Calibration of a model of declining prices in cattle auctions

Using data from dairy cattle auctions plus independent appraisals of the cattle sold, this paper is able to verify the existence of the “declining price anomaly”: prices decline over the course of the auction, with the main decline occurring towards the end of the day. We show that the data are consistent with a simple model of sequential auctions of goods with independent values, and examine distributions which replicate the important features of the data. The crucial feature driving the price declines in the model is a limited capacity for purchases by the participants in the auction, which in turn decreases competition for the final units in the auction.     

Hedonic Price Models for Dynamic Markets*

The price of a product depends on its characteristics and will vary in dynamic markets. The model describes a processing firm that bids in an auction for a heterogeneous and perishable input. The reduced form of this model is estimated as an expanded random parameter model that combines a nonlinear hedonic bid function and inverse input demand functions for characteristics. The model was estimated by using 289,405 transactions from the Icelandic fish auctions. Total catch and gut ratio were the main determinants of marginal prices of characteristics, while the price of cod mainly depended on size, gutting and storage.     

Electronic reverse auction configuration and its impact on buyer price and supplier perceptions of opportunism: A laboratory experiment

Buying organizations are increasingly using electronic reverse auctions (eRAs) to source from suppliers. However, recent quasi-experimental and field research has suggested that the use of this sourcing technique can create perceptions of opportunism among participating suppliers. Yet from the buyer's perspective, online reverse auctions can yield lower purchase prices. Given the many ways in which to configure on-line auctions, we extend existing research by using a laboratory experiment to investigate how different reverse auction configurations jointly influence bid price and suppliers’ perceptions of buyer opportunism.Our findings suggest that supplier bid prices decrease over time as they participate in more eRAs, regardless of the configuration of auction parameters. However, the combination of rank (versus price) visibility, high (versus low) supplier need to win a contract, and six (versus three) competitors was significantly more effective than other combinations of variables in immediately reducing bid prices. The data also indicated that when suppliers’ bids dropped substantially across auctions, their perceptions of opportunism increased. Notably, auction parameter combinations such as price visibility, three competitors, and low need for the contract yielded comparably low bids by the third auction, without any increases in perceived buyer opportunism.     

A final price prediction model for english auctions: a neuro-fuzzy approach

Online auction has now been a popular mechanism in setting prices for internet users. However, auction price prediction, involving the modeling of uncertainty regarding the bidding process, is a challenging task primarily due to the variety of factors changing in auction settings. Even if all the factors were accounted for, there still exist uncertainties in human behavior when bidding in auctions. In this paper, three models, regression, neural networks and neuro-fuzzy, are constructed to predict the final prices of English auctions, using real-world online auction data collected from Yahoo-Kimo Auction. The empirical results show that the neuro fuzzy system can catch the complicated relationship among the variables accurately much better than the others, which is of great help for the buyers to avoid overpricing and for the sellers to facilitate the auction. Besides, the knowledge base obtained from neuro fuzzy provides the elaborative relationship among the variables, which can be further tested for theory building.     

The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment

This paper analyzes six spectrum auctions conducted by the Federal Communications Commission from July 1994 to May 1996. These auctions were simultaneous multiple-round auctions in which collections of licenses were auctioned simultaneously. This auction form proved remarkably successful. Similar items sold for similar prices, and bidders successfully formed efficient aggregations of licenses. Bidding behavior differed substantially in the auctions. The extent of bidder competition and price uncertainty played an important role in determining behavior. Bidding credits and installment payments also played a major role in several of the auctions.     

Detection of collusion in government procurement auctions

Research on bidder collusion in procurement auctions is reasonably successful in unveiling the mechanisms of collusion among the bidders. But it is relatively weak in forwarding effective practical methods of collusion detection before the winner is declared, because they presuppose the knowledge of collusion in specific auctions. Past studies, however, point out the need for working with bid price-to-reserve price ratios rather than bid prices or winning bid prices, to be free from the problem of heteroscedasticity. They also draw an important inference that the set of collusive data are significantly different from the set of competitive data. On the basis of these basic facts, the current paper outlines a seven-step approach to collusion detection. The approach makes rudimentary statistical analysis of bid price-to-reserve price ratios for all the bidders. The analysis comprises tests of equality of means, medians and variance and tests of skewness, autocorrelation and normality of the ratios. It divides the ratios into two significantly different clusters. The cluster with the higher mean and variance values of the ratios corresponds to collusive bidding with the other cluster corresponding to competitive bidding. The paper proposes the construction of a process control chart to detect occurrence of collusion in an auction immediately after the price bids are opened. The approach is illustrated by applying it to data from procurement auctions for construction projects in a State Department of the Republic of India.     

