Harmful lie aversion and lie discovery in noisy expert advice games

This study tests whether individuals are reluctant to tell lies, or perhaps only “harmful lies”, in a previously untested environment: an expert sending a message to a decision maker whose interpretation of that message is subject to error, i.e. a noisy sender–receiver game. In the Aligned treatment, the expert can send a “white lie” to the receiver, eliminating the negative effects of noise and improving both parties’ payoffs. In the Conflict treatment, lies are harmful and the inability to commit to truthtelling destroys all meaningful communication in equilibrium unless there is a cost of lying. In the experiment, receivers are overly trusting and experts learn to take advantage of this. As experts gain experience they tell stronger and more frequent lies in both treatments, consistent with models of reinforcement learning. The findings suggest that neither harmful nor universal lie aversion is a factor when communication is noisy, provided individuals have time to discover their personal benefits of lies.     

BAYESIAN PERSUASION WITH PRIVATE EXPERIMENTATION

This article studies a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver by providing hard evidence that is generated by sequential private experimentation where the sender can design the properties of each experiment contingent on the experimentation history. The sender can selectively reveal as many outcomes as desired. We determine the set of equilibria that are not Pareto‐dominated. In each of these equilibria under private experimentation, the persuasion probability is lower and the receiver obtains access to higher quality information than under public experimentation. The decision quality improves in the sender's stakes.     

《动画运动规律》创新模块化教学模式的探讨

伴随高校招生规模的日益扩大,各专业学科在教学上都在寻求更大的突破,如何将“教”与“学”转换为“学以致用”,成为各高校研究的重点课题。以《动画运动规律》为例,根据该课程的学科特点对其进行分割式的模块化教学,通过一个班历时一学期的课程教学实践,对比学生的学习情况,使得该门课程在教学上更加立体化、多元化,大大调动学生的学习兴趣,从而摆脱了原有的单一教学方式,通过实践证明课程模块的分割,最终达到“学以致用”的教学目的。     

社会资本与技术支持对学术虚拟社区知识共享的影响——基于科学网平台的知识共享要素分析

学术虚拟社区是广大学者和科研工作者进行知识交流与探讨的重要平台，也是学术碰撞和知识创新的新阵地。通过构建社会资本与技术支持对用户知识共享行为影响的理论模型，探讨社会资本（关系资本、结构资本、认知资本）和技术支持（感知有用性、感知易用性）对社区用户知识共享行为（知识共享质量和数量）的作用机理。结果表明，关系资本与结构资本分别对学术虚拟社区知识共享质量和数量具有显著正向影响，属于持续动力。伴随其它因素介入，认知资本对学术社区知识共享数量产生正向影响，技术支持对知识共享的影响具有显著差异，感知易用性对学术社区知识共享质量和数量均具有显著正向影响，而感知有用性对知识共享质量具有显著负向影响。基于此，提出社区管理者应采取措施拓展用户社会资本并加强平台技术支持，以实现学术虚拟社区可持续发展。     

Learning to do: Facilitating practice in a large introductory macroeconomics class

Contemporary pedagogy encourages instructors to move away from memorization to teaching the ability to “do economics.” In such an environment, students are taught to apply knowledge of economic measurement, the economic model, and economic policy to analyze current events and policies. In this article, the authors build on existing literature describing independent activities by sharing a set of class exercises and assignments that comprise an entire course. The course discussed in this article is a large enrollment introductory course and presents a novel approach to active learning, adapted to this often-challenging context. The course emphasizes engaging students by encouraging them to practice using macroeconomic tools.     

区域创新系统中企业知识共享策略分析

构建了区域创新系统中企业知识共享的演化博弈模型,从理论上分析了模型的平衡点及稳定性条件。结果表明:只要有一个博弈方进行知识共享的额外收益小于其知识吸收与学习成本,博弈结局必然是所有博弈方不共享知识;当博弈双方进行知识共享的额外收益均大于其知识吸收与学习成本时,博弈结局有可能是共享知识,也有可能是不共享知识,具体结局与初始点的状态存在密切关系。最后提出促进区域创新系统中企业知识共享的建议。     

Cheap talk with multiple audiences: An experimental analysis

We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one sender and multiple receivers. We study the change in equilibrium behavior from the addition of another audience as well as from varying the degree of conflict between the senderʼs and receiversʼ preferences. We find that, as in cheap talk games with just one receiver, information transmission is higher in games with a separating equilibrium, than in games with only a babbling equilibrium. More interestingly, we find clear evidence that the addition of another audience alters the communication between the sender and the receiver in a way consistent with the theoretical predictions. There is evidence of the presence of agents that are systematically truthful as senders and trusting as receivers: deviations from the theoretical predictions, however, tend to disappear with experience, and learning is faster precisely in the games where deviations are more pronounced.     

