我国城市社区公共物品供给:研究回顾与拓展问题识别

城市社区公共物品供给已成为城市社区基层治理和社区建设发展的关键问题。从城市社区公共物品的概念界定、现状和问题、制约因素、供给模式及发展路径对国内文献进行了梳理总结,评析了已有研究问题与不足,并就城市社区公共物品的供给提出了相关问题拓展,为公共物品新领域探索和建立研究的理论框架及突出关键问题提供了理论、实践思考及依据。     

城市准公共物品市场化运作的困境分析——以城市污水治理为例

我国许多城市已进行了准公共物品市场化运作的改革,以城市污水治理为例,指出我国城市准公共物品市场化运作中存在的问题,从城市准公共物品市场化运作的前提条件、城市准公共物品的定价和市场化运作的环境方面探讨了"市场失灵"的原因,并得出相应的结论和对策。     

公共物品市场化研究——以绍兴市基础设施市场化建设为例

本文从公共物品的性质、分类等基本理论出发,对政府垄断公共物品供给存在的问题、公共物品市场化供给可能性、内在依据及条件等进行了理论分析,并通过构建公共物品供给的委托代理模型,分析政府在市场化过程中政府的职责和作用,提出充分利用市场机制改革政府提供公共物品的方式,是解决公共物品有效供给的必由之路,并围绕基础设施阐述适合我国基础设施市场化的几种项目融资方式。同时,本文以绍兴市的基础设施市场化建设为例,分析了绍兴市城市基础设施的主要做法,并从绍兴市的市场化实践中得出有益的启示,从政策上和措施上对如何利用市场机制、完善我国公共物品供给进行了探讨。     

香港政府的公共物品供给模式及其对内地城市政府的启示

文章详细阐述和分析了香港政府的公共物品供给模式。以此为鉴,指出内地城市政府在公共物品供给上,主要职责应是“掌舵”而不是“划浆”,公共物品生产的主体应多元化,应将市场机制引入公共物品供给领域     

试论城市经营的本质

文章论述了城市公共物品所有权、经营权和管理权的相互关系 ,指出城市经营就是对城市公共物品产权的再认识 ,认为公共物品所有权应实现多元化 ,所有权、经营权与管理权可以分离 ;并就城市经营过程中政府职能转变的原因和目标定位进行探讨 ,认为政府应由全能型向专职型过渡 ,指出在市场经济条件下城市政府应履行好经济制导管理、城市公共物品经营配套、城市整体形象策划三大职责     

基于税收契约的几种税收筹划创新

一、基于法定税收契约的政策性税收筹划 法定税收契约即税法,是政府与纳税人间的一种公共契约关系,约定纳税人通过向国家提供规定的税收,获得享受公共产权的资格,如国家安全、基础设施等。其中宽泛意义的法定税收契约是税收程序法,如税收征管法等;具体意义的契约是单项税法,如增值税法、个人所得税法等。     

制度变迁与社区公共物品生产——从"单位制"到"社区制"

由于任何公共物品都具有供应的相联性和排他的不可能性两个特征,导致集团成员在公共物品的消费和供给上存在搭便车的动机,公共物品的供给是一个典型的集体行动困境问题.作为整个社会制度变迁的一部分,城市社会管理体制经历了从"单位制、街居制到社区制"的变革,不同历史时段的社区公共物品供给机制具有不同的特征.单位体制所形成的"政府-单位"公共物品供给体系,已经不能满足转型时期社区日益增长的多元需求.在单位制解体和单位功能弱化的背景下,城市基层社区将替代传统单位,成为城市社会整合的又一种制度性选择,构成公共物品供给与消费的基本单元.     

基于税收契约的几种税收筹划创新

一、基于法定税收契约的政策性税收筹划法定税收契约即税法,是政府与纳税人间的一种公共契约关系,约定纳税人通过向国家提供规定的税收,获得享受公共产权的资格,如国家安全、基础设施等。其中宽泛意义的法定税收契约是税收程序法,如税收征管法等;具体意义的契约是单项税法,如增值税法、个人所得税法等。     

税收信息的非对称性分析

税收是国家为满足公共需要,凭借行政权力,按照预先设定的标准,向居民和经济组织强制、无偿地征收取得的一种财政收入。一般而言,一国经济市场化程度愈高,税收在其国民经济中所起的作用愈大。随着我国市场经济体系的逐步建立和完善,我国的市场经济法制建设也取得了巨大的成就,作为现代市场经济法制体系重要组成部分的税收法制建设也有了长足的发展。这对于有效地发挥税收在我国国民经济发展中的作用,提供了法律上的保障。但是,由于我国税收立法和适法上的原因,导致在各税收主体(文中指征税主体和纳税主体)之间存在税收信息的不对称性,这既增…     

