Forestry,Forest Fires,and Climate Change in Indonesia

In recent months, strong global growth, rebounding commodity prices, and relatively accommodative financial conditions have benefited the Indonesian economy. The first quarter of 2017 in Indonesia saw resilient GDP growth, moderate inflation, stable exchange rates, an increase in the growth of non-oil exports, and an investment upgrade from ratings agency Standard & Poor's. Investment growth, however, did not pick up enough to drive overall growth to a higher rate. The poor quality of banking-sector assets and the gaps in tax revenue—despite the fulfilment of the government's tax-amnesty program—are two of the most immediate economic concerns. President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), who is well into the second half of his term, is under pressure to deliver on his development platform, which includes making progress in sustainable development and climate change mitigation. The effective management of forests is key to this platform. There has been longstanding tension over Indonesia's forests between the protection of environmental values, including carbon storage, and the production of valuable commodities, including timber, palm oil, and pulpwood, which generate revenue and employment. We survey recent developments in four storylines related to forestry and climate change: first, Indonesia's commitment to reducing emissions to 29%–41% below projected business-as-usual levels by 2030, as well as the international climate agreements and finance that can help achieve this commitment; second, land-use rights and regulations, including a moratorium on clearing, draining, or setting fires on peatland; third, measures to prevent catastrophic forest fires like those during the 2015 El Niño, including the establishment of the Peatland Restoration Agency; and, fourth, the actions of non-state actors, especially large agribusinesses, in managing forests and peatland. We conclude by discussing differences in the approaches of Jokowi's administration and those of former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's administration and by questioning whether Indonesia's budgeted resources, actions, and results to date are commensurate with its climate commitments.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Amid global economic uncertainty and tumbling world oil prices, Indonesia's economy faces pressure on its external balance and a continued growth slowdown. The government of President Joko Widodo (widely known as Jokowi) has set an agenda of reform, including simpler, faster investment licensing, historic cuts to fuel subsidies to generate fiscal savings, and increased spending on infrastructure. On the political side, Jokowi has had to deal with several political issues coming not only from parties in opposition but also from parties supporting his government, including during the formation of the new cabinet. We examine the consequences so far of the government's policy initiatives and of the policymaking process. While some initiatives have been implemented with success, some seem to have been launched without enough preparation, consultation, or empirical evidence, and many have been poorly communicated. Although inflation accelerated after the November fuel-price rise, efforts have been made to contain inflationary expectations and to mitigate the effects on poverty through social-assistance programs. The government took steps to cushion the impending impacts of higher fuel prices on vulnerable households by giving cash handouts of Rp 200,000 per month to 15.5 million disadvantaged families who receive the lowest level of welfare, and by promoting publicly funded education and health care. The partial removal of gasoline subsidies and the introduction of a fixed-subsidy policy for diesel in the revised 2015 budget reduce uncertainty about the fiscal position, although increases in government spending in infrastructure development were announced at the same time. The revised budget for 2015 increases spending on infrastructure development by 63% from the 2014 budget, mostly on projects to improve connectivity on land and at sea—such as the development of toll roads, railways, and ports—and to increase the performance of the agricultural sector. However, the recent drop in international oil prices forced the government to increase its target for tax revenue by 30% on last year's target, raising concerns about the effect of falling oil prices on the economy. Trade and investment policy reform is important in unlocking Indonesia's growth potential and improving the country's current external balance. Jokowi's administration, however, has been sending mixed signals about its position towards more open policies. The country has yet to recommence several trade negotiations that were postponed in 2014 and is still struggling to meet its commitments under the ASEAN Economic Community. Although improvement in investment procedures and licensing is currently underway, Indonesia needs to adopt a more positive attitude if it is to attract more investment.     

SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Managing the Indonesian economy in 2015 has proved challenging for the administration of Joko Widodo (Jokowi). In a first quarter plagued by external adversity—especially a sharp drop in exports to China—coupled with internal political paralysis and the delayed disbursement of fiscal spending, the economy recorded its lowest rate of growth since 2009. Observing relatively stable inflation, Bank Indonesia (BI), the central bank, eased its policy rate in February by 25 basis points, to 7.5%. The bank also adjusted its macroprudential measures to counter declining bank lending. On the fiscal side, the expected stimulus from fuel-subsidy reallocation and aggressive public-capital spending did not arrive. Meanwhile, tax revenue made slow progress towards its ambitious target, which it seems unlikely to attain.

