上市公司治理与管理者过度自信行为关系实证研究

从行为决策的视角出发,利用上市公司盈余预告构建了度量管理者过度自信的测度指标值,再在此基础上对我国上市公司管理者过度自信的程度与公司治理机制的关系进行了理论分析与实证研究。证实公司治理机制能够对管理者过度自信行为形成有效的治理。研究表明,股东治理机制、董事会治理机制、高管薪酬机制对抑制管理者过度自信积极有效,但监事会机制的作用不明显。     

董事会监督与负债期限结构关系的实证研究——来自上市公司的经验证据

本文以2007—2009年沪深两市上市公司三年公开数据作为研究样本,考察了公司董事会监督情况与公司的债务期限结构之间的关系。研究结果表明董事会监督在一定程度上能够抑制内部控制人的机会主义行为,减少大股东对中小股东的＂隧道行为＂,使公司增加对长期债务的使用,但是我国董事会治理机制存在的一些缺陷,导致其应有的监督效力缺失,一些监督机制并没有起到监督作用,反而起到了相反的效果。应改变以前硬性的制度性规定,完善独立董事制度,制定有效的董事薪酬激励制度。     

上市公司内外治理机制如何影响高管-员工薪酬差距?

本文从公司治理角度出发实证检验公司内外治理机制对高管-员工薪酬差距的影响,得到以下研究结论:(1)基于全样本的研究发现:公司内部独立董事比例和两职兼任与高管-员工薪酬差距正相关,第一大股东持股比例、 董事会规模、 监事会规模等与薪酬差距负相关;公司外部产品市场竞争与薪酬差距负相关,"限薪令"、"八项规定"等管制政策因素与薪酬差距正相关.(2)基于产权性质差异的研究发现:两职兼任与董事会规模扩大会进一步拉开民营企业的高管-员工薪酬差距,但对国有企业、 中央企业、 非中央企业的高管-员工薪酬差距并无明显作用.(3)基于高管-员工薪酬差距区间效应的研究发现:在全样本、 民营企业、 非中央企业三个样本中,公司内部部分治理机制会受薪酬差距区间效应的影响而发挥不同的治理作用,但产品市场竞争和管制政策因素始终分别发挥着缩小和扩大薪酬差距的作用.本文结论厘清了公司内外治理机制影响高管-员工薪酬差距的作用方向,能够为企业如何缓解内部薪酬矛盾提供一定的借鉴参考.     

中国银行业内部治理与银行绩效实证研究

本文基于中国16家上市商业银行2007~2013年面板数据,研究银行股权机构、董事会治理、监事会监督、高管薪酬与银行绩效之间的关系。通过个体固定效应模型的建立发现:股权集中度和高管薪酬与银行绩效呈现显著正相关关系,而董事会和监事会治理效果不显著。说明在提高银行绩效过程中需要加强董事会治理和监事会监督在银行治理中的作用。     

风险资本联合投资对被投资企业公司治理的影响研究——基于董事会结构和高管薪酬契约的视角

从董事会治理结构和高管薪酬业绩敏感性两方面探讨联合投资对被投资企业公司治理的影响。研究发现,与单独投资支持的公司相比,联合投资支持的公司董事会中专业董事比例更高,高管薪酬业绩敏感性更高;参与同一家企业投资的风投机构家数越多,被投资公司董事会中专业董事比例越高,高管薪酬业绩敏感性越高。这说明,相对于单独投资而言,风险资本联合投资能进一步改善被投资企业的董事会治理结构和高管薪酬契约,从而更能提升被投资企业的公司治理水平。为了纠正联合投资内生性引起的估计偏误,本文还采用了2SLS分析方法,分析结果与OLS结果一致。     

国有企业薪酬差距与风险承担水平北大核心CSSCI

薪酬制度改革是国有企业市场化改革的重要内容。虽经历多轮政策变迁,但国企高管-员工薪酬差距问题仍备受争议。基于管理层私有收益假说,以国有上市公司为样本,检验国企高管-员工薪酬差距对风险承担的影响,丰富薪酬差距经济后果的相关研究。研究发现,薪酬差距越大,国有企业风险承担水平越低。考虑企业特征差异,与功能类国企相比,竞争类国企薪酬差距与风险承担负相关性更显著;与地方国企相比,中央企业薪酬差距与风险承担水平表现出更显著的负相关关系;在处于成熟期的国企中,薪酬差距与风险承担显著负相关,但在处于成长期和衰退期的国有企业中,薪酬差距与风险承担水平相关性不显著。进一步,从内部治理机制看,当国有上市公司有非国有大股东时,有利于完善公司治理制度,薪酬差距与风险承担水平不再显著负相关;从外部治理机制看,分析师跟踪有利于加强外部监督,弱化薪酬差距与风险承担水平的负相关性。可见,现阶段国有企业治理仍然不够完善,不能有效抑制管理层获取私有收益的行为,薪酬差距成为代理问题的一种表现,不能激励管理层积极承担风险。当前国有企业薪酬制度改革应分层分类、因地制宜进行,并充分发挥内外部监督机制对薪酬差距的治理作用。     

