商业银行信用风险评估的生存分析模型及实证研究

企业发生财务危机,不能归还到期贷款是商业银行信贷资产的主要风险来源,商业银行如何构建恰当的信用风险评估模型来预测企业的财务危机,从而避免这类信用风险的出现就显得尤为重要。本文以我国上市公司为研究对象,结合杜邦分析法建立了基于生存分析的信用风险评估模型,模型对于随机选取的预测样本,其提前1年、2年和3年的预测准确率分别达到86%、72%和68%。通过与Altman模型、Ohlson模型预测结果的比较和鲁棒性检验的结果发现,该模型同时具有可以使用时间序列、无需样本配对、中远期预测能力强和高鲁棒性的特点,这些特点特别对于商业银行中长期信贷风险管理具有较高的应用价值。     

Securitization and systemic risk: An empirical investigation on Italian banks over the financial crisis

This research examines the effects of securitization on the bank's risk exposure both in terms of individual expected shortfall and marginal expected shortfall as a measure of systemic risk. The relationship between securitization activity and tail risks is especially relevant in light of the consequences for financial stability, both for the individual securitizing banks and for the market as a whole, as the financial crisis 2007–2008 reveals. By using a sample of Italian listed banks over the period 2000–2009, we find that securitizing banks have, on average, higher expected losses in case of extreme events. This adds new evidence on the main findings in the literature that focused on the evidence that risk transfer through securitization is relatively insignificant compared to the risk retained by the originating bank. We show that this risk retention is in terms of an increase of tail risk. We also find that securitization increases the probability of banks to become “systemically” riskier, but we find no difference when comparing the pre-crisis with the post-crisis period. This suggests that the systemic exposures of Italian banks are still as high as before the crisis with severe implications for financial stability.     

The systemic risk of European banks during the financial and sovereign debt crises

European banks became a source of risk to global financial markets during the financial crisis and attention to the European banking sector increased during the sovereign debt crisis. To measure the systemic risk of European banks, we calculate a distress insurance premium (DIP), which integrates the characteristics of bank size, probability of default, and correlation. Based on this measure, the systemic risk of European banks reached its height in late 2011 around €500 billion. We find that this was largely due to sovereign default risk. The DIP methodology is also used to measure the systemic contribution of individual banks. This approach identifies the large systemically important European banks, but Italian and Spanish banks as a group notably increased in systemic importance during the sample period. Bank-specific fundamentals like capital-asset ratios predict the one-year-ahead systemic risk contributions.     

Incorporating risk input into the analysis of bank productivity: Application to the Taiwanese banking industry

This study reappraises banks’ productivity by using 42 Taiwanese banks during 1999–2007 as observations. It introduces an input-oriented generalized metafrontier Malmquist productivity index (I-gMMPI), while considering the latent effect of risk-taking behavior in the analytic framework. We learn that public and private banks should face separate short-term technological frontiers, while the econometric model considering risk input can portray banks’ operating frontiers better. Moreover, neglecting the influence of risk input would bring about distortions of efficiency, technology and TFP dynamic estimations for banks; meanwhile, the degree of scale economies would also be overestimated. The paper concludes that neglecting the risk-taking essence in bank performance evaluation is equal to allowing banks to barter risk-bearing as the term for further output growth. Consequently, the potential cost is that banks may excessively aggrandize their scales of business, implying the possibility of another financial crisis.     