Increases in supply costs made it difficult for the government to align domestic fuel prices more closely to the market. Major commodity exports fell significantly, but some manufactured exports showed hints of an upturn. The depreciation of the rupiah, the global strategies of leading investors, and the introduction of taxexemption policies that have been tested in neighbouring countries may have contributed to this trend. To further broaden the base of export diversification, the priorities should be to reduce business costs and enhance competition rather than enforce mandatory regulations. Jokowi has stressed that his focus on maritime development, part of a broader development strategy, includes reducing logistics costs.

The second quarter of 2015 saw the start of several projects in Jokowi's flagship ‘sea toll’ program to improve maritime connectivity. There is a concern, however, that the predominance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in strategic port operations will continue to limit competition and reduce efficiency. Jokowi's development strategy also focuses on reducing inequality. His government has implemented several distribution and redistribution policies, including the national social-security system initiated by the previous administration. The system suffered financially in its first year from low participation among those in the informal sector.     

Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call

Indonesian democracy experienced a near miss in 2014, when Jakarta governor Joko Widodo (Jokowi) defeated former general Prabowo Subianto by a margin of 6.3% in the presidential election. Both candidates were populists who rose to prominence in the context of public disillusionment with incumbent president Yudhoyono; Prabowo, however, condemned Indonesia's democratic system and promised to take Indonesia in a more authoritarian direction. We trace democracy's close call through five phases: the dying months of Yudhoyono's presidency, the rise of populist alternatives, the parliamentary elections of April 2014, the July presidential campaign, and the aftermath. We attribute the strength of Prabowo's campaign to superior organisational and financial support, while Jokowi's victory rested upon strong identification with him among poor and rural voters. Also determining the outcome was the fact that public satisfaction with democracy remained strong, undermining the effectiveness of Prabowo's authoritarian-populist message. Nevertheless, democracy's future remains uncertain, given that Prabowo and his supporters now control a sufficiently large number of parliamentary seats to continue promoting a rollback of democratic reforms.     

Jokowi's First Year: A Weak President Caught between Reform and Oligarchic Politics

When President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) took office in October 2014, he promised to usher in a new style of politics, generating optimism among many Indonesians that his government would enthusiastically promote reform. Yet Jokowi has since placed greater value on realpolitik than on reform, as evidenced by his choice of cabinet members, his response to the controversy surrounding senior police officer Budi Gunawan, and his handling of attempts by the police and others to weaken Indonesia's respected Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK). This article shows that Jokowi failed to deliver on his promises of reform largely owing to a combination of personal and external factors. He failed to show leadership on anticorruption and human-rights issues, for example—in part because he prefers economic development over democratic reform, but also because he is not immune to the oligarchic politics that dominate Indonesia's political life and promote the interests of Indonesia's elite.     

Widjojo Nitisastro and Indonesian development

Widjojo Nitisastro (2010) Pengalaman Pembangunan Indonesia: Kumpulan Tulisan dan Uraian Widjojo Nitisastro [The Experience of Development in Indonesia: A Collection of the Writings of Widjojo Nitisastro], Penerbit Buku Kompas [Kompas Book Publishing], Jakarta.

Widjojo Nitisastro is one of Indonesia's best-known economic policy makers. Much has been written by others about his role as a top adviser over more than three decades. This collection of his own essays helps fill out the picture. Seven main policy themes may be identified: the role of economic growth in helping overcome mass poverty; the need for economic policy makers to pay close attention to risk management and be constantly ready to respond to economic shocks; the importance of strong leadership and discipline in government; the need to scrutinise investment programs closely; the high priority to be given to borrowing programs and debt management; the role of the price mechanism; and the management of Indonesia's relations with the international community. Strong messages about growth, leadership and stability permeate the essays. The collection is a valuable contribution to the literature on economic policy making in developing countries.     

