Growth,Poverty, and Inequality under Jokowi

SUMMARY

The political authority of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) was bolstered in the third quarter of 2015 by a cabinet reshuffle, his coalition's gaining a parliamentary majority, and several foreign-policy developments. Indonesia's request to rejoin OPEC, for example, after having left in 2008, seemed more about international relations than oil prices, while official visits to the Middle East and the United States allowed Jokowi to project his presidency on the international stage. He still faces resistance from within his own party, however.

Jokowi's politically bold reshuffle of economic ministers in August soon yielded a range of policy announcements. In September and October, his government introduced its first substantial set of reforms—a number of economic policy packages intended, among other things, to attract investment and stimulate domestic demand. If even half of these policies are put in place, the impact on Indonesia's economy should be tangible.

Few countries have escaped the effects of falling global commodity prices and China's growth slowdown. At 4.7%, year on year, in the third quarter Indonesia's rate of economic growth again fell short of the government's target. Slowing growth and a negative outlook have lowered market expectations and weakened the rupiah, which is also burdened by the large outstanding external debt held by corporate borrowers. Indonesia's real effective exchange rate has recently begun to depreciate, however, which may stimulate exports. Growth prospects will also improve if the substantial increase in capital and infrastructure spending allocated in the state budget is realised.

Against this backdrop, we focus on what has happened to poverty and inequality in Indonesia since Jokowi took office. The distributional impacts of the current macroeconomic climate are likely to be hardest felt by the poor. Indonesia is well known for its record on poverty reduction, but between September 2014 and March 2015 the share of the population in poverty increased, even though economic growth was close to 5.0%. Slowing growth, rising food prices, the falling real wages of farmers, and the delayed disbursement of fuel-price compensation all had an effect. Such impacts may be mitigated in the medium term by Jokowi's budget reallocations to infrastructure, if realised, and his expansion of social spending.     

Jokowi and the New Developmentalism

Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), made a remarkable political recovery in 2016. During his first year in office, Jokowi had been overwhelmed by a combative and divided parliament, disunity in cabinet, tensions with his own party, and declining approval ratings. In 2016, however, Jokowi expanded his ruling coalition and consolidated his power, and his approval rating rose to almost 70%. By mid-2016, the president had achieved stable government for the first time since winning office. Political stability gave us greater clarity on Jokowi’s agenda and the kind of Indonesia he wants to shape. I suggest that in 2016 a Jokowi-styled new developmentalism began to emerge. Jokowi’s administration focused narrowly on infrastructure and deregulation; other problems of government were subordinated to these developmentalist goals. There are uncanny echoes of the past in the new developmentalism, and its conservative and nationalist features reflect political trends that pre-date Jokowi’s presidency. Indeed, Jokowi’s developmental strategy is neither unique nor coherent; his decision-making is defined by ad hocery. Instead, I argue, deeper structural features of Indonesia’s socio-political landscape are making their mark on the president and returning Indonesia to its developmentalist moorings.     

Indonesian politics in 2013: the emergence of new leadership?

The rise of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from small-town mayor to presidential frontrunner asks again whether new, alternative leaders could enter Indonesian politics in the 2014 elections. This article surveys Jokowi's impact on Indonesian politics over the past 12 months, and examines whether his election as Jakarta governor, and his evident popularity, has opened the way for alternative candidates at local level, or if it has changed parties’ calculations for the presidential election. The article concludes by considering whether a new leader could tackle some of the entrenched defects of democracy in Indonesia, given that he or she may have only minority support in the parliament. The article focuses in particular on corrupt law enforcement, the military and the rule of law, and violent religious intolerance.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Amid global economic uncertainty and tumbling world oil prices, Indonesia's economy faces pressure on its external balance and a continued growth slowdown. The government of President Joko Widodo (widely known as Jokowi) has set an agenda of reform, including simpler, faster investment licensing, historic cuts to fuel subsidies to generate fiscal savings, and increased spending on infrastructure. On the political side, Jokowi has had to deal with several political issues coming not only from parties in opposition but also from parties supporting his government, including during the formation of the new cabinet. We examine the consequences so far of the government's policy initiatives and of the policymaking process. While some initiatives have been implemented with success, some seem to have been launched without enough preparation, consultation, or empirical evidence, and many have been poorly communicated. Although inflation accelerated after the November fuel-price rise, efforts have been made to contain inflationary expectations and to mitigate the effects on poverty through social-assistance programs. The government took steps to cushion the impending impacts of higher fuel prices on vulnerable households by giving cash handouts of Rp 200,000 per month to 15.5 million disadvantaged families who receive the lowest level of welfare, and by promoting publicly funded education and health care. The partial removal of gasoline subsidies and the introduction of a fixed-subsidy policy for diesel in the revised 2015 budget reduce uncertainty about the fiscal position, although increases in government spending in infrastructure development were announced at the same time. The revised budget for 2015 increases spending on infrastructure development by 63% from the 2014 budget, mostly on projects to improve connectivity on land and at sea—such as the development of toll roads, railways, and ports—and to increase the performance of the agricultural sector. However, the recent drop in international oil prices forced the government to increase its target for tax revenue by 30% on last year's target, raising concerns about the effect of falling oil prices on the economy. Trade and investment policy reform is important in unlocking Indonesia's growth potential and improving the country's current external balance. Jokowi's administration, however, has been sending mixed signals about its position towards more open policies. The country has yet to recommence several trade negotiations that were postponed in 2014 and is still struggling to meet its commitments under the ASEAN Economic Community. Although improvement in investment procedures and licensing is currently underway, Indonesia needs to adopt a more positive attitude if it is to attract more investment.     

