大股东治理、机构投资者与公司治理结构改革

本文对机构股东治理的机制及其对公司治理效率的影响进行了系统分析,指出机构投资者作为大股东在“内部控制”和“公司控制权市场”公司治理中发挥着不同的作用,机构投资者的积极行为及其对公司治理结构模式改革趋同的推动,将使公司所有权和控制权在分离基础上实现局部的统一,机构投资者因此成为解决公司控制权难题的制度解。     

非执行董事与公司绩效的实证研究

董事作为股东及其他利益相关者的信托人，其独立性是保证公司有效运作的重要基础。本文对上市公司1999年的数据进行了实证分析，结果表明非执行董事比例与公司绩效之间的正相关关系得到了检验。另外，本文还揭示出大股东（除第一大股东外）的存在有利于提高董事会的非执行董事比例，但是第一大股东持股比例与非执行董事比例是负相关的（这主要与第一大股东大多数是国家有关系）。行业对公司非执行董事比例的影响并不显著，但作为内生性的治理机制，非执行董事比例与两职状态表现出较好的一致性。     

非政策性因素的独立董事形成机制实证研究

本文以面板数据模型为主要研究方法,考察非政策性的独立董事形成影响因素。本文实证结果及政策涵义可以归结如下:独立董事在国有控股公司中比例较低,在控股权发生变更时显著增加,说明了实现全流通除了有利于国有股减持外,也有利于市场接管机制作用的发挥;股权结构与独立董事比例关系的实证结果,显示在完成改制上市之后,下一步改革方向应当是降低控股股东的持股比例,同时增加其他大股东的持股比例;绩效变动是股东采取行动的一个因素,但股票价格波动对股东行动的影响很小,显示我国上市公司对一般投资者的关注还不充分;企业规模的扩大、销售收入的增长和资产负债率的上升也是独立董事比例增加的因素,间接反映了独立董事可能给企业带来潜在的外部资源。     

大股东控制、多元化经营与现金持有价值

已有多元化经营经济后果研究结论并不一致,本文认为其主要原因在于多元化经营的经济后果也是多元的,不同公司特征和不同影响链条下多元化经营对公司价值的影响也不同。本文以多元化经营对现金持有价值的影响为切入点,分别从市场价值和公司绩效视角分析多元化经营的经济后果。实证结果发现从整体上看,多元化经营对现金持有价值影响并不显著,但按大股东持股比例高低分组回归发现,当大股东持股比例高时,能够有效约束管理者的机会主义行为,提高内部资本市场效率,从而使得多元化经营能够显著提高现金持有价值;而当大股东持股比例低时,严重的代理冲突会导致多元化经营公司内部资本市场损失效率,从而导致现金持有价值的降低。     

民营上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的实证分析——以浙江省为例

作为公司产权基础的股权结构决定公司治理的有效性,进而决定公司的经营绩效.本文以浙江民营上市公司为样本,对股权结构与经营绩效的关系进行了实证分析.研究结果表明,法人股持股比例与公司绩效不存在明显的相关关系;第一大股东持股比例和赫芬达尔指数与公司绩效存在弱正相关,含有控股股东的股权结构与公司绩效存在正相关;流通股比例与公司绩效存在负相关;高管人员持股比例与公司绩效存在正相关.根据实证分析结果,本文提出了相应的政策建议.     

大股东控制与资金占用的实证研究

基于两权分离的理论分析框架,本文以上市公司大股东的资金占用行为为研究对象,研究了大股东控制下的所有权特征和董事会特征与资金占用行为之间的关系.我们的模型分析结果表明,大股东的资金占用行为与其持股比例呈现先上升后下降的关系,与其他股东持股比例显著负相关,由国有企业集团控制的上市公司大股东更容易占用上市公司资金;当上市公司关键管理人员在大股东兼职时,强化了大股东对上市公司的控制,便利了其资金占用行为;但是目前,独立董事还不能有效抑制大股东的利益侵占行为.     