CLIFFORD GEERTZ, 1926–2006: MEANING,METHOD AND INDONESIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

Clifford Geertz was best known for his pioneering excursions into symbolic or in terpretive anthropology, especially in relation to Indonesia. Less well recognised are his stimulating explorations of the modern economic history of Indonesia. His thinking on the interplay of economics and culture was most fully and vigorously expounded in Agricultural Involution. That book deployed a succinctly packaged past in order to solve a pressing contemporary puzzle, Java's enduring rural poverty and apparent social immobility. Initially greeted with acclaim, later and ironically the book stimulated the deep and multi-layered research that in fact led to the eventual rejection of Geertz's central contentions. But the veracity or otherwise of Geertz's inventive characterisation of Indonesian economic development now seems irrelevant; what is profoundly important is the extraordinary stimulus he gave to a generation of scholars to explore Indonesia's modern economic history with a depth and intensity previously unimaginable.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Outgoing Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second-term record is creditable, measured against the targets he set himself in 2010, but deficient in key areas: economic reform, infrastructure investment, and anti-corruption. Indonesia's 2009–14 parliament has been active in economic policymaking, and will leave as its legacy a raft of protectionist legislation. Both presidential candidates, Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo and Prabowo Subianto, have appealed to nationalism in their campaigns, calling for Indonesia to assert its sovereignty and increase its self-sufficiency, but Jokowi's economic platform is more moderate and economically literate than Prabowo's. The incoming president will inherit an economy that continues to slow. Growth is now not expected to approach 6% until 2015 at the earliest. Having engineered a reduction in the current account deficit, Indonesian policymakers now face the more difficult problem of structural fiscal adjustment. Energy subsidies are the most immediate problem, but fiscal reform more generally will emerge as an overriding and unpleasant imperative for whoever wins the presidential election on 9 July. Unless difficult fiscal policy measures are taken, Indonesia will face major trade-offs between deficit control and investment in social programs and economic infrastructure. The new president will struggle to restrict the deficit to the cap of 3% of GDP: a balanced budget will likely not be feasible for several years. He will need to increase the ratio of revenue to GDP and eliminate fuel subsidies—through a more systematic approach than the infrequent price increases of the past. He will need to choose carefully between competing expenditure priorities, such as infrastructure and defence. The new president would also be well advised to tread cautiously in implementing the legal mandates he will inherit, and to work with parliament to avoid further and unwind current earmarking of public expenditure.     

Indonesian politics in 2013: the emergence of new leadership?

The rise of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) from small-town mayor to presidential frontrunner asks again whether new, alternative leaders could enter Indonesian politics in the 2014 elections. This article surveys Jokowi's impact on Indonesian politics over the past 12 months, and examines whether his election as Jakarta governor, and his evident popularity, has opened the way for alternative candidates at local level, or if it has changed parties’ calculations for the presidential election. The article concludes by considering whether a new leader could tackle some of the entrenched defects of democracy in Indonesia, given that he or she may have only minority support in the parliament. The article focuses in particular on corrupt law enforcement, the military and the rule of law, and violent religious intolerance.     

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES: CHINA AND INDONESIA COMPARED

China's and Indonesia's development strategies have been compared with others, but rarely with each other. Radically different political contexts have produced both similar and distinctly different development patterns. Each using formal planning, Indonesia spurred radical reforms to promote growth, whereas China opted for incremental reforms to ‘grow out of the Plan’, as a political device and to discover what policies and institutions worked. Both strategies produced environments largely conducive to rapid development. Indonesia relied on a few economic technocrats to oversee development; China used decentralisation and party reforms to create a credible environment for non-state investment. Both shared concern for agricultural reform and food security; both opted to open up for trade—China gradually, Indonesia radically. Both did well in growth and poverty reduction following reform. China's growth performance is in a league of its own, especially since Indonesia's Asian crisis setback, but Indonesia had more equitable growth and survived a difficult political transition with, in hindsight, modest costs.     

Jokowi and the New Developmentalism

Indonesia’s president, Joko Widodo (Jokowi), made a remarkable political recovery in 2016. During his first year in office, Jokowi had been overwhelmed by a combative and divided parliament, disunity in cabinet, tensions with his own party, and declining approval ratings. In 2016, however, Jokowi expanded his ruling coalition and consolidated his power, and his approval rating rose to almost 70%. By mid-2016, the president had achieved stable government for the first time since winning office. Political stability gave us greater clarity on Jokowi’s agenda and the kind of Indonesia he wants to shape. I suggest that in 2016 a Jokowi-styled new developmentalism began to emerge. Jokowi’s administration focused narrowly on infrastructure and deregulation; other problems of government were subordinated to these developmentalist goals. There are uncanny echoes of the past in the new developmentalism, and its conservative and nationalist features reflect political trends that pre-date Jokowi’s presidency. Indeed, Jokowi’s developmental strategy is neither unique nor coherent; his decision-making is defined by ad hocery. Instead, I argue, deeper structural features of Indonesia’s socio-political landscape are making their mark on the president and returning Indonesia to its developmentalist moorings.     