Indonesian politics in 2010: the perils of stagnation

In the first year after President Yudhoyono's re-election, Indonesian politics continued to evolve in largely familiar patterns. Contrary to the expectations of some observers, Yudhoyono's strong popular mandate and his Democratic Party's newly won parliamentary plurality did not result in significant changes to the president's cautious style of governing or the fickle nature of president–parliament relations. Most political parties also opted for continuity over change, electing or re-electing established figures as leaders despite high levels of public dissatisfaction with their performance. The fact that the 2009 election failed to generate any new momentum for reform does not augur well for the remainder of Yudhoyono's second term. Although the basic parameters of Indonesia's democracy remain intact, political developments during 2010 have also confirmed a pattern of stagnation that is likely to see Indonesia barely muddle through as a reasonably stable yet low-quality democracy.     

Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call

Indonesian democracy experienced a near miss in 2014, when Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) defeated former general Prabowo Subianto by a margin of 6.3% in the presidential election. Both candidates were populists who rose to prominence in the context of public disillusionment with incumbent president Yudhoyono; Prabowo, however, condemned Indonesia's democratic system and promised to take Indonesia in a more authoritarian direction. We trace democracy's close call through five phases: the dying months of Yudhoyono's presidency, the rise of populist alternatives, the parliamentary elections of April 2014, the July presidential campaign, and the aftermath. We attribute the strength of Prabowo's campaign to superior organisational and financial support, while Jokowi's victory rested upon strong identification with him among poor and rural voters. Also determining the outcome was the fact that public satisfaction with democracy remained strong, undermining the effectiveness of Prabowo's authoritarian-populist message. Nevertheless, democracy's future remains uncertain, given that Prabowo and his supporters now control a sufficiently large number of parliamentary seats to continue promoting a rollback of democratic reforms.     