营商环境与薪酬契约优化——基于共同富裕的视角

共同富裕背景下,营商环境建设能够破除企业生产经营壁垒,降低高管努力的不可观测性,实现薪酬契约优化。本文以2008—2020年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,检验营商环境对企业内部薪酬差距的治理效应。研究发现,营商环境改善能够优化企业薪酬契约,缩小内部薪酬差距。良好营商环境下制度性交易成本降低、信息透明度增加和代理问题缓解是薪酬差距趋于合理的作用机制;具体实现路径在于企业能够有效控制高管薪酬增速、降低高管薪酬粘性。进一步分析表明,上述治理效应在内部控制质量较低、高管薪酬操纵动机较强和民营企业中更为显著。此外,营商环境改善能够缓解薪酬差距扩大带来的负面影响,提高企业生产效率和企业价值。研究结论为我国营商环境建设发挥微观治理效应、助力共同富裕实现提供了政策参考。     

董事会特征与公司成长性关系的实证研究——基于创业板上市公司经验数据

以创业板上市公司2010-2013年为研究区间,以主营业务收入增长率为公司成长性指标,选择董事会规模、独立董事比例、董事长与总经理两职设置、董事学历水平、董事薪酬变量作为反映董事会特征的变量,建立多元线性回归模型,对创业板上市公司董事会特征与公司成长性惯性进行实证分析。研究表明:创业板上市公司董事会规模与公司成长性线性负相关,董事薪酬与公司成长性正相关,而独立董事比例、董事长与总经理两职合一、董事学历水平与成长性没有相关性。为进一步完善创业板上市公司董事会治理机制,提高董事会治理效率,我国应控制董事会规模,进一步完善薪酬体系和激励制度,持续完善独立董事制度,以期提高创业板上市公司的成长能力。     

高管薪酬粘性研究综述——存在性、治理机制与经济后果

高管薪酬粘性现象的存在会削弱高管薪酬激励的效果,使高管不能尽到忠实和勤勉义务,因此制定合理的高管薪酬激励政策是解决公司治理问题的重要措施之一。本文首先对上市公司高管薪酬粘性的相关文献进行梳理,从理论层面分析高管薪酬与企业业绩的变动关系,证实高管薪酬粘性的存在性;然后在公司治理机制这个大框架下,分别从公司内部和外部治理机制两个角度归纳对高管薪酬粘性的影响以及高管薪酬粘性产生的经济后果;最后总结现有研究的不足,并探索未来可能的研究方向。     

卖空的公司治理效应:来自高管薪酬业绩敏感性的证据

基于2006-2017年中国A股上市公司数据,考察了卖空对公司高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响.研究结果表明,卖空机制显著提高了公司的高管薪酬业绩敏感性,且这种作用在非国有企业和市场化程度较高地区的样本中更为明显;其次,在使用融券卖空量来衡量卖空势力,以及使用基于倾向得分匹配的安慰剂检验和双重差分法缓解了内生性之后,结论依然成立;进一步,通过考虑转融券试点的影响、更换高管薪酬业绩敏感性的衡量指标以及改变样本区间等进行一系列稳健性检验,发现以上的结论保持不变;最后,分析了卖空对高管薪酬业绩敏感性影响的潜在机制,发现卖空可以通过提高股价信息含量来提升高管薪酬业绩敏感性.研究结果表明,卖空能够有效监督和约束管理层的行为,这也证明了卖空是一种有效的外部公司治理机制.     