产权性质、机构投资者持股与内部控制重大缺陷整改——来自沪深A股上市公司2010～2014的经验证据

本文以2012～2014年披露内部控制重大缺陷的沪深A股上市公司为样本，实证检验了机构投资者持股对内部控制重大缺陷整改的影响，在此基础上，进一步检验了产权性质对该治理效应的影响。研究发现：机构投资者总体持股与内部控制重大缺陷整改显著正相关；与压力敏感型机构投资者持股相比，压力抵制型机构投资者持股更能显著促进内部控制重大缺陷整改；与非国有企业相比，机构投资者的治理效应在国有企业中更显著。     

我国中小投资者法律保护与控制权私利关系实证检验

本文以1994-2003年间深沪两市发生的股权转让事件为研究对象,用控制权私利水平衡量法律保护的结果和效率．实证检验我国法律制度的完善是否起到保护中小投资者的作用。研究发现;我国证券市场存在较高的控制权私利水平,在中小投资者法律保护的不同阶段,控制权私利存在显著差异;总体上,中小投资者法律保护能起到降低控制权私利作用：1999年以前法律保护较差的阶段,投资者法律保护并没有发挥降低控制权私利的作用;但在2000年之后,法律保护逐渐发挥作用,控股股东获得的控制权私利不断降低。     

公司治理和破产关系的理论与实证研究——基于董事会结构和国有股比例的分析

本文应用代理模型系统地论述了公司治理与破产之间的关系,并在理论分析的基础上,基于中国上市公司的样本数据,运用实证方法直接对董事会结构和国有股比例等公司治理变量与破产(而不是财务困境)之间的关系进行了研究。研究结果表明:公司治理变量对公司破产有显著的解释和预警作用,但是,公司治理发挥作用的程度和用于预警的信息含量具有一定的时效性;公司治理变量与公司破产之间的关系比较复杂,但是国有股持股比例对公司破产概率有显著的影响,要注意董事长—总经理的两职合一与较低国有股持股比例的交叉作用对上市公司价值所可能带来的负面影响。     

中国上市公司治理与企业技术创新关系的实证分析

本文通过利用中国2005—2007年343家上市公司的相关数据,对公司治理与技术创新的关系进行了实证分析。本文的主要发现和结论是:经营者持股与企业技术创新存在正相关关系,但这种发现并不具有统计上的显著性;股权集中度与企业技术创新存在倒U型关系,适度集中的股权结构更有利于企业技术创新;国有持股比例(包括国有股和国有法人持股)与企业技术创新存在反相关关系,国有持股比例越高,技术创新能力越低;以证券投资基金为主的机构投资者对企业技术创新有显著的正效应,机构持股比例越高,技术创新能力越强;独立董事制度与企业技术创新存在正相关关系,董事会中独立董事占比较高的企业技术创新投入明显高于独立董事占比较低的企业。本文还根据上述结论,从公司治理的视角提出了提升中国上市公司技术创新能力的政策建议。     

Forced financial information restatements and management turnover: Market discipline and large family shareholders’ intervention in an emerging economy

Using data from Taiwan, this paper investigates the market discipline effects associated with the forced financial information restatement on management turnover, and how family governance intervenes with such market discipline. By integrating legitimacy theory, the institution-based view, and multiple agency perspective, we find that market discipline associated with the forced financial information restatement can be effective to trigger management turnover in an emerging economy. Family ownership strengthens such market discipline by promoting ex-ante management turnover but weakens such market discipline by deterring immediate/ex-post management turnover. On the other hand, family board control weakens market discipline in mitigating families-minority shareholders conflicts by deterring all ex-ante, immediate, and ex-post management turnover. The analysis contributes to our understanding of a firm’s legitimacy as the dominating force in supporting an effective market discipline on management turnover in a weak institutional environment. Families play multiple governance roles to intervene with such market discipline in a weak institutional environment in order to build a management team for their investment safety and maintain a management team for family private benefits of control.     

