Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note

Although it is theoretically expected that decentralization leads to efficient provision of local public services and stimulates economic development, there is a mixed picture of the decentralization effect on economic growth across earlier empirical studies. Using the instrument variables (IV) technique with the latest cross-country data for the period from 1997 to 2001, this paper found that fiscal decentralization has a significant positive impact on per capita GDP growth. Therefore, when the focus is placed on the latest information on the economic situation in the latter 1990s, decentralization, particularly on the fiscal expenditure side, is instrumental in economic growth.     

Fiscal decentralization and multinational firms’ ownership: evidence from China

China’s fiscal decentralization increases the incentive for local governments to maintain economic prosperity and improve institutional environments for multinational firms. This study investigates the impact of fiscal decentralization on the ownership shares of multinational firms in China. Multinational firms located in regions with higher degrees of fiscal decentralization are found to own larger shares of their foreign subsidiaries. This result is consistent under various robustness checks, including instrumental variables estimations. The finding suggests that multinational firms respond to local fiscal decentralization by increasing their participation in investment. This study therefore provides additional evidence for the beneficial effect of fiscal decentralization on China’s economic growth by highlighting the risk-mitigating role of fiscal decentralization.     

外商直接投资、区域经济发展:财政分权下的研究

文章从财政分权、外商直接投资和经济发展的角度分析了中国东中西部三个区域经济发展问题,发现中国区域经济增长的不平衡性也体现在财政分权的政府效率和经济发展阶段的不平衡。认为东部经济正在结构调整,分权需要深化;中部经济需要调整,分权需要继续推进;西部则需要改变政府效率,提高财政支出水平,改善投资环境。     

金融科技能影响金融分权吗? ——来自金融科技信贷的证据

金融科技正在变革全球金融体系、鼎新世界金融格局。那么，金融科技在改变中国金融业格局的同时，是否会影响中国中央和地方之间的金融分权呢？本文在理论分析的基础上，使用2010—2018年中国31个省级区域的面板数据进行实证检验，结果表明金融科技降低了地方政府的金融分权水平。进一步讨论发现：金融科技对金融分权的抑制效应受到财政分权和城镇化率影响，财政分权越大的地区，金融科技对金融分权的抑制效应越明显；城镇化率越高的地区，金融科技对金融分权的抑制效应越小；在中国区域经济发展不平衡的现实背景下，金融科技对金融分权的抑制作用在金融发展欠发达地区比在较发达地区更强。     

Fiscal decentralization and China’s provincial economic growth: a panel data analysis for China’s tax sharing system

Quality & Quantity - Theoretical studies suggest that there is a close association between fiscal decentralization and economic growth. However, whether this linkage holds in China or not is a...     

Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: evidence from OECD countries

This paper studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on public sector efficiency (PSE). We first use a theoretical framework that illustrates the two opposing forces that shape a non-monotonic effect of fiscal decentralization on PSE. Subsequently, we carry out an empirical analysis for 21 OECD countries, between 1970 and 2000. A country-level dataset is used to measure PSE in delivering education and health services and the new indices are regressed on well-established decentralization measures. Irrespective of whether PSE concerns education or health services, an inverted U-shaped relationship has been identified between government efficiency in providing these services and fiscal decentralization. This relationship is robust across several different specifications and estimation methods.     

Central government subsidies to local public goods

We examine the welfare effects of a central government's subsidy for a local public good in a Nash equilibrium model with two types of public goods. We first show that the welfare effect depends on the substitution and evaluation effects. We also investigate the optimal subsidy rate in a second-best framework and explore how the optimal subsidy scheme depends on the relative evaluation of the two types of public goods. Received: August 20, 1998/accepted: February 12, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to John Quigley, Minoru Kunisaki, Tom Panella, Andy Haughwout, Steven Craig, William Hoyt, Michael Ash, Konrad Stahl, Amihai Glazer, David Wildasin and two referees for helpful comments and suggestions, An early version of this paper was presented at a seminar at University of California, Berkeley and at conferences at JAEE Annual Meeting in Japan, North American Meetings of The RSAI in Washington, WSAI conference in Hawaii, Public Choice Meeting in San Francisco.     