Forestry,Forest Fires,and Climate Change in Indonesia

In recent months, strong global growth, rebounding commodity prices, and relatively accommodative financial conditions have benefited the Indonesian economy. The first quarter of 2017 in Indonesia saw resilient GDP growth, moderate inflation, stable exchange rates, an increase in the growth of non-oil exports, and an investment upgrade from ratings agency Standard & Poor's. Investment growth, however, did not pick up enough to drive overall growth to a higher rate. The poor quality of banking-sector assets and the gaps in tax revenue—despite the fulfilment of the government's tax-amnesty program—are two of the most immediate economic concerns. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who is well into the second half of his term, is under pressure to deliver on his development platform, which includes making progress in sustainable development and climate change mitigation. The effective management of forests is key to this platform. There has been longstanding tension over Indonesia's forests between the protection of environmental values, including carbon storage, and the production of valuable commodities, including timber, palm oil, and pulpwood, which generate revenue and employment. We survey recent developments in four storylines related to forestry and climate change: first, Indonesia's commitment to reducing emissions to 29%–41% below projected business-as-usual levels by 2030, as well as the international climate agreements and finance that can help achieve this commitment; second, land-use rights and regulations, including a moratorium on clearing, draining, or setting fires on peatland; third, measures to prevent catastrophic forest fires like those during the 2015 El Niño, including the establishment of the Peatland Restoration Agency; and, fourth, the actions of non-state actors, especially large agribusinesses, in managing forests and peatland. We conclude by discussing differences in the approaches of Jokowi's administration and those of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration and by questioning whether Indonesia's budgeted resources, actions, and results to date are commensurate with its climate commitments.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Outgoing Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second-term record is creditable, measured against the targets he set himself in 2010, but deficient in key areas: economic reform, infrastructure investment, and anti-corruption. Indonesia's 2009–14 parliament has been active in economic policymaking, and will leave as its legacy a raft of protectionist legislation. Both presidential candidates, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, have appealed to nationalism in their campaigns, calling for Indonesia to assert its sovereignty and increase its self-sufficiency, but Jokowi's economic platform is more moderate and economically literate than Prabowo's. The incoming president will inherit an economy that continues to slow. Growth is now not expected to approach 6% until 2015 at the earliest. Having engineered a reduction in the current account deficit, Indonesian policymakers now face the more difficult problem of structural fiscal adjustment. Energy subsidies are the most immediate problem, but fiscal reform more generally will emerge as an overriding and unpleasant imperative for whoever wins the presidential election on 9 July. Unless difficult fiscal policy measures are taken, Indonesia will face major trade-offs between deficit control and investment in social programs and economic infrastructure. The new president will struggle to restrict the deficit to the cap of 3% of GDP: a balanced budget will likely not be feasible for several years. He will need to increase the ratio of revenue to GDP and eliminate fuel subsidies—through a more systematic approach than the infrequent price increases of the past. He will need to choose carefully between competing expenditure priorities, such as infrastructure and defence. The new president would also be well advised to tread cautiously in implementing the legal mandates he will inherit, and to work with parliament to avoid further and unwind current earmarking of public expenditure.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Following the remarkably successful 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia, attention now turns to the new president and his agenda for the next five years. President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, has emphasised the importance of strong economic growth and rising living standards. But he faces significant, broad-ranging economic challenges and, perhaps not surprisingly, serious discussion of these issues did not feature during the election campaigns. In many respects the economy is at a crossroads, facing the choice between a business-asusual scenario of no reform and consequently sluggish economic growth, and a politically difficult reform agenda that would set it on a higher growth path. Economic policymakers regard the events of 2013 as a mini economic crisis, and they feel vindicated in their explicit preference for stability over growth—that is, for slowing the economy through tighter fiscal and monetary policy and letting the currency decline. For now, the economy is slowing but holding up quite well, especially by comparative international norms and considering foreign and domestic headwinds, including possible macroeconomic and financial fragilities. Here we examine these headwinds—from global economic volatility and declining commodity prices, particularly in the wake of the so-called Bernanke shock of May 2013, to the continuing policy drift at home. We investigate whether there is evidence of an emerging adjustment from the commodity-driven growth of the past decade to some of the traditional tradables sectors, especially manufacturing. While the commodity boom is almost certainly a thing of the past—at least at levels witnessed since 2005—the country's political narratives and the government's microeconomic policies appear to be still premised on an era of plenty funded by a disappearing boom. We speculate on likely options and directions for what in all likelihood will be a ‘Jokowi decade’.     

Recollections of my Career

Subroto, Professor at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FEUI), is one of the architects of the economic policies that brought growing prosperity to Indonesia over the New Order years Educated in Dutch colonial and Japanese occupation schools, he joined Indonesia's independence struggle, and later studied economics at FEUI, McGill University, MIT, and Stanford and Harvard Universities. He taught international economics and business cycles at FEUI and was Secretary of the Faculty. With Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadh, Ali Wardhana and Emil Salim, Subroto was appointed a Personal Economic Adviser to General (later President) Soeharto's new government in 1966 In 1968 he joined the Department of Trade, and later was minister of departments responsible for transmigration, cooperatives, mining and energy. After a 17-year ministerial career serving in four consecutive cabinets, Subroto was Secretary General of OPEC for six years from 1988 He remains active in Indonesia's nongovernmental Indonesian Institute for Energy Economics (IIEE), writing on energy problems, and is also Rector of the private Pancasila University in South Jakarta As part of our occasional series of interviews with economists who have helped shape New Order Indonesia, Professor Subroto talked with Chris Manning and Thee Kian VVie of the Bulletin's Editorial Board about his experience as a cabinet minister and as Secretary General of OPEC, and about his views on Indonesia's economic development, particularly its energy problems.     

