营销渠道中的渠道关系、权力使用与投机行为

文章基于营销渠道行为及关系营销理论,以制造商与其经销商之间的关系为研究平台,检验了制造商的关系营销导向以及跨组织私人关系对其使用权威机制以及经销商投机行为的影响。研究结果表明:制造商的关系营销导向对于其使用非强制性权力有显著的正向影响,对其使用强制性权力虽然没有直接影响,但会通过跨组织私人关系(情感性与工具性)产生负向影响;制造商与其经销商之间的跨组织私人关系(情感性与工具性)会抑制制造商使用强制性权力,工具性私人关系会促进其使用非强制性权力;制造商使用强制性权力会加重经销商的投机行为。最后,讨论了研究结果与应用及未来的研究方向。     

资产专用性、渠道异质性与渠道投机行为:基于中国汽车企业的实证

为了提升渠道价值和培育竞争优势,营销战略会针对特殊的渠道交易伙伴进行专用性投资。交易成本理论认为专用性投资在带来高的附加值的同时,也使得进行专用性投资的渠道成员面临投机行为风险。中国的实证数据表明,虽然销售商的专用性投资会导致制造商渠道投机行为,但这会受到制造商自身的专用性投资的影响以及渠道关系持续的影响,即双边“锁定”和渠道关系的持续会有效避免渠道投机行为。     

渠道合作情境下合同双元功能对主动和被动投机行为的影响差异研究

基于交易成本理论，在渠道合作情境下，以制造商的合同监督和企业间联合行动为工具测量合同治理的保障功能和协作功能，探讨二者对经销商主动投机行为和被动投机行为的影响差异。通过对512份问卷数据的统计分析，得到以下结论：第一，合同监督有助于抑制经销商的主动投机行为，但对其被动投机行为的影响不显著；第二，企业间联合行动有助于抑制经销商的被动投机行为，但对其主动投机行为的影响不显著；第三，经销商的主动投机行为和被动投机行为均会负向影响合作绩效；第四，经销商的主动投机行为中介合同监督对合作绩效的正向影响，被动投机行为中介企业间联合行动对合作绩效的正向影响。     

三元渠道网络中分销商的投机行为与网络嵌入治理机制

企业投机行为治理是营销渠道及B2B营销研究的核心和前沿领域之一。已有研究主要遵循二元分析范式,即关注由两个渠道成员构成的渠道关系中的企业投机行为及其治理问题。由于现实中的渠道结构是网络化的,传统二元分析范式极大地限制了对企业投机行为及其治理机制的理解。有鉴于此,依据社会网络理论、交易成本理论及代理理论,以"制造商—批发商—零售商"三元渠道网络为分析对象,先对批发商在此网络中的多元化投机行为进行分类与界定,继而提出一种新的治理机制——制造商网络嵌入治理机制,即制造商在保持与批发商、零售商渠道结构不变的情况下,与零售商建立非交易性联系。在此基础上,重点探讨这种治理机制对抑制三元渠道网络中企业投机行为的作用机制及路径。     

制造商IT资源、合同治理与分销商渠道投机

从交易成本视角入手并结合信息系统相关研究,文章分析了制造商IT资源对其合同治理手段的影响,以及对分销商渠道投机的抑制作用。经由实地收集的数据实证检验发现：第一,制造商的IT设备越先进,越有助于其与分销商制定更细致的一般合同条款与意外情况合同条款。第二,制造商IT人员提供的支持越多,则越有助于其与分销商制定更细致的一般合同条款与意外情况条款。第三,只有更细致的一般合同条款可以有效地抑制分销商投机,但更细致的意外情况条款则无助于降低分销商的投机。最后,根据上述研究结论,文章给出了企业怎样使用IT资源来提高渠道合同控制效率的相关建议。     

浅谈渠道机会主义行为的控制机制

近年来,渠道机会主义行为盛行,从各行各业经常发生的经销商窜货事件就可见一般。在渠道管理中,经销商的机会主义行为损害了制造商的利益、同事损害了品牌形象,对交易关系带来了巨大挑战。作为制造商,对掌握渠道终端资源的经销商,应该采取措施减少经销商的渠道机会主义行为。本文将对渠道机会主义行为进行分类并给出其影响因素。     

供应商家长式行为导向与经销商建言行为：人情的调节作用

以渠道行为理论、中国本土社会心理学理论和家长式领导理论为基础，从中国传统文化的视角提出供应商家长式行为导向这一构念，将其细分为立威行为导向和施恩行为导向两个维度，并在供应商经销商关系中实证检验供应商家长式行为导向对经销商建言行为的影响以及人情的调节作用。以327份来自经销商的调查问卷为基础，研究结果显示：供应商家长式行为导向对经销商建言行为具有显著影响，立威行为导向会抑制经销商的建言行为，人情会削弱立威行为导向的抑制作用；而施恩行为导向会促进经销商的建言行为，人情会强化这一影响。     

营销渠道投机行为成因及分类

营销渠道中经常会产生投机行为,对渠道中的成员利益产生了很大的影响,这些投机行为各式各样,而且投机行为产生的原因也有很多种.本文将对营销渠道中的投机行为产生原因进行总结,并对各种投机行为进行分类.     