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN INDONESIA: FIFTY YEARS OF DISCOURSE

The topic of foreign direct investment (FDI) has been prominent in assessments of economic development in Indonesia during the past 50 years. In this article I review Indonesia's FDI record in a historical perspective; the current urge to control FDI inflows and the need to augment domestic savings and facilitate technology transfers are not at all new in Indonesia. I draw in particular on the discourse on FDI in this journal, the Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, giving special attention to contributions by this journal to the international literature on FDI and its impact. The article demonstrates that the relation between FDI and economic growth has been less straightforward in Indonesia than elsewhere in Southeast Asia. Although FDI has grown in a restrictive investment climate, on occasion it has failed to do so despite more liberal conditions. This may be attributed to the sustained role of natural resources in determining Indonesia's attractiveness as a host country of FDI.     

SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Summary Apart from the peaceful December elections in Aceh, many major recent news stories from Indonesia have been about disasters of some kind: the sinking of an interisland ferry, the crash of a commercial plane, the continuing misery caused by a seemingly unstoppable mud flow in East Java, and severe flooding in and around Jakarta. The largely symbolic dissolution of the Consultative Group on Indonesia in January has helped neutralise economic nationalist criticism of the president.

The rate of output growth rose to 6.1% in the December quarter, driven by a sudden surge in investment spending. Inflation was modest, at 6.3% in the year to January 2007; the exchange rate has been steady; and the Jakarta Stock Exchange has been booming. The budget deficit is well under control, and public debt continues to decline relative to GDP. At the same time, it is a concern that exchange rate and monetary policies have increasingly come to resemble those in the months preceding the 1997–98 crisis.

Recent surveys confirm that Indonesia's investment climate remains poorer than those of its neighbours. The problem is exemplified by the uncertainty facing new investment in the oil and mining sectors: oil exploration has been sluggish, causing output to fall well below Indonesia's OPEC quota and, although mining operations have been highly profitable in recent years, spending on exploration and new mine development has declined steadily. Meanwhile, the government's hopes of improving infrastructure through public–private partnerships were met with a wait-and-see attitude by private sector participants attending a second infrastructure summit in November.

Non-oil manufacturing grew more slowly than GDP in 2006, reversing the outcome for 2005. Non-oil manufactured exports grew steadily over 2004–06, but there seems little prospect of a resumption of the double-digit growth of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Aside from the poor investment climate and infrastructure shortcomings, the constraints on manufactured export growth include strong competition from China and Vietnam and declining competitiveness resulting from big increases in regulation-driven labour costs.

In March 2006 the poverty rate stood at 17.8%, up from 16.0% in February 2005. A World Bank study has attributed this to the large increase in rice prices caused by the ban on rice imports. It argues that the Unconditional Cash Transfer program, which provided direct cash transfers to 19.2 million poor and near-poor households, more than offset the impact of the steep fuel price increases in 2005, although these findings have been the subject of vigorous debate.     

Indonesia's Non-Oil Export Performance During the Economic Crisis: Distinguishing Price Trends from Quantity Trends

Despite an enormous currency depreciation, the growth rate of Indonesia's non-oil exports, measured in dollars, did not accelerate during the first two years of the Asian crisis. In fact, during the second year of the crisis non-oil export value dropped sharply. This paper demonstrates that the main reason for the decline in the dollar value of non-oil exports was a collapse of export prices. Non-oil export dollar prices fell 26% between the second quarter of 1997 and the second quarter of 1999. Measured at constant prices, non-oil exports grew 24% and manufactured exports 31% during this period. Non-oil import prices fell by roughly the same amount as non-oil export prices during the crisis, with little change in the non-oil terms of trade. The decline in the price of traded goods significantly reduced the magnitude of the real exchange rate depreciation experienced by Indonesia.     

