What Women Managers Want: Customising Human Resource Management Practices

Amanda Sinclair and Jill Ewing report on a detailed study of women managers in a large retailing organisation to discuss why women are a poorly utilised and misunderstood reserve of managerial talent. They identify three main groups- ‘family first job occupants’, ‘mature career traditionalists’ and ‘career-family committeds’- and show how each has different aspirations and correspondingly different attitudes to organisational incentives. the message to policy-makers is that they need to ‘customise’ their practices in order to relaise benefits both for their women managers and their organisations. Amanda Sinclair is Associate Professor in Organisational Studies at the Graduate School of Management of the University of Melbourne. Jill Ewing is a postgraduate student in the same university and a Senior Research Assistant at the Key Centre for Women's Health in Society.     

How should charitable organisations motivate young professionals to give philanthropically?

One hundred and fifty‐eight bankers, accountants and corporate lawyers, aged under 40 years, earning more than £50,000 annually and working in the City of London were questioned about their attitudes and behaviour in relation to charitable giving. A conjoint analysis of the respondents' preferences revealed strong predilections for certain types of charitable organisation; for ‘social’ rewards in return for donating (invitations to gala events and black tie dinners for example); and for well‐known charities with established reputations. ‘Planned giving’ whereby donors receive tax breaks and other financial incentives to donate (as increasingly practised in the USA) did not represent a significant inducement to give so far as this particular sample was concerned. Overall the results suggest that young affluent male City employees constitute a distinct market segment for charity fundraisers, with unique characteristics that need to be addressed when developing donor products. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Policy modes,firms and the natural environment

This paper examines how different environmental policy types differentially impact firms and why firms vary in their responses to such policies. Based on the mechanisms embedded in policy instruments to create incentives for firms to comply, the characteristics of benefits/costs that policies impose on firms and the institutional context in which policy instruments were created and are sustained, the paper identifies five policy categories. These are category I (command and control), category II (market based), category III (mandatory information disclosures), category IV (business–government partnerships) and category V (private voluntary codes). Different policy types often bestow asymmetrical benefits/costs on firms. Some benefits/costs may constitute ‘private/club goods’ while others may constitute ‘public goods’. Drawing insights from public policy literature, the paper argues that firms can be expected to favor policies whose benefits have the characteristics of private/club goods but the costs of public goods. Thus, understanding the nature of benefits/costs (private/club versus public) and the magnitude of their excludability is critical in explaining the variations in firms' responses. To understand how managers perceive the nature of benefits/costs (monetary as well as non‐monetary), the paper draws on theories and perspectives in the business and public policy field. In doing so, the paper examines the ‘demand’ and the ‘supply’ sides as well as the market and non‐market environments of a given policy. Thus, the paper makes a case for a multi‐theoretic approach to understand variations in managerial assessments of benefits/costs, and consequently variations in their responses to various policy types. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment.     

Voluntary Disclosure and Analyst Forecast

Empiricists document that firms more often voluntarily disclose bad news than good news and link this pessimism to managers’ increased incentives not to fall short of earnings expectations. This paper analyzes the voluntary disclosure of a manager’s private information by explicitly considering her incentives to meet or beat an analyst’s earnings forecast. The model predicts that managers who face strong incentives to meet or beat these forecasts more frequently disclose bad news than good news in order to guide analysts’ expectations about future earnings downward. This pessimism is higher in markets with less informed managers and may hold even if the manager has strong incentives for high stock prices and meet-or-beat incentives are comparably low.     

Environmental Policies for Sustainable Development: An Analysis of the Drivers of Proactive Environmental Strategies in the Service Sector

This article examines the drivers of environmental proactivity in the service sector. Hypotheses were tested using multiple hierarchical regression analysis with data from a sample of 41 managers in Spanish environmental consulting companies. Results show statistically significant relationships between (1) managers’ attitude towards sustainable development, (2) positive short‐term firm performance and (3) the strategic attitude of environmental consulting firms and the adoption of proactive environmental strategies by the studied companies. This article is pioneering in the analysis of drivers of corporate proactive environmental strategies in the consultancy sector. The findings have practical implications for policy‐makers, investors and other agents interested in a better management of the environment. Economic incentives such as subsidies to environmental training programmes for managers can induce changes in cognitive components of managers’ attitudes. Education policies could also affect managers’ attitudes towards the environment. Companies may also encourage attitude change by providing their managers with financial assistance to receive environmental training. External assistance to develop a strategic attitude could be an interesting policy to encourage voluntary environmental initiatives. Finally, fiscal deductions, tax breaks or subsidies to those companies interested in managing the environment can be effective incentives for those firms facing a weak short‐term financial situation. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment     

