FISCAL ILLUSION AT THE LOCAL SPHERE: AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE FLYPAPER EFFECT USING SOUTH AFRICAN MUNICIPAL DATA1

While South Africa operates a relatively decentralised governance and administrative structure, an important feature of the country's intergovernmental fiscal relations system is the gap that exists between the expenditure responsibilities of sub‐national authorities and their assigned revenue bases. The resulting vertical fiscal imbalance is mainly addressed via significant intergovernmental transfers to provinces and local governments. This factor presents strong a priori grounds for assuming that in the South African context, the heavy dependence of many local governments on intergovernmental transfers may generate fiscal illusion. Despite this, there have not been many empirical studies of fiscal illusion in South Africa's intergovernmental transfer system. This paper extends existing literature on fiscal illusion by using the fiscal year 2005/06 financial and expenditure data from 237 local government authorities in South Africa to evaluate the flypaper variant of the fiscal illusion hypothesis. Empirical results indicate that the marginal effects of municipal own‐source revenues on local expenditure exceed those of intergovernmental transfers. No statistical evidence in support of the flypaper hypothesis within the context of municipal expenditures in South Africa is found.     

分税制改革20年对民族地区社会经济的影响

我国从1994年开始实行的分税制改革增强了中央政府的宏观调控能力,但却使地方政府承担了更多的支出责任。虽然分税制改革增强了民族地区地方政府的财力,增加了民生支出,使得民族地区基本公共服务均等化功能不断增强,居民收入水平不断提高,但同时民族地区仍然存在财力不足、中央与地方政府财权与事权划分不合理、转移支付制度不完善等问题。因此,本文认为应转变政府和财政职能,优化财政支出结构;合理划分各级政府事权范围,进一步明确各级财政支出职责;建立转移支付的激励约束机制;加强县级政府提供基本公共服务的财力保障。     

Fiscal decentralization, revenue and expenditure assignments, and growth in China

Theory suggests that a close match between revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels benefits allocative efficiency, and hence economic growth. That is, a convergence of revenue and expenditure assignments at sub-national levels of government should, according to the theory, be positively associated with a higher growth rate. In the case of China, this paper shows, divergence, rather than convergence, in revenue and expenditures at the sub-national level of government is associated with higher rates of growth. A panel dataset for 30 provinces in China is used to examine the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth over two phases of fiscal decentralization in China: (1) 1979–1993 under the fiscal contract system, and (2) 1994–1999 under the tax assignment system. The seeming contradiction between the theory and evidence in the China case is reconciled by taking into account the institutional arrangements that prevailed during the two phases of fiscal decentralization, in particular the inconsistency between the assumptions of the theory of fiscal decentralization and the institutional reality of China.     

财政自主与公共支出效率:自地方政府实践维度观察

公共支出效率主要受相对财政自主——地方政府自有收入在支出中的比例——的正面影响。这表明了分权确立独立主体的激励型好处,但更受绝对财政自主——地方政府自有收入——的负面影响,意味着我国分权缺乏相应的控制和问责机制,所谓的财政自主还没有达到规范意义上的要求。因此,我国地方分权应坚持,但配套的公共财政包括公共预算制度更应尽快建立和健全。     

财政分权导致地方政府财政赤字规模的膨胀吗?——来自分税制改革后中国省级的观察和经验证据

本文从理论和实证两方面探讨了分税制改革以来确立的财政分权模式对我国地方政府财政赤字规模日益膨胀的影响。理论分析表明,地方政府日益膨胀的财政赤字规模是现行财政体制下财权和事权割裂、公共泳池问题、横向策略互动以及政治锦标赛引发的激励扭曲和为增长而过度竞争等因素的综合产物。基于全国1998-2006年省际面板数据,本文的实证研究支持了我们的理论预期,即中国式财政分权对地方政府财政赤字规模的膨胀具有显著的正面激励作用。本文的发现是稳健的,能够为强化财政制度安排、增强宏观经济稳定性提供有益的启示。     

财政分权体制下地方政府的自利性行为研究

财政分权体制是我国经济转轨和社会转型的出发点和重要保障。新中国成立60多年来，我国的财政体制先后经历了由统收统支的财政体制到财政包干制再到分税制的演化过程，文章系统地阐述了在财政分权体制背景下地方政府的自利性行为的内涵及特征，并分析了其具体影响的表现形式。通过研究得出克服政府自利性的三大路径的结论：一是构建约束政府自利性的制度安排，二是合理界定政府职能，三是加强政府官员行政伦理素质的改造。     

政府行为、市场化与城乡经济和谐发展——基于VAR模型的实证分析

城乡经济和谐发展是构建和谐社会的基本要求。本文以城乡收入差距为切入点,选取1978年—2011年的相关数据,运用VAR模型,从政府行为和市场化程度两个角度对城乡经济和谐发展程度进行研究。结果表明：政府行为、市场化程度与城乡经济和谐发展之间存在长期均衡关系;财政收支效率、国内经济市场化程度的提高有利于城乡经济的和谐发展,而财政分权、对外经济市场化程度的提高则不利于城乡经济的和谐发展。因此,可从协调财政收支比例,扩大财政支农规模;改进财政分权体制,优化地方政府财政支出结构;推进国内市场化进程,提高农村市场化水平;降低对外依存度,缩小城乡教育差距等途径来推进城乡经济的和谐发展。     