Saving not Spending: Indonesia’s Domestic Demand Problem

Indonesian income per capita has risen rapidly in the past 10 years. The growth in income, combined with an expanding middle class, has corresponded with strong growth in retail sales. Recently, however, this trend has started to change. Consumption growth has been relatively stable, but retail sales are growing more slowly than in the past. In order to develop a clearer picture of consumer spending in Indonesia, we discuss differences in spending behaviour across two income groups—lower-middle income and upper-high income. Consumption varies across income groups, so saving and investment patterns may also vary. We find that the upper-high income group, despite having more income than in the past, is less willing to invest and borrow than previously, and that the lower-middle income group continues to suffer from a lack of purchasing power. Meanwhile, investors are simply postponing investments, preferring to take a ‘wait and see’ approach. Excess saving can be economically problematic. If effective demand is too weak, it can have negative consequences for long-term economic growth. We begin, however, by surveying recent economic developments in Indonesia, focusing on the third quarter of 2017. Indonesia’s current rate of economic growth (5.1% year on year) places it among the world’s fastest-growing large economies, but the lack of acceleration is a concern: growth has not exceeded 6.0% since the second quarter of 2012. Despite this lack of acceleration, Indonesia has achieved macroeconomic and financial stability. The balance of payments has been improving since early 2016, with a narrow current account deficit—well below 3.0% of GDP—and a surplus trade balance. Exports grew by 17.3% in the third quarter of 2017, owing to rising commodity prices (which boosted export growth in both value and volume), while imports grew by 15.1%, although the impact on economic growth has so far been more moderate than in the commodity boom of 2000–2011. The growth in commodity exports has also benefited Kalimantan, Sumatra, and other commodity-rich regions. However, rising commodity prices come with some caveats. They might boost growth for a short period, but they raise the challenge of making this growth sustainable. We have seen this many times in the past. Increasing institutional capacity to better implement policy initiatives, for one, will help to deliver sustainable, high-quality economic growth.     

Indonesia's economic performance in comparative perspective and a new policy framework for 2049

This is the first paper of a planned ‘Indonesia 2049’ project, which asks how far Indonesia's economy will have developed 100 years after actual political independence in 1949. We compare dimensions of Indonesia's economy with those of two oil exporters (Mexico and Nigeria), three large populous developing economies (China, India and Brazil) and three Southeast Asian neighbours (Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines). Under Soeharto, Indonesia's economic performance was better than it had been under Soekarno, and above the average of the eight comparator countries, but below that of the East Asian economies. Our view is that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's second administration must adopt a new economic policy framework to ensure successful transition to knowledge-based growth. This proposed new framework goes beyond the Washington Consensus of ‘getting prices right’ and ‘getting institutions right’ to include ‘getting the role of science right’ and ‘getting the conception of the reform process right’.     

Survey of recent developments

Despite a turbulent global economy and expectations that declining exports would cause an economic slowdown, the Indonesian economy grew at 6.5% in 2011. The growth rate was supported by high consumer confidence – the result of lower inflation of just 3.8% in 2011. Nevertheless, there were indications that the global financial crisis had had an impact on Indonesia in the last quarter of 2011, notably on the growth of exports and imports.

In October 2011, President Yudhoyono reshuffled his cabinet, citing a need to improve its performance in the administration's remaining three years. The reshuffle showed that the president is still subject to political party pressures. Moreover, the governing coalition of parties remains weak. Agreements made within coalition meetings are often broken in the parliament, and coalition parties are frequently distracted by media polemics. The case of former Democrat Party treasurer Nazaruddin, arrested in Colombia following a two-month manhunt, has revealed the magnitude of the money politics surrounding the Democrat Party, whose ratings are declining rapidly.

Indonesia enters 2012 bolstered by the restoration of its investment-grade credit rating. This will expose Indonesia to increased capital flows, since many funds are permitted to invest only in investment-grade countries. The effects on foreign direct investment (FDI) are not automatic, however. These investors evaluate the wider business climate and economic governance in making their investment decisions.

The fuel subsidy remains a challenge for Indonesia in 2011/12. Parliament rejected a proposal to limit fuel consumption from April 2012 over doubts about the government's readiness to handle the policy's technical complexity. Now the government is again considering a fuel price increase, and will have to seek parliamentary approval soon.

Indonesia faces a long-term problem of regional inequality. After four decades of economic development there is little variation in the shares of GDP across regions, but GDP per capita in some regions is slipping behind that of Java. Regional development policy needs to generate more economic activities in the outer islands, and to learn from the mistakes of past initiatives to promote economic development and growth centres in the regions. It is important to align policies with the current decentralisation arrangements.