Keeping Two Sets of Books: The Relationship Between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices

Multinational enterprises use two types of transfer prices: the tax transfer price to achieve optimal tax outcomes and the incentive transfer price to provide appropriate incentives to offshore managers. The two optimal transfer prices are independent if taxable income is assessed using the formula apportionment approach. Under the separate entity approach, however, they are interdependent: they both decrease as the penalty for noncompliance with the arm's length principle increases; and the tax transfer price decreases and the incentive transfer price increases as the marginal cost of production increases. We also examine the case where the incentive transfer price is negotiated rather than dictated by the parent. The results are robust to different market structures and tax environments.     

Managing Discretionary Accruals and Book‐Tax Differences in Anticipation of Tax Rate Increases: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how firms manage their earnings to trade off various incentives when tax rates increase. We hypothesize and find that firms generally choose to manage their taxable income upward in a book‐tax non‐conforming manner rather than in a book‐tax conforming manner before a tax rate increment, which in turn reduces the detection risk of aggressive financial reporting. These results suggest that firms give more weight to tax incentives and tax audit or regulatory inspection risks than to boosting financial reporting income in tax management. However, when firms have higher book management incentives or lower tunneling incentives (i.e., non‐state‐owned enterprises), we find that they manage their taxable income and book income upward together (i.e., in a book‐tax conforming manner), whereas their counterparts (i.e., state‐owned enterprises) do not. Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating the interplay of tax, tunneling and financial reporting incentives in influencing tax management strategies. The findings from our paper should also help government and regulators understand more about firms’ reactions to tax rate increases.     

STRATEGIC DECISIONS MADE BY TOP EXECUTIVES AND MIDDLE MANAGERS WITH DATA AND PROCESS DOMINANT STYLES

The influence of a manager's decision style in strategic decision-making is explored using simulations. The Jungian style classification is extended to identify ‘data and process dominant’ styles of decision-making. Managers with process dominant styles can use several types of data and managers with data dominant styles can apply various modes of data processing. Both the expanded and the traditional definitions of style are used as factors to explain how 79 top executives and 89 middle managers rated project simulations. Decision style is found to be a key factor in explaining the likelihood of taking strategic action and the risk seen in this action. Decisions made by top executives are more style dependent than those of middle managers. The extended definition of style reveals more about the preferences of top executives than traditional style categories.     

The Management of Creative Vision and the Economics of Creative Cycles

This paper proposes a new theory of variability in innovation performance in managerial firms that contract ‘creative vision’. We argue that such firms are prone to ‘creative cycles’ that arise from uncertainty‐induced systemic overshooting that can threaten the firm's financial viability, requiring managers to shift control back to risk‐averse financial controllers. But this creates opportunities for competing firms to engage in bold creative visions, threatening the firm's market viability and inducing control to shift back to newly contracted suppliers of ‘creative vision’. We discuss how this ‘principal‐agent‐agent’ mechanism plays out, the types of uncertainty that drive it, and consider the industry‐level externalities it induces. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

我国借鉴国外促进中小企业发展的税收政策的研究

目前我国促进中小企业发展的税收政策还不够完善和系统,所以,对促进中小企业发展的税收优惠政策的研究有着一定的现实意义。本文从国外扶持中小企业发展的税收措施入手,分析国内外现状,借鉴外国的有益经验,提出对促进中小企业发展在税收优惠方面的建议及构想。     

PROPRIETORIAL CONTROL IN FAMILY FIRMS: SOME FUNCTIONS OF 'QUASI-ORGANIC' MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the strategies of managerial control which are used by the proprietors of family-owned business enterprises. Interviews with the proprietors and senior managers of businesses in the building industry illustrate the ‘quasi-organic’ nature of management structures. These grant some autonomy to senior managers without threatening proprietorial decision-making prerogatives. Although the family firm has certain distinctive features, similar control strategies designed to ensure that delegated decisions are ‘reliable’ and ‘responsible’ are evident in various types of business enterprise. There is, then, scope for further comparative research within a conceptual framework which does not entirely divorce the family firm from other business organizations.     