Anticipation of Auction Fever: Entry Decision,Reserve Price and the Choice of Auction Design

This paper analyzes the entry decision of rational bidders who expect to experience auction fever in English auctions. It shows that nonparticipation decision reduces seller's expected profit and this effect may outweigh the positive effect of the auction fever. We analyze the choice between English and second‐price sealed‐bid auctions and the optimal reserve price in English auctions. We show that it might be optimal for the seller to set a reserve price below her own valuation of the object. Finally, we show that the order in which bidders place their bids matters and the first bidder always has an advantage. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ranking reversals in asymmetric auctions

This paper compares the first-price auction and the second-price auction with several asymmetric bidders who are either weak or strong. The ranking of these auctions in terms of profit may flip as the exogenous reserve price or the number of weak or strong bidders change. Similarly, with endogenous reserve prices the ranking may depend on the seller’s own-use valuation. In other words, the ranking may be fragile to changes along these dimensions. Existing models rule out such ranking reversals by imposing substantial structure on type distributions. The current paper relies on simple mechanism design arguments that require less structure.     

Common value auctions with independent types

In this paper I consider a common value model, with independent types, where the ex-post value of the good is influenced by the bidders' information at the auction stage. The seller cannot fully extract the surplus. In a symmetric model the optimal mechanism can be implemented through first price, second price, or English auctions; but not through a Dutch auction. Other properties of the optimal auctions are that the seller's reservation price is endogenous, and that in sealed bid auctions the price may exceed the value of the object (winner's curse).     

The Buyer's Option in Multi-Unit Ascending Auctions: The Case of Wine Auctions at Drouot

This paper studies multi-unit ascending (English) auctions with a buyer's option. The buyer's option gives the winner of an auction the right to purchase any number of units at the winning price. We develop a theoretical model and derive the optimal strategies for the bidders. The model predicts various behavioral implications (e.g., the winner never exercises the option, the price declines…) that are tested using a unique data set on wine auctions held at the Paris-based auction house Drouot. We also analyze why the buyer's option is used. Estimating the model in a structural econometric way, and using counterfactual comparisons, we find that the buyer's option does not affect the seller's revenue (relative to a system where the units are auctioned sequentially without the option). Drouot, however, saves a lot of time with the option and this effect represents a considerable amount of money. The time-saving effect seems thus to be the primary purpose of the buyer's option.     

Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions

We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices. Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they were often successful in realizing these synergies.     

On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers n−k gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner.     

Auctions with endogenous participation

We study endogenous-participation auctions where bidders only know the number of potential participants. After seeing their values for the object, potential participants decide whether or not to enter the auction. They may not want to enter the auction since they have to pay participation costs. We characterize equilibrium bidding strategies and entry decisions for both first- and second-price sealed-bid auctions when participation is endogenous. We show that there is a pure strategy entry equilibrium where only bidders with values greater than a certain cut-off point actually bid. In this context, both types of auctions generate the same expected revenue. We also show that, contrary to the predictions of the fixed number of bidders literature, the seller's expected revenue may decrease when the number of potential participants increases. In addition, we show that it is optimal for the seller to charge an entry fee, which contrasts with results from the existing literature on auctions with entry. As in the fixed-n literature, we show that first-price auctions generate more expected revenue than second-price auctions when buyers are risk-averse. Finally, we characterize the optimal auction – the auction that maximizes the seller's expected revenue – by using a direct revelation mechanism. The optimal auction involves a reserve price larger than the optimal reserve price in the fixed-n literature. The winner's payment is the second highest bid less the participation cost and losers receive a subsidy equal to the participation cost. Received: 17 August 1998 / 21 September 1999     

Valuation of ticket prices for first-division football matches in the Spanish league

This paper measures the optimal prices of football tickets and investigates the pricing strategy of the first-division teams in the Spanish league during the 2018/2019 season. The paper develops a dual hybrid model of supply and demand based on a hedonic price approach. Fans have multiple motivations to attend the stadium, such as the quality of the opposing teams, the pre-match qualifying position, the schedule, the day of the match, the stadium facilities, and the atmosphere. Their final decision will be conditioned by the price set by the clubs. The data show a difference of almost 300% in ticket prices among clubs. The estimation results from a hedonic price equation reveal that an optimal pricing strategy is followed by only five out of 20 clubs in the league. We also quantify the percentage of overvaluation or undervaluation of ticket prices.     