The government is revising Law 33/2004 on Intergovernmental Finance with the aim of improving some dimensions of decentralisation in Indonesia. Revenue certainty is to be enhanced in part through changes to the general allocation grant (DAU) formula and the disbursement mechanism for intergovernmental transfers. The planned revision has not, however, addressed sufficiently the problem of inefficiency in regional spending. In fact, some of the proposed solutions may well create further spending inefficiency.

The main barrier to increased FDI is infrastructure development, whose progress has been slowed by land procurement problems. Unfortunately, Law 2/2012 on Land Procurement for Public Purposes seems unlikely to deliver a clear solution to the key problem of determining fair prices for land compensation. What is needed is the creation of more independent price-setting committees, with sufficient capacity to disentangle the problems of land acquisition.     

Survey of Recent Developments

Following the remarkably successful 2014 parliamentary and presidential elections in Indonesia, attention now turns to the new president and his agenda for the next five years. President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi, has emphasised the importance of strong economic growth and rising living standards. But he faces significant, broad-ranging economic challenges and, perhaps not surprisingly, serious discussion of these issues did not feature during the election campaigns. In many respects the economy is at a crossroads, facing the choice between a business-asusual scenario of no reform and consequently sluggish economic growth, and a politically difficult reform agenda that would set it on a higher growth path. Economic policymakers regard the events of 2013 as a mini economic crisis, and they feel vindicated in their explicit preference for stability over growth—that is, for slowing the economy through tighter fiscal and monetary policy and letting the currency decline. For now, the economy is slowing but holding up quite well, especially by comparative international norms and considering foreign and domestic headwinds, including possible macroeconomic and financial fragilities. Here we examine these headwinds—from global economic volatility and declining commodity prices, particularly in the wake of the so-called Bernanke shock of May 2013, to the continuing policy drift at home. We investigate whether there is evidence of an emerging adjustment from the commodity-driven growth of the past decade to some of the traditional tradables sectors, especially manufacturing. While the commodity boom is almost certainly a thing of the past—at least at levels witnessed since 2005—the country's political narratives and the government's microeconomic policies appear to be still premised on an era of plenty funded by a disappearing boom. We speculate on likely options and directions for what in all likelihood will be a ‘Jokowi decade’.     

Recollections of my Career

Subroto, Professor at the Faculty of Economics, University of Indonesia (FEUI), is one of the architects of the economic policies that brought growing prosperity to Indonesia over the New Order years Educated in Dutch colonial and Japanese occupation schools, he joined Indonesia's independence struggle, and later studied economics at FEUI, McGill University, MIT, and Stanford and Harvard Universities. He taught international economics and business cycles at FEUI and was Secretary of the Faculty. With Widjojo Nitisastro, Mohammad Sadh, Ali Wardhana and Emil Salim, Subroto was appointed a Personal Economic Adviser to General (later President) Soeharto's new government in 1966 In 1968 he joined the Department of Trade, and later was minister of departments responsible for transmigration, cooperatives, mining and energy. After a 17-year ministerial career serving in four consecutive cabinets, Subroto was Secretary General of OPEC for six years from 1988 He remains active in Indonesia's nongovernmental Indonesian Institute for Energy Economics (IIEE), writing on energy problems, and is also Rector of the private Pancasila University in South Jakarta As part of our occasional series of interviews with economists who have helped shape New Order Indonesia, Professor Subroto talked with Chris Manning and Thee Kian VVie of the Bulletin's Editorial Board about his experience as a cabinet minister and as Secretary General of OPEC, and about his views on Indonesia's economic development, particularly its energy problems.     

The Demography of Indonesia in Comparative Perspective

Having reduced its fertility rate over the past 40 years, Indonesia has reached a new demographic crossroad. Its fertility rate is now around 2.5 births per woman, which, if sustained, would add substantial numbers to Indonesia's population in the future. There are concerns within Indonesia that the present level of population growth is an obstacle to continued economic development and, accordingly, that fertility should be reduced to the replacement level of 2.1 births per woman as soon as possible. Yet a comparative perspective indicates that countries such as Singapore, Japan, and Thailand are concerned about the effects that their very low rates of fertility are having on their labour forces and their rates of population ageing. This article suggests that with the right policy settings Indonesia can avoid this outcome yet continue to reduce its fertility. It discusses the implications of Indonesia's population growth and distribution for its economy, as well as the poor quality of demographic data.