管理层持股与股权资本成本北大核心CSSCISSCI

管理层持股计划是现代公司治理的重要内容之一,旨在将管理层利益与股东财富有机地结合在一起,达到保护投资者利益、持续增加股东财富的治理目标。在中国,鉴于国有公司治理自身存在的诸多先天不足,实施管理层持股计划被赋予了更加积极的意义。本文探讨在国有控股与非国有控股状态下,管理层持股比例对股权资本成本的影响。结果显示,管理层持股比例的设计及其变化是管理层持股计划的关键环节,对公司资本成本水平产生直接影响,进而决定着公司综合竞争力的变化;我国国有控股上市公司和非国有控股上市公司的管理层持股比例与股权资本成本均呈倒U形关系;同时,国有控股上市公司的资本成本对于管理层持股比例的变化比非国有控股上市公司更加敏感。这表明,只有基于资本成本的变化来设计管理层的持股比例,才能够保证管理层持股计划的有效性,实现其正向效应。本文为上市公司管理层持股比例的设置提供了理论依据和建设性意见。     

分析师跟进、管理层持股与公司价值——基于联立方程组模型的实证检验

本文基于现有理论文献,使用联立方程组模型探索在具有转型和新兴特征的中国证券市场中,分析师跟进、管理层持股与公司价值三者的相关关系。研究发现,分析师跟进有助于投资者发现公司价值,管理层持股与公司价值存在U型非线性关系;管理层持股对分析师跟进的影响呈倒U型;分析师跟进与管理层持股在投资者发现公司价值、提升公司价值方面体现的是协同效应。同时,研究发现分析师跟进、管理层持股比例与公司价值之间是相互作用,相互影响的。     

员工持股计划新宠

股票来源为二级市场购买的公司,持股计划中包含了结构化融资。比如公司员工认购资产计划的次级份额,优先级份额面向外部融资自中国证监会2014年6月20日发布《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》后,上市公司推出员工持股计划的案例不断增加。截至10月14日,上市公司公布《员工持股计划(草案)》的共15家,其中12家属于中小板和创业板。所谓员工持股计划,是通过让员工持有本公司股票和期权而使其获得激励的一种长期绩效奖励计划。     

机构投资者持股特征对IPOs长期绩效影响的实证研究

文章从机构投资者持股规模、持股集中度、持股稳定性三个方面归纳不同类型机构投资者持股特征,采用Log-it回归检验机构投资者持股特征对上市后股票购买并持有异常回报率(BHAR),即IPOs长期绩效的影响。实证结果验证了机构投资者持股比例越高、持股稳定性越强,股票上市后的长期绩效越好;而持股比例低、持股集中度高、持股稳定性差的机构投资者也导致了股票长期表现较差。积极型机构投资者对股票长期绩效具有正面的影响。因此,引入积极型机构投资者符合当前我国股票市场深化改革的目标。     

管理层持股与自由现金流量控制研究——来自股改成功的上市公司的经验证据

公司持有自由现金流量是会产生代理成本的,而管理层持股可以有效地控制公司自由现金流量,因为管理者为私人利益“滥用”自由现金也将承担部分损失。以我国股权分置改革成功的967家上市公司为样本进行均值差异和回归分析后发现：管理层持股对自由现金流量的控制有一定作用,但并不显著。其原因在于我国上市公司管理层持股比例太低、经理市场不发达和资本市场不完善等问题。实证结果还为自由现金流量的“负债控制效应”假说提供了新证据。     

管理层股权激励与企业业绩的相关性研究

文章从国有与非国有控股上市公司产权基础不同的视角,以2007-2010年A股数据为样本,对管理层持股比例与企业经营业绩的相关性进行比较研究。研究结论显示:管理层持股比例与企业经营业绩呈正相关关系,其程度在非国有控股上市公司表现更为显著。文章发现国有与非国有控股上市公司管理层持股比例对企业经营业绩影响的方向相同但程度存在差异,为我国上市公司完善股权激励机制提供了经验证据。     

对员工持股计划,制度设计应更细致一些

日前,证监会发布《关于上市公司实施员工持股计划试点的指导意见》（下称《指导意见》）。员工持股计划,有利于建立和完善劳动者与所有者的利益共享机制,提高职工凝聚力和公司竞争力。然而,笔者认为,《指导意见》稍显粗糙,还需更为详细的制度设计。首先,《指导意见》或难解决上市公司强迫职工参与问题。对于经营平庸或者垃圾公司。大股东减持正愁二级市场没有接盘。有了员工持股计划制度，或许就会打它的歪主意。《指导意见》规定了员工自愿参与原则，且规定独立董事和监审会应当就“公司是否以摊派、强行分配等方式强制员工参加本公司持股计划”等发表意见；但若管理层等以辞退卡日威胁，职工或只能被迫参与员工持股计划。为此应该为职工提供相应的外部投诉渠道以及救济制度。     