Effect of piracy on innovation in the presence of network externalities

This paper analyzes the impact of simultaneous increases in piracy (piracy effect) and network externalities (network effect) on R&D investment. A single firm's R&D investment increases (or decreases) if the network effect (or piracy effect) is dominant. With R&D competition, if the firms “significantly” differ with respect to their R&D efficiencies and if the piracy effect dominates the network effect then the less efficient firm's R&D investment increases and that of the more efficient firm's decreases. In this case, the overall probability of successful innovation increases. The reverse holds if the network effect dominates the piracy effect. If the firms are “less” asymmetric then their R&D investment either increases or decreases depending on the relative strengths of the piracy and network effects.     

Effect of Graduate-Program Rank on Success in the Job Market

Economic educators often profess the goal of teaching our students to “think like economists.” Since Siegfried and colleagues (1991) coined this phrase, its meaning has been interpreted as a focus on analytical concepts and methods of economics as opposed to the broader goal of preparing students for independent, critical thought in the complex world beyond college. Colander and McGoldrick (2009b) argued that students are more likely to achieve both of these objectives when the learning process includes open-ended questions that encourage them to move beyond algorithmic application of textbook principles. In this article, the authors operationalize this “big think” approach through an instructional module on differential tuition pricing, the development of which was enhanced by careful attention to contemporary learning theory.     

Morale,performance and disclosure

We study the optimal disclosure policy in a sender–receiver communication game where the receiver's morale, defined as his expected state of the world, affects his performance. The sender observes the state and chooses whether to disclose it to the receiver, who then decides whether to participate in a task. The receiver wins if his performance in the task meets a target. No disclosure is optimal if the receiver wins with average morale in each state. Otherwise, in the threshold disclosure equilibrium that Pareto-dominates full disclosure, the receiver quits as the sender discloses the worst states and wins as the sender withholds the rest. The receiver wins in more states in the Pareto-optimal equilibrium as the sender chooses a non-monotonic disclosure policy. Our theory reveals a trade-off between transparency and efficiency when morale affects performance. It has applications in a broad range of areas including military, family, education and business.     

Cheap talk with two senders and complementary information

This paper studies a cheap talk model in which two senders having partial and non-overlapping private information simultaneously communicate with an uninformed receiver. The sensitivity of the receiverʼs ideal action to one senderʼs private information depends on the other senderʼs private information. We show that the sendersʼ information transmissions exhibit strategic complementarity: more information transmitted by one sender leads to more information being transmitted by the other sender.     

Screening and Signaling in Communication*

In this paper, we analyze a model of repeated strategic communication between a sender and a receiver. The sender has private information on a policy‐relevant variable but does not know the receiver's motives. Together with the desire of the sender to please the receiver and the desire of the receiver to be pleased, the two‐sided incomplete information creates an interesting communication problem in which players can choose to use information strategically. We analyze various modes of communication, which allow for information transmission, and we compare them in terms of both the quality of the policy implemented and the welfare of the players.     

Job market signaling and employer learning

We consider a signaling model where the sender?s continuation value after signaling depends on his type, for instance because the receiver is able to update his posterior belief. As a leading example, we introduce Bayesian learning in a variety of environments ranging from simple two-period to continuous-time models with stochastic production. Signaling equilibria present two major departures from those obtained in models without learning. First, new mixed-strategy equilibria involving multiple pooling are possible. Second, pooling equilibria can survive the Intuitive Criterion when learning is efficient enough.     

