Complementarities and competition: Unpacking the drivers of entrants' technology choices in the solar photovoltaic industry

Entrants in new industries pursue distinct technologies in hopes of winning the technology competition and achieving sustainable competitive advantage. We draw on the complementary assets framework to predict entrants' technology choices in an emerging industry. Evidence from the global solar photovoltaic industry supports our arguments that entrants are more likely to choose technologies with higher technical performance and for which key complementary assets are available in the ecosystem. However, diversifying entrants are more likely to trade off superior performance for complementary asset availability whereas start‐up entrants are more likely to trade off complementary asset availability for superior performance. This difference is largely due to diversifying entrants with pre‐entry capabilities related to the industry. The study offers a novel illustration of how complementarities and competition shape entry strategies. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring

We ask whether and when shareholder‐oriented foreign owners are likely to change corporate governance logics in a stakeholder‐oriented setting by introducing shareholder‐oriented governance practices. We focus on board monitoring and claim that because the bundle of practices used in a stakeholder context does not protect shareholder‐oriented foreign owners' interests, they seek to introduce their own practices. Our results suggest that board monitoring is only activated when shareholder‐oriented foreign ownership is high and that the influence of foreign ownership is especially strong in firms without large domestic owners, with high levels of risk and poor performance. Our findings uncover the possibility of the co‐existence of different corporate governance logics within a given country, shaped by the nature and weight of foreign owners Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Confounding changes in averages with marginal effects: How anchoring can destroy economic value in strategic investment assessments

Profit maximization requires that decision makers assess marginal profits. We demonstrate that decision makers often confound marginal profits with changes in average profits (e.g., changes in return‐on‐investment). This results in systematic deviations from profit maximization where decision makers forgo profit‐enhancing investments that reduce average profits or engage in loss‐enhancing investments that decrease average losses. In other words, average profit becomes an anchor by which new investments are assessed. We conduct two decision‐making experiments that show this bias and demonstrate it is pronounced when average profit data are accessible or task‐relevant. Moreover, we find within‐subject effects across experiments, which helps demonstrate the mechanism that invokes the bias. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competing with complementors: An empirical look at Amazon.com

Research Summary : Platform owners sometimes enter complementors' product spaces and compete against them. Using data from Amazon.com to study Amazon's entry pattern into third‐party sellers' product spaces, we find that Amazon is more likely to target successful product spaces. We also find that Amazon is less likely to enter product spaces that require greater seller efforts to grow, suggesting that complementors' platform‐specific investments influence platform owners' entry decisions. While Amazon's entry discourages affected third‐party sellers from subsequently pursuing growth on the platform, it increases product demand and reduces shipping costs for consumers. We consider the implications of these findings for complementors in platform‐based markets. Managerial Summary : Platform owners can exert considerable influence over their complementors' welfare. Many complementors with successful products are pushed out of markets because platform owners enter their product spaces and compete directly with them. To mitigate such risks, complementors could build their businesses by aggregating nonblockbuster products or focusing on products requiring significant platform‐specific investments to grow. They should also develop capabilities in new product discovery so that they could continually bring innovative products to their platforms.     

Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest european companies

The paper examines the impact of ownership structure on company economic performance in 435 of the largest European companies. Controlling for industry, capital structure and nation effects we find a positive effect of ownership concentration on shareholder value (market‐to‐book value of equity) and profitability (asset returns), but the effect levels off for high ownership shares. Furthermore we propose and support the hypothesis that the identity of large owners—family, bank, institutional investor, government, and other companies—has important implications for corporate strategy and performance. For example, compared to other owner identities, financial investor ownership is found to be associated with higher shareholder value and profitability, but lower sales growth. The effect of ownership concentration is also found to depend on owner identity. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Profiting from innovations: the role of new game strategies in the case of Lipitor of the US pharmaceutical industry

In exploring why innovators often do not profit from their innovations, researchers concentrate on innovators versus imitators and the extent to which owners of complementary assets capture profits from innovations. The literature provides scant attention to factors that sap profits from innovations. This paper argues that an innovator's positioning vis‐à‐vis customers, suppliers, complementors, and other co‐opetitors plays a critical role in the innovator's profitability. The article explores how an innovator can use new game strategies to better positioning, thus capturing rents from innovations and enabling further innovations in the future. The study examines the case of Lipitor, one of the world's best‐selling drug, to illustrate how positioning can play in a firm's ability to profit from its innovations.     