财政支出结构对经济增长的外溢性研究——基于中国省际面板数据的实证检验

研究中国财政支出结构对经济增长的外溢效应,对于促进中国经济的长期平稳较快发展具有重要的理论和现实意义.本文基于一个三部门模型,从财政支出结构与经济区域相结合的角度,运用中国1997～ 2010年的省际面板数据进行实证研究.研究结果表明:(1)中国财政支出整体具有显著的外溢效应,其中购买性支出对经济增长具有正外溢效应,而转移性支出对经济增长具有负外溢效应;(2)区域发展水平对财政支出结构外溢效应的影响有所不同;(3)整体上看,购买性支出部门不具备要素生产率方面的优势,而转移性支出部门的生产效率优势较为明显.     

DESIGNING ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A DECENTRALIZED FISCAL SYSTEM

Abstract When external effects are important, markets will be inefficient, and economists have considered several broad classes of economic instruments to correct these inefficiencies. However, the standard economic analysis has tended to take the region, and the government, as a given; that is, this work has neglected important distinctions and interactions between the geographic scope of different pollutants, the enforcement authority of various levels of government, and the fiscal responsibilities of the various levels of government. It typically ignores the possibility that the externality may be created and addressed by local governments, and it does not consider the implications of decentralization for the design of economic instruments targeted at environmental problems. This paper examines the implications of decentralization for the design of corrective policies; that is, how does one design economic instruments in a decentralized fiscal system in which externalities exist at the local level and in which subnational governments have the power to provide local public services and to choose tax instruments that can both finance these expenditures and correct the market failures of externalities?     

中国式财政分权下的公共服务供给探析

中国式财政分权体现了突出的政府间收支矛盾。中国的公共服务供给主要依靠地方尤其是县级政府来完成,而它们却只有较小的财力授权。其结果是,公共服务的融资依赖于转移支付和预算外资金。同时,中国财政分权体制背景中公民参与机制的不完善,使得公共服务的满足需求和有效供给的效率较低。     

我国土地出让收入增长的影响因素与地区差异——基于空间动态面板模型的实证研究

利用1999～2008年的省级面板数据和空间动态面板广义矩(GMM)估计方法,本文考察了我国各地区土地出让收入增长的影响因素和地区差异。研究发现,各地方政府的土地出让收入间存在横向竞争,土地出让收入在全国范围内呈现一定的收敛性。财政分权程度、经济发展水平和市场化水平是影响各地土地出让收入增长的主要因素,并且其影响程度和方向呈现明显的地区差异。具体而言,东部地区的横向竞争程度高于全国平均水平和中西部地区。财政分权和经济发展水平对东部地区土地出让收入增长的影响不显著,市场化水平的影响显著为正。而财政分权对中西部地区土地出让收入增长的影响显著为负,经济发展水平的影响显著为正,市场化水平的影响不显著。     

事业单位会计报表存在的问题及改进建议

近年来财政部进行了五项财政改革,旧的《事业单位会计制度》已经不适应事业单位的发展,《事业单位财务规则》(征求意见稿)的出台,对于事业单位来说是一件划时代的事情。虽然新的征求意见稿与旧的《事业单位财务规则》相比有完善之处,但会计报表方面仍存在一些问题。文章通过对会计报表中的资产负债表、收入支出表、是否编制现金流量表及附注存在的一些问题进行分析,并提出一些改进建议。     

城市区域增长的网络化治理

肇始于20世纪末的信息技术发展及全球经贸联系的日益紧密,生产的分散化与管理的集中化导致国家间的竞争逐步演变为骨干城市及其所依托的城镇群体之间的竞争。立足于当代中国城市发展实践,衔接国际城市与区域研究的理论前沿,着眼于当前我国城市区域体制转型和制度变迁过程中凸显的深层次的体制障碍和运作瓶颈,采用城市政治经济学的研究方法,从背景、方法、视角、内容等多个层面,系统归纳和评述了中外城市区域增长的网络化治理机制,并从城市区域治理的增长网络、增长政体、增长制度和增长管理等角度提出了相关拓展研究的展望。     

