus on managers with track records of at least ten years, that is, managers that have been the sole manager of a fund for at least a decade. We find that the average, net of fee, risk-adjusted performance of these managers over the ten years of our sample is attractive compared to similar values calculated for wider samples of the manager population. However, this result may be a reflection of survivorship bias, since we find little evidence of performance persistence from year to year amongst these managers, and evidence to suggest that risk-adjusted performance over the ten year sample period declined. However, for those investors that would still prefer to invest with an experienced fund manager, the disaggregated analysis in this paper reveals certain key traits that are related to positive risk-adjusted performance of long-serving managers, such as relatively low fund fees, more concentrated portfolios and a small cap style bias.     

To believe or not to believe

This paper explains how the actions of skeptical traders can make manipulable earnings reports informative. Our model consists of a price-maximizing manager who chooses a cheap talk report, a profit-maximizing trader who may then seek costly information, and competitive market makers. Since the manager can influence the trader's information acquisition decision, the manager may choose to reveal even bad news to decrease the impact of order flows on prices. The paper provides foundations for treating positive and negative earnings surprises as good news and bad news respectively, even when external auditing cannot constrain opportunistic managers. Testable implications are derived.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

Determinants of accounting innovation implementation

Accounting innovations are often not successfully implemented or diffused throughout the organization. This study seeks to explain this phenomenon. One of the major impediments to the successful implementation of accounting innovation is that management accounting systems are generally used to serve the decision control needs of top management while at the same time purportedly supporting the decision management needs of lower level managers. To the extent that the accounting system is used for decision control, innovation creates the potential for wealth effects to occur. This prompts managers, whose wealth will be negatively affected, to resist accounting innovation. We present conditions where it is likely for negative wealth effects to occur. Under these conditions the system will fail to achieve its intended objectives. Our theoretical model examines how decentralization choices influence resistance to accounting innovation. We argue that delegation of decision rights can limit the potential for resistance in two ways—(a) by creating the environment which allows managers to ensure that their subunits are able to adapt to the new signals provided by accounting innovations and (b) by enabling subunit managers to become involved in the design of these systems. Our model also enables us to assess the consequences on organizational outcomes when subunit managers resist accounting innovations. Based on data collected from production managers, our results demonstrate the importance of decentralization choices on the effective implementation of accounting innovations.     

Optimal Control of DC Pension Plan Management under Two Incentive Schemes

Since the late 1990s, a performance fee arrangement has been approved as a managerial incentive in direction contribution (DC) pension plan management to motivate managers. However, the fact that managers may take undue risk for the larger performance fees and thus reduce members’ utility has been a subject of debate. As such, this study investigates the optimal risk-taking policies of DC pension fund managers under both the single management fee scheme and a mixed scheme with a lower management fee, as well as an additional performance fee. The analytical solutions are derived by using the duality method and concavification techniques in a singular optimization problem. The results show the complex risk-taking structures of fund managers and recognize the win-win situation of implementing performance-based incentives in DC pension plan management. Under the setting of geometric Brownian motion asset price dynamics and constant relative risk aversion utility, the optimal risk investment proportion shows a peak-valley pattern under the mixed scheme. Further, the manager gambles for gain when fund wealth is low and time to maturity is short. As opposed to the existing literature, this study found that the risk-taking policy is more conservative when fund wealth is relatively large. Furthermore, the utilities of the manager and members could both be improved by appropriately choosing the performance fee rate.     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

The duties of a receiver/manager in Nigeria and Ghana

This paper critically examines the duties of receiver/managers in Nigeria and Ghana with a view to determining their adequacy or otherwise. The paper distinguishes between a receiver/manager appointed pursuant to ownership or management dispute and a receiver/manager appointed pursuant to the realization of security. With respect to the former the paper concludes that the persons appointed thereby are better described as managers and suggests a more detailed elaboration of their duties. To determine the duties of receiver/managers appointed to realize security the paper examines the meaning of the receiver/managers; the capacity to be appointed to that office and the duties of a receiver/manager appointed by the court as well as those appointed out of court by the security holders. The paper also considers the consequences of a breach of duty and concludes that the law on receivership is largely the same in Nigeria and Ghana even though there is more litigation in Nigeria. Furthermore the paper suggests the importance of appointing professionals as receiver/managers; the need for the clarity of rules to enable the receiver/managers effectively discharge their duties to enable an assessment of the adequacy of the duties. In this regard the paper recommends a comprehensive reform of insolvency law in Nigeria and Ghana. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why Managers Use Cost Allocations: A Research Note