IDENTIFYING THE RESPONSE OF FERTILITY TO FINANCIAL INCENTIVES

While using financial incentives to increase fertility has become relatively common, the effects of such policies are difficult to assess. We propose an identification strategy that relies on the fact that the variation in wages induces variation in benefits and tax credits among ‘comparable’ households. We implement our approach by estimating a discrete‐choice model of female participation and fertility using individual data from the French Labor Force Survey and a detailed representation of the French tax–benefit system. Our results suggest that financial incentives have had a significant effect on fertility decisions in France. As an example, we simulate the effects of an additional, unconditional child credit of 150 euros per month. The effects are strongest for the third child. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When does the manufacturing reshoring strategy create value?

Reshoring has gained a lot of attention recently by academics and practitioners alike, and is promising to become even more relevant in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Building on earlier research on the effects of reshoring announcements on the short-term market value of the firm, this work employs an event-study methodology and aims to understand under which circumstances the market perceives reshoring as potentially more (or less) value-creating. The analysis of a sample of 64 reshoring instances from 2005 to 2019, announced by 54 firms from eight developed economies, suggests that investors are more confident in the firm's future cash-flow potential when: a) it invests in productive activities at home, instead of overseas, i.e. ‘kept-from-offshoring’ (as opposed to actual relocations of activities, i.e. ‘back-reshoring’); b) the reshoring instance is communicated as a ‘plan’ (rather than a fixed ‘decision’); c) no state- or government-induced financial incentives are involved; d) the motivations are primarily ‘cost-efficiency seeking’ (rather than ‘customer perceived value seeking’).     

Reassessing Moral Legitimacy in Times of Instability

The presence of conflicting cues about what is legitimate provided by various stakeholders, begs the question of how the legitimacy of contested institutionalized practices is justified. Recent critique of tax minimization strategies exemplifies this difficulty: on one hand, practitioners need to increase shareholders' profits; on the other, a growing number of stakeholders push for ‘fairer’ corporate tax payments. Conducted during a time of public criticism of Australian corporate tax strategies, our study draws on justifications of corporate tax minimization strategies by senior tax practitioners and corporate submissions to a Senate Inquiry on corporate tax avoidance. The study explores how legitimacy judgements come under pressure by conflicting cues. Through the application of Boltanski and Thévenot's (2006) Economies of Worth (EW) framework, we advance legitimacy scholarship by clarifying what constitutes situated judgements in times of instability. Our work puts forward the concept of perceived forecasted consensus as a guide for individuals in making situated legitimacy judgements in times of instability.     

Strategic Practice Drift: How Open Strategy Infiltrates the Strategy Process

This paper builds theory on the process of open-strategy infiltration through an ethnographic study investigating how open strategy entered a financial services firm's strategy process behind the backs of top managers. Based on our analysis, we show how open strategy infiltrates the strategy process through a ‘strategic practice drift’, i.e., a gradual and partly unnoticed shift towards open strategy that occurs through ‘accommodating’ and ‘legitimizing’ the performance of transparency and inclusion in the strategy process. We show how the ‘goal-based ambiguity’ and ‘procedural certainty’ of initiatives that latently imply the performance of transparency and inclusion in the strategy process enable open-strategy infiltration. Furthermore, we show how top managers' ‘goal-based rationalization’ and ‘procedural renegotiation’ of practising transparency and inclusion contribute to the eventual reproduction of open strategy in the strategy process. Our model generates an understanding of how and why open strategy can enter the strategy process behind the backs of top managers and adds nuance to extant understandings of the role of top managers in this process. In addition, our findings contribute to research on strategy as practice by theorizing ‘strategic practice drifts’ and extending our understanding of the role of ambiguity therein.     

Why Development Programmes Fail: William Easterly and the Political Economy of Intervention

Throughout his considerable body of work, William Easterly has identified several critical problems with foreign aid and economic development programmes. In particular, he argues that many working in areas of development act as ‘planners’, who believe they can implement effective policies but who in fact lack the necessary knowledge. Moreover, Easterly claims that these agents face perverse incentives that lead to suboptimal development outcomes. This article explores the theoretical roots of Easterly's critiques and relates them to the work of two Nobel prize‐winning economists, F.A. Hayek and James M. Buchanan. It explores the broader applicability of Easterly's criticisms by applying a similar framework to military activity.     