Endogenous Persuasion with Costly Verification

In this paper, I study a situation in which a sender tries to persuade a receiver with evidence that is generated via public or private experimentation. Under public experimentation, any experimental outcome is revealed, and under private experimentation the sender can hide adverse outcomes. The sender can design the properties of the experiments. The receiver chooses whether to verify at a cost the design of the experiment with which the revealed outcome was generated. I find that communication breaks down under public experimentation if there is no restriction on the experiment's design, and that persuasion is possible under private experimentation.     

实地调查基础之上的研究报告写作

本文从教学与科研相结合的视角,探讨强化经济系研究生与科研新人专业写作能力的有效途径。首先,针对研究生基本功欠缺的问题,借助案例分析,说明“从学习中研究”和“从研究中学习”的“补课”方法。其次,以专题调研项目执行中的能力建设为例,阐述如何通过以“干中学”为主的团队专业训练方式,对科研队伍新人加以引导。最后,对于实地调查基础之上的研究报告写作要领,引用范例加以扼要提示。     

Using Electronic Response Systems in Economics Classes

College instructors and students participated in a pilot project at the University of Akron to enhance student learning through the use of a common teaching pedagogy, peer instruction. The teaching pedagogy was supported by the use of technology, an electronic personal response system, which recorded student responses. The authors report their experiences in using this technology-enhanced teaching pedagogy and provide another example of an active and collaborative learning tool that instructors can use to move beyond “chalk and talk.” Preliminary survey results from students participating in this pilot project are also reported.     

Coordinated voting in sequential and simultaneous elections: some experimental evidence

This paper studies a situation wherein a set of voters choose between two alternatives in the presence of a payoff externality. Specifically, regardless of her intrinsic preference, a voter’s payoff is maximized should she vote for the alternative that garners a majority of the votes cast. Are votes coordinated on a single alternative? Using laboratory experiments, we examine voting patterns in sequential voting and simultaneous voting elections. Across both election types, we also vary the amount of information that an individual voter has regarding the intrinsic preferences of the other voters. Our main findings are as follows. In the “low” information treatment, sequential voting elections facilitate coordinated voting. However, in the “high” information treatment, voting patterns are not dependent on how the election is structured.     

Enjoy the silence: an experiment on truth-telling

We analyze experimentally two sender–receiver games with conflictive preferences. In the first game, the sender can choose to tell the truth, to lie, or to remain silent. The latter strategy is costly. In the second game, the receiver must decide additionally whether or not to costly punish the sender after having observed the history of the game. We investigate the existence of two kinds of social preferences: lying aversion and preference for truth-telling. In the first game, senders tell the truth more often than predicted by the sequential equilibrium analysis, they remain silent frequently, and there exists a positive correlation between the probability of being truthful and the probability of remaining silent. Our main experimental result for the extended game shows that those subjects who punish the sender with a high probability after being deceived are precisely those who send fewer but more truthful messages. Finally, we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria of a reduced form of the baseline game with two types of senders. The equilibrium predictions obtained suggest that the observed excessive truth-telling in the baseline game can be explained by lying aversion but not by a preference for truth-telling.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users. Financial support through the Ramón y Cajal program of the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science is gratefully acknowledged. This work was initiated while the author was working at Maastricht University.     

A Knowledge–based Algorithm for the Internet Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)

Using a knowledge–based approach, the authors derive a protocol for the sequence transmission problem, which provides a high–level model of the Internet transmission control protocol (TCP). The knowledge–based protocol is correct for communication media where deletion and reordering errors may occur. Furthermore, it is shown that both sender and receiver eventually attain depth– n knowledge about the values of the messages for any n , but that common knowledge about the messages is not attainable.     

Perturbed communication games with honest senders and naive receivers

This paper studies communication games in which the sender is possibly honest (tells the truth) and the receiver is possibly naive (follows messages as if truthful). The characterization of message-monotone equilibria in the perturbed games explain several important aspects of strategic communication including sender exaggeration, receiver skepticism and message clustering. Surprisingly, the strategic receiver may respond to more aggressive claims with more moderate actions. In the limit as the probabilities of the non-strategic players approach zero, (i) the limit equilibrium corresponds to a most-informative equilibrium of the limit (Crawford-Sobel) game; (ii) only the top messages are sent.