国际货物销售合同付款条款设计浅析

作为国际货物销售合同中关键的条款之一,付款条款直接关系到货款是否能顺利回收。通过界定国际货物销售合同付款条款的主要内容,结合交易实际阐述影响付款条款设计的因素,包括买方的资信情况、卖方市场战略和现金流压力。提出树立全局和双赢观念,根据实际情况选择收款币种,合理选择付款节点和付款凭证等完善国际货物销售合同付款条款的对策建议。     

基于演化博弈论的营销渠道合作竞争关系分析

营销渠道关系作为企业关键性资源,对于价值链上的供应商、制造商和各类经销商而言,其存在与运行效率直接影响着它们的竞争力和市场地位.因此分析营销渠道系统的合作竞争关系所遵循的规律,对于渠道内企业发展而言具有重要的理论与现实意义.基于区域产业间协同竞争行为与生物种群之间协同竞争行为机理的相似性,本文运用演化博弈论建立演化博弈模型,对营销渠道合作竞争关系的演化机制进行分析.     

Diffusing market orientation to drive marketing capital: evidence from Vietnam

Although Vietnam’s transition to a market-oriented economy has produced stunning results, the economy is still lacking qualified marketers. This study investigates underlying factors that are fundamental drivers of Vietnam’s economic renaissance, including the role of market orientation at the marketer level (i.e. marketers’ market orientation) in marketing capital pool, and subsequently, marketers’ occupational commitment. Based on data collected from 351 marketers working for various firms in Ho Chi Minh City, the study finds that marketers’ market orientation has a positive impact on marketing capital pool. Further, marketing capital pool invested by marketers has a positive impact on their occupational commitment. Finally, firm ownership moderates the relationship between marketers’ market orientation and marketing capital pool, and gender moderates the relationship between marketing capital pool and marketers’ occupational commitment. Implications for Vietnam and other transitioning economies are discussed.     

Reducing distributor opportunism in the export market: Effects of monitoring mechanisms, norm-based information exchange, and market orientation

As monitoring mechanisms are critical to exporter–distributor relationships, the effectiveness of different types of monitoring mechanisms remains an important issue. Our study goes beyond the separate effects of monitoring mechanisms on opportunism, and tests the moderating effects of market orientation (MO) and norm-based information exchange on the monitoring mechanism–opportunism relationship. Based on survey data of 160 export ventures in China, we find that process control increases distributor opportunism, while norm-based information exchange and MO decrease it. Moreover, at high levels of norm-based information exchange and MO, the impact of process control on opportunism turns from positive to negative.     

The moderating effects of customer driven complexity on the structure and growth relationship in young firms

Close exchange relationships with customers are recognized as important for young firms. In fact, close partnerships with customers provide many advantages, such as innovation, opportunity recognition, reputation, etc. The current paper argues that customers with their close exchange relationships create significant complexities for young firms that require effective structural response. Based on past work on customer driven complexity, four parameters of customer driven complexities were conceptualized: customer variability, customer opportunism, customer-interaction variability, and customer-interaction specificity. Using both archival and survey data from 134 young (6 year old or younger) firms, this study tests the moderating influences of customer driven complexity variables on the relationship between structure and growth of young firms. Findings support the suggestion that more formalization and less delegation of authority at the customer interface significantly contribute to the growth in young firms. However, the positive relationship between formalization and revenue growth is found to be weaker when young firms face a higher level of customer variability and stronger when firms face a higher level of customer opportunism. Similarly, the negative relationship between delegation of authority and revenue growth is weaker when these firms face either a higher level of customer-interaction variability or a higher level of customer-interaction specificity.     

Long-Term Relationships,Partnerships and Strategic Alliances:

The aim of this paper is to identify the conditions under which three different relationship marketing mechanisms-- long-term relationships, partnerships and strategic alliances--are most efficient. The contingency theory that is developed is based on, and extends, the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) framework. The TCE framework is modified in one respect, opportunism is assumed to vary across exchange relationships. In those relationships that are characterized by relational norms (absence of opportunism), the TCE governance mechanisms--markets, hierarchies and hybrids--are argued to be inefficient relative to the mechanisms of relationship marketing.     