董事会权力结构比较研究——兼论对我国公司治理的借鉴意义

董事会是公司权力执行机关 ,具有股东与公司在权力上的承接关系。但由于信息不对称 ,可能导致董事滥用权力造成损害性后果 ,且股东及监事的监督作用又具有滞后性。因此 ,对发达国家公司法律制度与我国制度现状进行有效评析 ,借鉴与设计有效的董事会内部权力制衡构架 ,对完善我国公司治理结构具有现实意义。     

The Media Impact of Board Member Appointments in Spanish-Listed Companies: A Gender Perspective

Recent corporate governance literature on gender diversity within boards has linked the effect of an increase in gender diversity to the firm’s corporate reputation. This paper analyzes the media impact of appointing new directors of Spanish companies at a particularly significant moment, during the period from 2007 to 2010, just a year before and 3 years after the Gender Equality Act was passed. By analyzing female and male board nominations in Spanish IBEX-35 companies, the paper examines whether appointing a female does have greater visibility than appointing a male, and thus a potential signaling effect for corporate stakeholders and an effect on the firm’s reputation. Results indicate that the effect on press visibility of appointing a female versus a male is negligible, although there is significant media visibility for new executive directors, in particular for the case of the only woman nominated as an executive director during the period. The paper contributes to the existing literature on gender diversity in corporate governance, specifically its effect on corporate reputation. The paper also offers information relevant to policy making and in particular to the current debate over quotas for women on boards.     

董事会结构与公司治理绩效的实证分析

独立董事制度为公司的权益资本和管理雇佣契约提供了更为安全的治理措施。但分析表明,那种认为董事会独立性越强,公司治理效率越好的想法是不恰当的。信息获取能力的约束以及非执行董事和执行董事之间的博弈水平使得董事会结构与公司治理绩效之间存在显著倒U型关系。     

Boards of Directors’ Self Interest: Expanding for Pay in Corporate Acquisitions?

Director compensation can potentially represent an ethical minefield. When faced with supporting strategic decisions that can lead to an increase in director pay, directors may consider their own interests and not solely those of the shareholders to whom they are legally bound to represent. In such cases, directors essentially become agents, rather than those installed to protect principals (shareholders) from agents. Using acquisitions as a study context, we employ a matched-pair design and find a statistically significant difference in outside director compensation between acquiring and control firms. Outside directors of acquiring firms earn more than twice as much as their counterparts in the matched-sample. S. Trevis Certo is an associate professor and Mays Research Fellow in the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. He received his Ph.D. in Strategic Management from the Kelley School of Business at Indiana University. His research focuses on corporate governance (boards of directors, ownership structure, and CEO compensation), top management teams, initial public offerings (IPOs), and research methodology. Richard H. Lester is a clinical associate professor and Director of Academic Entrepreneurship Programs in the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. He received his Ph.D. degree in Strategic Management from the Mays Business School at Texas A&M University. His current research interests focus on corporate governance, upper echelons and entrepreneurship. Catherine M. Dalton holds the David H. Jacobs Chair of Strategic Management in the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. She also serves as Editor of Business Horizons, as Research Director of the Institute for Corporate Governance, and as a Fellow in the Randall L. Tobias Center for Leadership Excellence. She received her Ph.D. degree in Strategic Management from the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Professor Dalton's research is in corporate governance, with particular expertise in board composition, board leadership structure, executive and director compensation, and firms' ownership structures. Her research spans all types of organizations, including entrepreneurial firms, small businesses, large public corporations, and private organizations. Dan R. Dalton is the founding Director of the Institute for Corporate Governance, Dean Emeritus, and the Harold A. Poling Chair of Strategic Management in the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. He is a Fellow of the Management in the Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. He is a fellow of the Academy of Management and an inaugural member of its Journals Hall of Fame. Professor Dalton is widely published, with over 280 articles in corporate governance, business strategy, law, and ethics. Additionally, his work has been frequently featured in the business and financial press including, Business Week, Wall Street Journal, Fortune, Economist, Financial Times, Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and the Washington Post. Professor Dalton regularly addresses public, corporate, and industry groups on corporate governance issues.     

社会资本与超额在职消费：激浊扬清还是推波助澜

作为企业治理的重要问题之一，代理成本诱发超额在职消费引起各界广泛关注。文章以2007-2019年A股上市公司为初始样本，考察我国各省社会资本水平差异对超额在职消费影响。研究表明，社会资本显著提高超额在职消费，起到推波助澜的负面效用；进一步研究表明，公司治理水平维度上通过提高机构投资持股比例、短期债务融资比例及扩大独立董事比例和监事会规模均能抑制社会资本加剧超额在职消费的负面效用，公司治理环境维度上通过强化企业内部治理环境、加快市场化进程亦能削弱社会资本对超额在职消费的“推波助澜”。以上结论为社会资本利弊之争提供有益补充，亦凸显非正式制度与正式制度的治理替代效应，同时为企业完善内部治理水平及政府优化制度环境与规则治理以抑制社会资本负面效用提供一定借鉴。     

