产品市场竞争、大股东持股与企业过度投资——来自沪深工业类上市公司的经验证据

由于产品市场竞争的清算威胁对我国上市公司的经理负面影响较小且可置信度低,因而大股东不会将抑制经理层过度投资的任务完全交给产品市场竞争来完成,而是随着产品市场竞争的加剧,大股东将自我约束对上市公司的“掏空”行为,增加持股比例,加强上市公司的公司治理,从而有效地抑制经理层的过度投资。以2000-2008年闻沪深工业类301家上市公司面板数据为样本的实证研究结果支持了这一分析结论。     

产品市场竞争、大股东持股与企业过度投资——来自沪深工业类上市公司的经验证据

由于产品市场竞争的清算威胁对我国上市公司的经理负面影响较小且可置信度低,因而大股东不会将抑制经理层过度投资的任务完全交给产品市场竞争来完成,而是随着产品市场竞争的加剧,大股东将自我约束对上市公司的"掏空"行为,增加持股比例,加强上市公司的公司治理,从而有效地抑制经理层的过度投资。以2000—2008年间沪深工业类301家上市公司面板数据为样本的实证研究结果支持了这一分析结论。     

A comparison of shareholder identity and governance mechanisms in the monitoring of CEOs of listed companies in China

This paper compares the relative effectiveness of two measures by which the Chinese government attempted to improve the monitoring of listed companies: shifting the ownership of state shares from government agencies (GAs) to the corporate form of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and strengthening corporate governance through statutory regulations and guidelines. The results show that SOEs are better able than GAs to monitor top executives, as indicated by a higher sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. However, corporate governance mechanisms have no significant impact on the sensitivity of top executive turnover to firm performance. This study suggests that incentives for controlling shareholders are more important than governance mechanisms in replacing executives due to poor performance in a transitional economy such as China's, where institutions that support governance mechanisms are still being developed.     

Shareholdings of Board Members and Corporate Performance: A Panel Quantile Regression Analysis

This paper investigates the impact of board member shareholdings on corporate performance in China and Taiwan, and employs unbalanced panel data over the period 2005–2009. In view of the inconsistent empirical findings in the literature and the limitations of least squares regressions, this study adopts a quantile regression method including fixed effects (FE) models. An important finding is that a significant, positive relationship exists between the shareholdings of board members and accounting measures of performance, and this relationship only exists for the more profitable firms in China, while a uniformly significant and positive relationship exists across all quantiles between the shareholdings of board members and accounting measures of performance in Taiwan. These findings, which cannot be obtained using a FE model, suggest that board members can influence firm performance through holding shares in most Taiwan firms and profitable Chinese firms.     

The impact of foreign investors on the risk-taking of Japanese firms

Consistent with a bank-centered governance system, Japanese firms exhibit an exceptionally low level of performance variability. The increased involvement of foreign investors motivated by shareholder value is thus likely to have triggered a major shift in their risk-taking behavior. My results confirm this assumption as all standard measures of performance volatility appear to have significantly increased with the level of foreign ownership. Controlling for endogeneity provides higher point estimates supporting anecdotal evidence that foreign investors have targeted firms taking unusually low risk. Overall, the evidence highlights the considerable impact that this category of investors can have on a firm’s decisions and, by consequence, on its performance.     

Corporate Governance and Shareholder Value Maximization: An African Perspective

Abstract: This study looks at corporate governance and its impact on shareholder value maximization in Africa. Data from South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Nigeria covering the period 1997–2001 were used and analysis done within the panel data framework. Results show that, though highly dispersed, both within and between firms, corporate boards in the selected countries are relatively not independent. The regression result shows that large board sizes enhance corporate performance and shareholder value maximization. Our study also shows that both sector and country‐specific effects have an impact on shareholder value maximization. While the mining sector is dominant in maximizing shareholder value, it also suffers from higher taxes and interest payments.     