中国金融十字路口

历史站在一个新的交叉点。对世界和中国皆如此。距离雷曼兄弟9月15日宣布破产整整两个月,11月15日,20国集团金融峰会在美国首都华盛顿国家建筑博物馆召开。与64年前的布雷顿森林会议格局所不同的是,当年主张自由、开放、全球化的美国挑落保守的英帝国的两强较量,演变为中美欧三极就国际金融新秩序主导权展开的博弈与合作。     

How economic integration affects the vertical structure of the public sector

This paper investigates the impact of economic integration on the vertical structure of the public sector within a country. To tackle this issue we set up a model of fiscal federalism, where economic integration is assumed to affect central government tax revenues. The main findings are that when an increase of the impact of economic integration brings about a reduction in central government tax revenues, under certain conditions: (a) it reduces central government expenditure; (b) it reduces general government expenditure; (c) it increases local taxation; (d) it increases the degree of public sector decentralization. Quite interestingly, these results are consistent with different patterns of local public spending and grants to local government.     

日本地方政府债券风险控制制度及其启示

日本地方政府债券几乎没有违约事件,其风险基本为零。这得益于其有效的风险控制制度。日本地方政府债券风险控制制度包括中央政府的"隐含担保"制度、审查和控制制度以及财务控制制度,具有以下几个特性:典型的行政控制、弱化的市场机制,以及零违约风险下的低经济福利。这给予中国有三大启示。正式制度是控制地方政府债券风险的关键;建立多层次风险管理制度;风险管理制度要顺应财政体制,即地方政府债券风险管理制度应"以民为本"、彻底的财政分权并非地方政府债券风险管理制度的必然基础。     

Population decentralization within metropolitan areas: 1970-1980

Using a data set that maintains geographic and fiscal continuity over time and across a sample of major U.S. metropolitan areas, the authors identify factors of economic and population decentralization that affected central city areas between 1970 and 1980. The problems of annexation are resolved by estimating population changes for central cities and suburban areas with constant 1980 boundaries, and by calculating fiscal variables from overlapping jurisdictions by city area as opposed to municipal city government only. "The empirical investigation supports the view that demographic and housing stock variables seem to have had a greater impact on decentralization than central city-suburban fiscal differences."     

经济转轨、财政分权与预算软约束

我国正处于经济转轨时期，预算软约束问题普遍存在。财政分权在通过地区竞争逐步缓解国有企业预算软约束问题的同时，却使政府预算软约束愈演愈烈。解决的办法在于规范财政分权。     

THE ECONOMICS OF FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

Abstract There is no complete overview or discussion of the literature of the economics of federalism and fiscal decentralization, even though scholarly interest in the topic has been increasing significantly over recent years. This paper provides a general, brief but comprehensive overview of the main insights from the literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization. In doing so, literature on fiscal federalism and decentralization is grouped into two main approaches: ‘first generation approach’ and ‘an emerging second generation approach’. The discussion generally covers the two notions of fiscal decentralization: ‘fiscal autonomy’ and ‘fiscal importance’ of subnational governments as the background of the most recently developed index of fiscal decentralization in Vo. The relevance of this discussion to any further development of a fiscal decentralization index is briefly noted.     

Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives

First generation fiscal federalism (FGFF) studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption of benevolent social planners. Second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) studies performance based on the fiscal and political incentives facing subnational officials. The paper focuses on three aspects of SGFF. First, it considers the design of intergovernmental transfers. While FGFF emphasizes correcting vertical and horizontal equity, SGFF emphasizes the importance of fiscal incentives for producing local economic prosperity. SGFF extends FGFF approaches by showing how non-linear transfer systems can produce both equalization and high marginal fiscal incentives to produce local economic growth. Second, the paper raises the fiscal incentive approach, showing how different tax systems produce different fiscal incentives for political officials to choose policies. Third, the paper discusses the interaction of democracy and fiscal federalism.