A supply-demand model of public sector size

We develop a supply-demand model for the public sector with a political equilibrium. The model considers the inefficiencies caused by taxes and includes costs associated with the provision of public goods to consumers. We show that the size of the public sector may depend on the median voter's income, population size, costs associated with paying tax, and quality of institutions, all of which reflect the costs of provisioning public goods. The estimates for the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member countries are compatible with theoretical predictions; however, they do not confirm Wagner's law, which holds that the public sector share does not grow with an increase in income. A greater dependency ratio and the Gini coefficient increase demand for redistribution policies. Greater government effectiveness is a supply-side factor that increases the public sector's share in an economy.     

An impossibility result for virtual implementation with status quo

In this paper, virtual implementation is restricted to deliver, on the equilibrium path, either a socially optimal outcome or a status quo: an outcome fixed for all preference profiles. Under such a restriction, for any unanimous and implementable social choice function there is a dictator, who obtains her most preferable outcome as long as all agents prefer this outcome to the status quo. Further restrictions on the lottery space and the range of social choice functions allow the dictator to impose her most preferred outcome even when other agents prefer the status quo to this outcome.     

For the Student: Matching and Economic Design

This article presents a brief survey of two‐sided matching. We introduce the reader to the problem of two‐sided matching in the context of the college admission model and explain two central requirements for a matching mechanism: stability and non‐manipulability. We show how the frequently used ‘Boston Mechanism’ fails these key requirements and describe how an alternative, the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, leads to stable matchings but fails to be non‐manipulable in general. A third mechanism, the Top Trading Cycle, is efficient and non‐manipulable when only one side of the match acts strategically. We also discuss some applications of matching theory.     

Alternative evolutionary theories: A historical survey

Our overview has the objective of making our study relevant to bioeconomists. The need for the ‘alternatives’ to the Synthetic Theory of Evolution in social-economic studies was substantiated, for example, by Colombatto (Journal of Bioeconomics, 5, 1–25, 2003), who maintains that the natural-selection theory is ‘ill suited’ to describing evolutionary processes in economics. He proposed an alternative ‘non-Darwinian’ approach by equating the ‘non-Darwinian’ approach with a definite version of neo-Lamarckism. Yet, as we will show, there is a palette of alternative approaches within and beyond the neo-Lamarckism. We hope to give bioeconomists more choice in their theoretical modeling and constructing of analogies between biology and economics. It will also be shown that in the light of suggested definitions the concept of ‘universal Darwinism’ recently discussed in bioeconomics makes little sense as a generalizing category. In addition, in the concluding part of the paper we demonstrate that the majority of alternative approaches are far from being pigeonholed as archaic and once and for all wiped off the theoretical landscape. On the contrary, in recent years one can observe some revival of interest in the theoretical ‘heresies’.      

Can Darwinism be ��Generalized�� and of what use would this be?

It has been suggested that, by generalizing Darwinian principles, a common foundation can be derived for all scientific disciplines dealing with evolutionary processes, especially for evolutionary economics. We show, however, that in the development of evolutionary biology, the abstract principles of so-called “Generalized Darwinism” have not been crucial for distinguishing Darwinian from non-Darwinian approaches and, hence, cannot be considered genuinely Darwinian. Moreover, we wonder what can be gained by invoking the abstract principles of Generalized Darwinism given that they do not suffice to substantiate an explanation of actual evolutionary processes. To that end, specific hypotheses are required. They neither follow from the suggested abstract principles, nor are they more easily found on that basis. Accordingly, we find little evidence in the literature for the claim that generalized Darwinian principles enhance the explanatory power of an evolutionary approach to economics.