Innovation and competition: The role of the product market

We study how competition impacts innovation (and welfare) when firms compete both in the product market and in innovation development. This relationship is complex and may lead to scenarios in which a lessening of competition increases R&D and consumer welfare in the long run. We provide conditions for when competition increases or decreases industry innovation and welfare. These conditions are based on properties of the product market payoffs. Implications for applied work and policy are discussed.     

竞争政策强化及产业政策转型影响市场效率的机理研究——兼论有效市场与有为政府

中国特色社会主义市场经济建设需要有效市场和有为政府更好结合,其中的一个重要途径是强化竞争政策基础地位,推进产业政策从选择性向普惠化、功能性转型。竞争政策强化与产业政策转型具有内在关联性,二者相互配合,共同促进有效市场形成。本文构建了基于竞争成功函数和共容利益假设的政企互动模型,研究发现:竞争政策和功能性产业政策有利于提升市场竞争效率,而选择性产业政策会降低市场竞争效率;功能性产业政策在一定程度上能起到弥补市场失灵的作用,体现了有为政府的积极作用。进一步考虑非对称市场竞争时发现,竞争政策可以同时兼顾提升市场竞争效率和分配效率两项目标,而选择性产业政策在两项目标上相互掣肘、由此强化竞争政策的优势凸显。本文理论模型的结论表明,有为政府应强化竞争政策基础地位,为产业政策转型创造良好的市场环境,加快选择性产业政策向功能性产业政策转型,放宽市场准入,持续推行公平竞争审查制度,维护和促进有效市场。良好的经济运行秩序需要有效市场减轻政府管控压力、有为政府简政放权营造良好市场环境,实现有效市场和有为政府更好结合。     

Product innovation with vertical differentiation: Is a monopolist's incentive weaker?

This paper compares the incentives for product innovation across different market structures when the new product is vertically differentiated and of lower quality, a common case empirically. We show that innovation incentive rankings across market structures can differ substantially when the new product is of lower rather than higher quality. In particular, the incentive to add the new product can be greater for a monopolist over the old product than for a firm that would face any degree of competition from the old product. This incentive ranking cannot occur when, instead, the new product is of higher quality as has been analyzed in previous work. Moreover, in that case, the incentive ranking is the same whether the market is covered or not covered, whereas in our setting the ranking can differ. With the market covered, our setting provides another environment where the monopolist can have the greatest incentive to innovate, as previously shown when the new product is horizontally differentiated. Together, both settings show that Arrow's famous result—a secure monopolist gains less from a nondrastic process innovation than would a competitive firm—does not always extend to nondrastic product innovations. However, in all the cases analyzed here, consumer welfare (though not total welfare) is always lower under monopoly, even when only the monopolist would add the new product.     

Costly Information Disclosure in Oligopoly

We examine the effect of competition on the incentive of firms to disclose quality to consumers before trade when information disclosure is not costless. We demonstrate that no firm will disclose information in the limit, no matter how small the disclosure cost is; that is, the market outcome converges to complete concealment of information as the number of competing firms becomes larger. Nonetheless, it can be shown that under a mild condition, the equilibrium amount of information disclosure is socially excessive for any number of firms, so discouraging information disclosure by levying a tax may increase social welfare.     

INPUT PRICE DISCRIMINATION WHEN BUYERS OPERATE IN MULTIPLE MARKETS*

This paper revisits third‐degree price discrimination when input buyers serve multiple product markets. Such circumstances are prevalent since buyers often use the same input to produce different outputs, and even homogenous outputs are routinely sold through different locations. The typical view is that price discrimination stifles efficiency (and welfare) by resulting in price concessions to less efficient firms. When buyers serve multiple markets, price discrimination leads to price breaks for firms in markets with lower demand. When lower demand markets also have less competition, price discrimination can provide welfare gains by shifting output to less competitive markets.     

On the strategic value of risk management

This article examines how firms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where firms that are rendered “risk averse” by financial frictions decide on and commit to their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We find that commitment to hedging modifies the pricing and production strategies of firms. This strategic effect is channeled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders' “risk aversion”. It has opposite effects depending on the nature of product market competition: commitment to hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, not committing to the hedging position can never be an equilibrium outcome: committing is always a best response to non-committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all firms.     

INFORMATIVE ADVERTISING: COMPETITION OR COOPERATION?*

In a duopoly version of the Grossman and Shapiro [1984] model of informative advertising, I examine firms' incentives to semicollude on advertising and the welfare implications thereof. I find that, relative to the noncooperative outcome, semicollusion on advertising is more profitable but is detrimental to welfare. I also find that when the advertising cost is ‘low,’ advertising semicollusion is more harmful to welfare than price semicollusion. These findings are important for competition policy since traditionally, cooperative advertising is not treated in the same light as price collusion.     