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: CHINA AND INDONESIA COMPARED

China's and Indonesia's development strategies have been compared with others, but rarely with each other. Radically different political contexts have produced both similar and distinctly different development patterns. Each using formal planning, Indonesia spurred radical reforms to promote growth, whereas China opted for incremental reforms to ‘grow out of the Plan’, as a political device and to discover what policies and institutions worked. Both strategies produced environments largely conducive to rapid development. Indonesia relied on a few economic technocrats to oversee development; China used decentralisation and party reforms to create a credible environment for non-state investment. Both shared concern for agricultural reform and food security; both opted to open up for trade—China gradually, Indonesia radically. Both did well in growth and poverty reduction following reform. China's growth performance is in a league of its own, especially since Indonesia's Asian crisis setback, but Indonesia had more equitable growth and survived a difficult political transition with, in hindsight, modest costs.     

Recollections of My Career

The Bulletin's occasional series of interviews with the older generation of economists has so far focused upon those who have served as ministers or held high positions in the civil service. A rather different perspective on economic conditions and economic policy under the Old Order is offered here by one of Indonesia's veteran pribumi (indigenous) entrepreneurs, Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, best known for his involvement with Bank Niaga and the Samudera Indonesia shipping group. Notable as one of the few pribumi to have survived in the forefront of business since the early years of Independence, he aimed in his business ventures to be an agent of soaoeconomic progress, a goal for which he is still working. His experience covers the fields of importing, office machines and computers (Soedarpo Corporation, est. 1952), insurance (Asuransi Bintang, est. early 1955), banking (Bank Niaga, est. late 1955) and, in the transport industry, agencies, stevedoring, shipping and freight forwarding (Samudera Indonesia and associated firms, 1964 onwards).

In view of the priority given after Independence to fostering the emergence of an indigenous business elite and the generally disappointing results, an underlying theme is that elusive factor of production, entrepreneurship. The interview therefore devotes some attention to Soedarpo's atypical family and educational background, as a prelude to his acquisition of banking skills and foreign contacts during a posting to the United Nations in New York (1948–50). By 1952, when he embarked on a business career, he was still inexperienced but better prepared than most of his contemporaries. The middle sections of the interview focus on the problems of capital formation, import licensing and inflation under the Old Order. Finally, Samudera Indonesia's role in the development of Indonesia's deepsea liner shipping is traced from the mid 1960s into the 1980s, showing how, even for a mature enterprise, survival still depends upon a judicious combination of local knowkdge, foreign Connections, and scarce capital.     

Reflections on Industrialisation and Industrial Policy in Indonesia

Abdoel Raoef Soehoed was born in Jakarta in 1920. After graduating from senior high school in Jakarta in 1939, he studied engineering in Bandung and subsequently graduated after the independence struggle. In 1956 Soehoed, who had become an officer of the Indonesian Air Force, resigned from military service and became an engineering consultant with a private firm. His career as a public servant started with his appointment as an Advisor to the Senior Minister for Development and Industries. He was then appointed a member of the Technical Committee for Capital Investment, which became the Coordinating Board for Capital Investment (BKPM). Soehoed was made Deputy Chairman of the Board, and head of BKPM's Division for Promotion of Foreign Capital Investment. In 1976 he was also appointed Chairman of the Asahan Development Authority, a position he still occupies In 1978, he became Minister of Industry in the Third Development Cabinet (1978–1983) and in May 1983 he was appointed Member of the Supreme Advisory Council.

As a forceful and articulate advocate of what has come to be called the structuralist approach to industrialisation, Soehoed can rightly be considered the prime architect of Indonesia's current industrial development. on 7 September 1987 he talked to Thee Kian Wie and Hal Hill about his views on the development of Indonesia's manufacturing sector.     

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 1926–2006: MEANING,METHOD AND INDONESIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

Clifford Geertz was best known for his pioneering excursions into symbolic or in terpretive anthropology, especially in relation to Indonesia. Less well recognised are his stimulating explorations of the modern economic history of Indonesia. His thinking on the interplay of economics and culture was most fully and vigorously expounded in Agricultural Involution. That book deployed a succinctly packaged past in order to solve a pressing contemporary puzzle, Java's enduring rural poverty and apparent social immobility. Initially greeted with acclaim, later and ironically the book stimulated the deep and multi-layered research that in fact led to the eventual rejection of Geertz's central contentions. But the veracity or otherwise of Geertz's inventive characterisation of Indonesian economic development now seems irrelevant; what is profoundly important is the extraordinary stimulus he gave to a generation of scholars to explore Indonesia's modern economic history with a depth and intensity previously unimaginable.     