How to get banks to take less risk and disclose bad news

There is wide agreement that before the recent financial crisis, financial institutions took excessive risk in their investment strategies. At the same time, regulators complained that banks did not reveal the extent of their difficulties in a timely fashion thus reducing the effectiveness of government intervention to prevent or mitigate the deleterious effects of the financial crisis. The purpose of this paper is to investigate how regulators can best use certain tools at their disposal to motivate banks to take less risk and to provide adverse information to regulators early. We argue that two tools, namely (i) allowing bank payouts to equity holders even when banks report they are in trouble and (ii) constraining banks’ future investment strategy when they are in trouble can achieve both goals. We show that, in some cases, it is optimal to use both of these tools in combination. That is, in such cases it is optimal to allow equity payouts when banks report they are in trouble, even though such payouts increase the incentive for banks to take excessive risk and even though these payments are financed by taxpayers. We also show that the more socially costly is constraining the bank’s portfolio selection or the more complex are the bank’s assets, the more likely it is that allowing larger payouts and fewer constraints is optimal. Finally we discuss how changes in bank capital requirements interact with inducing disclosure and preventing excessive risk taking.     

Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time

A main cause of the crisis of 2007-2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.     

What drives investment bank performance? The role of risk,liquidity and fees prior to and during the crisis

This paper examines factors that affect the performance of investment banks in the G7 and Switzerland. In particular, we focus on the role of risk, liquidity and investment banking fees. Panel analysis shows that those variables significantly impact upon performance as derived from Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Given our sample also comprises the financial crisis, we further test for regime switches using dynamic panel threshold analysis. Results show different underlying regimes, in particular over the financial crisis. In addition, a strong positive effect of Z-Score on performance for banks in the regime of low default risk is reported, while fee-income ratio has also a positive impact for banks with low level of fees. On the other hand, liquidity exerts a negative impact. Notably, there is a clear trend of mobility of banks across the two identified threshold regimes with regard to risk a year before the financial crisis. Our results provide evidence that recent regulation reforms regarding capital adequacy and liquidity requirements are on the right track and could enhance performance.     

Dividends and financial health: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies

Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2020, we show that there is a positive relationship between banks' dividends lagged by one quarter and their financial health in the current quarter. We also find that this positive relationship is more pronounced for banks with lower capital adequacy and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, indicating that it is more necessary for banks with these characteristics to use dividends to convey information regarding their financial health. Our additional analyses suggest that total payout is also positively associated with bank financial health, and that the positive relationship between dividends and financial health applies to private banks as well, but that the magnitude is weaker for them than for public banks. Our overall findings primarily complement a risk reduction hypothesis in corporate finance and bank payout policies.     

Bank Diversification and Overall Financial Strength: International Evidence

There are many studies in the finance and management literature that examine the impact of diversification on performance. Yet, the literature remains inconclusive as for the potential benefits in terms of risk and return. The present study aims to re‐examine this issue, while proposing a methodological framework that integrates various bank performance and risk indicators into a single measure of financial strength. Using an international sample of commercial banks, we find that diversification in terms of income, earning assets, and on‐ and off‐balance sheet activities influences positively their financial strength. We also find that income diversification can be more beneficial for banks operating in less developed countries compared to banks in advanced and major advanced economies. However, we observe the opposite in the case of diversification between off‐balance sheet and on‐balance sheet activities. Furthermore, the results reveal that income and earning assets diversification can mitigate the adverse effect of the financial crisis on bank financial strength. We continue to find a positive relationship between diversification and financial strength when we account for nesting effects, endogeneity, as well as when using an alternative approach for the construction of the financial strength indicator.     

The role of on- and off-balance-sheet leverage of banks in the late 2000s crisis

Extensive regulatory changes and technological advances have transformed banking systems to a great extent. Banks have reacted to the challenges posed by the new operating environment by creating new products and expanding their activities to some uncharted business areas. In this paper, we study how modern banking which gave birth to the off-balance-sheet leverage activities affected the risk profile of U.S. banks as well as the level of systemic risk before and after the onset of the late 2000s financial crisis. Towards this, we separate on- from off-balance-sheet leverage and capture the latter with different, yet complementary, measures which do not exist in the current literature. Special attention is paid on the deleveraging process that occurred in the banking market after the crisis erupted, which is an additional innovative feature of this study. Our findings reveal that leverage, both explicit and hidden off-the-balance-sheet, increases the individual risk of banking firms making them vulnerable to financial shocks. Reverse leverage, on the other hand, is beneficial for individual banks’ health, but is found to be harmful for financial stability. We also demonstrate that the banks which concentrate on traditional lines of business typically carry less risk compared to those involved with modern financial instruments.     

