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企业内部转移价格关系到责任会计的实施,对企业生产经营决策具有重大影响,如何制定企业的内部转移价格,如何利用企业内部转移价格对企业内部各责任中心进行业绩考核和评价以及如何利用企业内部转移价格进行企业短期决策是探讨的中心课题。 相似文献
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企业内部转移价格的制定是责任会计的重要组成部分,合理确定内部转移价格对正确考评各责任中心的工作业绩,激励有效管理及激发员工工作积极性具有重要意义。基于此,本文对企业内部转移价格的作用、制定原则及方法进行探讨,并以某公司为个案进行分析,以期为企业内部转移定价选择提供参考。 相似文献
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在实行责任会计的企业,由于企业内部各部门之间存在大量的内部产品和劳务的转让,因此制定内部转移价格则成为必然.但一组适应于评价责任单位经营业绩、激励其努力工作的转移价格,却经常导致责任单位做出与企业整体目标不一致的决策.本文拟就如何解决该问题谈一点粗浅的看法. 相似文献
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全面预算编制出来以后,如何完成预算所列示的各项指标就成了企业管理工作的一个中心环节.本文将从责任会计内部转移价格的制定,分别阐述制定内部价格结算的作用,以及制定内部转移价格的四种方法. 相似文献
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企业内部转移价格是企业集团内部相关联各方在交易过程中所采用的价格。我们通过追述内部转移理论的渊源与发展,描述企业内部转移价格选择策略,最后通过例证解析企业内部转移价格的选择制定。 相似文献
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关于企业内部转移价格的探讨 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
内部转移价格是指同一组织内部有关责任中心之间提供产品或服务的内部结算价格。由于各责任中心都是相对独立性的经济单位,内部转移价格的制定就是摆在整个组织面前的一个问题。这个组织成为影响各个责任中心短期和长期经营决策的重要因素,又是企业整体激励报酬系统的重要构成因素。基于此,本文试对内部转移价格的定义、转移价格因考虑的因素、及其合理运用做一番探讨,以助于企业提高经营管理体制的效率。 相似文献
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为了正确评价企业内部责任中心的工作成果,就必须为各责任中心的这种内部交易活动制定一个科学合理的计价标准,即内部转移价格。以内部转移价格作为企业内部各责任中心之间发生的经济活动的计量基准,可以正确评价各责任中心的工作业绩,明确划分经济责任,使各责任中心的工作业绩的评价与考核建立在客观的基础上,从而有利于调动各责任中心的工作积极性,正确进行管理决策,顺利实现企业总体目标。 相似文献
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在实行责任会计的企业,由于企业内部各部门之间存在大量的内部产品和劳务的转让,因此制定内部转移价格则成为必然。但一组适应于评价责任单位经营业绩、激励其努力工作的转移价格,却经常导致责任单位做出与企业整体目标不一致的决策。本文拟就如何解决该问题谈一点粗浅的看法。一、走出认识上的误区一般的观点认为,由于内部转移价格是企业内部各责任单位之间相互结算所采用的价格,所以,不论其形式如何,价格高低,从整个企业角度看,“一方增加的成本,可能是另一方增加的收入”,“一增一减,数额相等,方向相反”,不会改变企业整体的收益总额,所… 相似文献
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在实行责任会计的企业.由于企业内部各部门之间存在大量的内部产品和劳务的转让.因此制定内部转移价格则成为必然。但一组适应于评价责任单位经营业绩,激励其努力工作的转移价格.却经常导致责任单位做出与企业整体目标不一致的决策。本文拟就如何解决该问题谈一点粗浅的看法。 相似文献
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Using a reference utility entry and exit criterion, we consider an equilibrium model of production where market price is random but endogenous with respect to industry output. General conditions are identified for industry output to increase under shifts in costs and in the distribution of demand. Comparative statics of firm level production and firm numbers are also studied. Results confirm the intuition that improvements in cost and demand conditions increase industry production. However, firm level responses are not as intuitive, and depend upon the relationship between the source of disturbance and the compensation through the altered distribution of output price. 相似文献
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Here we consider the hedging roles of a price futures contract versus a revenue futures contract. In the absence of idiosyncratic output risk, the revenue contract almost always dominates the price contract. Idiosyncratic output risk provides conditions under which the price contract should dominate. When production risk is largely idiosyncratic, a producer with an anticipated long actuals position might combine a long revenue futures position with a short price futures position. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 24:503–512, 2004 相似文献
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Johannes Becker 《The World Economy》2014,37(9):1237-1246
If conventional instruments of strategic trade policy are unavailable, the system of foreign profit taxation and transfer price guidelines may serve as surrogate policy instruments. In this paper, I consider a model where firms from two countries compete with each other on a market in a third country. Both firms have affiliates in the third country where (part of) the production takes place. I analyse optimal policy choices of the firms' residence countries aiming at strategically manipulating the competitiveness of their firms. I show that, first, countries prefer the tax exemption system over the tax credit system if there is no intra‐firm trade. Second, if the headquarters provide inputs for production in the affiliate, countries prefer the tax exemption system if the transfer price for these inputs is close to the headquarters' variable cost and if the residence country's tax rate is high. However, if transfer prices are high and the residence country's tax rate is low, I show that the tax credit system is an optimal tax policy choice for both countries. From a policy perspective, the view that the tax exemption system is generally the best policy response if domestic firms' competitiveness is a policy goal has to be qualified. 相似文献
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We consider a team-investment setting in which transfer prices between two divisions are negotiable. Investments are made independently and simultaneously after the bargaining stage, i.e. with a given transfer price ‘on the table’. Both divisions’ investments jointly affect the sales price of the final product and total revenue. We analyze two transfer-pricing schemes and their corresponding bargaining problems. Both bargaining settings exhibit non-transferable utility because the transfer price not only allocates corporate profit but also affects corporate profit through the incentives it creates for the divisions’ investment and quantity decisions. In particular, we discuss how concepts from bargaining theory can be use used to determine a ‘fair’ agreement concerning the transfer price. 相似文献
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Theodore Mariolis 《Metroeconomica》2011,62(4):605-611
This paper constructs a measure of price‐labour value deviation that leads to an algebraically simple expression and provides a transparent separation between the effects of income distribution and of the technical conditions of production. 相似文献
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This paper presents a unified perspective on the production responses of the competitive firm to three conventional distributional shifts: (i) a rightward shift of the distribution, (ii) a Rothschild–Stiglitz increase in risk, and (iii) a Menezes et al. increase in downside risk. In particular, assuming that the von Neumann–Morgenstern utility is increasing and concave, and assuming its higher‐order derivatives are uniformly signed, we demonstrate that the production responses are unambiguous in the case of price less than or equal to marginal cost. In the alternative case of price greater than marginal cost, we then demonstrate that the production responses can be signed unambiguously by reference to sufficient conditions motivated by absolute risk aversion and by absolute prudence. 相似文献
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This study investigates optimal production and hedging decisions for firms facing price risk that can be hedged with vulnerable contracts, i.e., exposed to nonhedgeable endogenous counterparty credit risk. When vulnerable forward contracts are the only hedging instruments available, the firm's optimal level of production is lower than without credit risk. Under plausible conditions on the stochastic dependence between the commodity price and the counterparty's assets, the firm does not sell its entire production on the vulnerable forward market. When options on forward contracts are also available, the optimal hedging strategy requires a long put position. This provides a new rationale for the hedging role of options in the over‐the‐counter markets exposed to counterparty credit risk. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 28: 248–263, 2008 相似文献