Can a powerful CEO avoid involuntary replacement?—An empirical study from China

This study examines the impact of CEO power on forced CEO turnover from five perspectives, namely firm performance, structural power, ownership power, CEOs’ political connections, and tenure power. Using panel data of listed companies in China, this study finds that firm performance has negative effects on forced CEO turnover. Similarly, CEOs’ structural power, political connections, and tenure power can increase their ability to be insulated from involuntary replacement. In addition, two factors of CEO ownership power, the state-controlling shareholder and serving as the representative of the largest shareholder, appear to be effective in reducing the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.     

Do Employee‐Owned Firms Produce More Positive Employee Behavioural Outcomes? If Not Why Not? A British‐Spanish Comparative Analysis

Whether ‘employee ownership’ takes the form of worker cooperatives, co‐ownership or simply employee share ownership plans, there are normally high expectations that a range of positive outcomes will result. Yet many empirically based studies tend to find a much more complex picture. An influential segment of that empirical literature has posited the need for a number of mutually reinforcing workforce management components to be in place alongside co‐ownership. Drawing on detailed case research in two large and successful co‐owned retailers in Spain and Britain this paper examines the role of these wider elements supporting employee ownership. We find that employee ownership can be linked to higher productivity and lower employee turnover, while at the same time being linked to higher absenteeism and mixed effects on attitudes. Expectations held by managers and employees are higher; these expectations are not always fully met. The role of managers was also found to be crucial.     

The role of family management and family ownership in diversification: The case of family business groups

This study undertook a panel data analysis of the top 100 family business groups in Taiwan between the years 1988 and 2002 to investigate the role of family management and family ownership structures in diversification using an agency theory approach. The results show that, in the institutional context under study, family management and family ownership play key roles in diversification decisions in family business groups. Specifically, the likelihood of diversification declines as a controlling family assigns more family members to an affiliate firm’s key leadership positions. In contrast, the level of diversification increases as the degree of pyramidal ownership structure increases. The research findings presented in this study (1) clarify the roles that family management and the pyramidal ownership structure play in the diversification decisions of family business groups and (2) provide insights into family business groups’ growth.     

Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management,family control,and firm size

This study examines the relationship between family ownership and firm performance by considering the influence of family management, family control, and firm size. Using proxy data of 786 public family firms in Taiwan during 2002–2007, this study found that family ownership is positively associated with firm performance. The positive association is strong particularly when family members serve as CEOs, top managers, chairpersons, or directors of the firms; however, the association becomes weak when family members are not involved in firm management or control. The findings suggest that the potential family-ownership effects are more likely to be realized when family ownership is combined with active family management and control. In addition, the association between family ownership and firm performance is stronger in small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) than in large companies.     

盈余管理与国有公司高管晋升效率

本文主要考察盈余管理是否以及如何影响国有公司高管晋升对业绩的敏感性。以2000—2009年中国A股国有上市公司的高管晋升数据为样本,从操纵性应计利润与非经常性损益两个角度度量盈余管理,我们检验发现,盈余管理会降低国有公司高管晋升对业绩的敏感性,并且当信息不对称程度较低、第一大股东持股比例较高或市场化程度较高时,盈余管理的这种负向影响更大。本文实证结果表明,如果政府无法识别国有公司的盈余管理行为,其高管晋升效率将受到损害,而股权集中度及地区市场化程度的提高有助于增强政府的识别能力,改进高管晋升效率。     

论国有制的多种有效实现形式

本文首先从理论上论述了国有制和国有制实现形式的关系，指出了现阶段探索国有制实现形式的重要意义。本文把国家资产管理体制改革作为探索国有制实现形式的重要方面，研究了国有资产管理体制改革的若干思路，提出了有效的国有资产管理体制的目标模式和改革建议。最后，本文分析了如何提高各种形式的国有制企业的运行效率问题。     