The impact of reserve prices on the perceived bias of expert appraisals of fine art

We examine whether expert appraisals provided to bidders before major art auctions are unbiased indicators of value. Despite a strong grounding in theory, this aspect of optimal auction design has been frequently challenged in previous empirical research, particularly in the market for fine art. We adopt a valuation benchmark that incorporates sellers' reserve prices as well as high bids, and recognize censoring of works that fail to make reserve. Although the auction houses never divulge reserve prices, we exploit the fact that they can be observed indirectly via their impact on buy‐in rates. Using the set of French Impressionist paintings brought to auction from 1985 to 2001, we estimate the distribution of reserve prices, establish their link to a proper valuation benchmark, and isolate the selection bias due to bought‐in works on the perceived market value of fine art works. After controlling for the impact of reserve prices, and considering all works brought to auction, we find no evidence of bias in the experts' pre‐sale estimates. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Empirical implementation of nonparametric first-price auction models

Nonparametric estimators provide a flexible means of uncovering salient features of auction data. Although these estimators are popular in the literature, many key features necessary for proper implementation have yet to be uncovered. Here we provide several suggestions for nonparametric estimation of first-price auction models. Specifically, we show how to impose monotonicity of the equilibrium bidding strategy; a key property of structural auction models not guaranteed in standard nonparametric estimation. We further develop methods for automatic bandwidth selection. Finally, we discuss how to impose monotonicity in auctions with differing numbers of bidders, reserve prices, and auction-specific characteristics. Finite sample performance is examined using simulated data as well as experimental auction data.     

Synergies and price trends in sequential auctions

In this paper we consider sequential second-price auctions where an individual's value for a bundle of objects is either greater than the sum of the values for the objects separately (positive synergy) or less than the sum (negative synergy). We show that the existence of positive synergies implies declining expected prices. When synergies are negative, expected prices are increasing. There are several corollaries. First, the seller is indifferent between selling the objects simultaneously as a bundle or sequentially when synergies are positive. Second, when synergies are negative, the expected revenue generated by the simultaneous auction can be larger or smaller than the expected revenue generated by the sequential auction. In addition, in the presence of positive synergies, an option to buy the additional object at the price of the first object is never exercised in the symmetric equilibrium and the seller's revenue is unchanged. Under negative synergies, in contrast, if there is an equilibrium where the option is never exercised, then equilibrium prices may either increase or decrease and, therefore, the net effect on the seller's revenue of the introduction of an option is ambiguous. Finally, we examine a special case with asymmetric players who have distinct synergies. In this example, even if one player has positive synergies and the other has negative synergies, it is still possible for expected prices to decline.Received: 12 December 2000, Accepted: 1 May 2002, JEL Classification: D44Flavio Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (Grant A000000055) and CNPq. Monteiro acknowledges the financial support from CNPq and the hospitality of CERSEM where part of this paper has been written. We thank Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Peter Sørensen and two anonymous referees for useful comments.     

Econometrics of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices

This paper considers the structural analysis of first-price auctions with entry and binding reservation prices. The presence of entry decisions and binding reservation prices complicates the structural analysis. Building on the recent theoretical work on entry in auctions, this paper assumes that each potential bidder first decides whether or not to incur an entry cost and become an active bidder using a symmetric mixed strategy. Then each active bidder bids optimally following the increasing Nash–Bayesian equilibrium strategy. Using the observed bids and the number of actual bidders, we propose an MSM estimator to estimate the parameters in the distribution of private values and the distribution of the number of active bidders. Our approach can be used to validate the theoretical auction model, to test whether the reservation prices are binding, and to test the mixed-strategy of entry.     

Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and Evidence from eBay

Employing a procedure suggested by a simple theoretical model of auctions in which bidders and sellers have observable and heterogenous reputations for default, we examine the effect of reputation on price in a data set drawn from the online auction site eBay. Our main empirical result is that seller's, but not bidder's, reputation has an economically and statistically significant effect on price.     

Residential choice,hedonic prices,and the demand for urban air quality

This paper uses a two-step estimation procedure suggested by Sherwin Rosen to estimate structural demand and supply equations for urban air quality. In the first step, a hedonic price equation is estimated for residential property values for the Washington, D. C., SMSA for 1970. In the second step, a set of marginal hedonic prices is generated. These prices and the quantity of clean air (reciprocal of air pollution) are used as endogenous variables in a simultaneous equation model. Empirical results indicate a price elasticity of demand between ?1.2 and ?1.4 and a unitary income elasticity.