我国上市商业银行公司治理结构对经营效率影响的实证研究

本文首先从我国上市商业银行的发展现状与研究现状出发;其次基于我国上市商业银行2004～2009年的财务数据,以上市商业银行的效率作为被解释变量,以独立董事比例、第一大股东持股比例和第一大股东持股比例的平方作为解释变量,对我国上市商业银行的治理结构对经营效率的影响进行回归分析;最后针对我国上市商业银行的问题及回归分析的结果,从如何改善治理结构的角度,实现上市商业银行经营效率的提升提出一些对策与建议。     

Ownership structure and firm performance: Evidence from the Chinese corporate reform

We employ a new classification of ownership identity to analyze the impact of ownership structure on enterprise performance in China. Using both fixed effects model and Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), this study finds that marketized state-owned enterprises outperform firms controlled by the government, indicating that partial privatization of state-owned Chinese firms improves corporate governance. Non-controlling large shareholders of marketized state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are found to play active roles in corporate governance. Lastly, there is evidence that ownership concentration of a controlling shareholder decreases the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders.     

Debt financing structure,ownership concentration and firm performance: a comparison of the listed state-owned and non-state-owned CMNEs

This paper examines the impact of debt financing and ownership concentration on internationalization performance by using a sample of 217 Chinese multinational enterprises (CMNEs) from 2009 to 2016. Through fixed-effect regression and dynamic threshold analysis, this paper finds that increasing short-term debts is positively associated with the internationalization performance of non-state-owned CMNEs, while increasing short-term debts by state-owned CMNEs will harm their performance. Ownership concentration affects CMNEs’ risk preference and thus affecting their internationalization performance in different degrees. This paper finds that the threshold for the impact of CMNEs’ largest shareholder’s ownership concentration on its internationalization performance is 0.18, the thresholds for the impact of CMNEs’ top 10 shareholders’ ownership concentration on its internationalization performance are 0.346 and 0.433. When state-owned CMNEs’ top 10 shareholders’ ownership concentration exceeds 0.337 and 0.347, their internationalization performance will have significant positive changes. Overall, this study is expected to contribute to the literature of internationalization of emerging market companies.     

公司治理视角下的动态战略管理模型

公司治理通过战略管理对企业绩效产生影响,战略管理是公司治理对企业绩效影响的关键中间变量,管理者的战略选择行为受公司内部治理和外部治理的约束。文章认为,需要从公司治理的层面对企业的战略管理进行审视,注重企业文化环境的营造和组织学习能力的提高。     

微观治理、地区环境与控股股东的掏空行为

本文讨论了区域环境影响下的企业微观层面的治理对控股股东侵占行为的制约作用。研究发现：企业微观层面的治理和区域环境都能够制约控股股东的侵占行为,但是企业微观治理的制约效应在环境较差的地区显著变弱。本文的建议是,要提高上市公司质量,保护中小投资者,必须首先完善上市公司面临的环境。     

Research on Relationship of Corporate Governance and Bond Rating

The relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and the bond rating has not been fully studied yet. Based on the corporate governance index of Investor Responsibility Research Center, this paper finds that stronger management fights and weaker shareholder fights, as measured by corporate governance index, are associated with less favorable bond ratings, after controlling for other determinants or factors that will affect bond ratings.     

公司治理、大股东资金占用与盈余质量

论文从大股东资金占用行为的影响因素与行为后果两个角度出发,研究公司治理机制与大股东资金占用行为的关系以及大股东资金占用行为与盈余质量的相关关系。研究结果发现：第一大股东控制程度越高,其占用上市公司资金的可能性越大并且这种现象在国有控股上市公司中更为严重,公司治理综合水平对大股东资金占用程度起到了有效的抑制作用,大股东这种资金占用行为对企业盈余质量具有显著的影响。     

公司治理结构与财务管理目标--兼论企业价值最大化目标在我国的不现实性

企业的财务管理的目标依赖于其公司治理结构,股东利益最大化和企业价值最大化分别是与股东治理和共同治理模式相对应的理财目标。共同治理模式是股东治理模式的异化,在现阶段我国条件尚不具备,所以中国企业以企业价值最大化作为企业财务管理目标并不现实。     

高管团队稳定性与上市公司违规行为关系研究

以中国上市公司为研究对象,考察了高管团队稳定性对上市公司违规行为的影响机理。研究发现：（1）高管团队稳定性对公司违规行为有显著负向影响;（2）高管团队稳定性提高信息披露,进而影响公司违规行为;（3）媒体关注度对高管团队稳定性与公司违规行为关系具有正向调节作用;（4）当违规行为已成既定事实时,高管团队稳定性不利于违规稽查。相关结论对提升我国上市公司治理规范性、推动资本市场健康发展具有重要意义。     

External Corporate Governance and Misreporting

This study investigates how external corporate governance provisions, specifically statutory and corporate charter provisions that limit direct shareholder participation in the governance process, affect the likelihood of an accounting restatement. The analysis indicates that strong external governance (fewer restrictions on shareholder participation) is associated with a relatively low incidence of accounting restatements. The effect of external governance is incremental to that of internal governance, which is considered as provisions that foster effective board oversight of management. Such evidence supports the premise that shareholder participation improves financial reporting quality.     