Segmental new-product diffusion of residential broadband services

Aggregate models of innovation diffusion do not capitalise on valuable consumer adoption dynamics that may be useful to policy makers and market planners. The non-diffusion choice literature shows quite clearly that these dynamics may indeed be very important factors in the diffusion process. The authors present a segmental broadband diffusion model that is estimated from consumer survey data that measure the effect that household income has on its propensity to adopt this technological product. The results suggest that early broadband adopters are mostly made up from wealthy households and only as time progresses do less well off households adopt. The findings presented in this paper will be important to market planners and policy makers requiring a relatively simple technique that forecasts segmental innovation diffusion.     

A mixed spectrum management framework for the future wireless service based on techno-economic analysis: The Korean spectrum policy study

The evolution of radio technology and various services has increased the world's dependence on wireless communications. The demand for and value of spectrum resources therefore are also increasing. Spectrum efficiency is the most important factor in managing spectrum scarcity. However, under the current spectrum management approach, it is difficult to adopt innovative technologies that improve spectrum efficiency and flexible usage in the current dynamic wireless market. Recently, there have been several approaches to improve efficient use of spectrum resources, and each approach has its own advantages and disadvantages. Therefore, this research first discusses current issues and analyzes relative social welfare based on the different characteristics of technology and market conditions to compare various attributes of each approach. Based on the techno-economic simulation results, this paper introduces a mixed spectrum management framework for the future wireless service and support policy makers’ decision making. Furthermore, the mixed spectrum policy to spectrum management in Korea is proposed to find a more realistic and efficient spectrum management policy.     

Why Do Firms Enter a New Product Market? A Two‐Dimensional Framework for Market Entry Motivation and Behavior

What are the energetic forces that induce established firms to enter new product markets? While most previous research has explained the economic profits expected from a new product market as firms' distinctive motivation for market entry, some recent studies also emphasize interfirm competition and benchmarking activities as another important factor that motivates firms' new market entry. To explain the established firms' diverse new product market entry behaviors, this study presents a two‐dimensional scheme of entry motivation in terms of the degrees of target market profit focus and competitor focus. The first dimension captures the economic motivation of firms' new market entry that ranges from focusing on the direct expected profits from the target market to considering more strategic/indirect benefit incentives. The second dimension captures the degree of firms' external motivation for entry affected by competitors that ranges from independent entry decisions to fully competitor‐oriented entry decisions. Using multiple‐industry survey data, the current study empirically verifies that these two entry motivation dimensions explain a great portion of actual firms' new product market entry behaviors and that they are independent of each other. Subsequently, this study validates that firms' operational size and their environmental factors like perceived technological uncertainty and competitive intensity upon new market entry affect the degrees of the two dimensions of firms' new product market entry motivation. More specifically, large firms less emphasize target‐market profits than small firms, and when perceived technological uncertainty is high, potential market entrants become less target market profit focused but more competitor focused. Under a highly competitive new market condition, firms focus on both target‐market profits and competitors. Based on the analysis of new market entry motivation dimensions, the current study proposes a new typology of established firms' market entry behaviors. The suggested typology represents the four different types of new product market entrants and examines specific characteristics and entry strategies for each type of potential entrants. This entry‐motivation framework should provide a deeper understanding of the backgrounds of entry behaviors and assist firms in developing appropriate entry strategies and in advantageously responding to rival firms' actions with regard to entry.     

Resale price maintenance and restrictions on dominant firm and industry-wide adoption

We consider a model in which firms use resale price maintenance (RPM) to dampen competition. We find that even though the motive for using RPM is thus anti-competitive, market forces may limit the overall adverse impact on consumers. Indeed, we find that when there are a large number of firms in the market, consumer welfare under a laissez-faire policy might be as high or almost as high as it would be under an alternative policy in which RPM is banned. Government interventions that put an upper limit on the extent of industry-wide adoption of RPM can have adverse welfare effects in the model. We further show that proposed guidelines in the United States and Europe may come close to minimizing welfare.     

Measuring Welfare from Ambulatory Surgery Centers: A Spatial Analysis of Demand for Healthcare Facilities

This paper studies competition between healthcare facilities, particularly between hospitals and ambulatory surgery centers (ASC's), in the market for outpatient surgery. The goal is to answer questions about the existence and magnitude of welfare gains earned from the use of ASC's. These questions are relevant to current policy debates about the usefulness of ASC's. I calculate welfare by specifying a multinomial logit model of consumer demand for healthcare facilities, and estimating structural elements of demand functions. Total elimination of ASC's results in between 10.2 and 28.1 minutes of welfare loss per patient surgery.     

Costly interviews

In this paper, we show how the interaction between costly screening and competition in decentralized markets may prevent efficient matching. We examine this phenomenon in a simple dynamic model of a professional labor market, where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability. Inefficiencies arise when a firm decides not to interview potentially able candidates since it infers that sufficiently good candidates will be hired by more productive firms. This effect is robust to changes in the information structure of the market, but it can be mitigated by subsidizing screening costs.     