Married to the firm? A large‐scale investigation of the social context of ownership

Research summary : Using a large sample of private firms across Europe, we examine how the social context of owners affects firm strategy and performance. Drawing on embeddedness theory and the institutional logics perspective, we argue that embeddedness in a family, in particular the nuclear family, can strengthen identification and commitment to the firm, but can also induce owners to behave more conservatively. Consistent with this argument, we find that family‐owned firms have higher profit margins, returns on assets, and survival rates compared to single‐owner or unrelated‐owners' firms, but also invest and grow more slowly, hold greater reserves of cash, and rely less on external debt. These differences are most pronounced when the two largest shareholders are married. Our results highlight the key role of marital ties in explaining differences in behavior and performance among firms. Managerial summary : Despite the prevalence of the married‐couple ownership structure in firms, little research has been dedicated to understanding how these firms are managed and perform. We examine the behavior and performance of firms owned by married couples in a large panel of closely held Western European firms. We find that married‐owner family firms are managed more conservatively relative to firms with unrelated owners and even to other family‐owned firms. In particular, married‐owner family firms invest and grow more slowly and rely less on external finance. However, they also exhibit greater performance stability and higher profitability. Our findings suggest that social relationships among owners have a large impact on firm strategy and performance, and highlight some potential trade‐offs to performance when married couples control firms. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Virtuous or vicious cycles? The role of divestitures as a complementary Penrose effect within resource‐based theory

Research summary: Studies of how divestitures affect firm performance offer mixed results. This paper unpacks relationships between divestitures and subsequent performance, focusing first on the moderating role of prior performance and then on mechanisms through which divestitures by higher‐ and lower‐performing firms affect performance. The study suggests that divestitures can exacerbate weakness and reinforce strength: divestitures by lower performers improve profits but inhibit sales growth and tend to speed the firms’ exits as independent actors; by contrast, higher‐performing divesters invest in support of existing assets and gain new growth, while avoiding becoming acquisition targets. Most generally, divestitures help reduce constraints to changing a firm's resource base, which we refer to as a complementary Penrose effect. Managerial summary: Divestitures help both struggling firms and high performers free financial and managerial resources that they can reinvest in more productive uses. In doing so, divestitures reinforce the strength of high performers but may exacerbate weaknesses of struggling firms. Divestitures by lower performers improve their profits but inhibit their sales growth and increase the chances that the firms will be acquired. By contrast, higher‐performing divesters gain new growth by investing in support of existing and recently acquired assets and, by doing so, are less likely to become targets of acquirers who seek their productive assets. Thus, divestiture is part of a downward cycle for struggling firms but supports a virtuous cycle for superior firms.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Rent appropriation of knowledge‐based assets and firm performance when institutions are weak: A study of Chinese publicly listed firms

Research summary : A firm's strategic investments in knowledge‐based assets through research and development (R&D) can generate economic rents for the firm, and thus are expected to affect positively a firm's financial performance. However, weak protection of minority shareholders, weak property rights, and ineffective law enforcement can allow those rents to be appropriated disproportionately by a firm's powerful insiders such as large owners and top managers. Recent data on Chinese publicly listed firms during 2007–2012 were used to demonstrate that the expected positive relationship between knowledge assets and performance is weaker in transition economies when a firm's ownership is highly concentrated and its managers have wide discretion. Moreover, rent appropriation by insiders was shown to vary with the levels of institutional development in which a firm operates. Managerial summary : Investing in knowledge‐based intangible assets (e.g., R&D) is an important value‐creation activity for the firm. Such value creation process can be facilitated by large shareholders and powerful managers, who can then take an advantageous position with critical insider information on these valuable intangible assets and therefore enjoy more opportunities to appropriate more value from them, leaving less value for other minority shareholders. The value distribution becomes increasingly skewed against minority shareholders when the institutional protection for them is weak. Indeed, in a large sample of Chinese publicly listed firms, we found that R&D investment becomes less positively associated with firm financial performance with the presence of large shareholders, high managerial equity, or CEO/Chairman duality, especially in Chinese provinces with weak institutional development. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms

Research summary : We investigate why Japanese firms have adopted executive stock option pay, which was developed with shareholder‐oriented institutional logic that was inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented institutional logic. We argue that Japanese managers have self‐serving incentives to leverage stock ownership of foreign investors and their associated institutional logic to legitimize the adoption of stock option pay. Our empirical analyses with a large sample of Japanese firms between 1997 and 2007 show that when managers have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, and when firms experience poor sales growth, foreign ownership is more likely associated with the adoption of stock option pay. The study shows the active role of managers in facilitating the diffusion of a new governance practice embodying new institutional logic. Managerial summary : Why have Japanese firms adopted stock option pay for executives? Inconsistent with Japanese stakeholder‐oriented tradition in corporate governance, such pay has been believed to prioritize managerial attention to the interests of shareholders over those of other stakeholders. However, to the extent that shareholders' interests are legitimate in the Japanese context, executives who have self‐serving incentives to adopt such pay can leverage the need to look after shareholders' interest in their firms to legitimize their decisions. In a large sample of Japanese firms, we find that foreign ownership (representing shareholders' interests) is more likely to be associated with the adoption of stock option pay when managers are motivated to receive such pay, such as when they have elite education, high pay inequality with ordinary employees, or poor sales growth. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Antecedents and consequences of corporate governance reform: the case of Germany

The paper examines the antecedents and consequences of the voluntary adoption of corporate governance reform in firms embedded in a relationship‐based governance system with less protection of minority shareholders. In such locations, ownership structure should be a key determinant of governance reform. Firms with dispersed ownership are likely to face agency problems but may lack sufficient ownership power in the hand of external owners for adoption to occur. Extensive ownership by external parties facilitates adoption but decreases the need and motivation to adopt governance reform. We examined the adoption of stock‐based incentive plans and transparent accounting regulations (e.g., greater disclosure to shareholders) among large German firms (DAX 100) during the late 1990s. We found an inverse ‘U’‐shaped relationship between ownership concentration and governance reform. In addition, we found that firms adopting governance reform were more likely to engage in corporate divestitures and achieve higher levels of market performance than firms not adopting governance reform. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate divestitures and family control

This paper investigates the relationship between divestitures and firm value in family firms. Using hand‐collected data on a sample of over 30,000 firm‐year observations, we find that family firms are less likely than non‐family firms to undertake divestitures, especially when these companies are managed by family rather than non‐family‐CEOs. However, we then establish that the divestitures undertaken by family firms, predominantly those run by family‐CEOs, are associated with higher post‐divestiture performance than their non‐family counterparts. These findings indicate that family firms may fail to fully exploit available economic opportunities, potentially because they pursue multiple objectives beyond the maximization of shareholder value. These results also elucidate how the characteristics of corporate owners and managers can influence the value that firms derive from their corporate strategies. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivation Gaps and Implementation Traps: The Paradoxical and Time-Varying Effects of Family Ownership on Firm Absorptive Capacity

We present a theoretical framework of family ownership as a driver of the heterogeneity (between-firm differences) and variability (within-firm differences over time) of absorptive capacity (AC). Building on our analysis of the multiple dimensions of family ownership influence on firm behavior and the mechanisms that can shape the firm willingness and ability to acquire, assimilate, transform, and exploit external knowledge, we introduce the concepts of motivation gap and implementation gap to explain why, paradoxically, family ownership can cause both upward and downward divergences in AC. Our contingency framework identifies conditions under which the positive and negative effects of family ownership on AC are likely to prevail and adds a temporal perspective suggesting that AC varies depending on the duration of family ownership and ownership succession.     

Strategic investments in Japanese corporations: do foreign portfolio owners foster underinvestment or appropriate investment?

This paper investigates the effect of foreign ownership on strategic investments in Japanese corporations. Foreign owners are typically portfolio investors who frequently buy and sell shares and hold diversified portfolios of small stakes in many firms. Prior research has presented two conflicting perspectives on the role of such investors: (a) their frequent trading leads to pressure for short‐term returns that fosters underinvestment; (b) their active trading fosters appropriate investments. We investigated the relationship between foreign ownership and strategic investments using dynamic panel data analysis of a sample of 146 Japanese manufacturing firms from 1991 to 1997. We found that foreign ownership enhances strategic investments (in R&D and capital intensity) to a greater extent when firms have growth opportunities than when they lack such opportunities. We conclude that foreign ownership fosters appropriate investment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How family influence,socioemotional wealth,and competitive conditions shape new technology adoption