银行监督提高了债务人的经营绩效吗?——来自房地产上市公司面板数据的实证检验

中国房地产企业的银行信贷依赖特征为探索银行监督与企业绩效之间的关系提供了良好的现实背景。论文以企业绩效作为公司治理效率的替代,基于银行监督与企业绩效的研究主线,深入分析了银行监督与企业绩效的关系。研究发现:银行监督对企业绩效产生了负面影响,国有房地产企业和银行的产权同源性特征是导致银行负债的杠杆治理效应被扭曲的重要原因;虽然银行负债的杠杆治理效应被扭曲,但是银行监督作为一种外部治理机制,其与内部治理机制之间存在交互效应,要么表现为替代关系,要么表现为互补关系。在中国当前的制度背景下,要发挥银行监督的功能,提高企业绩效,而且要解决中国银行出现的呆账和坏账问题,其根本出路就是要发挥杠杆治理的作用。     

Financial performance and corporate governance in microfinance: Evidence from Asia

Good corporate governance is considered a building block of success for microfinance institutions (MFIs) as it is presumed to help them in achieving their social and financial goals. This paper analyzes the corporate governance and financial performance relationship for MFIs in Asia. We make use of a panel dataset involving 173 MFIs in 18 Asian countries for the period 2007–2011. We construct a corporate governance index based on seven measures pertaining to board size and composition, CEO characteristics, and ownership type. We then estimate the two-way relationship between this index and each of five different financial performance indicators. To address the likely simultaneity between corporate governance and financial performance, we adopt a two-stage least squares estimation approach with instrumental variables. Our results confirm the endogenous nature of corporate governance and financial performance. We conclude that profitability and sustainability of MFIs improve with good governance practices and conversely that more profitable and sustainable MFIs have better governance systems.     

大股东制衡机制与现金股利的隧道效应--来自1999-2003年中国上市公司的证据

鉴于公司的财务行为受到公司治理因素的影响,本文从公司治理的角度,基于国内外的相关研究提出六个研究假设,然后构建回归模型,依据1999年—2003年中国上市公司数据进行假设检验,具体探讨前五大股东持股比例以及在此基础上大股东之间的监督制衡机制对于上市公司派发现金股利的影响,研究因为我国股市“同股同权不同价”的特殊现象而导致的现金股利的“隧道效应”,探索其中的影响机制和制衡机制。研究显示,前五大股东的持股比例、大股东控制力(或联合控制力)、大股东制衡度(或联合制衡度)对派发现金股利的“隧道效应”存在重要影响。本文最后给出五点建议,试图限制控股股东通过现金股利的“隧道效应”谋取私利,以保护中小股东的正当权益。     

Outside Blockholders' Monitoring of Management and Debt Financing

Corporate governance mechanisms designed to alleviate manager‐shareholder agency conflicts can worsen shareholder‐bondholder conflicts. This study examines how one such corporate governance mechanism, monitoring by large outside shareholders, influences the choice between public and private debt. I conjecture and find that firms with higher outside blockholdings are inclined to choose bank loans over public debt when they borrow, consistent with the notion that banks are better monitors than public debt markets. I also find that bank loans carry less price protection than corporate bonds against increased agency risk associated with outside blocks. Corroborating the monitoring story, I document that bank loans contain more accounting‐based covenants and dividend restriction provisions for firms with higher outside blockholdings than for those with lower blockholdings. I find no such relation for public debt covenants. This supports that banks' monitoring of their loans counters the agency risk caused by blockholders. This study extends prior research that associates governance mechanisms with agency costs of debt, by incorporating lenders' differential monitoring mechanisms in the overall corporate governance system.