机构持股改善了企业高管的薪酬治理吗

选取我国沪深两市2007 年-2021 年上市公司样本，在使用PSM+DID 有效控制机构选股偏好引致的内生性前提下，检验了机构持股、机构持股结构对公司高管薪酬的影响。结论表明：机构投资者持股确实能够显著抑制高管薪酬操纵并提升上市公司高管薪酬- 业绩敏感性，但这一作用需要机构持股相对集中才能实现，机构持股集中度成为机构投资者影响高管薪酬的调节变量。同时机构持股对高管业绩- 薪酬敏感性的影响存在非对称性，在公司业绩下滑区间薪酬影响更为强烈。此外，机构持股的薪酬影响实现，主要是通过管理层限权而实现，在高管理层权力样本组中，机构持股对高管薪酬的影响被大大削弱。     

美国员工持股制度对我国的启示

美国企业的员工持股是以“福利型”为主，其直接目的是为企业员工谋取福利，吸引员工和保留人才，增加企业对职工的凝聚力。其实现形式多样，总体上可分为“杠杆型”和“非杠杆型”两种，占主流的是杠杆型员工持股，它是在公司之外成立员工持股信托基金，由公司担保，该基金出面向银行贷款购买公司股东手中的部分股票，购入的股     

高管持股变动、盈余管理与现金流预测

对于资本市场上会计信息的外部使用者来说,上市公司的会计信息处理过程绝对是一个黑盒子。外部投资者只看到会计信息披露的结果,但难以观察是否有管理层操纵会计信息的处理。本研究通过选择高管持股连续三年增加或减少的上市公司为样本,实证探讨了样本公司的盈余管理行为对未来1至3年现金流量变动的解释能力。结果显示,就上市公司高管持股变动此项重要信息披露工具来说,高管连续增加持股公司盈余管理无法显著解释任何未来现金流量变动。相反,高管连续减少持股公司的盈余管理能够透漏相关公司信息给外部投资者,非常值得外部投资者注意,尤其关注管理者通过应计会计项目进行投机性盈余管理行为。本研究最后也给政府监管部门提供了相关建议。     

The Walk‐down to Beatable Analyst Forecasts: The Role of Equity Issuance and Insider Trading Incentives*

It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts.     

The Effect of Short Selling on Market Reactions to Earnings Announcements*

This paper examines the effect of the inherent demand implied by short interest by studying how stock price reactions to earnings announcements depend on the level of short interest. We find that, for extreme good and bad news events, the inherent demand increases stock prices around the earnings announcement date, with the effect being stronger for good news relative to bad news. Specifically, the initial market reaction to an extreme positive earnings surprise is larger for firms with high levels of short interest. On the other hand, for an extreme negative earnings surprise event, the initial market reaction is less negative for heavily shorted firms. Furthermore, we find that the post‐earnings‐announcement drift is smaller (larger) in magnitude for extreme positive (negative) earnings surprises for the heavily shorted firms.     

The Timeliness of the Bond Market Reaction to Bad Earnings News

We find that bond price quotes impound bad earnings news on a more timely basis than good earnings news and that the bond market impounds bad news on a more timely basis than the stock market. We also find that the timeliness of the bond market reaction to bad news is concentrated primarily among speculative‐grade bonds, consistent with earnings news having a larger effect on bond price quotes when default risk is high. In addition, we find that a portion of the bad news impounded by the bond market reverses following the earnings announcement. Overall, our findings are consistent with bondholders’ asymmetric payoff function having important implications for the valuation role of accounting information in the bond market. Specifically, our findings indicate that bond quotes impound bad earnings news much earlier in the pre‐earnings announcement period than stock prices. In addition, bondholders appear to overreact to the bad earnings news initially and correct this overreaction subsequent to the earnings announcement.     