生产性支出偏好与经济增长波动

文章基于我国1998-2006年的县级面板数据,分析财政支出结构对经济增长波动的影响机制。理论分析表明,我国地方政府偏好生产性支出的特点,将提高经济增长波动率;实证结果有力地论证了上述结论,即生产性公共支出占比提高10%,经济增长波动率将增加0.42%。稳健性分析发现中西部县级地区较东部地区经济增长的波动率更大。此外,我国生产性支出偏好对经济增长波动率的影响具有明显的顺周期特征,在繁荣时期,经济增长波动率的增加幅度将超过0.8%。文章的结论可为推进和完善中央与地方财政事权和支出责任划分提供参考和依据。     

A framework for intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa

South Africa is in the process of developing a new governmental structure. In this paper the principles governing intergovernmental fiscal relations are examined. The main types of government and the conditions for an efficient decentralized structure, as well as the assignment of expenditure functions and tax bases to the various levels of government, are discussed. The inevitable imbalance between expenditure and revenue requirements at subnational level and possible remedies are noted. General guidelines for the design of intergovernmental fiscal relations in a revised governmental structure are presented in conclusion.     

户籍门槛、发展型政府与人口城镇化政策——基于大中城市面板数据的经验研究

文章从制度变迁视角分析了户籍改革难以突破的原因,在发展主义理念的指引下,如果户籍改革对地方经济增长或财政收支产生负面影响,地方政府可能会拖延或阻碍改革进程。基于大中城市面板数据的实证研究显示,特大城市提高门槛对地方人均产出有正面影响,户籍改革动力最弱。其他城市虽然可以通过降低户籍门槛提高人均产出水平,但率先放开户籍制度可能引发流动人口大量涌入抵消政策效果,地方政府的户籍改革动力随着城市人口规模增长逐步下降。同时,户籍人口增长会带来财政支出的显著增加,为避免户籍化政策对财政支出产生压力,地方政府会通过户籍门槛对流动人口进行筛选,将对财政收入贡献较低或产生明显财政支出的群体排斥在户籍门槛之外。本文认为中国大中城市的户籍制度存在刚性,可以通过收回地方制定落户政策的权力强制推动户籍制度改革,或利用财政政策降低户籍化成本,激励地方政府推动改革。     

Local land supply and fiscal incentives for R&D: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Whereas numerous studies have evaluated the effects of public research and development (R&D) support programs and R&D tax incentives on private R&D, little is known about local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D. In this study, we build a conceptual framework to clarify the critical role of local land supply in relation to fiscal expenditure on R&D. We treat the establishment of China's nine Land Supervision Bureaus in 2006 as a quasi-natural experiment, and run a difference-in-differences regression to identify causality. The results show that local governments allocate more fiscal expenditure to R&D in response to land-use supervision, which monitors illegal land granting behaviors, and this effect is stronger in cities where leaders have higher political career incentives and cities with greater fiscal decentralization. Moreover, we find that land-use supervision increases the probability and scale of firms' access to government subsidies for R&D; thus, enhancing regional innovation capacity. Our findings document that China's land resource is a curse for its innovation-driven growth as it impedes local governments' fiscal incentives for R&D.     

财政分权、地方财政支出偏好与城市用地规模扩张——以长三角地区为例

摘要：文章通过利用1996-2010年长三角地区16个核心城市的面板数据,实证考察了财政分权、地方财政支出与城市用地规模扩张之间的关系。研究表明：财政务权和地方政府竞争体制使得地方政府在财政支出上存在着明显的偏向,三者均是城市用地规模扩张的主要推动因素;不同城市用地规模扩张的速度存在差异;体制因素是城市用地规模盲目扩张的深层次原因。为了从根本土改变地方政府的行为为鼓励,需立足中国实际,完善现有的财政体制,规范中央和地方的财政收支;改革现行的政绩考核体制,保持官员任期的连续性和稳定性;要深化我国的户籍制度改革,打破居民迁移的体制壁垒。实现”用脚投票”的机制．     

日本财政分权与经济增长

本文利用计量经济模型及其相关数据分析了日本财政分权与经济增长之间的关系。模型中引入了财政分权水平、地区收入自主水平、地区相对富裕度、国库支出金与全部财政支出的比值等因素作为重要的解释变量,通过相关系数的计算、拟合误差对比检验,来探究它们与经济增长之间的关系。研究结果表明:财政支出分权在一定程度上促进了经济的增长,而地区收入自主水平以及国库支出金占全部财政支出的比值则阻碍了经济的增长。     