论品牌关系生命周期中消费者品牌信任与心理契约的建立

企业之间的竞争,集中体现为品牌统治权的争夺,实质是对消费者的争夺。只有与消费者建立长期持久的关系,才能取得竞争的先机。而信任是长期关系的基础,是关系营销取得成功的关键,与心理契约存在正相关关系。系统梳理、借鉴有关品牌信任和心理契约研究成果,并从理论上论证了品牌关系生命周期中消费者品牌信任与心理契约建立的横向动态关系与纵向互动关系同时存在,它们共同形成了消费者品牌信任与心理契约建立的动态整合模型。     

Technological opportunism effects on IT adoption,intra-firm diffusion and performance: Evidence from the U.S. and Spain

The paper pursues a joint analysis of the direct influence of the level of a firm's technology opportunism capability on performance and on the adoption and intra-firm diffusion of Internet-based technologies. The study here examines the mediating effect that intra-firm diffusion exerts on the relationship between capabilities and performance. This study uses the results from a survey of 100 Spanish and 109 American franchise firms. Results indicate that the firm's level technological opportunism influences the adoption and intra-firm diffusion of technology and also has a positive impact on performance. While intra-firm diffusion is a driver of performance, adoption has no influence. Finally the indirect impact of technological opportunism on performance differs across countries. While for American firms, the integration of technologies into activities that related to communication with partners has a positive impact on performance; Spanish managers should focus on the integration of these technologies into back-end functionalities.     

Opportunism and Long-Term Contracting: Transactions in Broken Hill Zinc Concentrates in the 1930s

The essay examines the design and operation of a long-term contract at the centre of the Anglo-Australian zinc industry during the 1930s. All the parties to this contract invested in durable assets that were highly specific to transactions in Broken Hill zinc concentrates. Under such conditions, according to transaction cost economics, an efficient contractual response would entail the vertical integration of exchange or, at the very least, some long-term arrangement under which the parties make sizeable credible commitments in support of exchange. The basis of the transaction cost argument is that such an arrangement is necessary to protect the parties against the risk of opportunistic behaviour by exchange partners. The contract examined here, however, did not possess such protective devices, yet, by all accounts, performed extremely well in the most testing of circumstances. Close analysis of the design and operation of this contract gives reason to question the generality of the transaction cost assumption that parties structure their institutional arrangements with a view to protect themselves against the hazards of opportunism. The parties to this contract did not anticipate a high degree of opportunism and this was reflected in the design of their contract. From the analysis of the way the contract actually operated it is clear that this expectation was more than justified and exchange in Broken Hill zinc concentrates was characterised by close co-operation and forbearance rather than opportunism.     

Government role,governance mechanisms,and foreign partner opportunism in IJVs

Although institutional environments are important determinants of transaction costs in IJV management and performance, prior studies have paid limited attention to their impacts on partner opportunism. Building on institution theory, this study examines how the characteristics of the host country government affect IJV foreign partner opportunism. The authors posit that host government resource dependence and policy uncertainty increase foreign partner opportunism, and their impacts are constrained by formal (i.e., contract specificity) and informal (i.e., shared vision) governance mechanisms, respectively. The empirical results from a primary survey of IJVs show that contract specificity is effective in curtailing the effect of resource dependence on foreign partner opportunism. In contrast, shared vision weakens the effect of policy uncertainty on foreign partner opportunism. These findings provide important research and managerial implications on how to manage foreign partner opportunism in IJVs.     

Business-to-Business Negotiations: The Role of Relativism,Deceit, and Opportunism

Purpose: Studies examining the impact of relativism and deceitful tendencies on unethical negotiation tactics have yielded inconsistent results; some studies report a positive relationship, some negative, while some others report a nonexistent relationship between these constructs. These inconsistencies suggest that there may be intervening variables mediating the effects of these factors on unethical negotiation tactics. We propose that opportunism plays an important role in determining the effects of these two antecedents on business managers' perceptions of unethical negotiation tactics.

Method: An Internet-based survey was administered to a sample of managers at U.S. firms engaged in business-to-business marketing. Structural equation modeling techniques were used to evaluate the mediating role of opportunism between deceitful tendencies and relativism on questionable negotiation tactics.

Findings: The analysis supports the hypothesized role of opportunism as a mediating variable. Opportunism was found to play a significant role in mediating the relationships of both relativism and deceitful tendencies on attitudes toward unethical negotiation tactics.

Contribution: In addition to the theoretical contributions suggested here, this article includes suggestions for minimizing the likelihood that a negotiation partner's relativism and deceitful tendencies will negatively impact business negotiation.