Labor market power and the distorting effects of international trade

This article examines how final product trade with China shapes and interacts with labor market imperfections that create market power in labor markets and prevent an efficient market outcome. I develop a framework for measuring such labor market power distortions in monetary terms and document large degrees of these distortions in Germany's manufacturing sector. Import competition only exerts labor market disciplining effects if firms, rather than employees, possess labor market power. Otherwise, increasing export demand and import competition both fortify existing distortions, which decreases labor market efficiency. This widens the gap between potential and realized output and thus diminishes classical gains from trade.     

Linking Product Development Outcomes to Market Valuation of the Firm: The Case of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry*

The purpose of this research was to examine empirically the effects of new product development outcomes on overall firm performance. To do so, first product development and finance literature were connected to develop three testable hypotheses. Next, an event study was conducted in order to explore whether the changes in the stock market valuation of firms are influenced by the outcomes of efforts to develop new products. The pharmaceutical industry was chosen as the empirical context for the present study's analysis largely because the gate‐keeping role played by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides a specific event date on which to focus the event study methodology. As such, this study's events were dates of public announcements of the FDA decisions to approve or to reject the New Drug Applications submitted by the sponsoring firms. Consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, this study's results show that market valuations are responsive strongly and cleanly to the success or failure of new product development efforts. Hence, one of this study's key results suggests that financial markets may be attuned sharply to product development outcomes in publicly traded firms. This study also finds that financial market losses from product development failures were much larger in magnitude than financial market gains from product development successes—indicating an asymmetry in the response of financial markets to the success and failure of new product development efforts. Hence, another implication of this study's results is that managers should factor in a substantial risk premium when considering substantial new development projects. The present study's results also imply that managers should refrain from hyping new products and perhaps even should restrain the enthusiasm that the financial community may build before the product fully is developed. The effect on firm value is severe when expectations about an anticipated new product are not fulfilled. Managers in effect should take care to build reasonable and realistic expectations about potential new products.     

Markov Perfect Equilibrium in the US digital camera market

This paper examines the model launch and withdrawal decisions of the major digital camera makers for the period 1996–1999. These manufacturers produce differentiated products and some have the experience of participating in a similar market—the film camera market. This paper investigates to what extent the following four factors affect firms' decisions to launch a new model of digital camera: the effects of competition with “within-brand” models; the effects of competition with “cross-brand” models; the level of experience in the film camera market; and market conditions. The empirical findings suggest that good market conditions can accommodate more products, which has a positive effect on product launches. On the other hand, existing cross-brand models have a negative effect on product launches, while within-brand models and experience in similar markets have an ambiguous effect on product launches.     

Taking industry structuring seriously: A strategic perspective on product differentiation

Given legal impediments to consolidation and collusion, firms often resort to product differentiation to attain market power. This paper provides a formal analysis of product differentiation as a tool for such industry structuring at both the firm and industry level. We examine: how industry structure differs when firms collaborate on their differentiation decisions, and when the profitability of such collaboration is greatest; how an individual firm's differentiation decisions affect subsequent market outcomes under price competition, such as margin, market share, and profit; how mere differentiation differs from a ‘differentiation advantage’; and how changing a firm's differentiation affects its rivals through both positive externalities (by restraining rivalry) and negative externalities (by shifting competitive advantage). Our results have implications for empirical research, strategy theory, and pedagogy.     

The Year in Review: Economics at the Antitrust Division, 2006–2007

In this paper, we evaluate the scope of Chadwick’s claim on the superiority of competition for the market over competition in the market under incomplete information. We firstly characterize the expected outcome achieved under competition in the market at a Cournot Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Then we characterize the optimal expected outcome achieved under a competition for the market mechanism designed by a government facing a shadow cost of public funds. We show that a regulated monopoly selected by an auction mechanism results in higher expected welfare than does duopoly competition when the entry cost is low but that the opposite holds when the market size is small and the entry cost is high for some values of the shadow cost of public funds. These results are explained by the influence of adverse selection on the entry decision at the Cournot equilibrium and by the level of expected total fixed costs in both mechanisms.      

Reducing the level of switching costs in mobile communications: The case of Mobile Number Portability

Switching costs are one of the most important economic forces that affect market competition in mobile communications. Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that switching costs reduce market competition leading to higher prices, lower product and service quality, and lower customer welfare. Given their negative consequences, national regulatory authorities have designed policies aimed at reducing switching costs and fostering competition. One of the most important of these, in the mobile communications industry, is mobile number portability (MNP). The aim of this paper is to investigate the effect of MNP on switching costs in mobile phone services. First, a hierarchical Bayes model is proposed to measure switching costs at the customer level and to investigate the impact of MNP on them. Second, this study examines the drivers of MNP adoption by customers using a binary logit specification. The results reveal that this regulatory policy has significantly reduced the cost of switching and that MNP adoption partially depends on customer-related variables.