Financial sector structure and financial crisis burden

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.     

International diversification and risk of multinational banks: Evidence from the pre-crisis period

The recent financial crisis has clearly shown that the relationship between bank internationalization and risk is complex. Multinational banks can benefit from portfolio diversification, reducing their overall riskiness, but this effect can be offset by incentives going in the opposite direction, leading them to take on excessive risks. Since both effects are grounded on solid theoretical arguments, the answer of what is the actual relationship between bank internationalization and risk is left to the empirical analysis. In this paper, we study such relationship in the period leading to the financial crisis of 2007–2008. For a sample of 384 listed banks from 56 countries, we calculate two measures of risk for the period from 2001 to 2007 – the expected default frequency (EDF), a market-based and forward-looking indicator, and the Z-score, a balance-sheet-based and backward-looking measure – and relate them to the degree of banks’ internationalization. We find robust evidence that international diversification increases bank risk.     

Bank regulation and international financial stability: A case against the 2006 Basel framework for controlling tail risk in trading books

In attempting to promote international financial stability, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006) provided a framework that sought to control the amount of tail risk that large banks around the world would take in their trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements. However, many of these banks suffered significant trading losses during the recent financial crisis. Our paper examines whether the Basel framework allowed banks to take substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty. We find that it allowed banks to do so and that its minimum capital requirements can be notably procyclical. Hence, focusing on the way the Basel framework sought to control the amount of tail risk in trading books relative to their corresponding minimum capital requirements, our paper supports the view that it was not properly designed to promote financial stability. We also discuss alternative regulatory frameworks that would potentially be more effective than the Basel framework in preventing banks from taking substantive tail risk in their trading books without a capital requirement penalty.     

Fair value accounting,fragile bank balance sheets and crisis: A model

A topic of recent interest in accounting research has been the investigation of the role of fair value accounting (FVA) in the global financial crisis. This research focused on finding a link during the crisis time-period and often states that “accounting is only a messenger”. The model presented in this paper emphasises finding the link before the crisis and “accounting as money.” Use is made of an accounting model of the economy due to the inability of standard models of monetary transmission to incorporate global financial crisis characteristics such as feedback effects, systemic risk and the centrality of the financial sector in the crisis. The model shows FVA in banks to be an accelerator that amplifies the financial cycle upswing. Feedback effects noted in the model include changes in the demand for financial instruments and changes in demand in the real economy. Minsky-like, crisis is shown to be endogenous to the model, working through the fragility of balance sheets in the real sector as well as in the financial sector. Bank balance sheet fragility is caused by bad capital driving out good capital, banks reaching for yield and the inversion of the yield curve. The model shows that the practice of not meeting rising credit demand with increasing credit supply is an essential control mechanism in the financial cycle.     

基于动态因子Copula模型的我国银行系统性风险度量

本文基于2007年至2019年我国14家上市银行的股票收益率,构建偏态t-分布动态因子Copula模型,利用时变荷载因子刻画单家银行与整个系统的相关性,计算联合风险概率作为系统性风险整体水平的度量,基于关联性视角提出了新的单家机构系统脆弱性和系统重要性度量指标——系统脆弱性程度和系统重要性程度。该方法充分考虑了银行个体差异性和系统的内在关联性以及收益率的厚尾性和非对称性,从而能够捕捉到更多的信息且兼具时效性。研究表明:银行机构在风险聚集时期相关程度更大,联合风险概率能够准确识别出系统性风险事件且在我国推行宏观审慎评估体系以后有明显降低;整体而言,大型商业银行系统重要性水平最高,同时风险抗压能力也最强;本文使用的度量方法降低了数据获取成本且更具时效性,有助于为宏观审慎差异化监管工作提供借鉴和参考。     