显性税收、隐性税收与税收资本化

税收作为调整经济行为的重要工具已受到理论界和实务界的广泛关注,税收优惠政策关系到不同行业和企业承担不同的税负.本文主要从纳税人的角度分析显性税收和隐性税收的基本含义和计量模式,借鉴西方国家的研究成果探讨隐性税收和税收资本化的根源,并分析税收是否会导致税收资本化问题,试图为我国的税制改革和投资者的纳税筹划提供理论支持.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and (Besley and Coate, 1997). As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

A supply-demand model of public sector size

We develop a supply-demand model for the public sector with a political equilibrium. The model considers the inefficiencies caused by taxes and includes costs associated with the provision of public goods to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector may depend on the median voter's income, population size, costs associated with paying tax, and quality of institutions, all of which reflect the costs of provisioning public goods. The estimates for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries are compatible with theoretical predictions; however, they do not confirm Wagner's law, which holds that the public sector share does not grow with an increase in income. A greater dependency ratio and the Gini coefficient increase demand for redistribution policies. Greater government effectiveness is a supply-side factor that increases the public sector's share in an economy.     

Optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility

A single region's optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility. In this model, property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures. Different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods (e.g., residential property). The key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified, and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods. The role of labor mobility is also investigated.     

Mobile Labor, Multiple Tax Instruments, and Tax Competition

The tax competition literature shows that local governments keep property tax rates inefficiently low to prevent capital outflows, thereby underproviding local public goods. This paper adds mobile labor and an alternative tax instrument to the model. Jurisdictions have access to a property tax levied on land and capital, plus either a head tax or a labor tax. Scale economies in public good provision create incentives to use the property tax, but these incentives are not accompanied by increased incentives to underprovide public goods. In contrast, underprovision is associated with the use of a distortionary labor tax.     

对地方政府"土地财政"的理性分析及兴利除弊之策

本文从宏微观方面对城市土地的本质和土地财政进行了分析,提出了土地的稀缺性和公共属性,决定了土地的增值收益应归全民所有,抑制房地产价格过快上涨,应将土地出让方式从以价高者得转变为综合评价,同时恢复征收房产税。     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

Welfare targeting in networks

This paper investigates welfare targeting for public goods in networks. First, we show that a tax/subsidy scheme (not necessarily budget-balanced) affects each consumer only insofar as it affects his neighbourhood. Second, we show that either a Pareto-improving income redistribution can be found or there exist Negishi weights, which we relate to the network structure. Third, in the case of Cobb–Douglas preferences, we show that a Law of Welfare Targeting holds and links two well-known notions of the comparative statics of policy interventions: neutrality and welfare paradoxical effects. Collectively, our findings uncover the importance of the $-1$ eigenvalue to economic and social policy: it is an indication of how consumers absorb the impact of income redistribution.     

Interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition: The optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy

This paper explores the implications of the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition for the optimal provision of public goods under representative democracy à la Osborne and Slivinski, 1996, Besley and Coate, 1997. As an extension of Hoyt’s (1991) finding that intensified tax competition is always harmful and aggravates the extent to which public goods are undersupplied in a region, we show that intensified tax competition can be beneficial if political as well as tax competition is considered. In particular, we identify plausible conditions under which (i) there is an optimal intensity of tax competition such that the interaction between interregional tax competition and intraregional political competition will result in the optimal provision of public goods and (ii) intensified tax competition will be beneficial if and only if the degree of tax competition is less than this optimal intensity.     

Urbanisation,fiscal decentralisation and economic development: A time series evidence

Several empirical tests using Multiple Regression Analyses were conducted on several hypotheses using time series data obtained from the federal and state governments. The results of our analyses establish that the degree of fiscal decentralisation is dependent on intergovernmental transfers and states income per capita. However intergovernmental transfers were not dependent on expenditure decentralisationper se. The degree of urbanisation was found to be inversely related to fiscal decentralisation. The variable measuring the degree of openess was found not statistically significant as an explanatory variable for fiscal decentralisation. However, the share of agriculture was found significant in revenue decentralisation but loses its importance in expenditure decentralisation.The policy implications of the study are that: (i) There is need for the states to develop plans to increase their per capita income, improve their tax collection system, introduce new tax bases and reduce the high degree of free ridership in public goods and services exhibited by the urban population. (ii) The Federal Government should provide specific grants to state governments for urban development, because of the high per capita cost of public goods and services. (iii) The existing Revenue Allocation Act should be reviewed to reflect state government efforts in generating their own revenue from internal sources.     

城市基础设施投融资活动分类管理的探讨

随着社会资本进入基础设施建设领域,政府的投融资体制产生转变,导致公共产品属性发生了变化,使得公共产品商品化。本文通过分析城市基础设施的公共产品属性及其投融资体制,分析得出城市基础设施应该回归公共产品本来的属性,相应的城市基础设施投融资体制应该进行改革,应以政府财政资金为主导,对应的社会资本应当纳入财政预算,接受财政监督,同时,在复式预算的基础上根据城市基础设施建设的不同性质,对城市基础设施的投融资进行分类管理。