Recollections of My Career

Teuku Mohamad Daud, a pioneer Indonesian entrepreneur, was born in Perlak, Aceh, in 1920. Educated in Aceh and Jakarta, he joined the fledgling Indonesian National Army (TNI) at the proclamation of independence in 1945. Charged with procuring military equipment for the TNI Sumatra Command based at Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, Mr Daud was forced to finance the procurement by smuggling agricultural commodities, with the help of his uncle, Teuku Abdul Hamid Azwar. In 1947, at the suggestion of Vice President Hatta, Mr Daud and his uncle established Indonesia's first state-owned general trading company, the Central Trading Corporation (CTC, renamed PN Tri Bhakti in 1961, and later PN Panca Niaga), based in Bukittinggi. Mr Daud became a director of CTC while remaining on the TNI staff, and was later President Director until his resignation in 1966. He and several colleagues then established a group of private companies, engaged mainly in construction work.

On 1 October 1996 and again in June 1997, Mr Daud talked with Howard Dick and Thee Kian Wie of the BIES Editorial Board about his experiences in running CTC, both during Indonesia's revolutionary struggle and in the early period of independence, and about his views on the role of government in commerce. References to current government policy relate to the Soeharto administration.     

Indonesia's economic performance in comparative perspective and a new policy framework for 2049

This is the first paper of a planned ‘Indonesia 2049’ project, which asks how far Indonesia's economy will have developed 100 years after actual political independence in 1949. We compare dimensions of Indonesia's economy with those of two oil exporters (Mexico and Nigeria), three large populous developing economies (China, India and Brazil) and three Southeast Asian neighbours (Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines). Under Soeharto, Indonesia's economic performance was better than it had been under Soekarno, and above the average of the eight comparator countries, but below that of the East Asian economies. Our view is that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second administration must adopt a new economic policy framework to ensure successful transition to knowledge-based growth. This proposed new framework goes beyond the Washington Consensus of ‘getting prices right’ and ‘getting institutions right’ to include ‘getting the role of science right’ and ‘getting the conception of the reform process right’.     

INDONESIAN POLITICS IN 2007: THE PRESIDENCY,LOCAL ELECTIONS AND THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY

This article begins by reviewing the politics of the presidency, including the relationship between the president, the political parties and the House of Representatives (DPR). Referring to survey data, it analyses the dynamics of public support for President Yudhoyono, and takes a preliminary look at the 2009 presidential election. It also discusses the manoeuvring between Indonesia's two largest parties, Golkar and PDI-P, in the context of recent debates in the DPR concerning a package of draft political laws.

Indonesia is undergoing continual reform with regard to local, as well as national, politics. The introduction of direct elections for heads of government at the local level is a major political development that may help accelerate democratic consolidation. Based on an examination of local election results, this article concludes that the advent of direct elections has fuelled the formation of unprecedented cross-ideological political alliances. It appears that the ideological polarisation of national politics is often no longer reflected in provincial and local politics.     

Post-crisis export performance: The Indonesian experience in regional perspective

This paper examines post-crisis export performance in Indonesia against the backdrop of pre-crisis experience and the comparative export performance of other Southeast Asian countries. It surveys trends and patterns of export performance, focusing on comparative experience in major commodity categories and changing revealed comparative advantage. It also examines the implications for Indonesia's export performance of China's emergence as a major competitor in world trade, considers market prospects for textile and garment exports following the demise of the Multi-fibre Arrangement, and explores the factors contributing to the post-crisis export slowdown. The findings support the view that Indonesia's poor export performance in the post-crisis era is largely supply driven. They strengthen the case for reversal of recent backsliding in macroeconomic policy reform, and for speedy implementation of the unfinished reform agenda. Prudent macroeconomic management, while necessary, is not sufficient to achieve rapid and sustained export growth in an era of rapid economic globalisation.     

Indonesian politics in 2011: democratic regression and Yudhoyono's regal incumbency

In 2011, a number of trends in Indonesian politics became clearer. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) has not become a more reformist and risk-taking president in his second term, contrary to the hopes of many, but has rather become more cautious, aloof and regal in style. He is irked by criticism and dislikes any disturbance to the authority of his rule. The political elite, often in concert with the SBY government, pushed through a range of democratically regressive measures, including allowing politicians to be appointed to the Elections Commission. The malaise within the party system deepened, with less than a quarter of the electorate professing any party affiliation. Most Islamic parties slid closer to the political periphery, and the largest one, PKS, was beset by controversy. Government and community responses to a brutal attack on the Ahmadiyah sect in early 2011 showed the limits of Indonesia's much lauded religious tolerance.