Using an experimental design, this paper investigates empirically the conditions under which managers use cost allocations for decision-making purposes. The paper focuses on decision-risk in the context of short-term decision-making when most capacity costs are unavoidable. Decision-risk is determined in this paper by a combination of two factors: uncertainty and irreversibility. Cost allocations can serve as a reference point for a decision maker to deal with decision-risk. Three hypotheses are formulated: (1) the combination of both uncertainty and decision irreversibility induces the use of cost allocations. However, (2) certainty or (3) decision reversibility alone are not expected to induce the use of cost allocations. The hypotheses were tested in an experiment, in which senior managers participated. The experimental results supported the hypotheses.     

Discretionary Accounting Choices: A Debt covenants Based Signalling Approach

This paper seeks to explain the discretionary accounting choices made by managers in a world characterised by asymmetric information between managers and investors. It considers a firm whose capital structure consists of both debt and equity, a manager who protects the interests of the firm's existing shareholders, and a financial market. The manager is committed to engage in an investment opportunity and needs to raise some equity to finance it. He is furthermore endowed with some private information about his firm's future earnings. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his accounting choices. In this equilibrium, the selection of balance sheet strengthening and income increasing accounting choices signals unfavourable information while the use of balance-sheet weakening and income- decreasing accounting choices signals favourable private information. The latter firms should thus experience positive abnormal returns around the announcement dates of their accounting choices.     

Investment timing,agency, and information

This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, greater inertia occurs in investment, as the model predicts that the manager will have a more valuable option to wait than the owner.     

The seasoned executive's decision-making style

Leaders make decisions every day of their lives, but how they do it changes dramatically over the course of their careers. At lower levels, the job is to get widgets out the door; action is at a premium. At higher levels, the job involves decisions about which widgets to offer and how to develop them. To climb the corporate ladder and be effective in new roles, managers need to change the way they use information and evaluate options. Based on a study of the decision-making profiles of more than 120,000 executives, the authors found that people make decisions very differently in public than they do in private and that the decision styles of successful managers evolve in highly predictable patterns. The most successful managers and executives become increasingly open and interactive in their leadership (or public) styles, and more analytic in their thinking (or private) styles, as they progress in their careers. The research shows that decision-making profiles do a complete flip over the course of a career; that is, the decision profile of a successful CEO is the opposite of a successful first-line supervisor's. When does the major change in focus occur? Somewhere between the manager level and the director level, executives find that formerly effective decision styles no longer work so well. At this point, decision styles fall into a "convergence zone", where managers use all styles more or less equally. From then on, the executives continue to evolve their styles. The most successful managers come to the convergence zone quickly and continue to adjust their styles as their careers progress. Low performers seem to stagnate once they hit the convergence zone; their styles do not evolve in new directions. Clearly, relying on past successes and habits is no guarantee of success-indeed, it may be the road to failure.     

CVP under uncertainty and the manager's utility function

Cost-volume-profit analysis has focused on the firm's short-run output decision assuming that the manager maximizes the firm's objective function rather than his or her own. This study argues that the decision problem facing the manager is to determine not only the level of output, but also the level of investment in risky assets in such a way that the expected utility of the manager's own end-of-period wealth can be maximized when the manager's wealth function is dependent on vested interests both within and outside of the firm, possibly in competition with the firm. Through analytical work, it is demonstrated that a change in fixed costs of the firm affects not only the production decision of a manager, but also his orher decision to invest in risky assets. The direction of this fixed cost effect depends on the particular type of risk aversion displayed by the manager. From the analytical work, five propositions are developed for empirical investigation in the future.The most helpful comments of Professor Cheng-few Lee are greatly acknowledged. We wish to thank anonymous referees who's comments have improved the paper. Furthermore, participants at the seminar at the University of Massachusetts Lowell also provided helpful comments.     