我国上市公司高管犯罪公告的市场反应研究

为了研究我国上市公司高管犯罪的经济后果,本文通过收集1998～2010年我国A股市场63个上市公司高管涉案犯罪的公告,将总体样本分为在职公告样本和离职公告样本,运用事件研究法,从实证的角度分析了上市公司高管犯罪公告的市场反应,通过分析事件窗口期[t-5,t+5]的11个交易日内个股的非正常收益,通过单样本均值t检验、配对样本t检验等显著性检验,发现高管犯罪公告当日产生了负的显著性非正常收益,并且在t和t+1日两天的非正常收益率存在显著性差异。     

Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent: Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions

We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock‐for‐stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre‐merger announcement abnormal accruals and post‐merger announcement market performance than non‐Friday announcers. This effect is driven mainly by mergers that are completed relatively quickly after they are announced. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that some acquiring managers inflate earnings prior to announcing the mergers, and time the merger announcements to exploit investor inattention.     

货币政策公布效应、投资者情绪与市场状态

从世界范围来看,我国证券市场属于新兴资本市场。所以从实践来看,宏观经济政策调控会对证券市场产生影响,其传递路径主要通过对投资者心理产生作用,进而会影响到投资者价值与价格的比较判断,最终导致证券市场的非正常波动。本文在结合国内外研究的基础上构建基于最小二乘的多元回归模型研究货币政策公布效应。研究结果显示:投资者心理指标的变动与证券指数有显著的相关性,而货币政策的调整幅度、虚变量市场状态对应的P值大于对应的显著性水平α,显示货币政策信息公布时点及调整幅度在市场处于牛市或熊市下不能一致性地产生溢价收益。     

Voluntary Income-Increasing Accounting Changes*

Abstract. This article presents an explanation of the reasons that managers might elect to change accounting methods. Facing adversity with a nontrivial probability of technical default on the debt covenants, the manager is motivated to effect an income-increasing accounting change to circumvent a technical default. Under rational expectations, if investors do not have any prior information about the firm's adversity, the market reaction on an accounting change announcement is predicted to be negative. We postulate that the market impact on the date of change announcement is negatively correlated with the amount of information the investors may have. A sample of 77 firms was selected to test the economic arguments. Investors' reaction to the accounting change was tested by abnormal returns on dates of announcement. Cross-sectional tests associate the investors' reaction with their prior information about the financial status of the sample firms. On the date of the change announcement, the sample firms did not experience a statistically significant negative market reaction. However, in a cross-sectional analysis, the market impact parameter was found to be significantly correlated in a negative manner with the prior information proxy variable.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Equity Offerings: Reducing Information Asymmetry or Hyping the Stock?*

We examine corporate disclosure activity around seasoned equity offerings and its relationship to stock prices. Beginning six months before the offering, our sample issuing firms dramatically increase their disclosure activity, particularly for the categories of disclosure over which firms have the most discretion. The increase is significant after controlling for the firm's current and future earnings performance and tends to be largest for firms with selling shareholders participating in the offering. However, there is no change in the frequency of forward‐looking statements prior to the equity offering, something that is expressly discouraged by the securities law. Firms that maintain a consistent level of disclosure experience price increases prior to the offering, and only minor price declines at the offering announcement relative to the control firms, suggesting that disclosure may have reduced the information asymmetry inherent in the offering. Firms that substantially increase their disclosure activity in the six months before the offering also experience price increases prior to the offering relative to the control firms, but suffer much larger price declines at the announcement of their intent to issue equity, suggesting that the disclosure increase may have been used to “hype the stock” and the market may have partially corrected for the earlier price increase. Firms that maintain a consistent disclosure level have no unusual return behavior relative to the control firms subsequent to the announcement, while the firms that “hyped” their stock continue to suffer negative returns, providing further evidence that the increased disclosure activity may have been hype, and suggesting that the hype may have been successful in lowering the firms' cost of equity capital.     

控股股东减持公告影响股价波动的实证分析

本文运用事件分析法对控股股东减持公告后的股价变动进行实证后发现,控股股东的减持行为具有信号效应,减持会对股价产生下跌的压力;在不同的市场环境中控股股东减持的信号效应对股价的影响差别很大。     

我国上市公司股票回购公告效应影响因素研究

本文以2007年1月1日至2011年3月15日期间我国A股市场发生的股票回购公告(董事会决议公告)事件为研究对象,对上市公司股票回购公告效应的影响因素进行探析。研究发现,市场对股票回购公告的反应积极,股价在公告日前后产生显著为正的超常收益率;股价被低估程度、财务杠杆、公司治理结构、公司成长性以及公司规模对股票回购公告效应有着正向影响。