The impact of state ownership on performance differences in privately-owned versus state-owned banks: An international comparison

This paper examines how government ownership and government involvement in a country’s banking system affect bank performance from 1989 through 2004. Our study uncovers an interesting pattern of changing performance differences between state-owned and privately-owned banks around the Asian financial crisis. We find that state-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital, and had greater credit risk than privately-owned banks prior to 2001, and the performance differences are more significant in those countries with greater government involvement and political corruption in the banking system. In addition, from 1997 to 2000, the 4-year period after the beginning of the Asian financial crisis, the deterioration in the cash flow returns, core capital, and credit quality of state-owned banks was significantly greater than that of privately-owned banks, especially for the countries that were hardest hit by the Asian crisis. However, state-owned banks closed the gap with privately-owned banks on cash flow returns, core capital, and nonperforming loans in the post-crisis period of 2001–2004. Our findings can best be explained by Shleifer and Vishny’s [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. J. Finance 52, 737–783] corporate governance theory on state ownership of firms and Kane’s [Kane, E.J., 2000. Capital movement, banking insolvency, and silent runs in the Asian financial crisis. Pacific-Basin Finance J. 8, 153–175] life-cycle model of a regulation-induced banking crisis.     

Governance and bank characteristics in the credit and sovereign debt crises – the impact of CEO power

The global financial sector recently suffered from two interrelated crises: the credit crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. A common question is whether the recent experience with the credit crisis has helped in dealing with the sovereign debt crisis. We study more specifically whether banks with powerful CEOs perform better or worse than other banks, and if there is any difference in this relationship between the two crises. Using unique hand-collected data for 378 large global banks, we find that CEO power has a significant positive relation to bank profitability and asset quality, but also to insolvency risk, during the sovereign debt crisis. Thus, strong CEOs do not appear to be detrimental to bank performance. Our results also support the idea that deposit insurance may have contributed to the credit crisis.     

A simple indicator of systemic risk

We examine the relevance and effectiveness of stock return correlations among financial institutions as an indicator of systemic risk. By analyzing the trends and fluctuations of daily stock return correlations and default correlations among the 22 largest bank holding companies and investment banks from 1988 to 2008, we find that daily stock return correlation is a simple, robust, forward-looking, and timely systemic risk indicator. There is an increasing trend in stock return correlation among banks, whereas there is no obvious correlation trend among non-banks. We also disaggregate the stock returns into systematic and idiosyncratic components and find that the correlation increases are largely driven by the increases in correlations between banks’ idiosyncratic risks, which give rise to increasing systemic risk. Correlation spikes tend to predict or coincide with significant economic or market events, especially during the 2007–2008 financial crisis. Furthermore, we show that stock return correlations offer a perspective on the level of systemic risk in the financial sector that is not already captured by default correlations. Stock return correlations are not subject to data limitations or model specification errors that other potential systemic risk measures may face. Therefore, we recommend that regulators and businesses monitor daily stock return correlations among those large and highly leveraged financial institutions to track the level of systemic risk.     

人民银行财务缓冲机制构建研究

近年来,国际金融危机和欧债危机的爆发,使部分央行的财务风险敞口和潜在损失风险扩大,一定程度上影响到央行职能的履行,建立完善的风险防御体系显得尤为重要。从目前实际情况看,建立财务缓冲机制是中央银行抵御各种风险的有效方式之一。本文从财务柔性理论出发,对如何构建人民银行财务缓冲机制进行了探讨。     

Assessing financial instability: The case of Brazil

In this paper we use the arbitrage pricing theory to infer the probability of financial institution failure for banks in Brazil. We build an index of financial stability for Brazilian banks. Empirical results seem to provide evidence that after the Russian crisis in 1998, systemic risk has increased in the country but this risk has decreased over time through 2002. Furthermore, for individual major banks the probability of failure has decreased monotonically after the Russian crisis with the adoption of a floating exchange rate regime, an inflation-targeting framework and the introduction of the new payment system.