“和而不群”还是“卓尔不群”?——基于基金网络信息使用的视角

如何识别出优秀的基金管理者,理解其信息决策机制,对于优化资源配置、提升市场效率具有重要意义。本文探究了基金经理对自身所处基金网络中的共享信息的使用程度与其管理能力之间的关系。具体而言,本文通过基金的重仓持股构建了基金网络,采用基金自身交易与其所处网络中其他基金平均交易的偏离程度作为该基金对基金网络中信息使用的衡量。研究发现:(1)对基金网络中信息使用程度较低的基金的业绩要显著好于对基金网络中信息使用程度较高的基金。(2)更高的超额收益主要来源于基金经理优异的选股能力,虽由此承担了更多的异质性风险,却并未增大总体风险水平。(3)基金经理更换数据表明基金对网络内信息的使用程度更多地与基金经理特征相关而非与基金特征相关。(4)网络内信息使用程度直接反映了基金私有信息含量,因此更可能与基金经理能力相关。     

Mutual Fund Manager Forecasting Behavior

I examine publicly released annual earnings forecasts issued in conjunction with stock recommendations by mutual fund managers of actively managed open-end mutual funds. I find that mutual fund manager annual earnings forecasts systematically overestimate the earnings number later disclosed at the annual earnings announcement. In further analyses, I attempt to distinguish between two explanations for this forecast bias: an untruthful reporting bias (market manipulation) and a truthful cognitive bias (optimism). These explanations generate different predictions about the timing of changes in fundholdings of forecasted securities between the forecast release and annual earnings announcement dates. I interpret my findings as more consistent with an optimism explanation for mutual fund manager annual forecast bias and less consistent with a market manipulation explanation for this bias. I am, however, unable to eliminate an unobservable selection bias either in the decision of the mutual fund manager to report a forecast publicly or in the media's decision to publish that forecast as an explanation for my finding that mutual fund manager forecasts are biased.     

Moral Hazard and the Portfolio Management Problem

This paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information. In addition, the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully. We analyze three contracting regimes: (1) first-best where effort is observable, (2) linear with unobservable effort, and (3) the optimal contract within the Bhattacharya-Pfleiderer quadratic class. We find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager. This underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. These contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk-tolerant principals.     

The impact of manager philosophy on knowledge management systems

This paper analyses how information about managers and technology can be used to provide those managers with a system that is congruent with their needs. In particular, using McGregor's Theories X and Y philosophies, managerial needs are elicited and then contemporary knowledge management technologies, including intelligent agents, and the way they are implemented, are analysed to determine how they meet those manager needs. Different knowledge management technologies are found to be important to manifesting the requirements of particular management philosophies. For example, ‘Theory X’ appears consistent with use of intelligent agents to ‘monitor’ behaviour. This leads to the concept of ‘technology congruence’, where the choice of the technology ultimately is tied to which view of the world the manager employs. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Pension fund manager skills over the economic cycle: the (non-)specialization cost

We study whether pension fund managers, as professionals of important social and financial products, are able to add value for their clients and adapt to economic changes. To this end, we analyze the performance and skills (market timing and stock picking) over the economic cycle from both pension fund and manager perspectives. This double analysis allows examining whether skills reside in managers and/or funds and control for manager substitutions. Despite the long-term nature of pension funds, we find that both fund and manager skills vary with market conditions, showing better evidence of stock-picking in booms, and of market timing in recessions. Nonetheless, top (bottom) funds and managers exhibit both (incorrect) skills in booms and in recessions. Some of the top (bottom) funds and managers are the best (worst) in both abilities in the same periods, but not in different periods, showing that not all managers have the ability to adapt to market conditions. Additionally, managers with limited skills tend to specialize because diversification requires multi-task skills and the non-specialization of these managers usually results in incorrect skills.     

经理人长期激励方案与股东利益的一致性研究

基于EVA(经济增加值)设计长期激励契约和激励比率,引导经理适度举债经营和投资决策能使双方利益趋于一致问题而建立的3个命题进行的逻辑推理证明:(1)在新兴的中国资本市场,高管激励机制不要盲目搬用西方激励方法,长期激励方案具有引导经理准确应用融资优序理论并适度举债,既能激励经理更为努力工作,又能将经理利益与股东利益更紧密融合在一起;(2)合理确定长期激励比率和建立适当的奖励薪酬金额上下限模型,为具体设计激励方案提供理论依据;(3)长激励方案能引导经理的投资决策选择投资项目的条件与股东财富最大化一致.