The Association Between Gender-Diverse Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation

In this paper we investigate whether independent directors’ attendance at board meetings enhances investor protection using a difference-in-difference approach. We find that independent directors’ attendance alleviates tunneling. This effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in state-owned enterprises. The reinforcement of external supervision substitutes for the role of independent directors’ attendance and this substitution effect is more significant in non-SOEs. Together, these results imply that independent directors’ attendance at board meetings can play an important role in protecting investors, especially in non-SOEs and when external supervision is weak. This paper sheds new light on independent directors’ function in corporate governance, and has implications for institutional improvements.     

Women and corporate boards of directors: The promise of increased, and substantive, participation in the post Sarbanes-Oxley era

Few aspects of corporate board diversity have generated the focused attention that the participation, position, and promise of women's service on the board has generated, especially in recent years. Of particular note is the extent to which women serve on large firm boards of directors (e.g., Fortune 500 firms). Increases in levels of participation have been described as glacial. While critics decry the level of participation of women on large-scale corporate boards, careful scrutiny suggests substantial progress. Concurrent with steady increases in the overall participation of women on corporate boards are increases in their presence on key board committees. Importantly, women's leadership of key board committees and their service as lead directors has improved in parallel with increases in their board memberships. These increases are particularly noteworthy in the post Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) period. Such trends suggest the continued progress of women in assuming prominent positions in the corporate governance landscape, and provide evidence that the increasingly challenging environment in the post-SOX era has not attenuated the gains noted in the pre-SOX period.     

Strategic and Regulatory Approaches to Increasing Women in Leadership: Multilevel Targets and Mandatory Quotas as Levers for Cultural Change

While substantial evidence is emerging internationally of positive increases in the participation of women on company boards, there is less evidence of any significant change in the proportion of women in senior executive ranks. This paper describes evidence of positive changes in the number of women on boards in Australia. Unfortunately these changes are not mirrored in the senior executive ranks where the proportion of women remains consistently low. We explore some of the reasons for these disproportionate changes and examine the likely effect of the recent amendments to the Australian stock exchange’s corporate governance code designed to improve gender diversity both on boards and throughout organisations. Based on the early corporate response to these regulatory changes, it is interesting to consider whether Australia’s approach in promoting voluntary self-regulation at the corporate level may be as effective in the long run as the emerging trend in Europe to apply legislated quotas for female corporate board representation. Interview evidence is presented suggesting that the primary reasons for the lack of women in leadership are not simply lack of opportunity at the apex of the corporation, but issues at mid-management level that are unlikely to be resolved by mandatory board quotas. In some circumstances carefully monitored voluntary targets may be more effective at promoting cultural and strategic change at the heart of the corporation. In summary, mandatory quotas (set through hard law usually with sanctions for noncompliance) may achieve early and significant results in terms of female board representation. However, voluntary targets for women’s participation on boards and in executive ranks (proposed in soft regulation such as corporate governance codes and set as part of corporate strategy) may promote more effective cultural and practical change in support of greater representation of women in leadership.     

独立董事选用与盈余管理监控有效性分析

作为我国公司治理机制的重要组成部分,独立董事制度的有效性对制约公司盈余管理行为至关重要,如果独立董事是自愿性选用的,董事会的独立性就会降低盈余管理;如果独立董事是强制性选用的,董事会的独立性程度较高与较低的盈余管理是不相关的。因此,董事会的独立性可以有效地监控盈余管理,但监控扭曲了独立董事的市场环境,这会导致治理机制失效。所以,我国监管机构通过不断完善公司治理机制,以应对国际金融市场不断反复的波动和冲击。     

Interim succession: Temporary leadership in the midst of the perfect storm

The corporate governance environment has changed. The rate of CEO successions is naturally trending up, succession planning is in dire need of repair, and boards are under increasing pressure to focus on oversight. This confluence of events creates a ‘perfect storm.’ Within this new environment, interim successions are on the rise. But is it all bad news? This article explores the decision of corporate directors to use temporary chief executive officers (CEOs) and the roles served by these interim leaders. We include a typology of interim CEOs and prescribe the contexts in which organizations can strategically pursue this type of succession. We conclude with a list of recommendations for how boards can most effectively manage interim leadership in the new corporate governance environment.