Multinationals and human resource practices in Ireland: a rejection of the 'new conformance thesis': a reply

This paper reports on a study of 398 people employed in two UK service organizations: a hospital and two divisions of a high street bank. The main purpose of the study was to determine the degree to which dispositional factors (predisposition to trust and trait anxiety) and situational factors (seven aspects of the job environment) predicted a person's reported trust in their managers. Two types of managers were investigated: a person's immediate line manager and ‘senior managers in their industry’. It was hypothesized that the dispositional factors would have a greater influence on trust in managers in the industry and that situational factors would have a greater influence on trust in one's immediate line manager. The first hypothesis was supported, but the second was not. It was found that trust in both types of managers was best predicted by a combination of general disposition to trust (not trait anxiety) and situational factors: five of the seven situational factors had a role in predicting intention to trust. This reflects the complexity involved in predicting trust at work and the managerial challenge of creating a trusting culture.     

Write-offs and Profitability in Private Firms: Disentangling the Impact of Tax-Minimisation Incentives

Private firms are likely to use the financial reporting process more for other objectives, such as tax savings, than for communicating performance. However, observing firms choosing accounting policies for tax-minimisation purposes is not straightforward due to (i) tax and non-tax costs of reporting lower income (ii) accounting policies that result in lower reported income and no tax savings but generate non-tax benefits (iii) preparers' multiple incentives and (iv) econometric issues. We observe a large sample of 20,505 private firms writing off assets in two separate regimes, one that generates tax savings and one that does not. Firms significantly decrease, but continue to use, write-offs after the adverse change in tax treatment of write-offs. The exogenous tax change should not affect other reporting incentives. This allows us to disentangle the tax-minimisation incentive from other (un-observable) incentives, including debt contracting, dividends and employee relations that contribute to the observed anomalous positive relationship between write-offs and profitability. We show that for private firms (i) obtaining tax savings is important overall (ii) non-tax costs and benefits are probably also important and (iii) earnings informativeness for future cash flows increases after the adverse tax legislation change.     

Seeing Like a City‐State: Behavioural Planning and Governance in Egypt's First Affordable Gated Community

Haram City is Egypt's first ‘affordable’ gated community, hosting both aspirational middle‐class homeowners and resettled poor urban residents. Amidst legal ambiguity during Egypt's 2011–2013 revolutionary period, the management team of this public–private partnership was tasked with creating a ‘fully self‐sufficient’ city. While Haram City is the product of top‐down ‘seeing like a state’ master planning (Scott, 1998 ), the day‐to‐day resolution of class vulnerabilities and disputes over ‘reasonableness’ in city life requires forms of interpersonal adjudication otherwise addressed through local urban law—‘seeing like a city’ (Valverde, 2011 ). This article uses ethnography of management techniques aiming to ‘upgrade behaviour’ to theorize that a private entity, in a strategically indeterminate relationship with the state, reconciles future‐oriented planning and storied prejudices by merging two visions of governance. Imitating the repertoire of urban law, managers plan the very realm of bottom‐up decision making. They then adapt top‐down urban planning to bottom‐up dispute resolution to spatially consolidate the ‘consensual’ outcomes of a rigged game. Evoking both colonial Egyptian vagrancy laws and neoliberal paternalist welfare, ‘seeing like a city‐state’ governance amounts to authoritarianism that conceals itself within custom, appearing neutral so as to plan streets, codes and inner lives at once.     

Pay fairness and intrinsic motivation: the role of pay transparency

The fairness of managerial pay can be judged in terms of its distributive justice properties (‘is my pay fair when compared to others’) and its procedural justice properties (‘is my pay fairly determined’). While both types of justice have been studied extensively in the organizational literature, their relative importance in predicting work-related outcomes is still open to debate. In this paper, we provide field evidence that the relationship between pay justice and managers' intrinsic motivation is moderated by pay transparency, which is the extent to which managers know each other's pay levels. In a homogeneous sample of 139 Slovenian bank managers, we find that procedural justice is a better predictor of intrinsic motivation when pay transparency is low, and that distributive justice is a better predictor of intrinsic motivation when pay transparency is high. These findings that are congruent with fairness heuristic theory (Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt and Wilke 1997a) suggest the importance of considering pay transparency for understanding and designing fair managerial pay systems.