论市场所有权

本文作者首次在国内外提出了市场所有权理论，作者认为，过去我们对企业微观产权（包括有形产权和无形产权）研究较多，而忽视了对这些微观产权赖以存在的基础和实现条件－－市场产权的研究。实际上，市场本身也有一个产权界定及其制度安排问题，本文在界定产权概念的内涵，本质与功能的基础上，认为市场产权由狭义市场所有权，市场使用权（经营权），市场占有权和市场收益权等四个要素构成，认为市场产权具有五个方面的基本特征；市场所有权的稀缺性，市场所有权的准资本属性；市场所有权的排他性；市场经营权的可转让性；市场所有权收益的可计量性等，市场产权具有三种基本形式；市场国家所有制；市场区域共享制；市场全球共享制等，虽然市场市场产权天生具有国家排他性，归一国政府所有，但市场经营可以转让，各种贸易战的实质是争夺市场经营权，控制权和收益权，区域经济一体化和经济全球化是市场经营经营权的有限互换和交叉分享。     

Variations in ownership behavior and propensity to diversify: a study of the Indian corporate context

The relationship between ownership and diversification has been the focus of renewed debate between financial economists and strategic management scholars. While financial economists hold that manager‐controlled firms tend to reflect higher levels of diversification, strategy researchers argue that ownership and diversification are not systematically related. In throwing light on this debate, this study uses a fine‐grained definition of ownership groups to explore how the different objectives and monitoring predispositions of distinct ownership groups might influence diversification strategy. The empirical examination is set in India to offer a striking contrast from the predominantly U.S.‐based studies that have shaped the ongoing debate. Findings show that diverse ownership groups adopt different postures in monitoring and/or influencing organizational diversification. While some ownership groups are closely associated with focused strategies, and some encourage diversification, others are quite indifferent. These results suggest that the context‐specific variation among ownership groups is germane to our understanding of diversification strategy. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incentive Mechanisms,Entrepreneurial Orientation,and Technology Commercialization: Evidence from China's Transitional Economy*

Scholars view entrepreneurial orientation as an essential element of high‐performing firms. The extant research has focused extensively on the construct development related to and performance implications of entrepreneurial orientation. Prior research has also identified the significant positive impact of entrepreneurial orientation on technology commercialization. The research community has, however, yet to examine critical antecedents of entrepreneurial orientation and to investigate relevant antecedents and consequences of entrepreneurial orientation in transitional settings such as that of China. Most Chinese firms are embracing significant changes in governance incentive mechanisms as China deepens the economic reform. The extant literature provides limited insight as to how incentive mechanisms such as chief executive officer (CEO) ownership and turnover may affect firm entrepreneurial orientation in China's transitional setting. Furthermore, given the significant changes and uncertainty in the market place, China provides an ideal laboratory to examine the influence of technological turbulence on the relationship between entrepreneurial orientation and technology commercialization. Aimed at filling in these glaring gaps, this study develops a conceptual model, with institutional theory as its underpinning, to examine the relationships among governance incentive mechanisms, entrepreneurial orientation, technological turbulence, and technology commercialization. The empirical results from a sample of 607 Chinese firms reveal several important findings. The CEO ownership has a significant positive effect on entrepreneurial orientation, and CEO turnover frequency has an inverse U curvilinear impact on entrepreneurial orientation. Furthermore, entrepreneurial orientation positively affects technology commercialization, with technological turbulence positively moderating this relationship. This study makes several important contributions. First, the present article brings into sharper focus the differing impacts of CEO ownership and CEO turnover on entrepreneurial orientation. The theoretical deliberation and empirical testing offer useful insights into the formation process of entrepreneurial orientation. Second, the examination of the moderating effect of technological turbulence provides additional richness to the extant literature. In addition, different from prior studies, this study was conducted under China's transitional economy context. By integrating unique institutional arrangements and the turbulent technological environment, two key characteristics of China's transitional economy setting, the study broadened and deepened understanding of key antecedents and consequences of entrepreneurial orientation. The article also discusses managerial implications of the findings and suggests directions for future research.