分税制、转移支付与地方政府财政努力

本文实证检验了分税制和转移支付对地方政府财政努力的影响,通过引入空间效应,将总效应分解为直接效应和间接效应。我们发现,地方财政收入分成比例的提高会提高地方政府财政努力程度,财政转移支付依赖越高则地方政府财政努力程度越低,并且地方政府会依据过去的分成比例和财政转移支付来决定其财政努力水平。利用空间计量模型,我们还发现,地方政府之间存在横向模仿行为,横向政府间财政策略存在空间外溢性。     

转型期的政治激励、财政分权与地方官员经济行为

本文在一个框架内考虑了政治激励与财政分权,考察了转型期我国地方官员的经济行为.中央强调经济增长与财政收入增加的考核导向,使得地方财政支出过度偏向基础设施建设而公共品支出不足,同时抑制了其中的官员私人消费支出.在资本不可流动但多期情形下,地方官员通过降低税率和加大基础设施投资来积累资本.在资本可流动情形下,地方官员为了吸引资本.有额外的激励降低征税力度和加大基础设施建设投入.在资本可流动情形下,地区初始发展水平差距意味着地区吸引资本能力的差异,这可能导致地区发展差距比资本不可流动情形下更大.由于资本有更好的流动性,地方倾向干将财政压力施加到劳动所得上,从而导致初次收入分配中劳动所得份额偏低.     

Decentralized Taxation and the Size of Government: Evidence from Swiss State and Local Governments

According to the Leviathan Model, fiscal federalism is a binding constraint on revenue‐maximizing government. The competitive pressure of fiscal federalism reduces public sector size, as compared to unitary states. This study uses panel data of Swiss cantons from 1980 to 1998 to empirically analyze the effect of different instruments on government revenue and its structure. Because of the considerable tax autonomy of sub‐national Swiss governments, it is possible to investigate different mechanisms by which fiscal federalism may influence government size. The results indicate that tax exporting has a revenue‐expanding effect; whereas, tax competition favors a smaller size of government. Fragmentation has no robust effect on the size of government revenue for Swiss cantons. The overall effect of revenue decentralization leads to fewer tax revenues but higher user charges. Thus, revenue decentralization favors a smaller size of government revenue and shifts government revenue from taxes to user charges.     

Covid-19, Economic Growth and South African Fiscal Policy

Following years of fast-rising debt levels, we show that the Covid-19 crisis worsened an already deteriorating fiscal position in South Africa. To restore fiscal sustainability in the aftermath of the crisis some commentators argue that higher government expenditure will grow GDP sufficiently to stabilise the debt/GDP ratio. We reject this, showing that although a real increase in expenditure stimulates economic growth (a short-run, once-off effect), the public expenditure/GDP ratio exceeds the level at which an increase in the ratio positively impacts growth. We then explore the past efforts of government to maintain or restore fiscal sustainability by estimating a fiscal reaction function using a Markov-switching model. Following the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on the budget, we subsequently establish the deficit, expenditure and revenue adjustments that the government will have to make to restore fiscal sustainability. Finally, we consider the merits of introducing a debt ceiling.     

我国政府间事权财权划分的方式演进、面临问题及对策建议

分税制财政分权体制下我国政府间事权财权划分存在事权界定模糊、中央与地方的事权和财力不对称、事权财权划分中缺乏规范的法律界定的问题。构建和完善我国政府间事权财权划分的法治化体系应从修正《中华人民共和国宪法》、制定《中央与地方关系法》、制定中央和地方政府财政收入权划分的法律以及完善《预算法》等方面入手。     

Fiscal Decentralization or Centralization: Diverging Paths of Chinese Cities

If fiscal decentralization promotes growth, why do some regions decentralize more than others? This article identifies the growing divergence of fiscal centralization among Chinese cities and explains it in a public finance framework. It argues that fiscal decentralization and its economy‐liberalizing effect entail significant short‐term fiscal risk. The more a locality relies on uncompetitive business ownership for fiscal revenue, the less likely fiscal decentralization is to occur. This article compiles a dataset of 20 provincial capitals between 1999 and 2016 to test for the connection between a city's tax base and its fiscal centralization level. It then pairs two “most similar” cities to trace how fiscal security concerns drove their fiscal and economic policies apart. This article adds a micro‐level perspective to the literature on fiscal federalism. By pointing out the fiscal constraints confronting local governments, it offers a new angle to understand the different growth paths of Chinese cities.     

财政分权，省级官员特征与地方政府债务规模——基于2010-2014年省级政府数据的实证分析

政府债务规模和风险是一级政府关注的重点问题。从财政分权和省级官员特征两个维度,本文考察了地方政府债务规模的影响因素,并在此基础上进一步研究财政分权程度和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的交互影响作用。通过2010-2014年30个省级政府的实证数据进行混合OLS回归,研究发现财政分权程度越高,地方政府债务规模越小。省级官员的年龄过大或过小都会使地方政府债务规模的减小,同时具有企业工作背景的省长和省委书记也会抑制地方政府债务规模的扩张,并且财政分权和省级官员特征对地方政府债务规模的影响是相互促进的。据此提出建议,合理控制地方政府债务膨胀。