Research summary : In family businesses, investment decisions often involve both socioemotional wealth and economic considerations. Focusing on new technology adoption, we argue that multiple dimensions of socioemotional wealth contribute to complex effects within different types of family firms—depending on the level of family control—as well as in contrast to non‐family firms. Results based on cable TV operators from 1983 to 1987 confirm that family ownership correlates negatively with technology adoption, especially when family owners hold a minority rather than majority position. We also show contingencies based on performance improvements and competitive threats. Our arguments contribute new insights about the tensions between economic and socioemotional factors within minority family ownership that are absent from non‐family firms and more pronounced than in majority family firms. Managerial summary : We find evidence of greater reluctance toward new technology adoption among firms with minority family influence than majority family influence. This suggests that goals related to socioemotional wealth only partly explain the cautious decision‐making observed in family firms, with further caution arising from conflicting priorities between family and non‐family owners. Recent performance improvements help offset the reluctance to adopt new technology, albeit to a lesser degree among firms with minority family ownership. High levels of competitive threats also offset the reduction in new technology adoption, and contrary to expectations, to a greater extent among minority family firms. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Riskiness of Real Estate Development: A Perspective from Urban Economics and Option Value Theory

In this article, we define a new construct for urban economic and investment analysis, which revisits the conventional wisdom that investment in real estate development is riskier than investment in stabilized property assets. This new construct, referred as a “development asset value index” (DAVI), is a value index for newly developed properties (only) in a given geographical property market. It tracks longitudinal changes in the highest and best use (HBU) value of locations, and it reveals developer and landowner behavior taking advantage of the optionality inherent in land ownership. In particular, the DAVI reflects developers' use of flexibility in the exercise of the call option to (re)develop the property to any legal use and density. We empirically estimate a DAVI for commercial property (i.e., central locations) and compare it with a corresponding traditional transaction‐price‐based property asset price index (PAPI) corrected for depreciation. We believe that the difference primarily reflects the realized value of flexibility in land development. We find that the DAVIs display greater value growth and are smoother over time and less cyclical than their corresponding PAPIs for the same locations. This suggests that developers successfully use flexibility, and that development may be riskier than stabilized property investment due primarily only to leverage effects (construction costs). Practical implications are also discussed.     

Performance of acquirers of divested assets: Evidence from the U.S. software industry

We provide a comparative analysis of acquirer returns in acquisitions of public firms, private firms, and divested assets. On the basis of a sample of 5,079 acquisitions by U.S. software industry companies during 1988–2008, we find that acquisitions of divested assets outperform acquisitions of privately held firms, which in turn outperform acquisitions of publicly held firms. While the higher returns for acquisitions of divested assets relative to stand‐alone acquisition targets can be explained by market efficiency arguments, seller distress and improved asset fit further enhance the positive returns of acquirers of divested assets consistent with the relative bargaining power explanation. Finally, we find that the effects of these buyer bargaining advantages are mutually strengthening and that they also hold for longer‐term acquirer performance Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does Homeownership Prolong the Duration of Unemployment?

We examine the effects of homeownership on individuals' unemployment durations. An unemployment spell can terminate with a job or with nonparticipation. The endogeneity of homeownership is addressed by estimating a full maximum likelihood function jointly modeling the competing hazards and the probability of being a homeowner. Unobserved factors contributing to the probability of being a homeowner are allowed to be correlated with unobservable heterogeneity in the hazard rates. Not controlling for ownership selection, there is neither a significant difference in the job‐finding hazard nor in the nonparticipation hazard of unemployed owners and renters. If we jointly model the ownership selection, we find that unemployed homeowners are more likely to find a job than renters.     

Business group affiliation and firm performance in a transition economy: A focus on ownership voids

In a transition economy, how does business group affiliation make a difference in firm performance? Under the broad label of institutional voids, what specific voids can business groups fill? This paper addresses these questions by drawing on insights from property rights theory and an institutional perspective. We argue that ownership voids, as a subset of institutional voids, occur due to the lack of unambiguously specified ownership of state assets in transition economies, and that business groups emerge to serve as the direct owners of state-owned enterprises to replace such voids. Based on a sample of 1,119 publicly-listed Chinese companies, we find that the interaction of business group affiliation and state ownership has a significant and positive effect on firm performance. Our findings point to business group’s substitution role in filling ownership voids in China’s transition economy.